Judgment :- Mishra, J.: Plaintiff has appealed against the judgment of learned single Judge of this in C.S.No.325 of 1975, dismissing his suit for a declaration that the sale alleged to have held on 30.6.1970 by the seventh defendant in the suit at the instance and under instructions of the first defendant is null and void, and not binding on the plaintiff and not convey any title to the third defendant in the suit property, and that the sale deed 16th August, 1971, is null and void and not binding on the plaintiff, and does not convey transfer any right to the third defendant in suit, as also for a direction to the defendants 3 in the suit to render a true and proper account of the income and expenses from 30.6.1970 till date of suit, for reconveyance of the property by defendants 1 and 2, for possession the suit property and damages. 2. The property bearing No.2, Dr.Singaravelu Street, T.Nagar, Madras-17 (described Schedule A to the plaint) according to the plaintiff, originally stood in the name Kannammal, the neither of the plaintiff and defendants 4 and 5 and grandmother of the defendant, having been purchased by the father of the plaintiff late Kannabi benami in the name of the mother of the plaintiff. During their lifetime, the mother a deed of simple mortgage in favour of one Dr.B.C.Raj for a sum of Rs.40,000 with at 12 per cent per annum with respect to the suit property. Later, in or about November, 1968, since, according to the plaintiff, the mortgagee threatened to bring the suit to auction sale, in exercise of the power of sale under Sec.69 of the Transfer of Property Act, granted to the mortgage deed in his favour and since the second defendant in the suit (since dead substituted by his legal heirs and representatives) offered to pay off the mortgage due to Dr.Raj, a simple mortgage deed was executed by the mother in favour of the defendant in the suit (daughter of the second defendant). In or about December, however, the first defendant obtained a deed of usufructuary mortgage from the plaintiff, deceased brother K.Narayanaswami and the sixth defendant (since the plaintiff’ s mother died) with respect to the very same property on condition inter alia that he would collect rentals from the tenants in the premises and the Kaly-ana Mandapam which existed in suit property, pay off the charges due to the Municipal and other Governmental authorities, etc., and “ also pay the monthly interest due to the 1st defendant in respect of her simple mortgage” . The first defendant, according to the plaintiff, was a party to this arrangement by agreeing to collect the interest from the second defendant directly without looking to plaintiff. This arrangement continued for quite some time. The second defendant, who bound to pay the monthly interest due to the first defendant on account of her simple mortgage, however, defaulted. One of the conditions in the usufructuary mortgage in favour of the second defendant was that in case default was committed by him in complying any of the terms and conditions of the usufructuary mortgage in favour of the second defendant, the same would be cancelled and the second defendant would be bound deliver back possession of the mortgaged property to the mortgagors; and notwithstanding, however, these conditions and the default committed by the second defendant, the defendant, according to the plaintiff, without any demand as required under Sec.69 of Transfer of Property Act and without recourse to the second defendant, her own father who alone, according to the plaintiff, was responsible for paying the interest to her from out of the rental collected out of the property and from whom she had agreed to receive interest as also payments of principal amount, attempted to bring the suit property auction sale on or about 30th June, 1970, through the auctioneers Chandramani Company, the seventh defendant in the suit. The plaintiff then filed a suit O.S.No.3018 1970 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras, for a declaration that the first defendant not entitled to bring the suit property to sale under Sec.69 of the Transfer of Property and also for a consequential permanent injunction restraining the 1st defendant from bringing the suit property to auction sale. The plaintiff then filed a suit O.S.No.3018 1970 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras, for a declaration that the first defendant not entitled to bring the suit property to sale under Sec.69 of the Transfer of Property and also for a consequential permanent injunction restraining the 1st defendant from bringing the suit property to auction sale. The plaintiff impleaded the 2nd defendant as of the defendants in the suit, and applied in I.A.No.9454 of 1970 for an interim injunction restrain defendants 1 and 2 in the suit from bringing the suit property to auction sale. Sixth Assistant City Civil Court Judge, however, ordered notice returnable by 4.7.1970. According to the plaintiff, he took notice to the auctioneer that day itself before the auction sale, but taking advantage of the fact that interim injunction was not granted, the defendant, who was not at all at Madras