B. P. JEEVAN REDDY, CJ. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition calls in question the validity of a letter dated 30/11/1990 written by the Secretary to Government of U. P. addressed to heads of Government departments, public corporations and other local bodies. Through this letter, the Secretary to Government conveyed the decision of the Government that all the departments of the Government, public corporations and other local authorities in the State should obtain the electronic goods specified in the letter from M/s. Uptron (India) Ltd. , alone. M/s. Uptron (India) Ltd. , is a company incorporated under the Companies Act owned and controlled by the Government of U. P. and engaged in the manufacture of electronic goods. The first petitioner M/s. International Data Management Ltd. is a public limited company having its registered office at New Delhi and engaged inter alia in manufacture and sale of electronic goods mentioned in the impugned letter. The petitioners challenge the validity of the said letter on several grounds, namely, violation of Arts. 19 (1) (g) and 301 of the Constitution of India. It is also alleged that the impugned decision of the Government is also violative of the equality clause enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. Case of the Petitioner : The first petitioner has its factory at Bombay. It is one of the leading manufacturers of Mainframe Computers, mini-computers and other electronic goods. Its business is spread over the entire country including the State of U. P. The second petitioner is a partnership firm registered with the Registrar of Firms of U. P. while the third petitioner is a citizen of India. The first petitioner carries on its business through petitioner Nos. 2 and 3. The departments of the Government, public corporations and local authorities are increasingly purchasing and using electronic goods for a more efficient discharge of their functions and so does the Government of U. P. It has set apart Rs. 3. 50 crores during the current financial year for purchase of computers and other electronic equipments. These purchases were hitherto made on a rate contract system. The rate contracts were determined by the Commissioner and Director of Industries after inviting tenders. In response to the tender notices dated 20/09/1990, called by the Commissioner and Director of Industries, U. P. petitioners submitted their tenders for approval and determination of rate contract for supply of computers and other electronic goods. The rate contracts were determined by the Commissioner and Director of Industries after inviting tenders. In response to the tender notices dated 20/09/1990, called by the Commissioner and Director of Industries, U. P. petitioners submitted their tenders for approval and determination of rate contract for supply of computers and other electronic goods. The fourth respondent (M/s/ Uptron India Ltd.) and several other manufacturers and dealers submitted their tenders which were finalised on 16/02/1991. The fourth respondent (M/s. Uptron India Ltd.), however, declined to supply goods at the rates so approved while the petitioners and other manufacturers were prepared to do so. When the petitioner contacted the departments of the Government for supply of the said goods it was apprised of the impugned Government decision. The petitioners were told that they would purchase their requirements only from M/s. Uptron (India) Ltd. and from no one else. By the impugned decision the Government of U. P. has created monopoly in favour of M/s. Uptron (India) Ltd. which is violative of the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioners by Art. 19 (1 ). It is equally violative of the guarantee enshrined in Arts. 301 and 14 of the Constitution and is liable to be quashed. M/s. Uptron (India) Ltd. , is not a department of Government. It is one of the several manufacturers of electronic goods in the country. It could not alone be preferred over other manufacturers, more particularly when it is not prepared to supply the goods at the approved rates but proposes to charge higher rates. Strong reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on a decision of a bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1986 Andh Pra 332. ( 2 ) THE fourth respondent (M/s. Uptron India Ltd.) has filed a counter-affidavit with the following averments : the fourth respondent (M/s. Uptron (India) Ltd.) is a subsidiary company of U. P. Electronic Company Ltd. , which is a Government company wholly owned and controlled by the State of U. P. Its entire paid up capital of Rs. 31. 02 crores is provided by the State of U. P. It manufactures a wide range of electronic goods and spends a substantial amount on research and development. It markets not only the goods manufactured by it but by its sister companies. 31. 02 crores is provided by the State of U. P. It manufactures a wide range of electronic goods and spends a substantial amount on research and development. It markets not only the goods manufactured by it but by its sister companies. For the year 1989-90 its turn-over was Rs. 210 crores. Only a small amount of Rs. 3. 13 crores of this turnover came from the sale of goods manufactured by other companies. It employs a large pool of technical, scientific and other personnel and it has acquired a high reputation for the quality and performance of its products throughout the country. It has entered into several technology transfer agreements with various reputed international companies like Toshiba of Japan, Unisys of U. S. A. , J. S. Telecom of France and many other countries. In 1979, the Uptron (India) Ltd. , was given a status of R and D House by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India. Its products have also received several meritorious awards. It has established a large number of service centres all over the country. In Uttar Pradesh it has got twelve factories and a large number of service centres. The approval of rate contract by the Commissioner and Director of Industries does not amount to a completed contract to purchase goods. It is only approval of rates. Such approval does not bind the Government to purchase goods of any particular manufacturer whose rates may have been approved. It is open to the Government to purchase the goods from any of the manufacturers at those rates. It is denied that the impugned order is the result of any manoeuvering on the part of the fourth respondent. The impugned order does not create any monopoly in favour of M/s. Uptron (India) Ltd. The total market of electronic goods in India is Rs. 1391 crores, out of which the share of U. P. Government is only Rs. 3 crores. Even if the petitioners and other manufacturers are excluded from this market of Rs. 3 crores, the remaining market of Rs. 1091 crores is still open to them both in the State of U. P. and all over the country. The impugned decision of the Government does not also violate Arts. 301 and 14 of the Constitution. 