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Madras High Court · body

1991 DIGILAW 712 (MAD)

Lakshmikanthan and others v. Thiruvengadam and another

1991-09-24

PRATAP SINGH

body1991
Judgment :- The defendants in O.S.No.953 of 1981 on the file of District Munsif, Poonamailee, have filed the Second Appeal No.2070 1986 against the judgment in A.S.No.34 of 1985 on the file of Subordinate Poonamailee, in which the learned Subordinate Judge has allowed the appeal and decreed the suit for permanent injunction. In S.A.No.2071 of 1986, the plaintiffs in O.S.No.335 1981 on the file of the same court have filed the second appeal against the judgment A.S.No.23 of 1985 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Poonamailee in which the learned Subordinate Judge has allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. 2. The plaintiffs case in O.S.No.335 of 1981 are briefly as follows: Venugopal and the first defendant are brothers. The second defendant is the daughter Venugopal. The suit lands belonged to their family. One Jayarama Pillai was the tenant these lands, prior to 1961. After 1961, the plaintiffs family were cultivating the lands tenants. In February, 1981, defendants 1 and 2 sent for the plaintiffs and required him surrender possession. Plaintiffs did not agree. While so, the third defendant is giving out he had negotiated purchase of the land and required the plaintiff to surrender the after harvesting the groundnut crop. The plaintiffs protested to this demand. They entitled to maintain their possession as long as the contractual tenancy subsists. They entitled to the rights under the Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act. The plaintiffs and members of their family contribute physical labour in the cultivation of suit lands. Plaintiffs apprehend that defendants would forcibly enter into the lands after harvest of the groundnut crops now standing on the land. Hence the suit for injunction. Subsequently plaint amended. The allegations in the amended portion of the plaint are briefly as follows: Pending suit, the third defendant, with the help of his brother Thiruvengadam, the defendant, had trespassed into the suit properties and planted casuarina. Hence alternative relief of possession is also prayed for. 3. The third defendant resists the claim on the following grounds: The suit properties were exclusively owned by Venugopal. The first defendant had interest in it. The claim that Jayarama Pillai was the tenant and thereafter the plaintiffs family were the tenants are all false. The vendors of this defendant were cultivating the properties through the first defendant. 3. The third defendant resists the claim on the following grounds: The suit properties were exclusively owned by Venugopal. The first defendant had interest in it. The claim that Jayarama Pillai was the tenant and thereafter the plaintiffs family were the tenants are all false. The vendors of this defendant were cultivating the properties through the first defendant. This defendant had purchased the western 4.16 in Survey No.51/1 under the registered sale deed, dated 15.4.1981 from the second defendant and others. He allowed his brother to cultivate the lands on lease. His brother possession of the suit properties in his own right in respect of portion of second item and full extent of first item on the basis of lease agreement with this defendant. The plaintiffs were never in possession and hence dismissal of the suit is prayed for. 4. The fourth defendant resists the claim on the following grounds: Jayarama Pillai was never cultivating tenant of the suit lands. The plaintiffs were never possession of the suit lands. The suit lands originally belonged to Venugopal. On his death, the second defendant became the absolute owner. By agreement dated 26.2.1981, second defendant entered into agreement of sale with defendants 3 and 4 to convey the lands for Rs.83,100 and received an advance of Rs.10,000. Prior to the said agreement, second defendant got back possession from the first defendant on 26.12.1980. On the of agreement of sale, the second defendant delivered possession to defendants 3 and They purchased it under registered sale deed dated 15.4.1981. The third defendant leased out his portion of the lands to the fourth defendant. This defendant is in possession the entire lands. The plaintiffs are not cultivating tenants. Civil Court has no right determine that question. Hence the dismissal of the suit is prayed for. 5. The fourth defendant in O.S.No.335 of 1981 has filed the suit in O.S.No.953 of arraying the plaintiffs in O.S.No.335 of 1981 as defendants 1 to 3. The plaintiff briefly as follows: ‘ A ’ and ‘ B ’ schedule properties originally belonged to Venugopal. On his death, his daughter Leela became entitled to the same. She had leased out the entire properties to paternal uncle Jayaraman. He was cultivating the lands. By agreement, dated 26.2.1981, entered into between Leela and the plaintiff, Leela agreed to convey the said property Rs.83,100 and received Rs.10,000 as advance. On his death, his daughter Leela became entitled to