at that time, acting through the 2nd defendant, purporting to exercise the power of sale under Sec.69 of the Transfer of Property Act under the mortgage deed, and “ in active collusion with the 2nd defendant, went through fraudulent sale which was solely aimed at knocking off the property worth more than lakhs, for a very low price and it was fraudulently declared that the suit property had sold for Rs.60,000” . The seventh defendant filed an affidavit in O.S.No.3018 of 1970 7.7.1970 stating that the property had been sold on 30.6.1970 for Rs.60,000. The plaintiff again approached the City Civil Court with a request in I.A.No.9611 of 1970 for an injunction restraining the defendants 1 and 2 herein (defendants 1 and 2 in that suit) from executing sale deed in favour of the alleged purchaser in furtherance of the auction sale of property alleged to have been held on 30.6.70. This time also the learned City Civil only ordered notice to defendants 1 and 2. When the said suit came up for final disposal, defendants represented that the sale deed had already been executed. Ultimately, 23.8.1971, the plaintiff withdrew the suit (O.S.No.3018 of 1970) with permission to suit for appropriate relief. 3. The main contest, however, has come from the 2nd defendant (now by his heirs and representatives), and the 3rd defendant, the auction purchaser. The 1st defendant adopted the written statement of 2nd defendant. 4. Ultimately, 23.8.1971, the plaintiff withdrew the suit (O.S.No.3018 of 1970) with permission to suit for appropriate relief. 3. The main contest, however, has come from the 2nd defendant (now by his heirs and representatives), and the 3rd defendant, the auction purchaser. The 1st defendant adopted the written statement of 2nd defendant. 4. Many facts stated in the written statement filed on behalf of the 2nd defendant are not variance with the statements of facts in the plaint that the 1st defendant obtained a simple mortgage for a consideration of Rs.44,000 and that he himself obtained a usufructuary mortgage sum of 14,000. His version, however, is that the suit property belonged exclusively Kannammal, who executed a deed of first simple mortgage along with her K.Narayanaswami (since deceased) as surety in favour of Sakru Chand Sowcar on August, 1952 for Rs.7,900 and later Kannammal borrowed various amounts from Purasaw-alkam Hindu Janopakara Saswatha Nidhi, and executed three mortgages over suit property on 12.6.1958 for Rs.8,000 on 12.6.1958 for Rs.4;000 and on 5.10.1969 Rs.6,500 respectively. She borrowed a further sum of Rs.5,000 under another deed mortgage dated 19.4.1965 from one Swa-minatha Iyer, who advanced a further Rs.3,000 on promissory note dated 21.2.1966, and for the purpose of discharging aforesaid mortgages and the debt covered by the promissory note and for other purposes, she borrowed a further sum of Rs.44,000 from one Dr.G.B.Raj, and executed a deed simple mortgage on 14.9.1967 on the security of the suit property. Since Kannammal defaulted in the payment of the principal and interest payable to the mortgagee, Dr.G.B.Raj, he brought the property to sale under Sec.69 of the Transfer of Property Act. Kannammal filed the suit O.S.No.4358 of 1968 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras praying injunction restraining the mortgagee from bringing the property to sale to be held 1.11.1968. At that time, in the auction at the instance of the mortgagee Dr.Raj, auction held on 1.11.1968. The suit property was sold, and in the said auction, the 2nd defendant was the purchaser. Kannammal died on 9.9.1968. The plaintiff and his deceased Narayanaswami came on record in the suit O.S.No.4358 of 1968 on the file of the City Court and applied for an injunction in that suit to restrain the mortgagee from executing sale deed. That application was dismissed. Kannammal died on 9.9.1968. The plaintiff and his deceased Narayanaswami came on record in the suit O.S.No.4358 of 1968 on the file of the City Court and applied for an injunction in that suit to restrain the mortgagee from executing sale deed. That application was dismissed. However at the intervention of friends mediators, the sale held on 1.11.1968 was not given effect to and concluded, and an agreement was entered into. As per the agreement, Dr.Raj along with the deceased Narayanaswami and the plaintiff agreed that the mortgage dated 14.9.1967 should assigned in favour of the 1st defendant (daughter of the 2nd defendant). Accordingly, 11.12.1968, a registered deed of assignment was executed by Dr.Raj in favour of defendant assigning the simple mortgage deed dated 14.9.1967 in her favour. 