3 crores. Even if the petitioners and other manufacturers are excluded from this market of Rs. 3 crores, the remaining market of Rs. 1091 crores is still open to them both in the State of U. P. and all over the country. The impugned decision of the Government does not also violate Arts. 301 and 14 of the Constitution. ( 3 ) A rejoinder affidavit is filed by the petitioners wherein they have denied the fourth respondents claim of high quality of its products. It is asserted that because of its inferior quality M/s. Uptron (India) Ltd. , has been steadily losing market to other computers. The investment in R and D by the fourth respondent is nothing peculiar to it; every manufacturer does it. Petitioner No. 2 has service centres all over the country including five centres in U. P. The impugned decision of the Government of U. P. practically nullifies the rate contracts. If the electronic goods are purchased only from chosen manufacturers there was no point in inviting tenders for approval of rate contracts or in approving the rate contracts. The products of the fourth respondent carry a price tag which is 30 per cent higher than the price charged by the petitioners and other similar manufacturers. Because it is unable to compete with other manufactures it has pressuriesed the Government of U. P. to take the above decision. As a matter of fact the fourth respondent was earlier disqualified by the Commissioner and Director of Industries. Though the said disqualification withdrawn later, it shows that fourth respondent is not above committing mal-practices. ( 4 ) THE petitioners challenge is mainly based on Arts. 19 (1) (g), 301 and 14 of the Constitution. It would be appropriate to examine each of these challenges separately. We shall take up the challenge based on Art. 19 (1) (g) in the first instance. ( 5 ) ARTICLE 19 (1) (g) guarantees to citizens of India the right "to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business". Clause (6) of Art. 19, however, empowers the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the said right in the interest of general public. ( 5 ) ARTICLE 19 (1) (g) guarantees to citizens of India the right "to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business". Clause (6) of Art. 19, however, empowers the State to impose reasonable restrictions on the said right in the interest of general public. In particular the clause declares that "nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevents the State from making any law relating to, - (i ). . . . . (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise. " The question is whether the decision of the U. P. Government contained in the impugned letter does violate the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners by Art. 19 (1) (g) and if so whether it is saved by clause (6) of the said Article? ( 6 ) THE impugned decision does not prohibit the petitioners or other manufacturers of electronic goods from carrying on their manufacturing or business operations in the State of U. P. It does not prohibit any one - not even the departments of the Government, public corporations and local authorities under its control from purchasing the electronic goods manufactured by the petitioners or other manufactuers. It only directs that the Government departments, public corporations and other local authorities under its control should purchase the electronic goods of the nature specified in the impugned letter only from M/s. Uptron (India) Ltd,. which is a subsidiary company of U. P. Electronics Corporation, a company wholly owned and controlled by the State of U. P. Can it be said that by the impugned decision the Government of U. P. has violated the fundamental rights to carry on business guaranteed to the petitioners? The petitioners say, yes. They mainly rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the District collector of Hyderabad v. M/s. Ibrahim and Co. , AIR 1970 SC 1275 , which in turn refers to and relies upon the case of Mannalal Jain v. State of Assam, AIR 1962 SC 386 . It is necessary to examine the ratio of both these cases. We shall first deal with the facts in the case of Ibrahim and Co. , AIR 1970 SC 1275 , which in turn refers to and relies upon the case of Mannalal Jain v. State of Assam, AIR 1962 SC 386 . It is necessary to examine the ratio of both these cases. We shall first deal with the facts in the case of Ibrahim and Co. (supra ). In the State of Andhra Pradesh, licensing of sugar dealers was regulated by Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1963 issued under S. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The respondents in the appeal before the Supreme Court were licensed under that order. The order provided that no person shall carry on business as a dealer of sugar except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions mentioned in the licence granted. It prescribed the procedure for renewal and cancellation of licences. Besides the above order the other statutory order was the Sugar Control Order, 1963 issued by the Central Government under R. 125 (2) of Defence of India Rules, 1962. This order defined a recognised dealer as a person carrying on the business of purchasing, selling or distributing sugar and licensed under the order relating to the licensing of sugar dealers for the time being in force in a State. The order provided for placing restrictions on sale, or agreement to sell or delivery by the producers of sugar for controlling the production, sale and distribution of sugar by the producers or recognized dealers, for regulating the movement of sugar, fixation of its price and allotment of quota and so on. The respondents before the Supreme Court, having been licensed under the said order, were recognized dealers within the meaning of Sugar Control Order, 1963. The Central Government fixed quotas for each State. These quotas were lifted by different licensees and dealers nominated by the State Government on its behalf. On 30/12/1964 the State Government issued an order directing that the sugar quota allocated to "the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad" be given in its entirety to the Greater Hyderabad Consumers Central Cooperative Stores Ltd. , Hyderabad. By this order the respondents who were very large in number, were prevented from carrying on their business in sugar. They challenged the validity of the said executive order by way of petitions in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. By this order the respondents who were very large in number, were prevented from carrying on their business in sugar. They challenged the validity of the said executive order by way of petitions in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The learned single Judge allowed the writ petitions and struck down the said executive order which was confirmed on appeal. The matter was then carried to the Supreme Court. The first ground on which the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal runs thus: The impugned order is not one issued either under the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1963 or under Sugar Control Order, 1963. It is only an executive order, issued by the State Government purporting to be in furtherance of its objective of encouraging co-operative societies. Even so "the order was still unauthorised. Under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 the State Government had issued an order for distribution of sugar through licensed dealers and the respondents have obtained licences in that behalf. Their licences could only be cancelled after making the enquiry provided under the Sugar Dealers Licensing Order. The respondents were also recognized dealers within the meaning of Sugar Control Order issued by the Central Government. The rights of the respondents could not be taken away by an executive order in a manner substantiallv contrary to the statutory orders. " It is thus apparent that the first ground upon which the Supreme Court upheld the High Courts decision is that while the statutory orders issued by the State Government as well as Central Government conferred upon the respondents the right to deal in sugar, it was taken away by the State Government by issuing an executive order which cannot be done. Not only that, the executive order went further and, in effect transferred the respondents business to the co-operative society. A monopoly was created in favour of the co-operative society in the matter of dealing in sugar in that district to the exclusion of the respondents. All this without a law within the meaning of Art. 19 (6) read with Art. 13 (3) (a ). The second ground upon which the Supreme Court sustained the High Courts order is to be found in para 12 of the judgment which deals with Art. 301 of the Constitution. All this without a law within the meaning of Art. 19 (6) read with Art. 13 (3) (a ). The second ground upon which the Supreme Court sustained the High Courts order is to be found in para 12 of the judgment which deals with Art. 301 of the Constitution. The reasoning on this score runs thus : Art. 301 declares the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India free. The declaration is couched in the widest terms and applies to all forms of trade, commerce and intercourse. It is subject to certain restrictions contained in the same chapter including Arts. 304 and 305 of the Constitution. Article 304 (b) empowers the State Government to impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest but a bill for this purpose has to be introduced or moved in the legislature only with the previous sanction of the President. Art. 305, of course, saves the existing laws providing for State monopoly from the purview of Art. 301. To put it in the words of the Supreme Court :"in the present case the State had not assumed a monopoly to deal in sugar. It had granted monopoly to a Central Consumers Co-operative Stores which was not a corporation owned or controlled by the State within the meaning of Art. 19 (6) (ii ). The order was challenged on the ground that it trenches upon the freedom of trade and commerce guaranteed by Article 301 of the Constitution. By Article 304 even by legislative restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse with or within the State may only be imposed, if such restrictions are reasonable and are required in the public interest and the Bill or amendment is introduced or moved in the legislature of a State with the previous sanction of the President. Obviously the guarantee under Article 301 cannot be taken away by executive action. The guarantee under Art. 301 which imposes a restriction upon legislative power of the Parliament or the State Legislature and the declaration of freedom is not merely an abstract declaration. There is no reason to think that while placing a restriction upon legislative power the Constitution guaranteed freedom in the abstract and not of the individuals. The guarantee under Art. 301 which imposes a restriction upon legislative power of the Parliament or the State Legislature and the declaration of freedom is not merely an abstract declaration. There is no reason to think that while placing a restriction upon legislative power the Constitution guaranteed freedom in the abstract and