Judgement Some important and interesting questions of law arise for consi-deration in this appeal. These are : (i) whether the trial Court having decided an issue as a preliminary issue is entitled to reconsider the same at a later stage in the same suit ? (ii) whether it is open to the parties to challenge the decision of the trial Court on a pre-liminary issue along with other issues in an appeal against the decree of the Court ? And (iii) whether an ex parte decree operates as res judicata in any subsequent suit between the parties in respect of the same subject matter ? 2. Before proceeding to examine these points, it may be expedient to briefly set out the facts of the case which have given rise to the present appeal. The appellants, as plain-tiffs, filed a suit in the Court of Munsiff, Nalbari for declaration of their title, interest and possession over the suit land. Their case was that the suit land along with some other lands belonged to Late Ladhom Boro who sold the suit land to the pro forma defendant No. 4. The plaintiffs purchased the suit land from pro forma defendant No. 4 and thus became the owners thereof. Their names were mutated in the land records and they were in peaceful possession thereof. In the year 1967 the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (respondents herein) filed a Title Suit against them in the Court of Munsiff, Nalbari which was num-bered as Title Suit No. 32 of 1967. The suit was decreed ex parte in favour of the defendants-respondents. Efforts to get the ex parte decree set aside also failed with the judgment of the High Court passed in revision by which the order of the trial Court setting aside the ex parte decree was reversed. The defendants-decree holders took steps for exe-cution of the ex parte decree. At that stage, the suit, (which has given rise of the present appeal) was filed by the appellants praying for declaration of their title over the suit land, for declaration that the ex parte decree passed in Title Suit No. 32 of 1967 was illegal and void and for injunction restraining the defendants from executing the said ex parte decree. 3. 3. The suit was contested by the main defendants, who filed a joint written state-ment on the ground, inter alia, that the suit was barred by res judicata. According to the contesting defendants, the land described in the Schedule Ka to the plaint, which also included the suit land, was the self-acquired property of late Ladhom Boro. The defendant No. 1 Dagripriya Kachari is the daughter of the said Ladhom Boro. On the death of Ladhom Boro his entire estate devolved on her, as the sole surviving heir. Defendant No. 1, at the time of her fathers death, was a minor. Taking advantage of her minority, pro forma defendant in collusion with others sold the suit land to one of appellants-plaintiff No. 1. In such circumstances, the defendant No. 1 (respondent herein) filed the Title Suit (No. 32 of 1967) which was decreed ex parte. A Title Execution case was instituted which was numbered as Execution Case No. 12 of 1967. In this execution case, the defendant No. 1 got delivery of possession of the suit land from the resent appellants on 7-6-76. 4. The present suit was tried on the basis of the aforesaid pleadings of the parties. A number of issues were framed by the trial Court. One of the issues (Issue No. 2) was whether the suit was barred by the principles of res judicata. The trial Court decided to try and determine this issue as a preliminary issue. The parties were heard and by order dated 11-9-79 this issue was decided by the trial Court. It was held that as the former suit (Title Suit No. 32 of 1967) had been decided ex parte, the issues involved in the said suit could not be said to have been "finally heard and decided", and, as such, the subsequent suit was not barred by res judicata. In view of the aforesaid decision on the preliminary issues, the trial Court - Munsiff, Nalbari proceeded with the trial to decide the re-maining issues. It may be pertinent at this stage to mention that when the preliminary issue was decided the office of the Munsiff, Nalbari was held by Shri J. C. Kalita who was transferred to another station during the pendency of the suit. Shri G. M. Paul, who succeeded him, proceeded with the trial and decided the various issues involved in the suit. Shri G. M. Paul, who succeeded him, proceeded with the trial and decided the various issues involved in the suit. The judgment was delivered on 16th March, 1981 and the suit was dismissed. The dismissal of the suit was mainly in view of the following two findings : (1) that the plaintiffs failed to prove their title and possession over the suit land and (2) that the suit was barred by res judicata. So far as the second finding on issue relating to bar of res judicata is concerned, it may be pertinent to observe that this issue had already been decided by the predecessor in office of Shri Paul as a preliminary issue and it was held that the bar of res judicata did not apply in view of the fact that the decree in the earlier suit was an ex parte decree. This finding on the preliminary issue was com-pletely ignored at the time of final judgment and the very same issue was reconsidered and re-decided. In that process, the earlier decision on the preliminary issue got reversed. 5. The plaintiffs went in appeal against the judgment of the trial Court. The Assistant District Judge, who heard the appeal, on consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, affirmed the judgment of the trial Court. Both the findings of the trial Court referred to above were upheld. It was held that the suit was barred by res judicata. While deciding this issue the lower appellate Court considered the relevant materials on record and arrived at an independent finding of its own. It, however, did not enter into the controversy whether the decision on prelimi-nary issue by the trial Court can be re-considered and reversed by that Court itself in subsequent proceedings in the same suit. It also considered the issue on merits and held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that they had acquired title over the suit land as claimed by them and that they were not entitled to any relief. In that view of the matter the appeal was dismissed. 