11.12.1968, the plaintiff along with his deceased brother K.Narayanaswami and Parthasa rathi, his son’s son executed a deed of usufructuary mortgage for a consideration Rs.14,000. The 2nd defendant was accordingly put in possession of the suit property. the recital of the usufructuary mortgage, the 2nd defendant was empowered to realize rental collection, pay all the municipal and other public charges due and payable of the suit property, incur necessary expenses for the upkeep and maintenance of and appropriate the balance towards the interest on the principal sum of Rs.14,000 under the deed of usufructuary mortgage dated 11.12.1968. Further, according to defendant, it was also specifically agreed that the balance of realisation should towards the interest due and payable in respect of the 1st mortgage dated 14.9.1967 was assigned in favour of the 1st defendant. Coming to the question of maintenance accounts, the 2nd defendant has said: ".....this defendant agreed as per the terms of the usufructuary mortgage to keep proper account of all the income and expenditure while he is in possession of the property....." This defendant sent true copies of all the accounts to the plaintiff and the Mohanakrishnan Narayanaswami and Parthasa-rathi under certificate of posting. went through the accounts given by the 2nd defendant and satisfied himself about thereof and signed the accounts on 8.2.1969, 16.2.1969, 23.2.1969 and .1.3.1969. went through the accounts given by the 2nd defendant and satisfied himself about thereof and signed the accounts on 8.2.1969, 16.2.1969, 23.2.1969 and .1.3.1969. statement of accounts for the period ending March, 1969 was sent to the plaintiff other mortgagors under certificate of posting to the plain tiff was not available that 18th July, 1969, the plaintiff signed the statement of accounts upto 15th March, Similarly, plaintiff also in token of the correctness of the accounts signed the accounts the period ending 23.3.1969, 31st March, 1969, 15.4.1969. Second defendant also statement of accounts periodically to the plaintiff and other mortgagors on 23.6.1969, 26.7.1969, 3.9.1969, 5.11.1969 and 8.12.1969." 5. The defendants’ case further is that on 3rd February, 1970, the 2nd defendant addressed a letter to the plaintiff and the mortgagors pointing out that it was not possible to work Kalyana Mandapam with a probable income of Rs.9,000 as against the anticipated expenditure of Rs.16,000 in 1970 and suggesting the sale of the property by public auction. Along with that letter, the statement for December, 1969 and January, 1970 was sent. was followed by another letter dated 13th February, 1970, addressed to the mortgagors. that letter, the mortgagors were informed that a sum of Rs.2,750 was due towards interest for the period of five months at Rs.550 per mensem from 1.11.1969 to 31.3.1979 in respect of the mortgage deed executed by the 2nd defendant besides the principal of Rs.44,000. Reference was also made to the amount payable to him in the sum of Rs.14,875 being 5. The defendants’ case further is that on 3rd February, 1970, the 2nd defendant addressed a letter to the plaintiff and the mortgagors pointing out that it was not possible to work Kalyana Mandapam with a probable income of Rs.9,000 as against the anticipated expenditure of Rs.16,000 in 1970 and suggesting the sale of the property by public auction. Along with that letter, the statement for December, 1969 and January, 1970 was sent was followed by another letter dated 13th February, 1970, addressed to the mortgagors that letter, the mortgagors were informed that a sum of Rs.2,750 was due towards interest for the period of five months at Rs.550 per mensem from 1.11.1969 to 31.3.1979 in respect of the mortgage deed executed by the 2nd defendant besides the principal of Rs.44,000. Reference was also made to the amount payable to him in the sum of Rs.14,875 being principal and interest due in respect of the usufructuary mortgage. Further details were given to that letter about the amount spent for the construction etc. The total amount and payable by the mortgagors including the amount payable to the 1st defendant Rs.83,338. On 14.3.1970, 20.4.1970, 2.6.1970 and 29.6.1970, the 2nd defendant accounts relating to February 1970, March, 1970, April and May, 1970 and June, respectively. The plaintiff never questioned the truth or genuineness of the accounts at time. Giving further details as to the facts leading to the suit O.S.No.3018 of 1970 and auction sale, the defendants have alleged that it was incorrect to state that the defendant did not make any demand as required under Sec.69of the Transfer of Property Act. In fact, Chandramani and Company had sent a notice of demand on the plaintiff and other mortgagors, but when no response came from them on 30th June, 1970 the seventh defendant conducted the auction in which the third defendant purchased the property Rs.60,000 followed by the execution of the sale deed on 16.8.1970 and registration 16.8.1971. 