not of the individuals. It cannot be inferred that the Constitution imposed restrictions upon Legislative power, but denied to the individuals affected by unauthorised assumption of executive power the right to challenge the exercise of that power. A vital constitutional provision cannot be so construed as to make a mockery of the declared guarantee and the constitutional restrictions on the power of the Legislature. If the power of the State Legislature is restricted in the manner provided by Art. 301, but within limits provided by Arts. 303 to 305, it would be impossible to hold that the State by executive order can do something which it is incompetent to do by legislation. "the second ground thus holds that the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed under Art. 301 cannot be interferred with by a mere executive order when it cannot be done even by a legislative measure except in accordance with Art. 304 (b ). In other words, a law within the meaning of Art. 304 must not only impose restrictions which are reasonable but a bill in that behalf be introduced in the legislature only with the previous sanction of the President. This argument must be understood in the light of the fact that the respondents who were licensed dealers under the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order and who were also recognized dealers within the meaning of Sugar Control Order were totally excluded from the said business by an executive order of the State Government. ( 7 ) WE may now examine the ratio of Manna Lal Jains case, ( AIR 1962 SC 386 ) (supra ). The Government of Assam had issued the Food Grains (Licensing and Control) Order, 1961 under S. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. While it provided for a preference in favour of co-operative societies in the matter of grant of license, it did not provide for creating monopoly in favour of co-operative societies. The Government of Assam had issued the Food Grains (Licensing and Control) Order, 1961 under S. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. While it provided for a preference in favour of co-operative societies in the matter of grant of license, it did not provide for creating monopoly in favour of co-operative societies. The petitioner was granted a license in 1958 under the preceding control order but when he applied for its renewal for the year 1959, he was told that his license would not be renewed beyond 31/12/1959 inasmuch as the Government has taken a decision to give a right of monopoly in the matter of procurement of paddy to a Co-operative Society (Assam Cooperative Apex Marketing Society Ltd. ). The said letter was questioned by the petitioner before the High Court of Assam which was allowed with a direction to the Licensing Authority to consider the petitioners application on merits and in the light of the provisions of the aforesaid Control Order. The petitioner was not granted license in spite of this order and ultimately he approached the Supreme Court directly under Article 32 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court noticed clause 5 of the aforesaid Control Order which provides for matters to be taken into consideration for granting a license. One of those considerations was mentioned in sub-clause (e) which read "whether the applicant is a co-operative society". The petitioner challenged the validity of clause 5 (e) before the Supreme Court. The said attack was repelled. It was held that such consideration is not unrelated to the twin objects underlying clause 5 (e) and, therefore, is not irrelevant. By virtue of position occupied by the co-operative societies in the village economy, the said consideration providing for a preferential grant of license in favour of co-operative societies cannot be said to be bad. But then the Court went further and held that the said clause does not authorise denial of license to a citizen altogether since it does not provide for creation of monopoly in favour of co-operative societies. It was held that by such denial the right of the petitioner guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g) has been infringed and also that such an order is discriminatory. This is the majority view expressed by B. P. Sinha, C. J. , S. K. Das, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ. It was held that by such denial the right of the petitioner guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g) has been infringed and also that such an order is discriminatory. This is the majority view expressed by B. P. Sinha, C. J. , S. K. Das, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ. Minority view is expressed by A. K. Sarkar and J. R. Mudholkar, JJ. , which upheld denial of license to a citizen on the ground that preference given to Co-operative societies, even if results in the exclusion of other dealers, would be a reasonable restriction on the right to trade and is not violative of right to trade guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g ). The principle of this judgment is that an executive order cannot supersede a statutory order nor can it nullify the rights created by a statutory order in favour of citizens. The concept of the rule of law cannot permit this. Since the control order does not permit creation of monopoly in favour of co-operative societies to the exclusion of citizens, an executive order creating such monopoly and depriving the citizens the right to trade guaranteed by the Constitution is invalid. ( 8 ) BEFORE we proceed to deal with the facts and contentions in the case before us it would be appropriate to examine the facts and ratio of the Division Bench judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1986 Andh Pra 332 (supra), upon which also strong reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Indeed this decision deals with an identical situation to the one arising before us. The Government of Andhra Pradesh had directed that all the Government departments. Government companies, public corporations and other local bodies shall purchase Light Commercial Vehicles only from