Judgment : SHYAMSUNDAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application moved on behalf of a private litigant seeking that action be taken against the respondents under the Provisions of Section 15 of the contempt of courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the act) alleging that in particular the 1st respondent who is a lawyer had committed contempt of a subordinate court by issuing a legal notice to the applicant herein who is also a lawyer, alleging that in the course of a suit he had filed on behalf of a particular plaintiff, he had made several allegations which exceeded (sic) his brief, and professional propriety, almost amounting to professional impropriety. Stung by the notice, the applicant apart from causing a trenchant reply being issued to the first respondent also moved the learned Advocate general seeking permission to proceed against the two respondents herein for contempt. The application made to the Advocate general is dated the 19th of september, 1988, the subject matter for action being the legal notice issued by respondent No. 1 to the petitioner herein on the 13th of july, 1988. The learned Advocate general by a considered order made on the 3rd july, 1990 acceded to the petitioners request for leave to initiate proceedings under Section 15 of the act before this court, being satisfied that the notice is question had the effect of debilitating the applicant from performing his professional duties in the suit in question and therefore amounted to interference with counsels liberty and had resulted in the (sic) of authority in that manner that had clearly impeded and crippled the lawyer acting before court leading thus to interference with the administration of justice. ( 2 ) FOLLOWING the grant of consent by the Advocate general a formal application purporting to be under Section 15 (1) (b) of the act was moved before this court through a necessary application filed on the 24th july, 1990. Upon notice thereof being issued to the respondents herein both of them have appeared in this court through counsel, where one of them is said to have filed an interlocutory application raising in lemine objections to the maintainability of this application on grounds of limitation and locus standi, the other had chosen to raise these very objections in the course of an objection statement. Therefore, it is, we are hearing this matter to-day apropos the inlemine objections raised on behalf of the respondents. ( 3 ) AFTER having heard Mr. Visweshwara for the petitioner, Mr. Keshava iyengar and Mr. R. p. hiremath, for the respondents, it seems to us, of the two objections raised, it is sufficient for the purpose of this case to deal with (sic) one of them, which pertains to the bar of limitation in the entertainment and disposal of this petition. The question itself arises in this manner. To put ourselves in the stride, we may with advantage set out the one and the only provision in the act which bears on the point under investigation,. e. , Section 20 which reads: "20. No court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. " (emphasis supplied by us) ( 4 ) THE argument resting on the construction of this provision, which to our mind (sic) little and no difficulty at all, being plain as it is. The submission made is, the letter in question which is said to be the offending piece in the proceedings, dated the 13th july, 1988 being the date which signalled the commencement of the period of limitation for the purpose of asserting whether the proceedings initiated before us was in time or out of time in terms of Section 20 of the act referred to supra. (sic) there is no gain say in denying that if the date of the said notice is taken into consideration, the petition filed before us on the 24th july, 1990 was clearly beyond the period of limitation prescribed by Section 20 of the act. ( 5 ) BUT then Mr. Visweshwara, joins in and submits that the petitioner cannot be shut out from this proceeding on grounds of limitation for the simple reason that within two months after the receipt of the offending notice in question, he had taken steps to move the Advocate general for obtaining his consent being an essential prerequisite for approaching this court under the act. He invites attention to sections 15 (1) and 15 (2) of the Act, which reads: "15. He invites attention to sections 15 (1) and 15 (2) of the Act, which reads: "15. (1) in the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in Section 14, the Supreme Court or the high court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by. (a) the Advocate general, or (b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate general. (2) in the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the high court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate general or, in relation to a union territory, by such law officer as the central government may, by notification in the official gazette, specify in this behalf. The contention urged is that because the applicant had to approach the Advocate general for necessary concurrence and the Advocate general had taken some time to dispose off the petitioners application, the time taken to obtain the consent of the Advocate general had necessarily to be excluded winle reckoning the period of limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the act. Winle it is true, under Section 15, it would perhaps be not open to a private litigant to straight away approach tins court alleging contempt of a subordinate court without the necessary pre-requisite of the consent obtained from the Advocate general, it seems to us the difficulties of the applicant in obtaining the Advocate generals consent within the period of limitation enjoined by Section 20 cannot stand in the way of Section 20 itself operating and stifling tins action initiated as it is, nearly one year after the commencement of the period of limitation. ( 6 ) WE need hardly remind ourselves, an action for contempt, if not criminal is atleast quasi-criminal (sic) at any rate, the consequence suffered by a contemnor is certainly penal for he can always be sentenced to imprisonment if the allegations made against in are held to be proved. In that context, it seems to us more appropriate to construe the Provisions of Section 20 of the act as if it was a penal statute. It is (sic) law that a penal statute has to be strictly construed. Mr. visweshwara does not deny that the act itself does not make any provision for extension of the