Judgment :- The petitioners are challenging their adjudication as insolvents by the Additional District Judge at Erode in C.M.ANo.51 of 1990. The 1st petitioner is the husband of the petitioner. The 1st petitioner filed I.P.No.16 of 1985 on the file of Sub Court, Erode, 10.10.1985 for declaring him an insolvent. The first respondent herein was shown as creditor, to whom a sum of Rs.1,40,000 was stated to be due. On the same day, the second petitioner filed I.P.No.15 of 1985 for declaring her an insolvent. The first respondent herein was shown to be a creditor and the same amount of Rs.1,40,000 was mentioned as debt. In both the petitions, it was alleged that the business of the first petitioner ended heavy loss and they could not pay the debts due to the creditors. The petitioners were opposed by the creditors. The second respondent herein filed applications to get itself impleaded as party to the said Insolvency Petitions. Those petitions were ordered and second respondent was impleaded. The debt due to the second respondent was mentioned to be Rs.1,25,000. The petitions were dismissed for default on 21.7.1987 as the petitioners and their counsel were absent. 2. On 9.11.1987, the respondents herein filed I.P.No.41 of 1987 on the file of Sub Erode, against the petitioners for adjudging them insolvents. Paragraph 9 of the reads as follows: “9. In spite of repeated demands in person, the respondents did not repay any amount the petitioners. The petitioners understand that the respondents had borrowed further from several other creditors also. With the mala fide intention to defeat and defraud debts payable to the petitioners, and the other crditors, the respondents were preparations to leave Erode and also to seclude themselves so as to deprive their creditors of the means of communicating with them. Before doing so, both the respondents petitions separately to be adjudged an insolvent under the Provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. The insolvency petition filed by the first respondent was numbered I.P.No.16 of 1985 and the insolvency petition filed by the 2nd respondent was numbered I.P.No.15 of 1985, both having been presented before Sub Court, Erode on 10.10.1985. Before doing so, both the respondents petitions separately to be adjudged an insolvent under the Provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. The insolvency petition filed by the first respondent was numbered I.P.No.16 of 1985 and the insolvency petition filed by the 2nd respondent was numbered I.P.No.15 of 1985, both having been presented before Sub Court, Erode on 10.10.1985. Several of the respondents/creditors including the present petitions before the said But suddenly both the respondents allowed their respective petition to be dismissed default on 21.7.1987, again with the mala fide intention and design to cause loss hardship to the petitioners and the other genuine creditors. Both the respondent also Erode and secluded themselves in some unknown place for several months in the 1986.” 3. In paragraph 11, the cause of action is stated to have arisen on 10.10.1985 when respondents presented Insolvency Petitions to adjudge themselves as insolvents and subsequent dates when the respondents departed from their usual place of business secluded themselves for several months in places unknown to the petitioners and creditors at Erode town. 4. The respondents filed a counter statement on 11.8.1989. Paragraphs 5 and 6 counter statement are in these terms: “5. The contentions of para 9 of the petition are false. The act of the insolvency against the respondent is false and incorrect. Hence the petitioners are not entitled order of this application. 6. The petitioners have no cause of action to file the petition, one alleged is false and non-est. The respondents reserve their right to file additional counter if any at a future date.” There is no other averments in the counter statement either denying specifically allegations found in paragraph 9 of the Insolvency petition or stating clearly whereabouts of the respondents during the relevant period. 5. The first respondent herein was examined as P.W.I. The Chief-examination commenced on 1.12.1989. Exs.A-1 to A-7 were marked on that date. The matter was adjourned 5.12.1989 for continuation and thence to 12.12.1989, 13.121989, 14.12.1989, 19.12.1989, 22.12.1989 and 4.1.1990. On that date, the examination of P.W.I continued and Exs.A A-22 were marked. It was posted to 5.1.1990 for continuation and further adjourned 8.1.1990 on request of the first petitioner herein. On 8.1.1990 P.W.I was cross and his evidence was closed. Ex.B-1 was marked. For further evidence on the side respondents herein, the matter was adjourned to 10.1.1990, 18.1.1990, 22.1.1990 27.1.1990. It was posted to 5.1.1990 for continuation and further adjourned 8.1.1990 on request of the first petitioner herein. On 8.1.1990 P.W.I was cross and his evidence was closed. Ex.B-1 was marked. For further evidence on the side respondents herein, the matter was adjourned to 10.1.1990, 18.1.1990, 22.1.1990 27.1.1990. On 27.1.1990 P.W.2 was examined and the matter was adjourned to 12.1990. On 12.1990 it was adjourned to 3.21990, on which date P.W3 was examined. It was to 6.21990 for further evidence. On 6.21990 the petitioners’ evidence was closed and matter was adjourned to 8.2.1990 for respondents’ evidence. It was further adjourned 13.21990, on which date an additional counter was filed by the first petitioner herein with a petition for receiving the same. In the said additional counter, there is no averment with regard to the particular act of insolvency alleged to have been committed by the tioners herein. The matter was adjourned to 19.21990, 27.21990, 5.3.1990, 7.3.1990 143.1990. On 14.3.1990 another additional counter was filed along with a petition to the same. That additional counter contains only one sentence viz., “Petition