M/s. Allwyn Nissan Ltd. , an undertaking of Andhra Pradesh State Government. In other words, the Government order directed that only the LMV manufactured by M/s. Allwyan Nissan Ltd. , named cabstar should be purchased. The validity of the order was challenged by one of the manufacturers of LMvs, namely, Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. , on the ground that the order violates the petitioners right to trade and business guaranteed by Art. 19 (l) (g) and is also violative of Arts. 301 and 404 of the Constitution. The validity of the order was challenged by one of the manufacturers of LMvs, namely, Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. , on the ground that the order violates the petitioners right to trade and business guaranteed by Art. 19 (l) (g) and is also violative of Arts. 301 and 404 of the Constitution. The judgment of the Bench was delivered by P. Kodandaramayya, J. while Anjaneyulu, J. appended a separate opinion expressing his reservations with respect to the few expressed by P. Kodandaramayya. J. regarding applicability of Art. 19 (1) (g) and also specifying the ground upon which he preferred to base his judgment. We shall first deal with the opinion of P. Kodandaramayya, J. The learned Judge observed that "every citizen has a right to carry on the trade and the State in its multifarious activities is itself a great trader, manufacturer and industrialist and it cannot act arbitrarily in giving jobs or entering into contracts or granting other forms of largess to whomsoever it likes. This is one of the well settled facets of Art. 14 of the Constitution as laid down by the Supreme Court. " The learned Judge observed that the impugned order is only an administrative order without reference to any statutory power and that such an order cannot take away the fundamental rights guaranteed to a citizen by Art. 19 (1) (g ). The learned Judge then dealt with the attack based on Art. 14 and after referring to certain decisions of the Supreme Court observed that "it is clear when a citizen complains about the unfavourable treatment, and discrimination against him the Court has to see who is the recipient of such largess and the terms of such largess and such action can be justified to be reasonable and in the public interest. " Tire learned Judge further observed that the second respondent, M/s. Allwyn Nissan Ltd. can be treated as constituting a class by itself for the purposes of classification but even so the order violates Art. 14, because there is no nexus between the said classification and the object of protecting new entrants. " Tire learned Judge further observed that the second respondent, M/s. Allwyn Nissan Ltd. can be treated as constituting a class by itself for the purposes of classification but even so the order violates Art. 14, because there is no nexus between the said classification and the object of protecting new entrants. The learned Judge observed that it is not reasonable to deny the entire market in public sector to other manufacturers and the classification of the second respondent as a class by itself cannot justify excluding all other manufacturers and deny them the benefit of the entire market in the public sector. Hence the impugned order is clearly hit by Art. 14 and cannot be justified by executive action. It is neither reasonable nor can be justified on ground of public interest. The learned Judge then dealt with the attack based upon Art. 301. The learned Judge noticed the observations in Ibrahims case, (supra) and held that in view of the said pronouncement he feels no hesitation in holding that the impugned order is clearly hit by Art. 301 of the Constitution. The learned Judge then come back to the attack based on Art. 19 (1) (g) and held that since the petitioner is a corporate body it cannot be treated as a citizen and cannot, therefore, complain of violation of Art. 19 (1) (g ). Anjaneyulu, J. in his separate opinion opined that he would prefer not to express any opinion on the violation or otherwise of Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. He based his judgment entirely upon Art. 14. The learned Judge pointed out the vast difference between the price of CABSTAR manufactured by M/s Allwyn Nissan Ltd. , and the price of a similar LMV manufactured by the petitioner (it was Rs. 1,38,563. 00 as against Rs. 97,568. 00) and held that inasmuch as the impugned Government order was issued with the obvious purpose of helping M/s Allwyn Nissan Ltd. from facing "stiff competition" in the market, it must be held to be arbitrary and violative of Art. 14. The learned Judge rejected the contention advanced by M/s Allwyn Nissan Ltd. , that the said decision was taken after examining the merits and the quality of its product. The learned Judge rejected the contention advanced by M/s Allwyn Nissan Ltd. , that the said decision was taken after examining the merits and the quality of its product. The learned Judge held that the material placed before him does not satisfy him that any such investigation was undertaken by the Government before issuing the order and that the real purpose of the order was to save M/s Allwyn Nissan Ltd. , from stiff competition presented by other manufacturers of LMVs. As stated above this decision squarely supports the petitioners contention. The question, however, is whether it lays down the law correctly. ( 9 ) THE first question is whether the petitioners right guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g) has been curtailed or taken away by the impugned order and whether the said order creates a monopoly in favour of M/s Uptron (India) Ltd. We think not. The petitioners are free to carry on business both of manufacturing and selling their products throughout India and even in the U. P. All that the impugned letter does is that it directs the departments of Government, public sector corporations, companies owned and controlled by it and the local authorities to purchase their requirement of certain specified electronic goods only from M/s Uptron (India) Ltd. This cannot amount to creating a monopoly