the same. She had leased out the entire properties to paternal uncle Jayaraman. He was cultivating the lands. By agreement, dated 26.2.1981, entered into between Leela and the plaintiff, Leela agreed to convey the said property Rs.83,100 and received Rs.10,000 as advance. She took back possession from Jayaraman on 26.12.1980. She had received Rs.10,000 as advance, as aforesaid and delivered possession to the plaintiff on 26.2.1981. Since then, the plaintiff is in possession of the same. For the sake of convenience at the request the plaintiff, Leela executed two sale deeds on 15.4.1981 for Rs.41,500 in favour of plaintiff and for Rs.41,600 in favour of plaintiffs brother Natarajan. The plaintiff was already possession of the entire suit property. He requested Natarajan to give him on lease property purchased by him and Natarajan leased out to the plaintiff; the property covered his purchase. He raised kuruvai paddy crop. The defendants and their men are trying interfere with the plaintiff’s possession. Hence the suit for permanent injunction. 6. The defendants resist the claim on the following grounds: Neither the plaintiff nor his brother or their vendors were ever in possession of the properties. Defendants 1 to 3 are in possession as cultivating tenants. The paddy crop land were raised by these defendants. When the plaintiff and his brother attempted disturb their possession, these defendants have filed suit in O.S.No.335 of 1981 and obtained interim injunction. The plaintiff has suppressed that fact. Hence dismissal suit is prayed for. The 10th defendant has filed a written statement which is in consonance with the case of the plaintiff. 7. Both the suits were tried together and plaintiffs have examined P.Ws.1 to 3 and have Ex.A-1 to A-24. The defendants have examined D.Ws.1 to 3 and have filed Exs.B- The Commissioner’s reports and plans were marked as Exs.C-1 to C-6. On a consideration the entire evidence, the learned District Munsif has decreed the suit in O.S.No.335 of for recovery of possession and has dismissed the suit in O.S.No.953 of 1981. Aggrieved the same, defendants 3 and 4 in O.S.No.335 of 1981 has filed the appeal in A.S.No.23 1985 and the plaintiff in O.S.No.953 of 1981 has filed the appeal in A.S.No.34 of 1985 the file of Subordinate Judge, Poonamallee. In the appeal, Ex.A-25 was filed by the appellant and Exs.B-20 to B-31 were filed by the respondents. Aggrieved the same, defendants 3 and 4 in O.S.No.335 of 1981 has filed the appeal in A.S.No.23 1985 and the plaintiff in O.S.No.953 of 1981 has filed the appeal in A.S.No.34 of 1985 the file of Subordinate Judge, Poonamallee. In the appeal, Ex.A-25 was filed by the appellant and Exs.B-20 to B-31 were filed by the respondents. On a consideration of the materials placed before him, the learned appellate Judge has allowed both the appeals consequently dismissed the suit in O.S.No.335 of 1981 and has decreed the suit O.S.No.953 of 1981. Aggrieved by the common judgment of the lower appellate court, two appeals were filed as I have stated at the outset. 8. In S.A.No.2070 of 1986, the substantial question of law on which the appeal admitted was, (a) Whether the court below is correct in law, when it has not discussed evidence on the various questions arising in the appeal? 9. In S.A.No.2071 of 1986, the appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether the provision of Sec.6 of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection stand attracted to the facts of this case? (2) Whether the lower appellate court has correctly appreciated the scope of the suit whether the reversal of the judgment of the trial court by the lower appellate court is and can be sustained, especially when the appellant is in possession of the land? and (3) Whether the observation of the lower appellate court that jurisdiction vests with the Court if the appellant has to assert that he is in possession so as to agitate the accrued to him by virtue of Sec.6 of the abovesaid Act, is correct in law. 10. Questions in both the appeals: The suit in O.S.No.335 of 1981 was filed on 6.3.1981. The suit properties therein cents in Survey No.50/4 and 7.36 acres in Survey No.51/1. They were originally of paimash Nos.270, 275 to 279. On the same day, I.ANo.376 of 1981 was filed for interim injunction and interim injunction was granted. For the purpose of convenience, I shall refer parties as they are arrayed in O.S.No.335 of 1981. According to the plaintiff, prior to P.W.I Jayarama Pillai was in possession of the properties as a lessee and since plaintiffs family are in possession as cultivating tenants. This Jayarama Pillai had filed O.S.No.45 of 1961 against the first defendant and the first plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, prior to P.W.I Jayarama Pillai was in possession of the properties as a lessee and since plaintiffs family are in possession as cultivating tenants. This Jayarama Pillai had filed O.S.No.45 of 1961 against the first defendant and the first plaintiff. Ex.A-4 is the copy of the judgment in the said suit. Ex.A-2 is the certified copy of the written statement