is barred limitation.” The Subordinate Judge allowed the applications to receive additional counters and accepted both the additional counters on file. He granted liberty to the respondents herein to file a reply statement, if any, and adjourned the matter to 22.3.1990. A statement was filed on 223.1990 by the respondents herein. Paragraph 4 in the statement is as follows: “4. Both the respondents left Erode and secluded themselves in some unknown places several months prior to the filing of this petition. Even after filing the petitions in I.P.No.16 of 1985 and I.F.No.15 of 1985, the respondents were absenting themselves by secluding some unknown places so as to deprive their creditors to have any communication with Because of their absence, the creditors were not able to locate them even during pendency of the petitions in I.P.No.16 of 1985 and 15 of 1985. Even after the petitions dismissed for default on 21.7.1987, these petitioners were not able to locate respondents herein. Only after filing of this petition, the first respondent appeared through counsel and till then he along with his wife had been secluding themselves in some unknown places. Therefore this petition is not barred by limitation.” 6. P.W.1 was recalled for further examination pursuant to an order on application therefor. On 28.3.1990 he was examined and again cross-examined. Only after filing of this petition, the first respondent appeared through counsel and till then he along with his wife had been secluding themselves in some unknown places. Therefore this petition is not barred by limitation.” 6. P.W.1 was recalled for further examination pursuant to an order on application therefor. On 28.3.1990 he was examined and again cross-examined. His evidence concluded 10.4.1990. The first petitioner herein was examined as R.W.1 on 16.4.1990. On the date, produced Exs.B-3 to B-10 and marked the same. 7. The Subordinate Judge discussed at length the genuineness of the debts claimed due to the respondents herein and held that no debt was due to the first respondent but debts were due to the second respondent. He proceeded to hold that the petition not filed within a period of three months from the date of act of insolvency. According him, the petition ought to have been filed within the period of three months from October, 1985 as the case of the respondents herein was that the petitioners had secluded themselves since October, 1985. The Subordinate Judge also opined that the respondents herein had fabricated false documents and filed the petition in the insolvency jurisdiction without approaching the regular civil forum, which would be a sufficient cause for dismissing the petition. Ultimately, he dismissed the insolvency petition. On appeal by the respondents, the Additional District Judge held that the question as to the genuineness of the debts not arise for consideration at this stage and the petitioners herein have committed an insolvency under Sec.6(d)(ii) and (iii) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The Additional District Judge held that the petition is not barred by limitation as it has been filed within a period three months from the date on which the respondents herein came to know of commission of act of iasol-vency. Consequently, the Additional District Judge allowed appearand adjudged the petitioners herein insolvents. 8. When the civil revision petition was posted for admission, the respondents appeared through counsel, having entered caveat already. Counsel on both sides agreed for the disposal of the civil revision petition and addressed arguments at length, after taking several adjournments therefor. Consequently, the Additional District Judge allowed appearand adjudged the petitioners herein insolvents. 8. When the civil revision petition was posted for admission, the respondents appeared through counsel, having entered caveat already. Counsel on both sides agreed for the disposal of the civil revision petition and addressed arguments at length, after taking several adjournments therefor. Learned counsel for the petitioners stated fairly that the question of genuineness of the debts does not arise for consideration this stage and the requirement prescribed in Sec.9(1)(a) and (b) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, hereinafter called ‘the Act’, is fulfilled in this case. He argued, however, insolvency petition deserves to be dismissed, as even according to the allegations petition, the act of insolvency occurred much before the period of three months prior presentation of the petition. At a later stage in the arguments, he contended petitioners did not commit the alleged act of insolvency and there was no proof therefore was also argued by him that the learned Additional District Judge has not given any on the relevant question of fact and in any event, has not considered the documents the petitioners herein in support of their case. 9. The first of the contentions urged by learned counsel for the petitioners is based interpretation of Sec.6(d) of the Act. The other two contentions rest on the facts available to the court. Hence, I will deal with the latter two contentions and conclusion on the facts and then proceed to consider the provisions of the Act. 10. I have already extracted the relevant portions of the pleadings with regard to the insolvency alleged. In spite of the specific averments in paragraph 9 of the Insolvency Petition, the petitioners herein have not chosen to make specific denials in their counter two additional counters. Nor have they come forward with a positive case as regards whereabouts and activities during the relevant period. It should be noted that the petitioners had more than two years’ time before the first petitioner entered the witness box as have also adverted to the fact that the evidence of P.W.I, the first respondent herein, completed and the evidence on the side of