Judgment :- In this petition, preferred under Sec.482, Crl.P.C invoking the inherent powers this Court, the prayer is to call for the records in M.C.No.3 of 1989 which culminated in order dated 8th July, 1989, signed by the 4th respondent, the Executive I Class Magistrate and Revenue Divisional Offi-cer, Dharapuram on 10.7.1989 and the amended order in same miscellaneous case dated 8.7.1989 and signed on 11.7.1989 and quash the proceedings therein, initiated under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. 2. The petitioner and the 3rd respondent are brothers, the petitioner being the elder. father Karuppasamy Gounder died on 15.1.1965. The family owned considerable landed property and during the life time of Karuppasamy Gounder, there was a partition, by means of a Registered Partition Deed, dated 30.11.1959, whereby Schedule B properties which the subject matter of the present dispute, were allotted to the petitioner. The respondent was born subsequent to the partition. The 3rd respondent filed a suit partition in O.S.No.87 of 1982 on the file of Sub Court, Dharapuram. The 3rd respondent had made the authorised officer also a party to the suit. He has stated therein that he was his mother ’ s womb on the date of the registered partition made on 30.11.1959 and therefore in law, he was entitled to a specific share. The petitioner was shown as the 1st defendant the suit He claims to have remained ex-pane, in pursuance of an arrangement arrived between the members of the family, leaving the Authorised Officer alone, as the contesting defendant. This arrangement was made to obviate the proceedings under the Land Reforms Act, since the petitioner owned lands in excess of the ceiling limit under the Tamil Nadu Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling of Land) Act and the Authorised Officer had initiated recovery proceedings. O.S.No.87 of 1982 was decreed, on 18.8.1982. The 3rd respondent allotted a 5/12th share in the property. However, the 3rd respondent chose to prefer A.S.No.887 of 1982 before this Court against the preliminary decree. On 18.1.1989, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. Before withdrawal of AS.No.887 of 1982, the petitioner preferred I.A.No.450 of 1989 in O.S.No.87 of 1982, to set aside the ex-parte preliminary decree. Final decree proceedings are pending in I.A.No.466 of 1989. The 3rd respondent also filed LANo.467 of 1989 for interim injunction and I.A.No.468 of -1989 for appointment of a receiver. On 18.1.1989, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. Before withdrawal of AS.No.887 of 1982, the petitioner preferred I.A.No.450 of 1989 in O.S.No.87 of 1982, to set aside the ex-parte preliminary decree. Final decree proceedings are pending in I.A.No.466 of 1989. The 3rd respondent also filed LANo.467 of 1989 for interim injunction and I.A.No.468 of -1989 for appointment of a receiver. While these petitions were pending, the impugned order under Sec.145(1), Crl.P.C, was passed by the Executive Magistrate on 8.7.1989, though stated to be signed a different date. 3. This petition was admitted on 2.8.1989 and in Crl.M.P.No.8994 of 1989, Bhaskaran, directed interim stay of all further proceedings, On 21.9.1989, S.T.Ramalingam, J. Crl.M.P.No.8994 of 1989 and Crl.M.P.No.10657 of 1989 preferred by the 3rd respondent vacate the order of stay made in the earlier petition, and directed continuation of already ordered in Crl.M.P.No.8994 of 1989, until further orders. For further hearing petitions were directed to be posted on 29.9.1989, but nothing further happened. petitioner preferred Crl.M.P.No.10652 of 1989 in Crl.M.P. No.8994 of 1989 for issue necessary directions to the Tahsildar, Dharapuram and the Executive I Class Magistrate Revenue Divisional Officer, Dharapuram to realise and recover the sale proceeds Rs.1,50,000 towards the sale of sugarcane harvested from his lands, from the Special Officer, Amaravathy Cooperative Sugars, Udumalpet and pay the same to him, under a receipt. Bhaskaran, J. disposed of this petition on 1.11.1990 by directing the Tahsildar, Dharapuram and the Executive Magistrate-cum-Revenue Divisional Officer, Dharapuram recover the sale proceeds from the Special Officer, Amaravathy Coopera tive Sugars credit the same in the account of O.S.No.87 of 1982, on the file of the Sub Dharapuram. In or about December, 1990, one. Vijayakumar claiming himself as the of the petitioner, preferred Crl.M.P.No.18118 of 1990 in Crl.M.P.No.8993 of 1989, pleading for permission to harvest the paddy crops raised by him, by paying Rs.45,000 the amount lease to the Receiver, and further allowing him to continue as a lessee of the properties, pending disposal Crl.M.P.No.8993 of 1989. It must be stated that Vijayakumar, the petitioner Crl.M.P.No.18118 of 1990; got himself impleaded as the 5th respondent in Crl.M.P.No.8993 of 1989, on his petition in Crl.M.P.No.13289 of 1990 pleading for such a course allowed. 4. Padmini Jesudurai, J. disposed of Crl.M.P. No.l8118of 1990 preferred by respondent in Crl.M.P.No.8993 of 1989, by an order dated 6th March, 1991. It must be stated that Vijayakumar, the petitioner Crl.M.P.No.18118 of 1990; got himself impleaded as the 5th respondent in Crl.M.P.No.8993 of 1989, on his petition in Crl.M.P.No.13289 of 1990 pleading for such a course allowed. 