filed by the first defendant herein in that suit. Ex.A-3 is the certified copy of the statement filed by the first plaintiff herein in that suit. In para 6 of Ex.A-2, it is averred follows: "The plaintiff had peacefully surrendered possession of the lands in reference to the defendant on the expiry of the date fixed in the notice dated 27.12.1960 and that the defendant is in lawful possession and enjoyment of the said lands as per the lease his favour. The aforesaid lease deed in favour of the 2nd defendant is perfectly valid and plaintiff has no manner of right to impugne same. “ The second defendant in that suit was Elumalai Naicker viz., the first plaintiff herein. So, first defendant herein has categorically stated in the suit in O.S.No.45 of 1961 that the plaintiff herein was in possession of the suit land on that day as a tenant. In Ex.A 6, the first plaintiff herein who was the second defendant in that suit has averred as follows: ” Accordingly, this defendant entered into an agreement of lease with the first defendant took possession of the lands during the first week of January, 1961. In para 7, he has averred as follows: “ ........... the plaintiff had voluntarily surrendered possession of the lands to this defendant in the presence of several witnesses on or about 10th January, 1961....... ” From Ex.A-4, I find that the suit filed by P.W.2 against the first plaintiff and the defendant herein for permanent injunction was dismissed, accepting the case of defendants therein. Ex.A-4 is dated 28.8.1962. Ex.A-5 is the certified copy of the decree that suit. The suit properties in that suit were also paimash No.270 and 275 to 279. The properties herein were the suit properties in O.S.No.45 of 1961. That suit was of the 1961 and at that time nobody would have thought of this suit. Ex.A-4 is dated 28.8.1962. Ex.A-5 is the certified copy of the decree that suit. The suit properties in that suit were also paimash No.270 and 275 to 279. The properties herein were the suit properties in O.S.No.45 of 1961. That suit was of the 1961 and at that time nobody would have thought of this suit. At that time when there no dispute between the first plaintiff and first defendant herein, it was their uniform that first plaintiff herein was given possession of the suit properties by the first defendant herein and that was accepted by the court. 11. The next important document is Ex.A-20 an inland letter written by the first defendant to the first plaintiff. The postal seal found on it bears the date 6.2.1981. In it, he has as follows: The first defendant did not figure as witness. The second defendant who figured as has admitted that the signature in Ex.A-20 is that of the first defendant. Ex.A-20 which written in February, 1981 would go a long way to show that ever since 1961, the plaintiff continues to be in possession of the suit properties as a lessee even as on 6.2.1981. While so, it is idle to contend that the first defendant was in possession of the suit property and he surrendered it to the second defendant. Ex.B-12 is purported to be the letter written by the first defendant to the second defendant surrendering possession of the suit properties on 26.12.1980. When first plaintiff was in possession even on 6.2.1981, how can defendant surrender possession on 26.12.1980. Apparently, it is a document created for purpose of this case. Ex.B-14 is the agreement of sale entered into between the second defendant and the fourth defendant on 16.2.1981. In it, it is not stated that first defendant gave possession of the property to the fourth defendant on the date of agreement itself. now the case put forward is that on the date of this agreement, possession was given fourth defendant. The case of the defendants that first defendant got possession of properties on 26.12.1980 and that on the date of sale agreement Ex.P-14, date 26.2.1981 possession was given to the fourth defendant are all clearly false. now the case put forward is that on the date of this agreement, possession was given fourth defendant. The case of the defendants that first defendant got possession of properties on 26.12.1980 and that on the date of sale agreement Ex.P-14, date 26.2.1981 possession was given to the fourth defendant are all clearly false. When the first defendant himself wrote to the first plaintiff on 5.2.1981 making a request to hand over possession the first defendant after harvesting the standing crops, it is too much to say that even 26.12.1980, the first defendant gave possession to the second defendant by virtue of 12. 