the respondents herein was closed before petitioners herein filed their additional counters. Even then the petitioners did not set relevant facts, but they were content with raising the plea of bar of limitation. Even then the petitioners did not set relevant facts, but they were content with raising the plea of bar of limitation. Having such a plea in the second additional counter, the petitioners have now raised grounds memorandum of grounds of revision petition that the requirement of Sec.9(c) of the not a period of limitation, but a condition precedent and find fault with the appellate for having framed a point as to whether the insolvency petition was barred by limitation have also referred to the circumstance that Exs.B-3 to B-10 were produced in court first time on 16.4.1990 when R.W.1 entered the witness box. With the above facts background, the court has to consider whether the evidence on record makes commission of act of insolvency by the petitioners herein. 11. P.W.1 in his chief-examination stated that at the time of the present petition, petitioners herein were not in Erode. In the cross-examination he repeated the same denied the suggestion that he did not make enquiries in places outside Erode. He denied suggestion that the petitioners lived only in Erode. He denied another suggestion him that he occupied the house mentioned in Ex.A-20, when the petitioners went town. When he was examined on 28.3.1990 he deposed that the petitioners left the after filing I.P.Nos.15 and 16 of 1985 and that the petitioners herein were not in town the present LP. was filed. He added that they were not there even for a year prior He stated that himself and four or five persons along with him searched for the petitioners and they were not found in Erode. He deposed that they went to Ambasamudram, the place of the petitioners and could not find them. He deposed that the place of the petitioners could not be found till the filing of the petition. In the cross-examination he admitted the petition the petitioners herein were stated to be in Soorampatti. He denied suggestion that the petitioners were living in their own house in No.10, State Bank till the filing of the present petition. He denied the suggestion that on 10.10.1985 the of the petitioners was not delivered to him as per Ex.A-20 and that he broke open and entered the house unlawfully. Major part of the cross-examination was focused the genuineness of the debts said to ’ be due to the respondents. He denied the suggestion that on 10.10.1985 the of the petitioners was not delivered to him as per Ex.A-20 and that he broke open and entered the house unlawfully. Major part of the cross-examination was focused the genuineness of the debts said to ’ be due to the respondents. Much attention given to the act of insolvency alleged to have been committed. In fact, there suggestion in the cross-examination that the first petitioner was doing business in and also carrying on business of tailoring at the same place in which he was carrying on business. No specific suggestions were put to P.W.I with regard to the whereabouts of the petitioners herein during the relevant period. 12. P.Ws.2 to 5 did not speak anything about the act of insolvency. R.W.1, the petitioner herein, stated in his chief-examination that he allowed the earlier petitions I.P.Nos.15 and 16 of 1985 to be dismissed as well the creditors told him not to proceed the same. He stated that after the filing of the earlier petitions, he locked the house went to Ambasamudram in connection with a death. According to him, he returned after or twelve days and found that the first respondent herein broke open the lock and occupied the house. He deposed that he gave a complaint to the police, but he was advised to approach the court, as there was a lease deed. He deposed that he was staying Soorampatty since then and it was false to say that he left Erode in order to cheat creditors. It was also deposed that after the dismissal of the earlier insolvency petitions, opened a shop for selling buttons and he was doing tailoring. He alleged that he repaying the debts due to the creditors in driblets. According to him Exs.B-3 to B the receipts for payment of rent for the place where he was carrying on , button business and that it was false to say that he secluded himself from June 1986. In the examination he stated that he never had accounts for the business which he carried in 84. He stated that he had office in 18, Sivashanmugam Street and 81-82, Brough Road. admitted that he had a phone. He admitted that he closed his accounts which he had Nedungadi Bank. In the examination he stated that he never had accounts for the business which he carried in 84. He stated that he had office in 18, Sivashanmugam Street and 81-82, Brough Road. admitted that he had a phone. He admitted that he closed his accounts which he had Nedungadi Bank. According to him, he handed over the pass-book to the Bank and that knew not the month or the year in which the account was closed. He was doing business under the name and style G.M.M.Lottery in the places referred to above till 2.10.1985. admitted having borrowed from the second respondent herein. He stated that he did know the dates on which he borrowed the money and the amounts he borrowed. He that he had no accounts or any notes and that he was deposing about his debts only his memory. He claimed to have given a complaint at Karungalpalayam police station personally as regards the respondents’ occupation of his house twelve days after the filing the LP. He claimed that he began to reside at 21/10, Gramani street, Soorampatty, 20 after filing the Insolvency Petition. According to him, the rent was Rs.180 and he did know the date on which he started residing there. He lived there for 11/2 years and at time of deposition he was living in Soorampat-tyvalasu, where he received the summons denied the suggestion