4. Padmini Jesudurai, J. disposed of Crl.M.P. No.l8118of 1990 preferred by respondent in Crl.M.P.No.8993 of 1989, by an order dated 6th March, 1991. The Judge observed as follows: “ A receiver has already been appointed by the Executive I Class Magistrate and Divisional Officer, Dharapuram (5th respondent) to manage the properties, pending of Sec. 145, Crl.P.C., proceedings. It is stated by both the sides that the Receiver already harvested the previous crop, after his appointment as Receiver. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent (Petitioner in Crl.M.P.No.8993 of 1989), petitioner (Vijayakumar) has yet to establish his status as a cultivating tenant and his to be in possession of the property as a tenant under the petitioner. While so, this under Sec.482, Crl.P.C., cannot go into this disputed question. Since the Receiver already taken possession of the properties, and has harvested the previous crops, deposited the sale proceeds in Court, it is but proper that the same arrangement continue till the main proceedings under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. are concluded. Under circumstances no permission can be granted to the present petitioner to harvest the The Receiver Tahsildar shall harvest the standing crops and deposit the sale proceeds Court. This petition is accordingly dismissed. ” 5. Mr.M.V.Krishnan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended, the subject matter of the property, in the proceedings initiated under Sec.145, Crl.P.C, restricted to those lands which the petitioner had obtained by a Registered Partition 30.11.1959, of which the petitioner was in possession. This property has been shown Schedule-A property in the suit. The final decree is yet to be passed. Even in the final proceedings, applications filed by the 3rd respondent for an injunction and for appointment a Receiver are pending. Further the application filed by the petitioner to set aside parte decree was yet to be decided by the civil Court. In this background, there cannot two independent parallel proceedings one in the civil Court and another before the Magistrate and on that sole ground, the pending proceedings are liable to be quashed. then contended that the impugned order does not . In this background, there cannot two independent parallel proceedings one in the civil Court and another before the Magistrate and on that sole ground, the pending proceedings are liable to be quashed. then contended that the impugned order does not . conform to the mandatory provisions Sec.145, Crl.P.C, and therefore it must be held unsustainable in law. He pointed neither the initial order nor the amended order had stated about the materials considered and the resultant satisfaction about the existence of a dispute which was likely to breach of the peace. He then contended that the preliminary order contained a statement of actual possession by the petitioner and therefore steps ought to have taken to protect his possession rather than initiat-. ing action under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. then argued that the Executive Magistrate had no power under Sec.145, Crl.P.C., to both the parties from entering into the property in dispute. Further yet another infirmity in the preliminary order is that it had not called upon the contesting parties writing their claims regarding the fact of actual possession of the disputed property. he submitted that the preliminary order under Sec.145(1), Crl.P.C, cannot be sustained. 5-A. On these contentions, Mr.K.Ramasami, learned counsel representing the 3rd respondent submitted, that though the jurisdiction of the civil Court was wide regarding possession of the property, jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate was restricted possession alone. He urged that it would be too broad a proposition to hold that proceedings ought not to be initiated in the civil and criminal courts for, the civil and proceedings can run parallel only to some distance and not all the way. He pointed out a party chooses to file a civil suit subsequent to initiation of action, under Sec.145, that party can effectively nullify the criminal proceedings. He went on to argue, that when in a civil suit the dispute between the parties had been adjudicated, then proceedings under Sec.145, Crl.P.C, may not be possible. But even that proposition must depend the facts of each case. In other words, he argued that pendency of a civil suit will the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. If the Executive Magistrate is not allowed to exercise power under Sec.145, Crl.P.C., chaos would be the result. But even that proposition must depend the facts of each case. In other words, he argued that pendency of a civil suit will the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. If the Executive Magistrate is not allowed to exercise power under Sec.145, Crl.P.C., chaos would be the result. Sec.145, Crl.P.C., should allowed to become a dead letter and that jurisdiction should be sought to be conserved then contended that there was no prohibition under Sec.145, Crl.P.C., to restrain both from entering into the disputed property and there would be nothing wrong or illegal course being followed for, the ultimate object was to prevent breach of the peace. submitted that the sentence in the pre- liminary order stating that the petitioner possession of the disputed land was not the finding or observation of the Magistrate, but was an averment made by the police agency, while pleading for initiation proceedings under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. Finally he argued that once the essential requisite furnishes jurisdiction to the Magistrate under Sec.145, Crl.P.C., had led to his arriving satisfaction that there was likelihood of breach of the peace concerning land or water boundaries thereof, the subsequent action would only relate to procedure and not jurisdiction and therefore even if there are certain infirmities in the preliminary order, the cannot take advantage of the same to halt the pending salutary proceedings. 