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1991 DIGILAW 717 (ALL)

Aqil Ahmad v. Prescribed Authority, Amroha, Moradabad

1991-05-02

D.S.SINHA

body1991
ORDER D.S. Sinha, J. - Heard K.A. Ansari, learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. In the disputed shop bearing Municipal No. 635 (West facing), situate in Mohalla Danish-Mandan, Amroha, district Moradabad, of which Sri Shandar Hasan Khan, the respondent No. 2, is landlord, the petitioner is a tenant at the monthly rent of Rs. 48/-. On 11th July, 1990, before the Prescribed Authority, Amroha, District Moradabad (Munsif, Amroha), the petitioner moved an application under sub-section (4) of S. 28 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter called the (Act), praying that the landlord of the disputed shop may be required to carry out certain major repairs or, in the alternative, the petitioner hismself be permitted to carry out the repairs. The said application was numbered as case No. 328 of 1990 and is still pending consideration before the Prescribed Authority, the respondent No. 1. 3. On 7th August, 1990, the respondent No. 2, Shandar Hasan Khan, instituted an application under S. 21(1)(a) of the Act seeking eviction of the petitioner from the disputed shop. This application is registered as Case No. 14 of 1990 and is pending consideration before the Prescribed Authority, the respondent No. 1. 4. In case No. 14 of 1990, under S. 21(1)(a) of the Act pending before the Prescribed Authority, the respondent No. 1, the petitioner moved an application under S. 27C praying for stay of the proceedings of the case till the disposal of the proceedings, emanating from the application moved by him, under S. 28 of the Act, on the ground that issue in both the proceedings is identical and as such the instant proceedings which were instituted later in point of time should be stayed under S. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 hereinafter called the 'Code'. This application of the petitioner was resisted by the respondent No. 2 on the ground that S. 10 of the Code did not apply to the proceedings under the Act. It was further pleaded on behalf of the said respondent that the issue involved in two proceedings was not common. 5. This application of the petitioner was resisted by the respondent No. 2 on the ground that S. 10 of the Code did not apply to the proceedings under the Act. It was further pleaded on behalf of the said respondent that the issue involved in two proceedings was not common. 5. Respondent No. 1, after hearing the parties and investigating their respective claims, came to the conclusion that the proceedings under S. 21 of the Act, instituted by the respondent No. 2, were not liable to be stayed under S. 10 of the Code in as much as the scope of the proceedings and the relief claimed therein were different. Respondent No. 1, therefore, by means of his order dated 21st March, 1991, rejected the application of the petitioner for stay of the proceedings in Case No. 14 of 1990. It is this order which is under challenge in this writ petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends before this Court that the respondent No. I committed a manifest error of law in coming to the conclusion that proceedings under S. 21 instituted by the respondent No. 2 were not liable to he stayed under S. 10 of the Code in as much as S. 10 of the Code mandates the stay of proceedings instituted later in point of time, if the proceedings involve adjudication of issues which are also involved in proceedings instituted earlier, between the same parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner points out that respondent No. I was clearly wrong in coming to the conclusion that issues and reliefs involved in two proceedings were different. 7. The contention of the learned counsel is misconceived. S. 10 of the Code has not been made expressly applicable to the proceedings under the Act. Even if the principles contained in S. 10 of the Code are invoked in the proceedings under the Act, the proceedings, giving rise to the instant petition, are not liable to be stayed for the simple reason that in both the proceedings, one instituted by the petitioner and the other instituted by the respondent No. 2, the parties are unanimous on the question of the bad condition of the shop. In both the proceedings, the parties admit that the condition of the shop is such that it is either required to be demolished or calls for major repairs. In both the proceedings, the parties admit that the condition of the shop is such that it is either required to be demolished or calls for major repairs. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that issue involved in the two proceedings is identical. Apart from this, as noticed by the respondent No. I, the reliefs in the two proceedings are also different, 8. The foregoing discussion leads to an irresistible conclusion that respondent No. I was perfectly justified in declining to stay the proceedings under S. 21 of the Act against the petitioner and reject his application for stay by means of the impugned order. 9. However, Sri Ansari, learned counsel for the petitioner, urges this court to direct the Prescribed Authority to decide the application of the petitioner under S. 28 of the Act before deciding the application of the respondent No. 2, under S. 21 of the Act, or in any event, decide the application of the petitioner expeditiously. For this purpose the petitioner may approach the Prescribed Authority itself and this Court trusts that if the petitioner approaches the Prescribed Authority, the Prescribed Authority will dis pose of the prayer of the petitioner on merits and in accordance with law. 10. Subject to the observations made above, the petition is dismissed summarily. 11. A certified copy of this order may be issued to the learned counsel for the petitioner within a week on payment of usual charges.