that he went out of Erode after filing the earlier Insolvency Petitions and came to Soorampatty only after the filing of the present petition. He admitted signatures in the documents filed by the respondents herein. He claimed that he was having the bunk shop for the last one year. That means, he was having the shop from 1989. said that he had the tailoring shop from 1987. According to him, he had the said shops the same place where he was having his previous business. He denied the suggestion he was away from the place from October, 1985 to November 1987. He stated that Exs.B to B-8 (obviously mistake for Exs.B-3 to B-10) were rent receipts for 18, Sivashanmugam Street and that Abdul Samad had signed the same. He stated that the prior receipts available but were not filed in court He denied the suggestion that the receipts were falsely fabricated. He claimed that he had noted the repayments of debts to some creditors and could produce such notes. He stated that the prior receipts available but were not filed in court He denied the suggestion that the receipts were falsely fabricated. He claimed that he had noted the repayments of debts to some creditors and could produce such notes. According to him, he repaid the debts from the income derived from tailoring shop and button shop. He stated that he would get a profit of Rs.1,000 mensem from the two shops and denied the suggestion that he could not discharge debts with his properties. 13. Much reliance is placed on Exs.B-3 to B-10 which are rental receipts purporting to been issued by K.K.Abdul Samad Sahib, Erode, from 30.4.1987 to 30.11.1987. The rent stated to be Rs.350. They purport to relate to a shop in Sivashanmugam Street, Erode per the receipts, rent was being paid on the last day of each month commencing from 1987 to November, 1987. Significantly, the Door Number of the shop in Sivashanmugam Street, is not mentioned in any of the receipts. It is left blank, though the printed contains a provision therefor. The description of the premises is may mean eastern shop or the ground floor shop. The petitioners have not chosen to examine Abdul Samad who is said to have issued the receipts. While it is stated by R.W.1 in the chief examination that Exs.B-3 to B-10 are receipts for the place where he is carrying on button business, in the cross-examination he has stated that the “”bunk shop was commenced only one year prior to his deposition, i.e., from 1989. According to his statement in cross-examination, the tailoring shop was commenced earlier in 1987. Thus, his version in the chief-examination that the receipts pertained to button shop cannot be true, as the same was commenced only in 1989. The receipts do not have any serial number though there is a provision therefor. A look at the receipts give rise to a suspicion that they were written on the same day at the same time. Viewed in the background of late production of the receipts, without any specific pleading with regard to the business buttons and tailoring by the 1st petitioner and the aforesaid suspicious circumstances, receipts cannot be accepted as evidence of the first petitioner carrying on business in a in Sivashanmugam Street. Viewed in the background of late production of the receipts, without any specific pleading with regard to the business buttons and tailoring by the 1st petitioner and the aforesaid suspicious circumstances, receipts cannot be accepted as evidence of the first petitioner carrying on business in a in Sivashanmugam Street. While he mentioned in his evidence that the rent for residence in Gramani Street was Rs.180, he did not say anything about the rent for his shop. He did not produce the notes said to have been maintained by him for repayment of due to some creditors from out of his business income. He did not examine any creditors to whom he had repaid. His version that he did not maintain any accounts business and that he returned the pass-book to the bank after closing the account knowing the month or year in which the account was closed is wholly unbelievable. A of his evidence shows that he has not placed the truth before the Court. 14. The positive evidence of P.W.1 taken along with the circumstances that the petitioners herein allowed the earlier insolvency petitions to be dismissed for default, the pleading of the petitioners in the present petition and the unreliable evidence adduced the first petitioner herein enable the Court to hold on the facts that the petitioners have committed the act of insolvency as stated in the Insolvency Petition. It is no doubt that there is no express reference in the order of the appellate Judge to Exs.B-3 to B that does not vitiate his finding in paragraph 12 that the petitioners herein left Erode purpose of cheating their creditors and secluded themselves so as to deprive the creditors the means of communicating with them. The appellate Judge has relied on the absence specific pleading on the part of the petitioners and their admission that they had gone Erode in 1986 for some period besides the dismissal of the earlier Insolvency Petitions account of the absence of themselves and their counsel. As I have pointed out Exs.B-3 to B-10 do not constitute acceptable evidence. The failure of the appellate Judge refer to the same will not amount to material irregularity or illegality in the exercise jurisdiction, I do not find any warrant or justification to interfere with the finding arrived at by the appellate Judge in paragraph 12 of his order. 15. The failure of the appellate Judge refer to the same will not amount to material irregularity or illegality in the exercise jurisdiction, I do not find any warrant or justification to interfere with the finding arrived at by the appellate Judge in paragraph 12 of his order. 15. Turning to the relevant provisions in the Act, Sec.6 sets out the acts of insolvency. better to set out the entire section here in order to appreciate the significance provisions in Sub-sec.