6. counsels have relied upon several decided cases to seek support for their respective contentions. They will be referred to at the relevant context. 7. I have carefully considered the rival contentions with great care, in view of conflicting law, placed before me. 8. In Ram Sumer Puri v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 472, the Apex Court observed follows: “When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession involved and has been adjudicated, initiation of a parallel Criminal Proceeding under of the Code, would not be justified. The parallel proceedings should not be permitted continue and in the event of a decree of the civil Court, the criminal court should allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. On the basis of this decision, Padmini Jesudurai, J. in K.S.Magaoom v. N.S.Jalal, 1988 (Crl.) 89, K.M.Natarajan, J. in R.M.Govindaswamy Pillai v. Sub-Inspector of Police, Order,Arantangi 1987 L.W. (Crl.) 111 and 112, and in Karthikeyan v. State by Inspector Police, 1990 L.W. (Crl.) 49, took the view that parallel proceedings under Sec.145, ought not to be conducted when civil litigation was pending, wherein directions appointment of a Receiver and other interim reliefs could be obtained. These cases decided on the facts concerned. However, Sengottuvelan, J., in Vallimalal v. Ayyannan Ambalam, 1986 L.W. (Crl.) 110, after referring to the decision of the Supreme Court Sumer Puri v. State of U.P., A.I.R 1985 S.C. 472, stated, “that the decision of the Court in the said case would only be taken to mean, that when a litigation was regarding title and possession before a civil Court an inquiry, regarding title and possession in Sec.145, Crl.P.C., proceedings should be avoided, since the civil Court is the authority regarding title. But it cannot be contended, on the strength of the above that when once there is a civil court Proceeding no Proceeding under Sec.145 instituted. The said decision cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition Sec.145 proceedings cannot be started when civil proceedings are pending.” Janarthanam, without referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Ram Sumer Puri of U.P., A.I.R 1985 S.C.472, Venkatakrishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1989 Crl.L.J. held “ that pendency of civil proceedings in respect of that immovable property was to criminal proceedings. However, if the civil Court decides question of possession, binding on the Criminal Court and the Magistrate cannot proceed under Sec.145, M.N.Moorthy, J. in P.George v. M.Narayanan Nair, 1983 L.W. (Crl.) 47, stated that the of the proceedings under Sec.145, Crl.P.C., were such that the Magistrate was responsible for maintenance of law and order. The main purpose of the proceedings maintain peace and secondly, whoever was aggrieved by the order so made had recourse get remedy in a civil Court. Parallel proceedings in civil and Criminal Courts warranted. S.Natarajan, J., (as he then was) in Thayammal v. Krishna Chetty, 1978 L.W. (Crl.) 128, that jurisdiction of Criminal Court to pass appropriate orders for avoiding breach of was not ousted. Parallel proceedings in civil and Criminal Courts warranted. S.Natarajan, J., (as he then was) in Thayammal v. Krishna Chetty, 1978 L.W. (Crl.) 128, that jurisdiction of Criminal Court to pass appropriate orders for avoiding breach of was not ousted. The learned Judge observed that civil Court’s decree and judgment was a bar to the jurisdiction of Criminal Court, where it had no bearing on the question of possession. That was a case where preliminary decree for partition had been obtained civil suit. 9. As far as the other High Courts are concerned, in Jagdish v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Panipat, 1987 Crl.L.J. 1198, the Punjab and Haryana High Court, held that, the pendency of a civil suit regarding the same subject-matter between the parties did not the criminal court from exercising jurisdiction under Secs.145 and 146, Crl.P.C. judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Sumer Puri v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1985 S.C. was referred to and thereafter the following observation was made: “It has not been ruled by the Supreme Court that in every case where a civil Suit is regarding the same subject-matter, Criminal proceedings under Sec. 145 of the Code continue. The plaintiff’s suit had been dismissed and the appeal against dismissal pending. Question of possession was involved which had already been adjudicated the trial Court. It is in these circumstances that the Supreme Court observed that initiation of Criminal proceedings under Sec. 145 at the instance of the close relations plaintiff could not be permitted. This judgment of the Supreme Court is, therefore, of to the petitioner. In the instant case none of the parties is found to be in prima possession of the land in dispute by the civil Court.” In Shamrati Kuer v. Janki, Saran Singh, 1981 Crl.L.J. 978, a Division Bench of the Patna Court observed, that the pendency of a civil Suit between parties cannot be a bar to of proceedings under Sec.145 Crl.P.C., and that there could be no uniform rule. Rajasthan High Court in Udmi Ram v. Dharam Singh, 1989 Crl.L.J. 