6. Against the judgment of the lower appellate Court the plaintiffs have approach-ed this Court by filing the present second appeal. The three important questions of law that arise for consideration have already been set out above. I shall now deal each of them separately. 7. In that view of the matter the appeal was dismissed. 6. Against the judgment of the lower appellate Court the plaintiffs have approach-ed this Court by filing the present second appeal. The three important questions of law that arise for consideration have already been set out above. I shall now deal each of them separately. 7. The first point for consideration is whether the trial Court having decided an issue as a preliminary issue is entitled to reconsider the matter at a later stage in the same suit. For a proper appreciation of this controversy, it may be expedient to refer to Rule 2 of Order 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC hereinafter) as am-ended by the Amendment Act of 1976. Order 14, Rule 2 reads : "2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues - (1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues. (2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to- (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue." 8. From a reading of this Rule it is evident that ordinarily the Court is required to pro-nounce judgment on all issues notwithstand-ing that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue. Sub-rule (2) of this rule is an exception which empowers the Court to decide a particular issue as preliminary issue where such issue is an issue of law and relates to jurisdiction of the Court or a bar of the suit. In such cases the Court may postpone settlement of other issues until the prelimi-nary issue is determined and deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on the preliminary issue. The two sub-rules of Rule 2 are intended to achieve two different objects. In such cases the Court may postpone settlement of other issues until the prelimi-nary issue is determined and deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on the preliminary issue. The two sub-rules of Rule 2 are intended to achieve two different objects. The object of sub-rule (1) requiring the Court to give judgment on all issues is to eliminate delay. It was noticed that where a case is disposed of only on a preliminary issue of law and such decision is reversed in appeal, the appellate Court is to remand the case to the Court of first instance for trial on other issues which causes delay. To eliminate the same Rule 2 was substituted by Amendment Act of 1976 and a provision was made for the first time requiring the Court to pronounce judg-ment on all issues notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue. While making this provision the Legislature was also conscious of the unnecessary in-convenience and expense of the parties and waste of time and labour of the Court in deciding all the issues in cases where the Court is of the opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law which pertains to the jurisdiction of the Court or a bar to the suit created by any law. In such cases the Court has been vested with the discretion to decide only the preliminary issue and postpone decision on other issues. The suit in such a case had to be dealt with in accordance with the decision on such pre-liminary issue. 9. On a careful consideration of the scheme and object of sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order 14 of the C.P.C., I am of the clear opinion that the decision of the trial Court on a preliminary issue is final and binding on the parties in all subsequent proceedings before that Court in the same suit. It cannot be reagitated before the same Court. Whether the decision on a preliminary issue is right or wrong can be considered later only by the appellate authority in the event of an appeal against the decree. This is so because if the trial Court is permitted to reconsider its own findings on preliminary issues decided sepa-rately as provided in Order 14, Rue 2(2) of the C.P.C., litigation will never come to an end. This is so because if the trial Court is permitted to reconsider its own findings on preliminary issues decided sepa-rately as provided in Order 14, Rue 2(2) of the C.P.C., litigation will never come to an end. The decision given by the trial Court will never attain finality and the very purpose of deciding an issue separately as preliminary issue would be frustrated. 10. Reference may be made in this con-nection to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kalyan Das v. Kashi Prasad, AIR 1938 All 113 : (1937 All LJ 1272). The facts of this case are very much similar to that of the present case. There also, despite an issue relating to jurisdiction of the Court having been decided by the trial Court as a pre-liminary issue, the successor in office, at the time of hearing of other issues allowed that issue to be reagitated and on hearing the parties, decided it afresh. This action being challenged, on consideration of Rule 2 of Order 14 (as it stood prior to Amendment Act of 1976), the Allahabad High Court observed as follows (at page 114) : "...... As the Code provides for the decision of a single issue, it must, in our view be implied that as far as the trial Court is concerned that issue is decided once and for all.......If the trial Court was permitted at a later stage to reconsider findings recorded on issues decided earlier, there would really be no end to litigation. There must be some finality to decisions and in our view having regard to the provisions of the Code which expressly permit the decision of preliminary points and issues, we must hold that once such issues have been decided they have been decided once and for all as far as the trial Court is concerned and that such cannot be reconsi-dered by that Court." On facts of the case, it was held (at page 115) : "....... There has, in the case before us, been a decision given by a competent Judge on a matter in issue. There has, in the case before us, been a decision given by a competent Judge on a matter in issue. He was entitled by the provi-sions of the Code to decide that issue at the time he did, and in our judgment his decision is binding between the parties in all subse-quent proceedings before the Court of first instance......." To the same effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in Prahlad Singh v. Col. Sukhdev Singh, AIR 1987 SC 1145 where it was reiterated (Para 1) : "It is well settled that the decision given by the Court at an earlier stage of a case is binding at a later stage...." These decisions fully support the view that I have taken in the present case. 11. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the opinion, that in the instant case the Munsiff Shri G. M. Paul acted illegally in redeciding issue No. 2 relating to bar of res judicata which had already been decided as a preliminary issue by his predecessor Sri J. C. Kalita. 12. In this connection, it may be apposite to refer to a decision of the Privy Council in Hook v. Administrator General of Bengal, AIR 1921 PC 11 : (19 All LJ 366) where to arrive at a decision that judgment given on preliminary issue is binding on the parties at all subsequent stages of the suit, the general principles of res judicata were applied. It was held that though Section 11 of the C.P.C. had no application to such a case, upon general principles, the parties to the suit were bound by decisions given on various issues and that the same could not be reagitated in the same suit. This decision was referred to in Mirza Abid Husain Khan v. Mt. Khaniz Fatima, AIR 1924 PC 102 : (22 All LJ 284) and the principles enunciated therein was affirmed. It was held that the decision previously given though not given in a former suit was binding between the parties and operated by way of res judicata. 13. This aspect of application of prin-ciples of res judicata was also considered by the Supreme Court in Satyadhyan v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941 . It was observed (at page 943) : "The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial deci-sions. 13. This aspect of application of prin-ciples of res judicata was also considered by the Supreme Court in Satyadhyan v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941 . It was observed (at page 943) : "The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial deci-sions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again....." It further observed : "The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a Court, whether the trial Court or a higher Court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to reagitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings...." 14. The principles laid down by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court in above referred cases squarely apply to the facts of the present case. In that view of the matter, I am also of the opinion that the decision of the trial Court in the present case on preliminary issue, though given in the same suit, operate as res judicata at all subsequent proceedings in that suit. 15. The next question that arises for consideration is whether it is open to the parties to challenge the decision of the trial Court on a preliminary issue along with other issues in an appeal against the decree of the trial Court. This question does not pose much problem in view of the provision of Section 105 of the CPC which, inter alia, provided : "Where a decree is appealed from, any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memo-randum of appeal." 16. This provision makes it clear that in an appeal from a decree it is open to the parties to challenge the decision on a pre-liminary issue as well as the decision upon all other issues in the case. It is not necessary to challenge the decision on the preliminary issue separately. A party can wait till final decision of the suit and, if aggrieved, it can file appeal. In such appeal, it can challenge the decision of the trial Court on the preliminary issue in the very same way as decision on any other issue. 17. It is not necessary to challenge the decision on the preliminary issue separately. A party can wait till final decision of the suit and, if aggrieved, it can file appeal. In such appeal, it can challenge the decision of the trial Court on the preliminary issue in the very same way as decision on any other issue. 17. This view of mine is fully supported by a decision of the Privy Council in Mohe-shur Singh v. Bengal Government, 7 Moo Ind App 283 and decision of the Supreme Court in Satyadhyan v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941 , 944. In Moheshur Singh (supra), the Privy Council observed : "...... We cannot conceive that anything would be more detrimental to the expeditious administration of justice than the establish-ment of a rule which would impose upon the suitor the necessity of so appealing; whereby on the one hand he might be harassed with endless expense and delay, and on the other inflict upon his opponent similar calamities. We believe there have been very many cases before this Tribunal in which their Lordships have deemed it to be their duty to correct erroneous interlocutory orders, though not brought under their consideration until the whole cause had been decided, and brought hither by appeal for adjudication." Any contrary view, as observed by the Sup-reme Court in Satyadhyan (supra), will put on every litigant the burden of running to the higher Courts for redress of the grievances. It is with a view to preventing such appeals at different stages of the trial that the Legislature included in the Code of Civil Procedure from the very beginning a provision like the one at present contained in Section 105 to expressly confer a right on the parties to challenge any order affecting the decision of the case that might have been passed in course of the trial. In Satyadhyan (supra) it was, therefore, held by the Supreme Court that an interlocutory order which had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken could be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order. This decision applies proprio vigor to decisions of the trial Court on preliminary issues. 