(d). The section reads as follows: "6. A debtor commits an act of insolvency in each of the following cases, namely: (a) if, in (India) or elsewhere, he makes ’ a transfer of all or substantially all his property third person for the benefit of his creditors generally; (b) if, in (India) or elsewhere, he makes a transfer of his property or of any part thereof intent to defeat or delay his creditors; (c) if, in (India) or elsewhere, he makes any ‘ transfer of his property, or of any part which would, under this or any other enactment for the time being in force, be void fraudulent preference if he were adjudged an insolvent; (d) if, with intent to defeat or delay his credidors, — (i) he departs or remains out of the territories to which this Act extends, (ii) he departs from his dwelling-house or usual place of business or otherwise absents himself, (iii) he secludes himself so as to deprive his creditors of the means of communication him; (e) if any of his property has been sold in expedition of the decree of any Court for payment of money; (f) if he petitions to be adjudged an insolvent under the provisions of this Act; (g) if he gives notice to any of his creditors that he has suspended, or that he is about suspend, payment of his debts; or (h) if he is imprisoned in execution of the decree of any Court for the payment of money. Explanation: For the purposes of this Section the act of an agent may be the act of principal.” 16. In this case we are concerned with sub-sec(d), clauses (ii) and (iii). Under sub-clause (ii), there are two parts. The first part relates to the debtor departing from dwelling house or usual place of business and the second part relates to his absenting himself otherwise. In this case we are concerned with sub-sec(d), clauses (ii) and (iii). Under sub-clause (ii), there are two parts. The first part relates to the debtor departing from dwelling house or usual place of business and the second part relates to his absenting himself otherwise. Clause (ii) pertains to the seclusion of the debtor by himself so as deprive his creditors of the means of communicating with him. In clauses (ii) and together, three situations are contemplated. One, the debtor departs from his dwelling house or usual place of business. Two, the debtor absents himself otherwise from his dwelling house or usual place of business. Three, he secludes himself so as to deprive his creditors the means of communicating with him. In the first of the contingencies, the act of insolvency is complete as soon as the debtor departs from his dwelling house or usual place of business with intent to defeat or delay his creditors. The second contingency arises when the debtor absents himself from his dwelling house or his usual place of business otherwise than departure therefrom. It is possible for a debtor to be absent from his dwelling house or place of business without actual physical absence. In a case where the debtor takes an assumed name so as to conceal himself and be out of reach of his creditors, it will be an absence otherwise than by departure. Even if the debtor conceals himself in a room of the house place of business on a false pretext, that will also fall within, the second part of clause But, in the case of absenting himself, it is a continuing act of insolvency so long as he absent. The act is not completed on the first day on which he absents himself, but continues until he presents himself. It is a continuing act of insolvency, giving rise to a cause of action for filing a petition for adjudication every day and every moment till the absence comes to an end. (Vide: RE Alderson Ex parte Jackson, (1895)1 Q.B.183). Similarly; in third contingency also, there is no necessity for the debtor to leave his dwelling house usual place of business. Even without doing so, he could seclude himself in such a way as deprive his creditors of the means of communication with him. (Vide: RE Alderson Ex parte Jackson, (1895)1 Q.B.183). Similarly; in third contingency also, there is no necessity for the debtor to leave his dwelling house usual place of business. Even without doing so, he could seclude himself in such a way as deprive his creditors of the means of communication with him. In that case also, it is continuing act of insolvency, so long as he continues to seclude himself. 17. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 3, page 158, paragraph 246, law is stated thus: ” The absence of the debtor must be an absence from his dwelling house or place of business or must amount to denying himself to some particular creditor 1, and must be brought about with an absolute intention to defeat or delay creditors 2, which in every case must be clearly proved 3. In the absence of any such intent the mere failure of the debtor to keep appointment with a creditor is not in itself an act of bankruptcy 4. The debtor may commit act of bankruptcy without physical absence if he adopts an assumed name for purposes concealment 5. Subject to the principles stated above, the debtor ’ s intention and his absenting himself, which are sufficient to constitute an act of bankruptcy, are matters of fact to be decided upon the circumstances of each particular cased 1. xx xx xx 2. xx xx xx 3. xx xx xx 4. Re Stephany ex parte Meyer, (1871)7 Ch.App. 188, (debtor subsequently found at place of business). See also Key v. Shaw, (1832)1 Moo. &S.462. 5. Such conduct constitutes a continuing act of bankruptcy, Re Alderson, ex parte Jackson (1895)1 Q.B. 183. 