in favour of M/s Uptron (India) Ltd. There is no analogy between Ibrahims case and Manna Lal Jains case, on one hand and this case on the other. In Ibrahims case the licensed/recognized dealers were totally deprived of their business by an executive order while they were entitled to carry on the said business by virtue of licenses granted under statutory orders. This was held to be bad. Similarly, in Mannalal Jains case the petitioner was totally deprived of his right to carry on the business of food grains by virtue of refusal of license. Moreover, in that case the statutory order did not permit creation of a monopoly in food grains by the State in favour of a Co-operative Society. It was field that what is not sanctioned by a statutory order cannot be achieved by an executive order. We are unable to see any fundamental right in the petitioners to compel the Government to purchase their products. No such right flows from Art. 19 (1) (g ). Nor is there any other statutory provision clothing them with such right. It was field that what is not sanctioned by a statutory order cannot be achieved by an executive order. We are unable to see any fundamental right in the petitioners to compel the Government to purchase their products. No such right flows from Art. 19 (1) (g ). Nor is there any other statutory provision clothing them with such right. Of course, if the petitioners had been totally deprived of their right to do business in their products they could have validly complained of violation of their fundamental right but that has not been done here. In this connection we may refer to the decision of Supreme Court in M/s Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1980 SC 1992 . In that case the State of Jammu and Kashmir excluded about 12 lacs blazes in inaccessible areas as a matter of policy and kept that area out of auction sale by the State. The said area was allotted by it to a private party for tapping under certain terms and conditions, which was questioned by certain citizens as violative of Art. 19 (1) (g ). The attack based on Art. 19 (1) (g) was repelled on the following reasoning :"the impugned order did not hand over the tapping of the entire forest area in the State exclusively to the 2nd respondents so as to deny the opportunity of tapping any forest areas to the petitioners. What was done under the impugned order was merely to allot 11,85,414 blazes in the inaccessible areas of Reasi, Ramban and Poonch divisions to the 2nd respondent so that the 2nd respondent could have an assured supply of 3500 metric tonnes of resin for the purpose of feeding the factory to be set up by them in the State and a large number of blazes amounting to about 68 lacs in other forest areas of the State were left available for tapping by the petitioners and other forest contractors. No monopoly was created in favour of the second respondents; the petitioners and other forest contractors could bid for wage contract in respect of the other blazes which were more than five times in number than the blazes allotted to the second respondent. " ( 10 ) IN our opinion, the said reasoning applies with equal force in the present case. " ( 10 ) IN our opinion, the said reasoning applies with equal force in the present case. It is not as if the petitioners only business is selling to U. P. Government. As pointed out in the respondents counter affidavit. . . . . . . which fact has not been controverted in the rejoinder affidavit out of the total market of Rs. 1391 crores, the purchase by U. P. Government represents a mere Rs. 3 crores. Even within the State of U. P. the market is of Rs. 16 crores. The petitioners are free to sell to others in U. P. and all over the country. Even if we take the State of U. P. it cannot be said that denying a market of Rs. 3 crores out of total market of Rs. 16 crores amounts to deprivation of the fundamental right of the petitioners to sell their products nor can it be said that by that token a monopoly is created in favour of M/s Uptron (India) Ltd. A major portion of the market is still available and open to the petitioners and other similar manufacturers. In such a situation the question of absence of a law within the meaning of clause (6) of Art. 19 does not arise. There is no statutory provision which entitles them to sell their goods to the Government nor any such statutory right has been taken away by an executive order as in the case of Ibrahim, AIR 1970 SC 1275 . The attack based upon Art. 19 (1) (g) is, therefore, rejected. ( 11 ) WE may in this connection refer to the decision of Supreme Court in M/s Daruka and Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 2711 , relied upon by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for M/s Uptron (India) Ltd. The attack in that case was upon the canalisation of export scheme. By a notification, mica was included within the said scheme with the result that all export of mica had to be canalised through the Mineral and Metals Trading Corporation of India Ltd. (MMTC ). It was argued that the canalisation scheme in effect transfers the business of the petitioner (exporter) and his good-will in favour of the Corporation. It was submitted that the scheme evolved was outside the purview of Export Control Order, 1968 as well as the Import and Export Act, 1947. It was argued that the canalisation scheme in effect transfers the business of the petitioner (exporter) and his good-will in favour of the Corporation. It was submitted that the scheme evolved was outside the purview of Export Control Order, 1968 as well as the Import and Export Act, 1947. It was also argued that the scheme constitutes an unreasonable restriction upon the petitioners fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g ). Article 14 was also invoked by the petitioner. It was held by the Supreme Court following its earlier decision in Glass Chatons case, AIR 1961 SC 1514 , that the scheme of canalisation does not amount to acquisition of right to carry on trade and that it only interposed an agency in the matter of export trade. It was further held that