6. The indisputable facts are: (1) The first defendant is the daughter of the second defendant. (2) The second defendant, before the simple mortgage in favour of the 1st defendant taken some sort of sale in an auction under Sec.69 of the Transfer of Property Act (according to his own version) conducted at the instance of Dr.Raj, which however, was transformed into a deed of assignment of the simple mortgage which Dr.Raj held in favour of the defendant on 11.12.1968. (3) The second defendant entered in posses-sion of the property on 11.2.1968 usufructuary mortgagee on the condition that he would collect rent from the tenants income from the Kalyana Mandapam, etc., and pay the taxes etc., including interest on simple mortgage of his daughter, the first defendant according to him, only when there surplus after the other expenses. (4) The second defendant defaulted in payment of interest to the first defendant, according to him because there was no surplus available for discharging the mortgage, and that informed the plaintiff and the other mortgagors on various dates that they had failed honour the commitments under the simple mortgage in favour of the first defendant as under the usufructuary mortgage deed in his favour. “ 7. “ 7. It is on the record that the third defendant participated in the alleged auction held 30.6.1970, and it is said that an advance of Rs.15,000 was paid by him towards purchase money of Rs.60,000 but the sale deed was executed in the name of Thaiyanayaki Ammal Trust having its office at No.11/3, Bazulla Road, Thiagarayanagar, Madras represented by the trustee K.R.Viswanathan, of which trust the second defendant was founder trustee. 8. Sengottuvelan, J. who tried the suit, has, however, said in his judgment at one place. ” It is stated in the plaint that the sale on 30.6.1970 was conducted without enough publication which resulted in fetching low price for the property. It is also contended there was no sale on 30.6.1970 and that the defendants 1, 2 and 3 in collusion with seventh defendant had fraudulently brought about the sale. The first defendant who entitled to bring the property to sale under Sec.69 of the Transfer of Property Act entrusted the proceeding for sale to the 7th defendant who are the recognised auctioneers. Ex.D a draft sale notice published by the auctioneers and approved by the first defendant. 38 is a letter approving the pamphlet and the advertisement by the first defendant. is the notice published by the seventh defendant the auctioner in respect of the auction conducted on 30.6.1970. The fact that the notice auction was held on 30.6.1970 is also borne out by the receipt for the payment of cent of the bid amount by the auction purchaser the third defendant which is marked Ex.D-36 dated 30.6.1970. “At another place, the learned single Judge, has said:” There is much force in the contention on the side of the plaintiff that the income subsequent years cannot in any way, go below the income fetched during 1969. Since 13 came into existence before the difference of opinion arose between the plaintiff and second defendant and contents of Ex.P-13 are of much evidentiary value. Hence, we easily assess to monthly income of the property at Rs.1900. The annual income amounts Rs.22,800 and after deducting the tax and other expenses towards maintenance and making an allowance for the uncertainties of the income, we can safely come conclusion that the income from the suit property will be at least Rs.6,000 per annum. market value can easily be taken to be 20years income which amounts to Rs.1,20,000. The annual income amounts Rs.22,800 and after deducting the tax and other expenses towards maintenance and making an allowance for the uncertainties of the income, we can safely come conclusion that the income from the suit property will be at least Rs.6,000 per annum. market value can easily be taken to be 20years income which amounts to Rs.1,20,000. if we take the building and the site separately the site can be valued at Rs.25,000 ground which amounts to Rs.1,00,000 and the superstructure can easily be valued Rs.20,000 as on 30.6.1970, even after allowing depreciation. Hence on 30.6.1970, building will be worth at least Rs.1,20,000 though not Rs.2,75,000 as alleged by the plaintiff. Hence, the complaint of the plaintiff that proper value had not been fetched in the conducted on 30.8.1970 will have to be accepted. “At yet another place, the learned single Judge has stated: “I have already found that the market value of the suit property on the date of sale 30.8.1970 is Rs.1,20,000. If the auction was conducted after wide publicity, there reason why the suit property should not have fetched a price of at least Rs.1,20,000 auction.....Though D.W.2 an employee of Chandramani & Co., the auctioneers had examined as a witness, he is not able to produce any document relating to the publication the conduct sales. Not even the person who made the torn torn is examined. Under circumstances, we have to conclude that there is no evidence of publication of the sale that proper market value had not been fetched in the auction conducted on 30.6.1970. such a case, under Sec.69(3) of the Transfer of Property Act, the mortgagors will be entitled to a decree for damage against the person exercising the power. Hence, in this case, difference between the market value and the amount fetched in the auction will have awarded as damages to the mortgagors. 