6. Warner v. Baker, (1816) Hold. N.P. 175 (departure to avoid arrest); Bamford ex parte, (1809)15 Ves. 449, (even though the debtor’s apprehension of arrest was groundless); Woolstenholme ex parte Poster & Company, (1887)4 Morr 258, Re Baker ex parte Baker, (1887)5 Morr. 5. In the following cases, an act of bankruptcy was held to have been committed; Re M Ex parte M ’ Keand, (1889)6Morr. 240, DC (departure leaving dishonoured promissory note); Holroyd v. Whitehead, (1814)3 Camp. 530, (departure owing to domestic dissensions, with no provision for business arrangements or debts); Nobson v. Brown, (1855)1 Jur.Ns. 920, (departure in debt and removal of tools and furniture); Spencer v. Billing (1812)3 Camp. 240, DC (departure leaving dishonoured promissory note); Holroyd v. Whitehead, (1814)3 Camp. 530, (departure owing to domestic dissensions, with no provision for business arrangements or debts); Nobson v. Brown, (1855)1 Jur.Ns. 920, (departure in debt and removal of tools and furniture); Spencer v. Billing (1812)3 Camp. 310 at 314, (departure of partners from place of business and removal of books); Chenoweth Hay, (1813)1 M. & S. 676, (Concealment in a back room on a false pretext); Bramwell v. Lucas, (1824)2 B. & C. 745, (absence meeting of creditors in fear of arrest); Re Beer, ex parte Beer, (1841)1 Mont. D. & 390, (non-attendance at creditors’ meeting). But in Re Hooper, ex parte Addition, De.G. & Sm. 580, a direction by the debtor after dissolution of partnership to address letters to a particular post office was held not to be an act of bankruptcy." Paragraph 248 reads as follows: "248 The debtors intention can be inferred from surrounding circumstances, and therefore, debtor who withdrew to a part of his house to avoid personal application for payment, banker who closed his bank against customers and a trader who closed down his shop home without directions or an address to which communications might be sent to him, each held to have committed an act of bankruptcy. However, the inference of intent rebutted by evidence that the creditor called at an unreasonable hour, or by other satisfactorily explaining the debtor’s conduct in apparently avoiding a meeting with him. denial must be to a creditor or to a person substantially in the position of a creditor. creditor has a right to call on his debtor at the place where he may probably be found, need not necessarily call at his place of business." 18. In Mulla’s Law of Insolvency in India, Third Edition, pages 86 and 87, paragraph is stated as follows: "The words "otherwise absents himself seem intended to cover cases which are expressly specified in clause (d) of the section. The words mean "absenting himself from place of abode for the time being, though it may not be his dwelling house, or from his of business or from some particular creditor at some other place. Thus concealing oneself the back room of a house to avoid arrest is an act of insolvency. The words mean "absenting himself from place of abode for the time being, though it may not be his dwelling house, or from his of business or from some particular creditor at some other place. Thus concealing oneself the back room of a house to avoid arrest is an act of insolvency. In order to "absenting" it is not necessary to show actual physical absence from a particular Presence in disguise may constitute ‘absence’. "Absenting" may equally be carried change of the debtor’s name or the name of his house. The mere failure of the debtor keep an appointment with a creditor is not an act of insolvency, unless it is accompanied with intent to defeat or delay. Thus where a debtor promised to call at an appointed time a creditor and pay the money, and having failed to procure the money he did not call was to be found at his own place of business, it was held that there was no act of insolvency. If, however, a debtor absents himself from a place at which he has appointed to meet creditors with reference to a settlement of their demands with intent to defeat or them, it is an act of insolvency, although the place at which the appointment was made not the debtor’s usual place of business. Absenting oneself with intent to defeat or delay continuing act of insolvency. 106. If a debtor with intent to defeat or delay his creditors secludes himself so as to deprive his creditors of the means of communication with him, an act of insolvency. This is called in English law "beginning to keep house." If a debtor a general order to be denied to creditors or others, and a creditor is in consequence denied, it will constitute an act of insolvency. The denial must be connected with the order to and it must be to a creditor or his duly authorised agent. If the order to be denied creditors is not followed by actual denial to a creditor, it seems there is no act of insolvency. It is not an act of insolvency if a debtor denies himself to a creditor at unreasonable as for instance, at eleven O’ clock at night. There was various other circumstances besides denial to creditors from which this act of insolvency may be inferred. It is not an act of insolvency if a debtor denies himself to a creditor at unreasonable as for instance, at eleven O’ clock at night. There was various other circumstances besides denial to creditors from which this act of insolvency may be inferred. Thus it may be inferred if the debtor withdraws from that part Of the house where he usually sits to a more part to avoid his creditors; but the inference does not arise if he is still accessible creditors, for he could then be served with process in the ordinary way. It may similarly inferred if a banker closes the bank against customers and remains within. Where a warrant has been issued for the arrest of a judgment-debtor in execution of a decree and the conceals himself in order to avoid arrest, such conduct amounts to an act of insolvency." 