the attack based upon Art. 19 (1) (g) is untenable inasmuch as they were not prohibited from doing the business but only restriction was that they must canalise their goods through the Corporation. It was held that the canalisation scheme was in public interest and must be upheld. ( 12 ) NOW we come to the contention based upon Art. 14 of the Constitution. Its principle has been well illustrated by several decisions of the Supreme Court, in particular Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 , M/s. Kasturi lal Lakshmi Reddy v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir. AIR 1980 SC 1992 (supra ). This aspect is also illustrated and emphasised by the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 266 . In short the principle is this. While purchasing goods for meeting its requirements, the State (as defined in Art. 12) which would include public sector corporations, local authorities and Government companies owned and controlled by a (Government) should not discriminate between a citizen and citizen. It must give equal opportunity to all to sell their goods or for that matter to enter into contract/agreements for sale of goods with the Government. It cannot prefer one over other unless public interest so demands. The Government no doubt has a discretion in this matter but it is not unlimited or arbitrary. It must be exercised in public interest. It cannot prefer one over other unless public interest so demands. The Government no doubt has a discretion in this matter but it is not unlimited or arbitrary. It must be exercised in public interest. It would be sufficient if we refer the following observation in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India, (supra) :"the discretion of the Government has been held to be not unlimited in that the Government cannot give or withhold largess in its arbitrary discretion or at its sweet will or on such terms as it chooses in its absolute discretion. There are two limitations imposed by law which structure and control the discretion of the Government in this behalf. The first is in regard to the terms on which largess may be granted and the other in regard to the persons who may be recipients of such largess. Every activity of the Government has a public element in it and it must, therefore, be informed with reason and guided by public interest. Every action taken by the Government must be in public interest; the Government cannot act arbitrarily and without reason and if it does, its action would be liable to be invalidated. If the Government awards a contract or leases out or otherwise deals with its property or grants any other largess, it would be liable to be tested for its validity on the touchstone of reasonableness and public interest and if it fails to satisfy either test, it would be unconstitutional and invalid. " ( 13 ) LET us now examine whether the impugned action of the Government is liable to be struck down on the above principles? M/s Uptron (India) Ltd. , is a subsidiary company of the U. P. Electronics Corporation Ltd. which is a corporation wholly owned and controlled by the State of U. P. It is undoubtedly not a part of the Government. It is an independent Corporation having its own separate juristic entity. We are not unaware of the philosophy underlying the creation of such corporations. It is that such corporations must be run as business propositions and must compete with other similar corporations unless, of course, a monopoly is created in their favour. They are supposed to have their own economics and must become viable as economic entities. We are not unaware of the philosophy underlying the creation of such corporations. It is that such corporations must be run as business propositions and must compete with other similar corporations unless, of course, a monopoly is created in their favour. They are supposed to have their own economics and must become viable as economic entities. But this principle cannot be carried too far nor can we ignore the realities of the situation nor allow our vision to be blurred by the aforesaid legal considerations while considering the reasonableness of the Government action under Art. 14. After all public money is invested in these corporations and any losses suffered by such concerns tell upon the public exchequer. This point need not be elaborated; the experience over the last few decades conclusively establishes this fact. Thousand of crores of public money is being spent every year in sustaining and subsidising them. While examining the reasonableless of the action and in scrutinising whether the action of the Government serves public interest, the fact that they are in effect public concerns cannot be over-looked. Now here is a corporation wholly owned and controlled by the State. A substantial amount of public money is invested in it. It has got a huge organization including a large number of factories, service centres, employing a large number of persons. It manufactures quality goods just like the other manufacturers do in the country. The price of its products does not vary substantially from the products of the other manufacturers. (It is necessary to point out here that unlike in the Andhra Pradesh High Court decision in Mahindra and Mahindras case, AIR 1986 Andh Pra 332), there is no material in this case to show that the products of M/s. Uptron (India) Ltd. are priced substantially higher than comparable products of the petitioners. Only a general allegation to this effect is made, that too in the rejoinder affidavit, to which averment no value can be attached.) In addition to the above circumstances, M/s. Uptron (India) Ltd. is having larger number of service centres in the State and it has got a far bigger organization including R and D facilities than any other similar manufacturer in the country. It has entered into technology transfer agreements with various reputed international companies in Japan and U. S. A. It does not appear that the petitioner has entered into any such agreement. It has entered into technology transfer agreements with various reputed