12. The Commissioner appointed by the Court had inspected the property and has filed report and plan. They are Eix.C-1 and C-2. They would show that by means of pipe water was taken from the well in the suit property to the other properties belonging to plaintiff. That would not be the case unless the suit properties were in enjoyment of plaintiff. Inspection was made on 24.6.1981. In para 5 of the report, the Commissioner stated that he saw in the north-eastern corner of the suit property, nearly 31 granite used as fencing, were plucked out from the soil and “”were broken into pieces. Apart from the above documentary evidence and observation by the Commissioner on the spot, convincing oral evidence has been tendered by P.Ws.1 about the possession of the lands by the plaintiffs on the date of suit. The trial court given a positive finding in para 18 that on the date of suit, plaintiffs were in possession during the pendency of the suit, they were removed from possession. The lower appellate court has. formulated point No.1 as follows: "Whether the plaintiffs in O.S.No.335 of 1981 were in possession of the suit lands at the of the filing of the suit? In para 13 of the Judgment, the finding is given by the lower appellate court against appellants and in favour of the respondents viz., the plaintiffs. Thus there are concurrent findings of facts by the courts below that on the date of suit in O.S.No.335 of 1981 plaintiffs were in possession of the suit properties. I have concurred with their findings on unassailable evidence. It is also clearly made out that their possession originated lease, and continued to be on that basis. Thus there are concurrent findings of facts by the courts below that on the date of suit in O.S.No.335 of 1981 plaintiffs were in possession of the suit properties. I have concurred with their findings on unassailable evidence. It is also clearly made out that their possession originated lease, and continued to be on that basis. While so, during the pendency of the suit, were removed from possession by the defendants 3 and 4. In such circumstances, still they maintain their possession and plaintiffs should be deprived of a remedy of injunction which they were entitled to as on the date of the filing of the suit and whether they should deprived of the alternative prayer of recovery of possession though it was found by courts below that their possession was taken away during the pendency of the suit by defendants. The trial court has rightly held that this should not be countenanced and plaintiffs are entitled to recovery of possession. But the lower appellate court had held plaintiffs are not cultivating tenants of the properties inasmuch as they have not proved they have put in physical exertion in the cultivation of the land and their demise was than 6.2/3 acres and hence they cannot ask for recovery of possession. Regarding physical exertion, P.W.I has stated that they cultivated groundnut and they watered lands. P.W.2 has stated that after his lease came to an end, Elumalai Naicker viz., plaintiff cultivated the lands. He has also stated that the first plaintiff and his family members cultivated the paddy crops which were in the land. So it is not as if there was no evidence show that plaintiffs family physically exerted on the lands. Regarding the extent of demised land, the plaintiffs relied upon the partition deed which was filed on the appellate stage. 13. That apart, I am clear that no party can dispossess the other party during the pendency of the suit and claim an advantage on the fact of it. In Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun, 1986 Cal. 220, the suit was laid for permanent injunction and declaration as a tenant. was forcible dispossession of the plaintiff in violation of interim injunction. It was held inherent power can be invoked to grant temporary mandatory injunction by directing to restore possession of the plaintiff. In Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun, 1986 Cal. 220, the suit was laid for permanent injunction and declaration as a tenant. was forcible dispossession of the plaintiff in violation of interim injunction. It was held inherent power can be invoked to grant temporary mandatory injunction by directing to restore possession of the plaintiff. In State of Bihar v. Usha Devi, A.I.R. 1956 Patna was held that if a court comes to the conclusion that an order passed under O.39, Rule Rule 2 has been disobeyed and by a contravention of that order, the other party in the has done something for its own advantage to the prejudice of the other party, it is open the Court under inherent jurisdiction to bring back the party to a position where it originally stood as if the order passed by the Court has not been contravened. The exercise of inherent power vested in the Court is based on the principle that no party can be allowed take advantage of his own wrong inspite of the order to the contrary passed by the rationale of this ruling is applicable to this case. When the plaintiffs were in possession the suit property on the date of filing of the suit and prayed for injunction for protecting lawful possession and interim injunction has been granted, it is not open to the other forcibly enter into the possession of the suit property and then when the plaintiffs come forward with the alternative prayer for recovery of possession resist it stating that petitioners are not cultivating tenants of the property. It is proved by unassailable evidence plaintiffs were in possession under a lease. It does not make any difference whether were contractual lessees or cultivating tenants. It is proved by unassailable evidence plaintiffs were