19. Under Sec.9(1)(d) of the Act, a creditor shall not be entitled to present an insolvency petition against a debtor unless the act of insolvency on which the petition is grounded occurred within three months before the presentation of the petition. It was argued before the trial and accepted by it that in the present case, the act of insolvency committed occurred 1985 when the petitioners herein-absented themselves from Erode as alleged Insolvency Petition. The same contention was repeated before me by learned counsel petitioners. According to him, if an act of insolvency falls within clauses (i) to (iii) (d), the petition for adjudication should be presented within three months from the which the act of insolvency commenced. In other words, according to learned counsel, debtor absents himself from his dwelling house or his usual place of business or himself so as to deprive his creditors of the means of communication, the act of has occurred on the first day on which the debtor does so, and the petition for adjudication shall be presented within three months therefrom. Though learned counsel conceded there is no direct authority in support of his contention, he relied on the judgment Bench of this Court in Re Laurence Claude Lazack, A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 898. Though learned counsel conceded there is no direct authority in support of his contention, he relied on the judgment Bench of this Court in Re Laurence Claude Lazack, A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 898. In that Full Bench considered the meaning of the word ‘ absent ’ found in Sec.241 of the Succession Act Under that section, when any executor is absent from the province application is made, letters of administration with the will annexed may be granted attorney or agent of the absent executor for the use and benefit of his principal. Referring the terms of the section, the Full Bench held thus: "The conditions which have to be satisfied before Sec.241 can apply are, (1) the absent from the province in which the application is made and there is no executor the province willing to act, and (2) the person applying is the attorney or agent of the executor. In the present case there can be no doubt that the petitioner must be be attorney or agent of the two executorices. The question therefore is whether the trices can be said to be "absent from the province." "Absent" literally, that is, etymologically, means" not present". Present "means" being place in question." It follows that when an executor is not in the province in application made at the time of the application* the first condition must be held satisfied. There is no implication in the word "absent" that the person should have any time present, or the person is only temporarily not present. In Ashbury v. Ellis, 1893 A.C. 339, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council construe the word "absent" which occurred in a rule of the New Zealand Condem material part of which is as follows: "In actions founded on any contract.... on proof that any defendant is absent colony at the time of the issuing of the writ, and that he is likely to continue absent...the court may give leave to the plaintiff to issue a writ and proceed thereon without service." The following observations deal with the point: "The only other contention related to the word ‘absent’ in Rule 53. The appellant confine it to persons who at some previous time have been domiciled or resident Zealand. The appellant confine it to persons who at some previous time have been domiciled or resident Zealand. It is not easy to appreciate the reasons why such an artificial sense should upon the word: and during the argument their Lordships expressed agreement Judges of the Court of Appeal, who held that the word is used in its ordinary sense, describes, persons who are not in New Zealand." "Prima facie" therefore, it looks the conditions are satisfied in this case and the petitioner is entitled to the grant of Administration under Sec.241." 20. The Ruling of the Full Bench has no application whatever to the present case. It help learned counsel for the petitioners to contend that even in the case of continuing insolvency, the petition for adjudication shall be presented within three months from day on which the act of insolvency occurred. I have no hesitation to reject the contention learned counsel There is certainly a distinction between the other acts of insolvency in Sec.6 of the Act and acts of insolvency now in question. Sec.6(a) to (c) relate to In all those cases, the act of insolvency is complete the moment the transfer is effected. They are not cases of continuing act of insolvency. Similarly, under Sec.6 (3), (0. (g), (h) the act of insolvency is complete the moment it occurs. But under Sec,6(d)(i) there two parts. The first part relates to departure and the second part relates to remaining out the territories to which the Act extends. While under the first part, the act is complete, the moment the debtor departs, under the latter part, the act continues so as the debtor remains outside the territories. Similarly, under clause (ii) the act is complete as soon as he departs from his dwelling-house or usual place of business, which would under the first part and under the second part, the act continues so long as he is absent. Under clause (iii) also, the act continues to be an act of insolvency so long as the debtor secludes himself. Thus, the cause of action is a continuing cause of action and it arises day for the purpose of Sec.9(1)(c) of the Act. The expression used in Sec.9(1)(c) of the is “has occurred”. Under clause (iii) also, the act continues to be an act of insolvency so long as the debtor secludes himself. Thus, the cause of action is a continuing cause of action and it arises day for the purpose of Sec.9(1)(c) of the Act. The expression used in Sec.9(1)(c) of the is “has occurred”. In the case of a debtor remaining out of the territories, absenting himself otherwise than by departure and secluding himself, the act of insolvency is occurring moment of his remaining outside the territory, remaining absent and secluding himself. Sec.9(1)(c) of the Act does not use the expression ‘has first occurred’. Hence, the intention of the legislature is very clear that the period of three months mentioned in Sec.9(1)(c) the Act will have to be calculated from the date on which the act of insolvency has occurred and in cases of continuing act of insolvency it occurs on every day until the act of insolvency continues to exist. 