Judgment :- This appeal arises out of a claim petition for removal of obstruction filed by the decreeholders in E.A. No. 705 of 1981 in E.P. No. 780 of 1973 in O.S. No. 795 of 1963 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Salem. 2. The facts in brief are as follows: The property belonged to one Govindasamy and his son Chandrasekaran. It was mortgaged by Govindasamy to one Gurusamy for Rs. 4,000/-On 10.1.1945. The mortgagor was adjudged as an insolvent in I.P. No. 5 of 1945 and the Official Receiver attempted to sell the equity of redemption to one Kandasamy, who was the brother of the mortgagor. But, the sale was not concluded. The mortgagee filed O.S. No. 227 of 1949 to enforce the mortgage against the mortgagor, his brother, who has purported to purchase from the Official Receiver the equity of redemption and the minor son of the mortgagor, Chandrasekaran. It was held by the Court that the mortgage was not binding on the minors half share. A preliminary decree was passed on 5-9-1950 as against the mortgagors half share of the property. Final decree was passed on 29.6.1951. The decree was executed and the decreeholder himself purchased the property on 25.6.1953. 3. The minors half share was sold by his mother an guardian in favour of the mortgagors younger brother Krishnasamy, on 14.9.1950. He was adjudged insolvent in I.P. No. 49 of 1953 and the Official Receiver sold the half share to one Soundappa on 27.7.1957. 4. In the meanwhile, Salem Municipality had filed the suit in O.S. No. 303 of 1954 for arrears of property tax. The suit was filed against Govindasamy, his brother Kandasamy, Soundappa and Sampoorna Ammal. Gurusamy, mortgagee/decreeholder/purchaser was not impleaded as a party, even though he had purchased the property even before the filing of the suit. The suit was decreed. In E.P. No. 641 of 1962, the property was brought to sale. It was purchased by S.K. Krishnasamy Chetty on 22.12.1962. He took delivery of possession. He sold it to one A.K.V. Shanmugham on 25.3.1968, who in turn settled it on the appellant herein on 12.5.1978. The appellant happens to be the wife of one of sons of Kandasamy. 5. In the meanwhile, Gurusamy, mortgagee/decreeholder/purchaser, filed a suit for partition in O.S. No. 795 of 1963 against Kandasamy and Soundappa. He took delivery of possession. He sold it to one A.K.V. Shanmugham on 25.3.1968, who in turn settled it on the appellant herein on 12.5.1978. The appellant happens to be the wife of one of sons of Kandasamy. 5. In the meanwhile, Gurusamy, mortgagee/decreeholder/purchaser, filed a suit for partition in O.S. No. 795 of 1963 against Kandasamy and Soundappa. He claimed half share, which was purchased by him in court auction. A preliminary decree was passed on 6.1.1965 and a final decree was passed on 29.6.1968. In the final decree proceedings, western half of the whole property was allotted to the decreeholder. He filed E.P. No. 780 of 1973 for possession. He had brought on record the sons of Kandasamy as respondents 6 to 8. The said petition was allowed and it was challenged by the respondents 6 to 8 in revision. The revision petition was dismissed. 6. Thereafter, the present appellant obstructed the execution and delivery proceedings. The decreeholder filed R.A. No. 705 of. 1981 for removal of obstruction. The trial Court allowed the same. On appeal, the order of the executing court was confirmed. The present appeal is against the said order. 7. Two contentions are raised by learned counsel for the appellant. First is that under S. 88 of the District Municipalities Act, the liability to pay tax shall be fastened not only on the transferor, but also on the transferee. According to learned counsel, the section has cast a duty on the transferor and the transferee to inform the Municipality about the transfer and get mutation of the registry. If they fail to do so, it is open to the Municipality, according to learned counsel, to enforce the charge against the property and bring the property to sale. According to him, in the event of such sale, it will be binding not only on the transferor, but also on the transferee, who failed to inform the Municipality about the change in ownership. Applying the said proposition to the facts of the case, learned counsel submits that in the present case, Govindasamy was the owner, who failed to pay the taxes and on Gurusamy acquiring ownership of one half share in the property, the latter was bound to inform the Municipality of the change in ownership and enter his name in the register. Applying the said proposition to the facts of the case, learned counsel submits that in the present case, Govindasamy was the owner, who failed to pay the taxes and on Gurusamy acquiring ownership of one half share in the property, the latter was bound to inform the Municipality of the change in ownership and enter his name in the register. It is argued that when the Municipality filed the suit in O.S. No. 383 of 1954, they are not aware of the sale of half share in favour of the mortgagee/decreeholder. Therefore, the suit was maintainable as against the prior owner Govindasamy. It is also argued that the proceedings, which ended in a decree in the suit and the Court auction sale in execution of the decree were valid and binding not only against Govindasamy, but also against the mortgagee/decreeholder/auction purchaser. 8. Under S. 88 of the District Municipalities Act, whenever the title of any person primarily liable to the payment of property tax on any premises is transferred, the person whose title is transferred and the person to whom the same is transferred shall within three months after the execution of the instrument of transfer or after its registration, give notice of such transfer to the executive authority of the Municipality. Under sub-section (4) if a transfer is made without such notice, the transferor shall, in addition to any other liability which he incurs through such neglect, continue to be liable for the payment of property tax until he gives notice of the transfer to the Municipality. It is also stated that such liability is independent of the liability of the transferee for the payment of tax. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that in view of the provisions in S. 88, making the transferee liable for the payment of tax in the absence of notice to the executive authority of the transfer, and at the same time, leaving in tact the liability of the transferee for payment of tax, the suit filed by the Municipality against the transferor was maintainable and that by such a suit, the Municipality was in a position to enforce the charge against the property. According to him, even though the transferee was not made a party to the suit, he will be bound by the result of these proceedings. 9. I have no hesitation to reject the above contention. According to him, even though the transferee was not made a party to the suit, he will be bound by the result of these proceedings. 9. I have no hesitation to reject the above contention. The language of S. 88 of the District Municipalities Act does not warrant such a proposition of law. The Section only makes the transferor continuously liable for payment of tax. It is open to the Municipality to recover the tax from the transferor in the absence of any notice from him of the transfer and proceed against him and attach his properties for recovery of the tax. If, on the other hand, the Municipality wants to “enforce the charge over th e property, it shall do so only by taking proceedings against the transferee, who has become the owner of the property. The ownership of the property does not get lost by the absence of any such notice to the Municipality, either by the transferor or by the trasferee. There is no provision in any law, which declares that by neglect on the part of the transferor or transferee, the transfer will come to an end and the transferee will cease to be the owner; nor does it permit the Municipality to take proceedings even without impleading the transferee to enforce the charge as against the property. Hence, I reject the contention urged by learned counsel for the appellant. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant invites my attention to the judgment of this in The Chairman of the Municipal Council, Nellore v. Dwarapalli Kuttamma I.L.R., 30 Madras 423 That case relates to the question whether a person who purchased the property in the middle of a year is liable to pay tax in entirety for the year or liable only proportionately for the period of the year, which remained after his purchase. The court held that he will be liable to pay tax for the entire year during which he purchased the property. That judgment has no bearing to the facts ofthe present case. 11. Learned counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Nripendra Nath v. Chaibasa Municipality A.I.R. 1981, Patna 47. The court held that he will be liable to pay tax for the entire year during which he purchased the property. That judgment has no bearing to the facts ofthe present case. 11. Learned counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Nripendra Nath v. Chaibasa Municipality A.I.R. 1981, Patna 47. The Court held in that case that a person who will be deemed to be the owner of the property cannot repudiate his liability in a suit for recovery of arrears of tax from the date he becomes the owner of the holding on the ground that his name has not been mutated in the records of the Municipality for one reason or other. The proposition laid down by the Full Bench is in one sense against the appellant. The proposition of the Bench isthat unless there is a notice of the transfer to the Municipality, the latter is entitled to proceed against the transferor and enforce the charge. The Full Bench has also held that even if there is any mutation, the ownership of the transferee is not lost and he will be liable to pay tax due on the property. The ruling as such has nothing to do with the present case. But, to limited extent, the proposition laid down by the Full Bench is against the appellant. 12. The second contention urged by learned counsel for the appellant is that the mortgagee/decreeholder/auction purchaser know of the suit instituted by the Municipality and the fact that there were arrears of property tax. He relies on Ex. B-9, copies of the petition and affidavit dated 5.5.1955 alleged to have been filed in R.A. No. 92 of 1954 in O.S. No. 227 of 1949 by the mortgagee. It is stated that copies were served on counsel for the mortgagor Govindasamy. It is not known as to now the 9th respondent who gave evidence as R.W.I could produce the copies and speak about him. He was not a party to O.S. No. 227 of 1949 or R.A. No. 92 of 1954. Hence, the documents are not properly proved. 13. Apart from that, the affidavit, which in a white paper does not bear any legislature of any counsel with the endorsement that it is a true copy. He was not a party to O.S. No. 227 of 1949 or R.A. No. 92 of 1954. Hence, the documents are not properly proved. 13. Apart from that, the affidavit, which in a white paper does not bear any legislature of any counsel with the endorsement that it is a true copy. No reliance can be placed on the affidavit as a true copy of the affidavit filed in R.A. No. 92 of 1954. Nothing turns out of the affidavit and petition filed in execution proceedings. Even assuming for a moment that the documents are genuine, the application was for appointment of a receiver filed y the mortgagee/decreeholder, who took possession of the property purchased. In the affidavit, there is a reference to O.S. No. 383 of 1954 filed by the Municipality. The affidavit bears the date 3.2.1955. But, even before that, Gurusamy had passed the half share of the mortgagor on 25.6.1953 and get a sale certificate on 29.3.1953. Hence, his knowledge of the suit O.S. No. 383 of 1954 does not in any manner affect his purchase in court auction. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the mortgagee/decreeholder having had notice of the suit filed by the Municipality are the existence of arrears of property tax and having kept quiet without taking any steps against the Municipality, is not entitled to put forward his title to the property, is without any substance. The title required by Gurusamy mortgagee/decreeholder in the court auction held on 25.6.1953 will not be let by his inaction after coming to know the filing of the suit by Municipality. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant places reliance on Ss. 3 and 78 of the Transfer of Property Act. Under S. 3,” a person is said to have notice” of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful which absten tion from an inquiry or search when he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. In the present case, according to the appellant, the mortgagee/decreeholder had actually known the fact. Under Explanation II to S. 3, any person acquiring any immovable propert y or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof. Under Explanation II to S. 3, any person acquiring any immovable propert y or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof. I am at a loss to understand, how this Explanation will help the appellant in the present case. There is no evidence to show that the mortgagee/decreeholder/auction purchaser was aware of the claim of the Municipality for arrears of tax, even, before his purchase. In fact, the suit by the Municipality was filed only after the court auction sale was held and the mortgagee/decreeholder purchased the half share of the mortgagor. 15. S. 78 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that where, through the fraud, misrepresentation, or gross neglect of a prior mortgagee, another person has been induced to advance money on the security of the mortgaged property, the prior mortgagee shall be postponed to the subsequent mortgagee. Learned counsel wants to draw an analogy from this section and submits that the prior sale in favour of the mortgagee/decreeholder in court auction shall be postponed to the court auction sale held on 22.12.1962 in favour of Krishnasami Chetty in execution of the decree obtained by the Municipality in O.S. No. 383 of 1954. There is no substance in this contention. The analogy is misplaced and the title acquired by Gurusamy mortgagee will not be lost by his inaction after his coming to know of the arrears of property tax, for which Municipality had instituted proceedings. 16. It is elementary principle that in court auction sales, there is no warranty of title and the principle of caveat emptor will apply to such sales (Vide AhamedabadMunicipalityv. Haji Abdul Gajur 1971 S.C 1201. 17. It has been repeatedly held that if an execution proceeding is taken against a property without impleading the owner of the property as a party thereof, the proceedings are null and void and any sale held in such execution is a nullity. In Kairajmal v. Daim I.L.R. 32 Calcutta 296 the Privy Council observed as follows; “Their lordships agree that the sales cannot be treated as void or now be avoided on the grounds of any mere irregularities of procedure in obtaining the decrees or in the execution of them. In Kairajmal v. Daim I.L.R. 32 Calcutta 296 the Privy Council observed as follows; “Their lordships agree that the sales cannot be treated as void or now be avoided on the grounds of any mere irregularities of procedure in obtaining the decrees or in the execution of them. But, on the other hand the Court had no jurisdiction to sell the property of persons whowere not parties to the proceedings or properly represented on the record. As against such persons the decrees and sales purporting to be made would be a nullity and might be disregarded without any proceeding to set them aside. If authority be desired for these elementary propositions it may be found in the judgment of Sir Barnes Peacock in Kistien Chunder Ghose v. Asheeun “1863 I March, 647 .A similar ruling was rendered in Kedar Nath v. Munshi Ram A.I.R. 1935 Privy Council, 139 = 42 L.W. 279(P.C.). 18. In Jagannath v. Perumal Naidu 1955-1-M.L J. 114, a Division Bench of this Court held that the jurisdiction to sell a property can arise in a court only where the owner is given notice of the attachment and sale. It goes without saying that if the owner is not made a party, the Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the property. 19. In Velayudha Konar v. Kera Mish A.I.R. 1974 Madras 355 = 87 L.W. 574, it was held that if in a given case no notice of the execution sale goes to the judgment-debtor and without such notice his property is sold in court auction, undoubtedly such a sale is one made without jurisdiction, for, no court has jurisdiction to sell the property of a person without he being informed about it. Reliance was placed on the iudgment of the Privy Council in Khirajmals case 5.1. L.R. 32 Cal. 296 and the judgment of another Bench in Nalaraja v. Chandmul Amarchand 84 L.W. 36. 1971 -1-M.L.J. 474. 20. In the present case, the sale held in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 383 of 1954 was a nullity to the extent of the property purchased by mortgagee/decreeholder and it did not convey any right in the property to K. Krishnasami Chetty, who was the court auction purchaser therein. Consequently, no title was conveyed to A.K.V. Shanmugham or the present appellant. Consequently, no title was conveyed to A.K.V. Shanmugham or the present appellant. The conclusion of the court below is absolutely correct on the facts of this case and this civil miscellaneous second appeal deserves to be dismissed. 21. This appeal is dismissed. But, there will be no order as to costs.