9. A rule which has received universal recognition and needs no reiteration, however, to have been over-stretched by the mortgagee in the sense that a mortgagee with a of sale is not a trustee of the power of sale; it is a power given to him for his own benefit enable him the better, to realise his mortgage debt. 9. A rule which has received universal recognition and needs no reiteration, however, to have been over-stretched by the mortgagee in the sense that a mortgagee with a of sale is not a trustee of the power of sale; it is a power given to him for his own benefit enable him the better, to realise his mortgage debt. If he exercises it bona fide purpose, without corruption or collusion with the purchaser, Court will not interfere though the sale be very disadvantageous, unless indeed the price is so low as itself evidence of fraud. This Statement of law on the subject in the early English Decisions been often repeated by the courts in India including the Supreme Court. In Pichai Moideen C.D.K.Das & Sons,A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 736, the dictum approved by the Judicial Committee Haddington Island Quarry Company Ltd. v. A.W.Huson, (1911) A.C. 722, has been quoted, dictum which was stated by Kay, J. in Warner v. Jacob, (1882)20 Ch.D. 220, “ A mortgagee, is strictly speaking, not a trustee of the power of Sale. It is a power given him for his own benefit, to enable him the better to realise his mortgage debt. If he exercises it bona fide for that purpose without corruption or collusion with the purchaser, the Court not interfere, even though the sale is very disadvantageous, unless indeed the price is as in itself to be evidence of fraud. ” This view has been reiterated by a Bench of this Court in Chakrapani Naidu v. Mudaliar, (1972)2 M.L.J. 290 . We do not propose to multiply decisions dealing with dictum. 10. The finding recorded by the learned Judge about the value of the property unassailable. The sale was knocked down at almost half of the expected selling price property as found by the learned single Judge. Had this happened in a proper sale conducted with full publicity, perhaps this in itself would not have been enough to doubt the bona fide of the mortgagee. The learned single Judge has also found that “there is no evidence regarding the details the publication of the auction ....under the circumstances, we have to conclude that there no evidence of publication of the sale and that proper market value had not been fetched the auction conducted on 30.6.1970. ” True, the mortgagee had handed over the auction an auctioneers Company, Chandramani & Co. ” True, the mortgagee had handed over the auction an auctioneers Company, Chandramani & Co. But then, who was the purchaser? The defendant, Viswanathan? Nay, Thaiyanayaki Ammal Trust, of which the second defendant the founder trustee. And who the second defendant is? The father of the first defendant, himself having a usufructuary mortgage and bound to fulfil a condition therein that interest would be paid to the first defendant daughter, by him. We are tempted at this stage to the evidence of the second defendant in the suit, examining himself as D. W.1. He said: Q: What has happened to the usufructuary Mortgage? A: I am still in possession. Q: The mortgage has not been redeemed by the mortgagor? A: No. The mortgage is still alive. xxx xxx xxx xxx Q: My client states that you went there at 5 p.m., the time fixed for the auction and there was no bidders there and only three of you, yourself, Singaravelu and one person were there? A: The auction took place and the people would have gone home. Q: Who paid the advance? A: Viswanathan paid the advance. Q: You paid on behalf of Viswanathan? A: It is immaterial as to who paid the amount. Q: Who were the bidders? A: There were 14 or 15 bidders. xxx xxx xxx xxx Q: The highest bid was by Mr.Viswanathan on 30.6.1970? A: Yes. Q: Did he pay the l/4th deposit? A: Yes. He paid the amount. A receipt is in his name. Q: who paid the amount. A: I think he paid the amount. Even if I have paid there is no harm. I do not remember Q: He paid in his individual capacity. Is it not? A: No. On behalf of the trust. “ The above evidence shows that Viswanathan was a name lender for the second defendant. There is enough indication in the evidence afore-quoted that the second defendant deposited one-fourth of the bid amount. 11. Then, there is the story about the purchase by the Trust. We know from the record the sale was effected on 30.6.1970. We are also told and so the records reveal, that deed was executed on 16.8.1971 in the name of Thaiyanayaki Ammal Trust, that there no such legal entity in existence until 1973. Evidence in this behalf is available deposition of the second defendant himself. Q: The Trust was registered only in 1973. We are also told and so the records reveal, that deed was executed on 16.8.1971 in the name of Thaiyanayaki Ammal Trust, that there no such legal entity in existence until 1973. Evidence in this behalf is available deposition of the second defendant himself. Q: The Trust was registered only in 1973. A: It was informally formed in 1967 although it was registered some time later. Q: The sale deed also was executed in 1971? A: There was no sale deed whatsoever.” We have seen a specific mention in the evidence by the second defendant usufructuary mortgage had not been redeemed and that he was solely in possession. Q: How did Thyayyanayaki Ammal Trust get into possession of the property? A: Possession was with me. I gave possession. Q: Was it transferred by a deed? A: I