18. This decision applies proprio vigor to decisions of the trial Court on preliminary issues. 18. I now turn to third question that arises in this case whether an ex parte decree operates as res judicata between the parties in any subsequent suit. This question is no more res integra. The law is well-settled by now that an ex parte decree can operate as res judicata because an ex parte decree is a decree on merit. As observed in Baldevdas Karsondas Patel v. Mohanlal Bapalal Bahia, AIR 1948 Bom 232 at page 232 : "..... The only difference between an ex parte decree and a decree in invitum is that when an ex parte decree is passed, the defen-dant is absent; but an ex parte decree is as much on merits as a decision in invitum." It was further observed at page 233 - "..... It is true that that decree is passed in the absence of the defendant; but the defen-dant has to thank himself if he is prevented from defending his suit. In our opinion...... the learned Judge was right in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiffs suit was barred by res judicata." This decision was relied on in Gouri Shankar Bajoria v. Ram Banka, AIR 1963 Pat 398 where also it was held that an ex parte decree would operate as res judicata between the parties in any subsequent suit in respect of the same subject-matter. 19. I shall now examine the legality of the finding of lower appellate Court in regard to bar of res judicata. Before reverting to the facts which led to the ex parte decree in the previous suit it may be expedient to mention that the admitted position in the present case is that both the suits, namely, Title Suit No. 32/67 (former suit) and Title Suit No. 18/76 (latter suit) were between the same parties. The plaintiffs in the former suit were defendants in the subsequent suit and the plaintiffs in the latter suit were the defendants in the former suit. The subject-matter directly and substantially in issue in both the suits was also identical. The only dispute between the parties was whether the issues had been heard and finally decided by the Court in the former suit in view of the fact that the decree was ex parte. The subject-matter directly and substantially in issue in both the suits was also identical. The only dispute between the parties was whether the issues had been heard and finally decided by the Court in the former suit in view of the fact that the decree was ex parte. I have already referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Baldevdas where it has been held that an ex parte decree equally operates as res judicata as a decision in invitum. The facts which led to the ex parte decree in this case also appear to be similar to those in the Bombay case. In this case the ex parte decree was made due to the failure of the defendants to appear on the date of hearing. The said ex parte decree was set aside by order passed by the trial Court in three Misc. cases on condition of payment of Rs. 12/- in each case as cost. The defendants were given time till 29-1-70 to deposit the cost. A specific order was also passed to the effect that if the cost was not paid within the stipulated time, the misc. cases for setting aside the ex parte decree would stand dismissed. The defen-dants did not deposit the amount in time and filed fresh applications. The trial Court, by order dated 12-7-81, set aside the ex parte decree and allowed the defendants to pay the cost of Rs. 12/-. Against this order of the Munsiff the plaintiffs in that suit (defendants 1, 2 and 3 of the subsequent suit) preferred civil revision before this Court which were numbered as Civil Revision Nos. 16, 17 and 18 of 1972. By order dated 21-7-75 this court allowed the revision petitions, quashed the order of the Munsiff setting aside the ex parte decree. As a result, the ex parte decree passed in the former suit on 9-7-69 became final. By the subsequent suit the plaintiffs wanted to revive the very same matter again which had been heard and finally decided by the ex parte decree. 20. From a perusal of the facts and circumstances of the case set out above, it is clear that the subsequent suit in the instant case is clearly barred by principles of res judicata. The plaintiffs in the subsequent suit also prayed for a declaration that the ex parte decree was null and void. 20. From a perusal of the facts and circumstances of the case set out above, it is clear that the subsequent suit in the instant case is clearly barred by principles of res judicata. The plaintiffs in the subsequent suit also prayed for a declaration that the ex parte decree was null and void. Nothing is on record to show on what ground such a relief was sought for. Besides under Section 59 of the Limitation Act, even for filing a suit to set aside an ex parte decree on the ground of fraud there is a period of limitation. The period is 3 years from the date of the decree. The decree in the instant case was passed in the year 1969 and the subsequent suit which has given rise to the present appeal was filed in the year 1976. The suit, so far it relates to a declaration that the ex parte decree was null and void, is not maintainable even on the ground of limitation. Evidently, in this case the plaintiffs, in effect, wanted from the trial court on one ground or the other, relief which they were denied by the High Court in proceeding arising out of the previous suit. This is not permissible. 21. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the clear opinion that the learned lower appellate Court was right in holding that the suit was barred by res judicata. 22. This appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. Under the facts and circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.