21. The above principle is set out in the following passage in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 3, page 367, Paragraph 661. “.....If the act of bankruptcy is a continuing act on the part of the bankrupt, that is to one that is committed afresh on each day that passes after its first commission, bankruptcy commences with, and relates back to the day of the continuing act which is within the three months next before the presentation of the petition. ” The case referred to as authority for the above passage is “In Re Burrows ex parte, Official Receiver v. Steel, 1944 Ch. ” The case referred to as authority for the above passage is “In Re Burrows ex parte, Official Receiver v. Steel, 1944 Ch. 49 DC.” A reference is made to the ruling in Alderson’s case, (1895)1 Q.B. 183, In Burrows case the following statement of law from the judgment of Vaughan-Williams, J. is quoted: “I think that for a debtor to absent himself with intent to defeat or delay his creditors continuing act of bankruptcy.” The following passage in Norton, J’s judgment is very instructive: “ .....I may add that, as was pointed out by Cohen, J., in the course of the argument, clear that where there is more than one act of bankruptcy the trustee ’ s title cannot back to an earlier date than three months preceding the date of the presentation of petition, yet, if the argument for the trustee is right, in the case of a single continuing act bankruptcy the title of the trustee can relate back to a period which might be ten, twenty, thirty, or even more years before the date of the presentation of the petition. It is possible conceive a continuing absence which might extend for a very long period and, if argument for the trustee is right, his title might relate back, under the earlier portion Sec.37, sub-sec.1, to a very remote date, whereas under the later portion, where the sub section refers to more acts of Bankruptcy than one, It could not relate back to a date earlier than three months before the presentation of the petition.” 22. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the judgment in Jagannath BadriPrashad,A.I.R. 1949 East. Punj. 359. After holding that it is necessary for the petitioning creditor to allege the acts of insolvency complained of by him in the petition and specify particulars as to the time and place of their commission, it was pointed out in that case while it was quite easy to specify the exact date and place of the giving of a notice suspension of payment, it may not be always possible to give the exact date or time of departure of the debtor from his dwelling house or place of business or the exact date time of such departure may not be within the knowledge of the petitioning creditor. It also held that where no objections were raised by the debtors in the trial or lower appellate courts and evidently the debtors did not in any way feel harassed in contesting proceedings by reason of the absence of exact date of the commission of act of insolvency alleged against them, it cannot be said that the formal defect has resulted in any substantial injustice requiring interference in revision. Far from helping the petitioners, the ruling is really against them. In the present case, I have already referred to the exact pleading made by respondent herein and the vague reply thereto by the petitioners in their counter. 23. Reliance is also placed on the judgment in Harnam Singh v. Balai Kumar Sinha another, A.I.R. 1975 Pat. 259. It is held that the period of three months mentioned in Sec.9 of is not a period of limitation, but a condition precedent for making the application. pointed out that the provision is made on sound reason and as a matter of public policy. general proposition laid down in that case is of no avail to the petitioners herein. 24. Having regard to the various facts and circumstances established in the case, I hesitation to hold that the petitioners herein have absented themselves from dwelling and usual place of business and secluded themselves so as to deprive the creditor of communicating with them. Thus the acts of insolvency alleged by the respondent have been established in this case. They are continuing acts of insolvency and the petition adjudication has been presented within three months from the date of occurrence. The of the respondent herein that the petitioners were not in Erode even at the time of the of the present Insolvency Petition, has been rightly accepted by the lower appellate court. 25. In the view I have taken, it is wholly unnecessary to consider the other contentions forward by the learned counsel for the respondents. He urged that the dismissal I.P.Nos.15 and 16 of 1985 for default was illegal and it was not a disposal in accordance law. According to him it is open to this court to set aside the orders of dismissal of petitions and adjudge the petitioners herein on the ground that they have themselves for adjudication. He urged that the dismissal I.P.Nos.15 and 16 of 1985 for default was illegal and it was not a disposal in accordance law. According to him it is open to this court to set aside the orders of dismissal of petitions and adjudge the petitioners herein on the ground that they have themselves for adjudication. As I have confirmed the finding of fact given by the appellate Judge, and held that the conditions set out in Sec.9 of the Act are satisfied in the present petition, it not necessary for me to discuss the alternative contentions urged by the learned counsel for the respondents. 26. In the result, the civil revision petition fails and it is dismissed. But, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.