period of limitation. In that context, it seems to us more appropriate to construe the Provisions of Section 20 of the act as if it was a penal statute. It is (sic) law that a penal statute has to be strictly construed. Mr. visweshwara does not deny that the act itself does not make any provision for extension of the period of limitation. As a matter of fact Section 20 of the act is a built-in provision and a complete code beyond winch it is not necessary for us to cast our eyes. ( 7 ) MR. Keshava iyengar appearing for the respondents invited our attention in tins connection to Section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code winch provides for extension of period of limitation in certain cases and very pertinently points out to the absence of a provision akin to Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the act. It seems to us the submission of Mr. Lyengar making a comparative analysis of the two Provisions namely Section 20 of the act winch we are now construing and Section 473 of the code of criminal procedure winch involve the extension of period of limitation in certain cases, is well founded. Clearly the absence of a like provision under the act is certainly a grave handicap for the petitioner, in a case where for other reasons the petition had been delayed. But we think there is little the court can do in tins matter. Nonetheless Mr. Visweshwara sought to contend that he can take the benefit of Section 15 (2) of the Limitation Act to gain an enlarged period of limitation. Section 15 (2) of the Limitation Act reads: "15 (1 ). . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) in computing the period of limitation for any suit of winch notice has been given, or for winch the previous consent or sanction of the government or any other authority is required, in accordance with the requirements of any law for the time being in force, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded. Explanation.-In excluding the tune required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the government or any other authority, the date on winch the application was made for obtaining the consent or sanction and the date of receipt of the order of the government or other authority shall both be counted. (3) (4) (5 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 8 ) THE argument led is, that in computing the period of limitation for commencement of any proceedings a pre-requisite viz. , The previous consent or sanction of the government or any other authority (sic) needed, the time taken for obtaining such sanction shall be excluded. We are afraid that we cannot accede to the aforesaid submission of Mr. Visweshwara basing himself as he does only on a portion viz. , Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Limitation Act. If the Section is read as a whole, what becomes apparent therefrom is that benefit of adding on the time taken for obtaining such sanction was (sic) by the provision only to cases that required a notice being issued before filing a suit. Therefore we would be offending the Provisions of the Section, if we do not take into consideration the fact that benefit under Section 15 (2) of the Limitation Act was created with a particular object viz. , For instituting a suit in relation to winch a prior notice was required to be issued. Section 15 (2) of the Limitation Act does not refer to any other proceedings or application regarding winch the benefit thereof can possibly be bestowed. Herein we are not concerned with any suit. We are concerned with the application made under Section 15 of the act for taking appropriate action thereunder. In the circumstances, it becomes clear that Section 15 (2) of the Limitation Act has ipso-facto no application at all and the petitioner cannot take the benefit of that provision. ( 9 ) EVEN so Mr. We are concerned with the application made under Section 15 of the act for taking appropriate action thereunder. In the circumstances, it becomes clear that Section 15 (2) of the Limitation Act has ipso-facto no application at all and the petitioner cannot take the benefit of that provision. ( 9 ) EVEN so Mr. Visweshwara argued that if not Section 15 (2) atleast Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act would help in enabling the petitioner to get out of the constraints of limitation. Section 29 (2) is a saving provision and we do not see anything therein winch could possibly assist the petitioner. To make the aforesaid aspect quite clear, we refer to the Section itself winch reads: "29. (1 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the schedule, the Provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the Provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to winch, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. (3 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " (emphasis supplied by us) ( 10 ) WE are afraid that the aforesaid section has no application at all to the proceedings on hand. That provision only reveals the restrictive operation of the Limitation Act and to some extent mitigates its rigour, provided there are two specific inputs. One is that the period of limitation prescribed for doing or not doing something under a special law or local law, (sic) in respect of any suit or appeal or application being specified, but the period so prescribed being different from the period prescribed under the schedule, winch means the schedule to the Limitation Act, (vide Section 2 (j) of the Limitation Act) in such a case Section 29 (2) comes into play. Mr. visweshwara does not contend that the schedule to the Limitation Act does not provide any particular period of limitation for the making of an application under the act. If that be the fact situation, it seems in. Vain to appeal to clause (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act. ( 11 ) THESE are all the submissions made by Mr. Visweshwara, winch for the reasons mentioned above do not commend themselves to us and leaves as ho option except to hold that the application made under Section 15 (1) (b) of the act was clearly barred by limitation. ( 12 ) NOW that we have held the petition to be barred by limitation, it seems unnecessary to go into the other question, in that whether the petitioner had the necessary locus standi to move tins court, in the absence of a reference by the subordinate court or the learned Advocate general. Tins question we leave open. ( 13 ) IN the result, tins application fails and is rejected as barred by time.