Judgment :- The petitioner has come up to this Court challenging the order of the second respondent dated 21.4.1988 requiring the petitioner to apply for reclassification of the site through the Commissioner, Corporation of Madras, along with necessary particulars. 2. The short facts leading to the filing of this Writ Petition are that the petitioner applied for a planning permit to the Corporation of Madras, in respect of Old No. 1, New No. 2, Harrington Road, Madras 31 of extent of about 47 grounds and 2292 sq. ft. comprised in S. No. 355/1, for the purpose of constructing a two star hotel. The Corporation of Madras was exercising the powers delegated to it under the Town and Country Planning. The Application was returned to the petitioner for furnishing all necessary particulars for exemption under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, and Certificate from the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. The petitioner paid a sum of Rs. 30,777/-towards development charges as directed on 23.9.1980 and the planning permission was given to the petitioner on 8.10.1980. Again on 17.5.1982 the petitioner deposited a sum of Rs. 76,000/- along with Rs. 20/- towards scrutiny fee as directed by the Corporation of Madras. At this point of time, the petitioner wrote a letter to the second respondent on 17.11.1987 stating that though they have complied with all the formalities, the building permit has not been granted to them. To that the second respondent replied to the petitioner stating that no powers have been delegated to the Corporation of Madras for the issue of planning permission for the construction of Hotels and Lodges which are regulated under DCR 7(b) and that since the planning permission was granted by the Corporation of Madras in violation of the powers delegated, the connected file was called for verification and was returned to the Corporation. However, the petitioner was directed to approach the Commissioner of Corporation of Madras. The petitioner on 6.2.1988 again wrote to the Member Secretary, Madras Metropolitan Development Authority stating that the site was still in the primary residential zone and requested the authority to change it as commercial zone. By order dated 21.4.1988 which is impugned in this Writ Petition, the petitioner was asked to apply for reclassification of the site through Commissioner, Corporation of Madras. 3. By order dated 21.4.1988 which is impugned in this Writ Petition, the petitioner was asked to apply for reclassification of the site through Commissioner, Corporation of Madras. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the planning permission was given to him by the Corporation after considering the materials placed by him and that now the second respondent has not given any opportunity to clear the doubts entertained by them. It is also urged that there is no necessity for classification of the site in question as it is situated in between Village Road and Harrington Road and that the second respondent has passed the order mechanically. It is also stated that the petitioner has complied with all the requirements contemplated under the enactment and also has deposited lakhs of rupees for acquisition of the land and for obtaining the permit and that the second respondent is delaying the matter without any reason. 4. The second respondent has filed a counter affidavit. In that it is stated that the planning permission given by the Corporation of Madras is not within the powers delegated to it and that power of delegation does not cover issue of planning permission to hotels. Since the Corporation of Madras has given the permission exceeding its power now the second respondent cannot grant the prayer of the petitioner for the change of zone. It is stated that special sanction involves reclassification of this site from primary residential use zone to mixed residential or commercial use zone. The reclassification of a site from one use zone to another can only be taken up on an application from person who requests for such reclassification to the respondent in spite of written reference. It is stated that since the Corporation of Madras has granted the permission in excess of the powers delegated to it, it was asked to revoke the permission. It is also stated that though the petitioner was asked to meet the Member-Secretary of the Madras Metropolitan Development Authority, so that the problems involved could be clearly explained to him, the petitioner has not chosen to do so, but again sent a letter dated 12.9.1988. Hence the second respondent replied to him that there was no fresh ground to re-consider the decision taken by the second respondent. Hence the second respondent replied to him that there was no fresh ground to re-consider the decision taken by the second respondent. It is also stated even in 1983 itself the second respondent has informed the Madras Corporation not to issue planning permission in excess of the power delegated to it and to revoke it and that though the petitioner was asked to approach the first respondent he has not chosen to do so. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends the petitioner applied for planning permission as early as in 1980 itself and that the second respondent is denying the same on the ground that the Corporation has exceeded its powers. Learned counsel states that the attitude of the second respondent cannot be supported in law because no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner to explain his case before the impugned letter was issued to the petitioner and what all has happened is done behind the back of the petitioner without notice to him and that now the petitioner should not be asked to apply for change of the character of the zone. It is pointed out that under Rule 4(c)(ii) of the Development Control Rules framed under the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 it is stated as follows: “All lands and premises listed in Annexure-II shall be deemed to be zoned under Mixed Residential Use zone.” Learned counsel produced the annexure from which it can be seen where the petitioners property is situate and based on that it is not necessary to apply for change of the zone. The argument of the petitioner is based on the principle of promissory estoppel. 6. Learned Counsel for the respondents contends that all that the petitioner is required is to go and approach the Madras Metropolitan Development Authority for his relief and when he comes with the said prayer his request will be accepted. Learned counsel points out that it has been made residential zone and hence re-classification is necessary now, if the petitioner wants to pursue the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioner accepts that the Corporation has granted permission but in violation of powers delegated to it. 7. Mr. R.G. Annamalai, learned counsel for the first respondent though has not filed a counter affidavit states that the permit granted to the petitioner by the Corporation is still in force. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner accepts that the Corporation has granted permission but in violation of powers delegated to it. 7. Mr. R.G. Annamalai, learned counsel for the first respondent though has not filed a counter affidavit states that the permit granted to the petitioner by the Corporation is still in force. 8. Considering the arguments of both the parties, and after going through the affidavit and the records produced before me I am satisfied that this is a case where the second respondent is asking the petitioner to pursue an unnecessary procedure. On 6.2.1988 itself the petitioner has applied to the Member-Secretary, Madras Metropolitan Development Authority for the change of land use (?) or for the change of classification. It is the second respondent which had directed the petitioner to apply for re-classification from the Corporation of Madras along with sufficient particulars. As early as in 1988 itself the petitioner applied to the second respondent to re (?) classify the land. But the concerned authorities have slept over the matter. Now it is not necessary to insist upon the formalities in so far as the facts of this case are concerned, because it has been complied with by the petitioner before the Corporation of Madras. Hence, I do not think that the petitioner should trouble himself once again. Besides in Rule 4(c)(ii) of the rules there is a non-obstante clause. Under Rule 4(c)(ii) of the Rules all lands and premises listed in Annexure-II shall be deemed to be zoned under mixed residential zone. I had gone through Annexure-II produced before me. There cannot be any dispute and it cannot also be disputed that the petitioner wants the permit for the land which falls under Annexure-II. If it is so I do not think that any special classification is necessary in view of the non-obstante clause. Any instructions or order made in violation of rule cannot override the rule. So long as Sub Rule (ii) of (c) is there in my view the petitioner is entitled to the effect of deeming clause. When all lands and premises listed in Annexure-II are deemed to be under mixed residential use zone, I do not think that the petitioner has to get re-classification as required by the second respondent. 9. So long as Sub Rule (ii) of (c) is there in my view the petitioner is entitled to the effect of deeming clause. When all lands and premises listed in Annexure-II are deemed to be under mixed residential use zone, I do not think that the petitioner has to get re-classification as required by the second respondent. 9. Apart from that a look at the facts shows that the petitioner applied for permission as early vas in 1976 and got the permission from the Corporation in 1980. He has been strictly following the procedure and has invested huge amounts as development charges and other fees, as early as in 1980 itself. Nearly ten years have lapsed. Still the petitioner cannot get permission. The second respondent cannot escape by saying that the Corporation has exceeded its power. It is not disputed that certain powers are delegated to the Corporation of Madras. As long as the Corporation of Madras has got power, the petitioner is entitled to apply and get permission. Now, the petitioner must not be taken to task. Assuming for a moment that the Corporation has exceeded its power and has granted permit, at this point of time the second respondent cannot ask the petitioner to apply for re-classification. 10. However, learned counsel for the first respondent, has brought the concerned file from the Corporation. Before any decision is taken against the petitioner, the second respondent has called for the file in 1983 and first respondent has sent the same in 1987 and now the second respondent cannot come up and say that the petitioner should get classification from the Corporation. In view of all these, the impugned order is to be set aside. The Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, empowers the second respondent to delegate its power. Hence, by exercising the powers the second respondent can rectify the matter by invoking the provisions of the Act. 11. In support of the argument of promissory estoppel the decision in Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1986 S.C. 872 was referred: “In 1948, Denning, J. in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions 1949 1 KB 227 laid the foundation to the applicability of promissory estoppel in public law. As Prof. 11. In support of the argument of promissory estoppel the decision in Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1986 S.C. 872 was referred: “In 1948, Denning, J. in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions 1949 1 KB 227 laid the foundation to the applicability of promissory estoppel in public law. As Prof. De Smith in his Judicial Review of Administrative Act, 4th Edition at p. 103 observes; “There is a growing body of authority, attributable in large part to the efforts of Lord Denning, to the effect that in some circumstances when public bodies and officers, in their dealings with a citizen, take it upon themselves to assume authority on a matter concerning him, the citizen is entitled to rely on their having the authority that they have asserted if he cannot reasonably be expected to know the limits of that authority and he should not be required to suffer for his reliance if they lack the necessary authority.” The learned Authority then states: “But it is extremely difficult to define with any degree of precision the circumstances in which the Courts will be prepared, in the interest of ‘fairness’ to the individual to derogate from orthodox of ultra vires .” Professor H.W.R. Wade in Administrative Law, 5th edition, at page 232 observers that the basic principle of estoppel is that a person who by some statement or representation of fact causes another to act to his detriment in reliance on the truth of it is not allowed to deny it later, even though it is wrong. Justice here prevails over truth. Estoppel is often described as a rule of evidence, but correctly it is a principle of law. As a principle of common law it applies only to representation about past or present facts. But there is also an equitable principle of promissory estoppel which can apply to public authorities. The facts in Robertsons case were these. The War Office wrote to Robertson, an Army Officer who had claimed a disable pension on account of the War injury, that his disability had been accepted attributable to military service. But, for this injury the responsible department was the Ministry of Pensions which the War Officer had not consulted. The Ministry later decided that the disability was not attributable, and the Pension Appeal Tribunal upheld that decision. But, for this injury the responsible department was the Ministry of Pensions which the War Officer had not consulted. The Ministry later decided that the disability was not attributable, and the Pension Appeal Tribunal upheld that decision. In relying on the War Office letter the Claimant had refrained from getting a medical opinion and adducing the other evidence which might have strengthened his case for such disability pension against the Ministry. On appeal to the Court, Denning, J. reversed the decisions of the Ministry and the Tribunal holding that the Crown was bound by the War Office letter and observed: “The Crown cannot escape by saying that estoppels do not bind the Crown, for, that doctrine has long been exploded. Nor can the Crown escape by praying in aid the doctrine of executive necessity, that is, the doctrine that the Crown cannot bind itself so as to fetter its future executive action”. It would appear that Denning, J. evoked two doctrines (1) that assurance intended to be acted upon and in fact acted upon were binding; and (2) that where a Government department wrongfully assumes authority to perform some legal act, the citizen is entitled to assume that it has that authority, and he dismissed the contention that estoppels do not bind the contention that the Crown by saying that that doctrine has long been exploded and that the Crown cannot fetter its future executive action. Professor Wade points out that the proposition about wrongful assumption of authority evoked by Denning, J. was immediately repudiated by the House of Lords in a later case in which Denning, J. had again put it forward in Howell v. Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd. 1951 AC 837. It is beyond the scope of this judgment to enter into a discussion as to how far Denning, J.s dictum can still be regarded as part of the common law in England. But there appears to be a school of thought in India laying down that the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies to the Government except under certain circumstances.” 12. The impugned order is set aside and the second respondent is directed to consider the issue of permit to the petitioner, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, after providing an opportunity to the petitioner. The writ petition is allowed. No costs. The impugned order is set aside and the second respondent is directed to consider the issue of permit to the petitioner, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, after providing an opportunity to the petitioner. The writ petition is allowed. No costs. The petitioner shall rile an application in this respect on or before 30.11.1991, before the second respondent. And this petition having been posted this day for further orders in the presence of the said Advocates, the Court made the following order. The matter comes up for modification of the result portion of my order dated 11.9.1991. Instead of para-12 of the earlier order the following is substituted; The impugned order is set aside and the first respondent is directed to issue plan and planning permit to the petitioner and give the necessary sanction under the Act. The writ petition will stand allowed. No costs. The first respondent is directed to comply with this order on or before 31.10.1991.