152% stated, that when between the parties was pending in a civil Court, the question of possession of the property was involved and therefore parallel Criminal proceedings under Secs.145 and Crl.P.C. cannot be permitted. In that case the Revenue Board had passed an maintain the status quo. Rajasthan High Court in Udmi Ram v. Dharam Singh, 1989 Crl.L.J. 152% stated, that when between the parties was pending in a civil Court, the question of possession of the property was involved and therefore parallel Criminal proceedings under Secs.145 and Crl.P.C. cannot be permitted. In that case the Revenue Board had passed an maintain the status quo. The Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Mangilal v. Banghal, Crl.L.J. 1905, held that keeping in view the object behind Secs.145 and 146, Crl.P.C., pendency of a civil litigation may not furnish any justification for dropping the proceedings initiated before a Criminal Court. The Allahabad High Court in Sachchida Nand Misra of U.P. 1987 Crl.L.J. 1366, observed, that the language of Sec.145, Crl.P.C., was plain clear and that even if the land in dispute was held by co-sharers of co-tenants, proceedings under Secs.145 and 146, Crl.P.C. can be initiated in respect of such land. Kerala High in Dominic v. State, 1987 Crl.L.J. 2033, after referring to the judgment of the Supreme in Ram Summer Puri ’ s case, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 472, held, that mere pendency of a suit oust the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to proceed under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. and that if decree or interim order had been passed by the civil Court, the Criminal Court must it. After extracting the enunciation of law by the Supreme Court, it was stated as follows: “But it may be noticed that it was a case where civil court passed a decree, in favour party and an appeal filed by the other party was pending and it was in this context Supreme Court observed that initiation of proceedings under Sec.145 was not justified. the instant case though a civil litigation is pending before the court of subordinate Palghat, it has not resulted in a decree. No interim order also has been passed by the Subordinate Judge though an application for interim injunction is pending. ” It was stated that adjudication of the dispute by a civil Court will have a bearing litigation of proceedings under Sec.145, Crl.P.C., and mere pendency of a civil litigation not oust such jurisdiction. No interim order also has been passed by the Subordinate Judge though an application for interim injunction is pending. ” It was stated that adjudication of the dispute by a civil Court will have a bearing litigation of proceedings under Sec.145, Crl.P.C., and mere pendency of a civil litigation not oust such jurisdiction. Dr.A.S.Anand, Chief Justice, J. and K.High Court, as he then in Ghani Shamdass Anand v. Shakti Prakash, (1988)1 Crimes 40, observed that the question whether mere filing of the civil suit is any bar to the continuation of the proceedings under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. in his opinion, had to be answered in the negative. It was those cases where the civil court had returned a finding, interim or final, regarding possession between the same parties in respect of the same subject matter that the court will be called upon to consider, the advisability of continuing the proceedings and not otherwise. That was a case where the civil instituted after the determination of the proceedings by the Judicial Magistrate initiated Sec.145, Crl.P.C.. The learned Judge took note of the judgment of the Supreme Court Sumer Puri v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 472, and laid stress on the words adjudicated" in the following passage found in the judgment of the Supreme Court. "When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a criminal proceedings under Sec. 145 of the Code." The learned Judge referred to the judgment of Division Bench of the same Crl.R.P.No.78 of 1984 and Crl.R.P.No.90 of 1982, dated 17.3.1987 wherein also the the judgment of the. Apex Court in Ram Sumer’s case, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 472, considered. Again Kerala High Court in P.C.Khader v. P.K.Khader, 1989 Crl.L.J. 1276, that when the civil court was not adjudicating question of possession between the in favour of one party and the parties were not in a position to seek interim order from court as no proceeding was pending, the Magistrate had jurisdiction and must arrive finding, in accordance with Sec.145, Crl.P.C. The law laid down by the Supreme Court Summer’s case, A.I.R 1985 S.C. 472, was taken note of and stress was laid upon ‘adjudicated’ . The Delhi High Court in Ashrafi Lal v. Labh Singh 1981 Crl.L.J. 1172, that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Secs.145 and 146, Crl.P.C., to maintain will prevail over the orders of the civil court, except where (i) the determination of the civil court has become final, or (ii) the civil court has appointed a receiver vide (2) of Sec.146. The requirements of peace were paramount, the orders of the civil notwithstanding. 10. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in P.Madhava Rao v. K.Bhagavandass, 1981 Crl.L.J., 1673, shows an extreme case, where the Executive Magistrate chose two recent decision of the civil courts, including that of the Apex Court, In that case courts in exercise of their vertical jurisdiction held that the petitioner therein had no or possession of the suit land and it was the respondent that was in possession of land. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the petitioner on 11.4.1979. But within one month, on 7.3.1979, the petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. The Andhra Pradesh High court observed as follows: ‘Even if when there is a very recent decision of the Supreme Court, to say that the is not bound by it, he can reappraise the evidence that was adduced in the civil Court come to a contrary conclusion regarding pos-session is defeating the very intendment Sec.145. The magistrate clearly erred ignoring the effect of the decision of the Court dated 11th April, 1979 and holding that the petitioner was in possession of property on 10th May, 1979, when he passed the preliminary order. It was the duty Magistrate under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. to protect the lawful possession of a party as declare the civil Court. ............. proceedings under Sec.145, Crl.P.C.. are to be taken as a preventive measure to breach of peace when there is a dispute with regard to a land. What the concerned is the actual possession of the land. It is for the civil court to decide the of title." 11. Yet another case decided by the Supreme Court in Jhunamal v. State of M.P., 1988 S.C. 1973, is significant in that the effect of its earlier pronouncement in Ram Puri’s case, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 472, has been explained. What the concerned is the actual possession of the land. It is for the civil court to decide the of title." 11. Yet another case decided by the Supreme Court in Jhunamal v. State of M.P., 1988 S.C. 1973, is significant in that the effect of its earlier pronouncement in Ram Puri’s case, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 472, has been explained. That was a case where the Magistrate had passed an order under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. The High Court quashed passed under Sec.145(6), Crl.P.C. merely on the ground that the unsuccessful party a civil suit. The Apex Court stated that Sec.145, Crl.P.C., cannot be set at naught because the unsuccessful party had approached the civil court. The Apex court went add, that from the order of the High Court, it was obvious that the decision in Ram case,A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 472, the Supreme Court stated as follows: "The ratio of the said decision is that a party should not be permitted to litigate before criminal Court when the civil suit is pending in respect of the subject matter. That mean that a concluded order under Sec.145, Crl.P.C., made by the Magistrate of competent jurisdiction should be set at naught merely because the unsuccessful party had approached the civil court. An order made under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. deals only with the factum possession of the party as on a particular day. It confers no title to remain in possession the disputed property. The order is subject to decision of the civil court. The unsuccessful party therefore must get relief only in the civil court. He may move the civil court properly constituted suit. He may file a suit for declaration and prove a better possession. The civil court has jurisdiction to give a finding different from that which Magistrate has reached." 12. The object of Sec.145, Crl.P.C. has been succinctly stated by the Supreme R.H.Bhutani v. Miss.Mani J.Desai, A.I.R 1968 S.C. 1444. It will be relevant to extract observations: "The object of Sec.145, no doubt is to prevent breach of peace and for that end to speedy remedy by bringing the parties before the court and ascertaining who of them actual possession and to maintain status quo until their rights are determined competent court. The section requires that the Magistrate must be satisfied before proceedings that a dispute regarding an immovable property exists and that such dispute likely to cause breach of peace. The section requires that the Magistrate must be satisfied before proceedings that a dispute regarding an immovable property exists and that such dispute likely to cause breach of peace. But once he is satisfied of these two conditions, the requires him to pass a preliminary order under Sub-sec.(1)and thereafter to make an under Sub-sec.(4) and pass a final order under Sub-sec.(6). ...... The Magistrate has first to decide who is in actual possession at the date of his preliminary order. If, however, the party in de facto possession is found to have obtained possession forcibly and wrongfully dispossessing the other party within two months next proceeding date of his order, the Magistrate can treat the dispossessed party as if he was in possession on such date, restore possession to him and prohibit the dispossessor from interfering that possession until eviction of that person in due course of law,..... To say otherwise would mean that if a party who is forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed not in retaliation take the law into his hands, he should be at disadvantage and cannot the benefit of Sec.145." 