transferred it not by a deed. Q: So I take it that yourself, Thayyanayaki Trust, Viswanathan and Seetha Natarajan one and the same? A: Quite right. All are the same except payment of money. The association of the first defendant Seetha Natarajan with the second defendant is to seek. Viswanathan is only a name lender on behalf of a so-called trust which was non existent on 30.6.1970, and if it had to take birth, since it took birth in the year 1973, it only because the second defendant was the founder. The facts speak for themselves. simple mortgage in the hands of the first defendant, which was used for the purpose of under Sec.69 of the Transfer of Property Act the usufructuary mortgage in the hands of second defendant, the father of the first defendant, which facilitated the sale under Sec.69 of the Act, the creation of a trust by the second defendant only to purchase under Sec.69 the property which he held under the usufructuary mortgage together beyond doubt that it was in execution of scheme of a sort in which the property belonging the plaintiff-mortgagor was sold at a grossly low value, not even enough to meet the of the first defendant upon the simple mortgage, what to speak of the additional with which the property had already been charged by the second defendant, that is the usufructuary mortgagee. Such a sale cannot be called bona fide. It was not a sale low valuation due to the negligence on the part of the mortgage. Such a sale cannot be called bona fide. It was not a sale low valuation due to the negligence on the part of the mortgage. There was no trust that mortgagee was holding for the mortgagor, yet there has been a fiduciary relationship between them, and bona fide alone could justify such a sale. Courts in India do not ordinarily interfere with the right of the transferee at an auction sale under Sec.69 of the Transfer Property Act, the principle being that the Transferee being a third party who is not at even though there is some negligence or mistake committed by the mortgagee in conducting the sale; but when the purchaser or a transferee is none else than the mortgagee, interfere. Here is a case in which the mortgagee ostensibly involved in the sale daughter of the second defendant; and the purchaser is a trust founded by him. He has in possession of the property from before the sale, and continued in possession even the sale. That is what he has said in his evidence. It is difficult on such facts not to say. if not exactly fitting in the jacket of a case of the mortgage being the purchaser himself, a case very near it. 12. We have given our anxious consideration to all such aspects, which would throw upon the conduct of sale of the property at the instance of the first defendant mortgagee. Our irresistible conclusion is that there is no escape from the conclusion that it is vitiated the reason of mala fide. 13. It is not necessary to say about the dispute relating to the accounts which the defendant as usufructuary mortgagee was required to render to the plaintiff. No fault found with the decree in this behalf, for it is a condition under which he held the mortgage. The calculations upon which he himself proceeded, and a good reason was assigned learned single Judge in accepting the year previous to the disputed period as the basis working out the annual income, are sufficient material to hold that everything was not in the accounts of the second defendant. The trial court has done no mistake in this and rightly given a decree for rendition of accounts. 14. In the result, O.S.A.No.130 of 1983 filed on behalf of the plaintiff is allowed with throughout. The trial court has done no mistake in this and rightly given a decree for rendition of accounts. 14. In the result, O.S.A.No.130 of 1983 filed on behalf of the plaintiff is allowed with throughout. The suit is decreed in full, and the sale alleged to have been held on 30th 1970, by the seventh defendant at the instance and under the instructions of the defendant is declared null and void, and not binding on the plaintiff. Accordingly, conveyance by the first defendant to the third defendant, whether in his name or name Thaiyanayaki Ammal Trust stands annulled, and is not binding on the O.S.A.No.324 of 1989 is dismissed, but without costs. These appeals having been posted for clarification the court made the following order: The Order of the Court was made by Mishra, J.: The matter has been brought before us after the disposal of the appeals judgment dated 17.7.1991 for a clarification whether the appellant/plaintiff who sued pauper would be asked to pay the court-fee. The trial Court had dismissed the suit and the estate fell in the hands of the defendant, directed the defendant to pay court said Judgment, however, has been set aside in the appeal and the sale deed has declared null and void. The estate, however, has reverted to the plaintiff. We do not however any material before us to find out whether the estate in respect of which dispute had been raised is sufficient for the court fee. We do not also propose to this aspect. We accordingly order that no court-fee shall be demanded from either party. Order accordingly.