international companies in Japan and U. S. A. It does not appear that the petitioner has entered into any such agreement. Electronics is a field where technological advance is very rapid. There is also no absolute identity between the products of one manufacturer and the other. There are several individual features besides quality and offer of facilities like repairing and servicing facilities. If in the above circumstances the Government of U. P. says that the State of U. P. (in the larger sense including the public sector corporations, local authorities and other companies owned and controlled by the Government of U. P.) shall purchase their requirements of certain specified electronic goods only from M/s Uptron (India) Ltd. , can it be said that the said decision is unreasonable or that it is not in public interest. May be, by this process the Government of U. P. wants to encourage M/s Uptron (India) Ltd. , can it be said that the said decision is unreeasonable or that it is not in public interest. May be, by this process the Government of U. P. wants to encourage M/s Uptron (India) Ltd. , but is there anything wrong in it? We see noting unreasonable or contrary to public interest if the State chooses to encourage a public sector concern as against a non-public sector concern in the matter of purchasing their products so long as there is no substantial difference in quality or price of both the products. It cannot be forgotten that if the public sector concern incurs loss it has ultimately to come out of the public exchequer. We may not be understood as saying that this argument is a cover for permitting inefficiency nor an argument against competitiveness which seems to be the current economic doctrine. All we are saying is that other this being substantially equal it would not be unreasonable for the Government to prefer a public sector concern. Such a course in fact serves public interest rather than defeating it. On this reasoning the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in so far as it is based upon Article 14, is distinguishable though we may not agree with the other propositions enunciated therein. For the above reasons the attack based upon Art. 14 of the Constitution also fails. On this reasoning the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in so far as it is based upon Article 14, is distinguishable though we may not agree with the other propositions enunciated therein. For the above reasons the attack based upon Art. 14 of the Constitution also fails. ( 14 ) WE shall now deal with the argument based on Art. 301. We must say at the very outset that we are unable to see any relevance of Art. 301 in the facts and circumstances of this case. Article 301 declares that subject to the other provisions of Part 13 (the Article occurs in part 13) trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free. We are unable to see, how this right, or guarantee as may be called, is defeated or restricted by the Government of U. P. in refusing to purchase the products of the petitioners. The guarantee no doubt extends not only to trade, commerce and intercourse with a State but also within the State but it is difficult to say that this guarantee takes in or confers upon the petitioners a right to sell their goods to the Government. In Ibrahims case, (supra), Art. 301 was attracted because the respondents therein who were licensees under the Andhra Pradesh Control Order and recognized dealers within the meaning of Central Order were totally excluded from their business, namely, to deal in sugar by an executive order. Similarly in Mannalal Jains case, (supra), the petitioner could not carry oil business in foodgrains except under license and that was denied to him on the ground that the Government wishes to confine the said licenses only to co-operative societies. The relevant statutory order did not provide for creation of such a monopoly. No such deprivation or exclusion is present in this case. The petitioners are free to sell their goods not only throughout the country but also in the State of U. P. The total market of electronic goods in the U. P. is Rs. 16 crores out of which the purchase by the Government is only Rs. 3 crores. The petitioners business does not consist only in selling to the Government nor is it a case where they cannot carry on their trade or business unless they are permitted to sell to the Government. 16 crores out of which the purchase by the Government is only Rs. 3 crores. The petitioners business does not consist only in selling to the Government nor is it a case where they cannot carry on their trade or business unless they are permitted to sell to the Government. We must say with all due respect at our command that the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mahindera and Mahindra, (supra), is not correct in so far as it holds that Art. 301 was violated by the impugned order in that case. The said conclusion was arrived at by the said Court purporting to apply the ratio of Ibrahims case, AIR 1970 SC 1275 , but as we have explained above, the facts in Ibrahims case are entirely different and can have no application to a case like the present one. ( 15 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Weston Electronics v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 2038 , but that was a case where the sales tax on locally manufactured electronics goods was reduced while the rate of tax over electronics goods manufactured outside the State of Gujarat was maintained at l5 per cent. This was held to be violative of Art. 301. It was a clear case of discrimination where the goods manufactured outside the State of Gujarat were subjected to a higher rate of tax while the goods manufactured within the State of Gujarat were taxed at a far lower rate i. e. 1 per cent. By this method the goods manufactured outside the State of Gujarat were made incompetitive if we can use the expression; they were practically priced out of the market. ( 16 ) FOR the above reasons, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs. Petition dismissed. .