13. The case law referred to above does indicate divergence ’ in judicial opinion. At the time it is fairly apparent that almost all the decisions were pronounced on the particularity facts available therein. It looks reasonable to hold on the basis of case law, that, filing of a civil suit cannot totally bar initiation or continuation proceedings under Crl.P.C.. Cases are not wanting, wherein after initiation of a proceeding under Crl.P.C. purely with a view to nullify the said proceeding, civil suits are sought to without any intention to obtain any interim order. The Supreme Court by its Judgments R.H.Bhutani v. Mani J.Desai, A.I.R 1968 S.C. 1444, Ram Sumer Puri v. State of U.P., 1985 S.C. 472, and Jhunamal v. State of M.P.,A.I.R 1988 S.C. 1973, has clearly explained, not only the scope of proceedings under Sec.145, Crl.P.C.. but also when a proceeding be said to be parallel to a civil proceeding. I have extracted the views expressed by High Courts and the Supreme Court, since Mr.K.Ramasami, learned senior strenuously contended, that effective guidelines were not available to the Magistrates. but also when a proceeding be said to be parallel to a civil proceeding. I have extracted the views expressed by High Courts and the Supreme Court, since Mr.K.Ramasami, learned senior strenuously contended, that effective guidelines were not available to the Magistrates. The High Court, exercising its power under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. will always note of the facts placed before it, while considering whether the criminal proceedings Sec.145, Crl.P.C., were parallel to a civil proceeding in respect of the same property. want to dwelve on this question at greater length though on facts, it has sufficient force a decision in this petition can be arrived at, on the other grounds, referable to the compliance with the provisions of Sec.145(1), Crl.P.C. by the Executive Magistrate, choosing to initiate the impugned proceedings. 14. Sec.145, Crl.P.C. is intended to provide a speedy remedy for the prevention of breach peace, arising out of disputes relating to immovable property, by maintaining one or other the par-ties, in possession. The object of the Section is to enable a magistrate to intervene and pass a temporary order in regard to possesion of a property in dispute having until the actual right of one of the parties gets determined by a competent civil court. guard or precaution will be neces-sary to prevent the purpose of the section being abused persons using it, with the object of getting possession of the property to drive the other side to go to the civil Court as the plaintiff. The Legislature keeping in view, breach of the peace must be prevented, thought that the best way of doing it maintain the party in possession by forcing the other party to go to a civil court. The under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. being exceptional, its exercise must be strict, and implicit adherence to the relevant provision will be essential. Where the Magistrate relies upon the police application of judicial mind to the contents of the said report must be apparent. 15. The under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. being exceptional, its exercise must be strict, and implicit adherence to the relevant provision will be essential. Where the Magistrate relies upon the police application of judicial mind to the contents of the said report must be apparent. 15. Steering clear of the controversy of the dates on which impugned orders 1 and signed a look at the detailed order shows that on the basis of the report of the Inspector Police, Law and Order, Dharapuram, the Executive Magistrate was satisfied that there likelihood of breach of the peace and therefore there was a need to initiate proceedings under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. After stating so, the learned Magistrate has extracted the Inspector of Police, Law and Order, Dharapuram. The impugned order shows, that the result, of the scrutiny by the Executive Magistrate, of the report forwarded Inspector of Police. The report which has been considered by the Executive Magistrate, which forms part of the impugned order itself, clearly shows, that by a registered deed dated 30th November, 1959 Karuppasamy Gounder, the father of the petitioner 3rd respondent and the petitioner had partitioned the property, and the petitioner pursuance of the partition deed was in possession of the property, which is the matter of the proceeding initiated, under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. The report extracted also that a civil suit for partition in O.S.No.87 of 1982 had ended in a preliminary decree 18.10.1982, in pursuance of which the 3rd respondent was entitled to a 5/12th share. an amicable atmosphere did not exist between the petitioner and the 3rd respondent respect of the civil litigation, there was a need to institute an inquiry under Sec.145, The order further shows, that the Inspector of Police, Dharapuram chose to initiation of security proceedings under Sec.107, Crl.P.C. But the Government Advocate, Dharapuram expressed an opinion, that there can be no legal hurdle to initiate action Sec.145, Crl.P.C. On this basis, the operative portion of the impugned order fallows: In further reads as follows: 16. The word refers to the petitioner and the third respondent, the M.C.No.3 of 1989 being, Inspector of Police, Law and Order Dharapuram. In effect impugned order the Executive Magistrate had prohibited both parties from entering disputed property. This prohibitory order is not restricted to any particular period. The word refers to the petitioner and the third respondent, the M.C.No.3 of 1989 being, Inspector of Police, Law and Order Dharapuram. In effect impugned order the Executive Magistrate had prohibited both parties from entering disputed property. This prohibitory order is not restricted to any particular period. It to be operative either till the proceedings get finally terminated or probably till revoked, the instance of any of the parties to the proceedings. 