in possession under a lease. It does not make any difference whether were contractual lessees or cultivating tenants. Once they are proved to be lessees, having been in possession of the land under a contractual lease or as cultivating tenants possession as on that date of suit is bound to be protected and if during the pendency of suit their possession was forcibly removed, even without an amended prayer for recovery possession, by virtue of the inherent powers of the Court, the court is competent and in opinion, the court is obliged to put back the parties in their original possession by restoring possession to the plaintiffs and court should not anybody to take law in his own hands and dispossess the plaintiff when the court is seized the matter. So looking the case from any angle, plaintiffs claim for recovery of possession cannot be denied. 14. The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the ruling reported in R.Muthirian P.Muthirian, (1966)1 M.L.J. 308 . In this case, Justice Venkatadri, has observed as follows: “ Under Sec.4 of Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, when a tenant comes to the Revenue Court to be put in possession of the property on the ground that he was dispossessed, should satisfy that he is not in possession of more than 6-2/3 acres of land. Under Sec.4 the landlord shall be entitled to resume possession from any cultivating tenant for purposes of personal cultivation of lands not exceeding one half of the extent of lands leased out cultivating tenant. Reading both Secs.4 and 4-A, I am of the opinion that whether landlord or tenant wants to get possession of the leased property they should satisfy whether the extent is more than 6-2/3 acres or less than 6-2/3 acres. As there is difference finding with regard to the extent of the property possessed by the respondent herein, not want to give any finding in this matter. Therefore, the proper thing would be to direct learned District Munsif to transfer the suit to the Revenue Court for giving a finding whether the respondent is in possession of more than 6-2/3 acres of land. Therefore, the proper thing would be to direct learned District Munsif to transfer the suit to the Revenue Court for giving a finding whether the respondent is in possession of more than 6-2/3 acres of land. ” On the strength of this observation, the learned counsel for the respondents would contend that in as much as the plaintiffs have been dispossessed and they can claim back possession as cultivating tenants, the civil court has no jurisdiction to give a finding whether cultivating tenant or not and the court below cannot try the matter and the matter decided only to a Revenue Court and should be referred to a Revenue Court. I am accept this argument. The facts of the case before me are totally different from the case on which the above observation was made by Justice Venkatadri. That case where the plaintiff was dispossessed during the pendency of a suit for injunction when the primary relief sought for is one of declaration of status of their party cultivating tenant, the civil court may not have jurisdiction to decide the controversy. provisions of Sec.6 of Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenant’s Protection Act are not attracted facts of this case. The Rent Court does not have jurisdiction to try the matter in this case. 15. As I have pointed out above, the plaintiffs in O.S.No.335 of 1981 were proved possession of the suit properties on the date of suit. They were forcibly dispossessed the suit properties during the pendency of the suit. After dispossessing the plaintiffs, concerned defendants cannot maintain it. Such a position cannot be countenanced court of law. A party cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. The are entitled to get an effective decree for proper relief. I am clear that it is the duty court to pass, a decree for proper relief to the plaintiffs by removing the wrong done defendants in this case. The duty of the court is to see that proper and substantial done according to the circumstances of the case so that the aggrieved party may feel right is vindicated. The court has authority and duty to restore possession of the plaintiffs evicting the defendants. In this case, the plaintiffs themselves have amended the had sought for the alternative prayer for delivery of possession. They are entitled same. 16. The court has authority and duty to restore possession of the plaintiffs evicting the defendants. In this case, the plaintiffs themselves have amended the had sought for the alternative prayer for delivery of possession. They are entitled same. 16. In view of the above, the plaintiffs in O.S.No.335 of 1981 are entitled to possession and the suit is to be decreed accordingly. The plaintiff in O.S.No.953 not entitled to injunction and the suit is liable to be dismissed. 17. In the suit, both the appeals are allowed with costs and consequently the O.S.No.335 of 1981 is decreed for recovery of possession with costs. The suit in of 1981 is dismissed with costs. Time for delivery of possession two months. Appeals allowed.