17. The legality of the preliminary order restraining both the parties from entering property, till the petition was decided according to law by the Executive Magistrate, considered by this Court in Crl.M.P.No.1093 of 1987 and by his order dated 10.3.1987, Maheswaran, J. held, that restraining both the petitioner and the counter petitioner entering into the property in question was not warranted by the provisions of Sec.l45(1), Crl.P.C, It was further observed that there was no provision in Sec.145(1), Crl.P.C, empowering the Executive Magistrate restrain both the parties from entering into the said property. P.K.Sethuraman, J., in Rnmachan-dran v. State, 1988 L.W. (Crl.) 147. referred to the view expressed Maheswaran, J. on this aspect and expressed his consonance. Janarthanam, J. Venkatakrishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1989 Crl.L.J. 1836, expressed his opinion, that order of the Magistrate prohibiting both parties from entering into property without deciding the question of possession was manifestly illegal and suffered from want of jurisdiction. impugned order in that case was quashed. In Karthikeyan v. State by Inspector of 1990 L.W. (Crl.) 49, after referring to the aforestated case law, 1 took the view, that infirmity of restraining both the parties from entering into the subject matter of a was a serious one sufficient to vitiate the preliminary order in the impugned proceedings. However, Mr.K.Ramaswami, brought to my notice the decision of the Calcutta High Tarak Chandra Palk v. Nairn Mondal, 1976 Crl.L.J. 769, wherein A.N.Banerjee, J. held the order of converting proceedings under Sec.144 to one under Sec.145 and restraining both the parties from entering into the disputed land was justified under the circumstances of the case. That was a case in which the petitioner therein had obtained an ex parte of injunction against the opposite party and his brothers who were claiming to be bargadars in respect of the disputed lands. The opposite party had applied for vacating the aforestated ex parte order of injunction and the matter was still pending. That was a case in which the petitioner therein had obtained an ex parte of injunction against the opposite party and his brothers who were claiming to be bargadars in respect of the disputed lands. The opposite party had applied for vacating the aforestated ex parte order of injunction and the matter was still pending. It was also noticed that the filing of the suit the principal opposite party and his brothers had their names as abraders in an application filed under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. The petitioner had moved the Calcutta High Court against such order and that matter too was pending learned Judge did not deem it necessary to exercise the revisional powers, holding did not think that the learned Executive Magistrate had erred in converting the proceedings under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. and restraining both the parties from entering into the land. The learned Judge had certainly added the words, such circumstances. 18. The object of Sec.145, Crl.P.C. being aimed at maintaining one or other of the parties possession, it does not appear to stand to reason, that both parties should be prevented, without any time limit, from entering into the disputed property. The purpose contemplated under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. would then become a dead letter. On this ground, the impugned order cannot be allowed to operate any longer. 19. The Executive Magistrate under Sec.145(4), Crl.P.C. will have to ultimately whether any and which of the parties, at the date of the order made by him under (1) was in possession of the subject of dispute. Under the proviso, if any party had wrongfully and forcibly dispossessed 2 months before the date on which the report police officer or other information had been received by the Executive Magistrate that date and before the date of his order under Sub-sec.(1), he may have to trust the so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under sec(1). The preliminary order clearly showing, that in pursuance of the partition, petitioner was in possession, the appropriate remedy, if there was likelihood of breach peace, was to initiate proceedings under Sec.107, Crl.P.C. as originally contemplated not under Sec.145; Crl.P.C. Even otherwise, the detailed facts narrated earlier indisputably show that a preliminary decree had been passed in the civil suit and applications appointment of a receiver and injunction are also pending. Similarly at the instance petitioner, a petition to set aside the ex parte decree is also in cold storage. The petitioner and the 3rd respondent, who are brothers, seem to be more interested in dragging litigation rather than attempting to terminate proceedings expeditiously, either approaching the civil court for quick disposal or settling the disputes between them the brothers are interested in creating a breach of the peace, on the long pending dispute the civil court, the only answer is security proceedings under Sec.107, Crl.P.C. 20. There is one another serious infirmity in the impugned order, passed under Sec.145(1), Crl.P.C. The parties to the proceedings have not been directed to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of The operative portion of the order shows, that the petitioner and the third respondent appear either in person or through their advocate and file their statements in writing the impugned order. A proceeding under Sec.145, Crl.P.C.. relates to actual possession. In the event of a regarding that issue, was likely to cause a breach of peace, the Executive Magistrate draw the attention of the opposite parties to put forth their case, as regards the fact possession of the subject of dispute. That obviously has not been done by the Magistrate. 21. However, Mr.K.Ramasami contended, on the basis of a judgment of a Division this Court in T.Kamalkutti and 3 others v. Uthayavarma Raja Vali Raja of Chirakkal, (1913)36 Mad. 275, that once the essential requisite to give jurisdiction to the Magistrate, that a dispute existed, which was likely to cause a breach of the peace concerning water or boundaries thereof, his jurisdiction was complete and his subsequent action considered in relation to procedure and not jurisdiction. In that case decided by the Bench of this Court, there was an omission to set forth in the preliminary order the of the Magistrate’s satisfaction and in that context, it was observed that it did not jurisdiction. The question that has arisen in the instant case, was not posed for decision, the said case. Further it is not the law laid down by the Division Bench, that contemplated under Sec.145, Crl.P.C., could be thrown to the winds. I have already that jurisdiction under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. is exceptional and therefore its exercise strict and implicit adherence to the relevant provision will be essential. 22. Further it is not the law laid down by the Division Bench, that contemplated under Sec.145, Crl.P.C., could be thrown to the winds. I have already that jurisdiction under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. is exceptional and therefore its exercise strict and implicit adherence to the relevant provision will be essential. 22. We can look at this issue from a different angle too. The purpose of promulgating order under Sec.145(1) is to put on notice the rival parties of the satisfaction Magistrate, about a dispute regarding possession of property, which was likely to breach of the peace. If that be so, the object behind the order is to communicate the to the parties concerned. When an order is communicated, the parties must be in a to understand the case they have to meet. If the preliminary order does not indicate, they were expected to put in their claims, Regarding the fact of actual possession subject of dispute, there is a serious lacuna and the parties would be in a quandary, what exactly was expected of them. This serious defect cannot be easily got contending, that the parties had already filed written statements and no non-following procedure, cannot be held to have prejudiced the parties concerned. The preliminary has been challenged at the earliest point of time. If there is a serious lacuna, account of jurisdiction or violation in regard to procedure, affecting the very purpose provision, it would be futile to contend, that in spite of the infirmity the proceedings should be allowed to continue. The words used in Sec.145(1), Crl.P.C. in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession the subject of dispute". The word ‘actual possession’ means ‘actual physical possession irrespective of any right or title to possess. This is obvious for, under Sec.145(4) Magistrate is not expected to determine the claim of a right to possess. The parties put on notice that what the Executive Magistrate was concerned, was evidence regarding fact of actual physical possession. That not having been done, on this ground as pending proceedings cannot be allowed to survive. 23. The provisions under Sec.145, Crl.P.C., are complementary to the provisions Sec.146, Crl.P.C. The object of attachment under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. is to keep the property custodia legis so as to prevent the disputants from causing a breach of the peace, attempting to obtain actual possession of property. 23. The provisions under Sec.145, Crl.P.C., are complementary to the provisions Sec.146, Crl.P.C. The object of attachment under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. is to keep the property custodia legis so as to prevent the disputants from causing a breach of the peace, attempting to obtain actual possession of property. Sec.146, Crl.P.C. takes in the contingencies "(A) a case of emergency, (B) none of the parties was in possession, and (C) no decision possible as to possession. If the preliminary order cannot legally exist for continuation of further proceedings, in order under Sec.146, Crl.P.C. will be a non-est. Even otherwise, some of the contingencies, contemplated under Sec.146, Crl.P.C. is available on facts. The report of the police considered and appended to the preliminary order shows actual possession with petitioner. 24. This petition has to be necessarily allowed. Accordingly it is allowed and all proceedings in M. C. No.3 of 1989 on the file of the Executive First Class Magistrate Revenue Divisional Officer, Dharapuram shall stand quashed. It will be open to the contesting parties to obtain quick orders from the civil Court and it will equally be open to the Magistrate, in the event of likelihood of a breach of the peace, to initiate proceedings Sec.107, Crl.P.C. After pronouncement of orders, Mr. K. Ramasamy learned counsel made an oral plea for leave to appeal to Supreme Court. This order is based law laid down by the Supreme Court and I do not find any ground, made out to grant The oral request for leave shall stand negatived. Petition allowed.