JUDGMENT - DAUD S.M., J.:---This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution takes exception to an order passed by the Chief Officer of the second respondent hereinafter referred to as the "Board" vis a vis the entitlement of respondent No. 3 as against the petitioner. 2. Respondent No. 3 was in occupation of Room No. 8 on third floor of Madhav Building at Parel, Bombay 400 012. On 11-7-1976 respondent No. 3 entered into a leave and licence agreement with the petitioner's husband vis a vis the said room whereby she placed the petitioner's husband in occupation of the room. The agreement was to be for a duration of 11 months and was to expire on 10-6-1977. While the agreement was in force on 31-1-1977, the third floor of the building caught fire and all the tenements on the said floor were burnt down. Accommodation had to be provided to the persons displaced and various records had to be prepared. In the record of tenants the name of the third respondent was entered. In relation to temporary accommodation a notice was addressed to the third respondent but was served upon petitioner's husband. An order showing allotment of permanent accommodation in the reconstructed building to respondent No. 3 was passed. The petitioner's husband came on the scene at this stage and made a representation claiming the allotment of alternative accommodation in the reconstructed building to him. The Deputy Chief Officer scheduled a hearing and in the course thereof documents were tendered by the petitioner's husband, the third respondent and also the petitioner. Having gone through all these papers the Deputy Chief Officer on 2-6-1986 upheld the eligibility of petitioner to accommodation in the reconstructed building. The order passed by the Deputy Chief Officer was re-considered by the Chief Officer. His view was that the order had to be reversed. Consistent with this view the order in favour of the petitioner was set aside and substituted by that in favour of the third respondent. 3. Petitioner has taken exception to the order passed by the Chief Officer which order is at Ex. C and is dated 7-10-1986. In support of petitioner's claim reliance is placed upon sections 91(1) and 94(5) of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (MHADA). To the extent relevant these provisions read as follows :- "91.(1) Where a building suddenly collapses or becomes uninhabitable due to fire.... C and is dated 7-10-1986. In support of petitioner's claim reliance is placed upon sections 91(1) and 94(5) of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (MHADA). To the extent relevant these provisions read as follows :- "91.(1) Where a building suddenly collapses or becomes uninhabitable due to fire.... and all or any of the occupiers thereof are dishoused, the Board shall allot temporary accommodation to such occupiers in any building maintained by the authority for such purpose at such places and to such extent as it deems fit...... 94(5) Subject to the provisions of this section every occupier.. shall have a right to get such accommodation in the new building... on payment of such rent and subject to such other terms and conditions as the Board may determine......" The contention raised by Mr. Joshi is sought to be negatived by Counsel representing respondent No. 3. His argument is that term 'occupier' has been defined in the MHADA as including various categories, and petitioner's case if any cannot be higher than classes specified at Clauses (d) and (e) of section 2(25) of MHADA. These clauses make the term 'occupier' inclusive of- "(d) a licencee in occupation of any land or building; and (e) any person who is liable to pay to the owner damages for the use and occupation of any land or building." Counsel submits that the 'licencee' contemplated by Clause (d) has to be a licensee whose occupation is protected by the Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Rent Act). In the instant case the licence transaction set up by the petitioner came into existence in the year 1978. Such a licence was contrary to the Rent Act and therefore would not clothe the occupant with the capacity of a licensee included within the definition of "occupier". To my mind the definition of 'occupier' given in section 2(25) need not pose any difficulty for consideration of the entitlement under sections 91(1) and 94(5) of the MHADA. This is because the defining section i.e. section 2 of MHADA starts with the words "unless the context requires otherwise". Does the context require otherwise is the next question? A close look at section 91(1) would show that the object is to provide temporary accommodation to a specified class of persons. That class is those who are "dishoused". This is because the defining section i.e. section 2 of MHADA starts with the words "unless the context requires otherwise". Does the context require otherwise is the next question? A close look at section 91(1) would show that the object is to provide temporary accommodation to a specified class of persons. That class is those who are "dishoused". The persons dishoused are those who were in occupation of the building or a part of the building which has been affected by the natural calamity spoken in the section. It does not speak of those notionally dishoused, but of persons actually dishoused. The occupiers contemplated by section 91 have been equated with those affected by natural calamity and therefore becoming houseless. Section 94(5) speaks of accommodation in the new building. The eligibility is to "every occupier". An occupier entitled to accommodation in the new building must have the same meaning as the occupier dishoused as a result of the natural calamity taking place in the old building. Construed thus, there can be no doubt that the word 'occupier' in both the sections has to be understood as meaning only that person who is the victim of natural calamity. In the present case the victim would be not the third respondent who was admittedly not in physical possession or occupation of Room No. 8 when the fire took place. Significantly, respondent No. 3 took no objection when the petitioner's husband was provided accommodation in the transit camp. It may be said that this was because of the recognition of respondent No. 3's eligibility as the order for allotment of accommodation in the transit camp was in the name of respondent No. 3. That was not acceptance of her claim but only a mere acknowledgement of her notional right of being a tenant of the tenement which had been destroyed by fire. 4. It was contended that the Chief Officer had the authority to overrule the Deputy Chief Officer. Even if this is accepted, I do not see how the wrong and illegal order passed by the Chief Officer takes precedence over the correct and lawful order passed by the Deputy Chief Officer. Another submission put forth on behalf of the respondent No. 3 is that the order of the Deputy Chief Officer passed on 2-6-1986 itself was without jurisdiction as he had no power to review an earlier order. Another submission put forth on behalf of the respondent No. 3 is that the order of the Deputy Chief Officer passed on 2-6-1986 itself was without jurisdiction as he had no power to review an earlier order. In regard to the legality or otherwise of the said order we need not go into that aspect of the matter for the present. The point is whether respondent No. 3 was entitled to the recognition accorded to her claim by the order impugned in this petition, which order, is that passed by the Chief Officer on 7-10-1986. It was submitted that the Chief Officer had not been impleaded as respondent to the petition and therefore the order passed by him was unquestionable. I do not see how, that can be said when the Chief Officer was functioning as an Officer of the second respondent which eo nomine is a party to this petition. It is no one's case that the Chief Officer was exercising a function de hors his position in the Board. If the Board is a party, the orders passed by any officer thereof are within the reach of this Court, for the Board has been impleaded. Last, there is the contention that the petitioner has no right to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution. The leave and licence agreement was in her husband's favour and if any one had a right to accommodation whether under section 91(1) of section 94(5) of the MHADA it was her husband and not she herself. There is hardly even technical merit in this contention. One of the persons dishoused as a result of the fire that broke out on 31-1-1977, was the petitioner. She was living with her husband at that time and she was in the same position as the husband was. Being an occupant she had an independent right to relief under sections 91(1) and 94(5) of the Act. If the husband chose to abandon the claim initiated by him, and whatever be the reason for that abandonment, the petitioner cannot be made to suffer. Her entitlements under the two provisions mentioned above did not cease because the husband has chosen to betray her. The petition succeeds and the order passed by the Chief Officer is quashed. If the husband chose to abandon the claim initiated by him, and whatever be the reason for that abandonment, the petitioner cannot be made to suffer. Her entitlements under the two provisions mentioned above did not cease because the husband has chosen to betray her. The petition succeeds and the order passed by the Chief Officer is quashed. Subject to her otherwise being eligible, petitioner's occupation of the transit camp shall not be disturbed and allotment of accommodation in the reconstructed building shall not be denied to her. The allotment in the reconstructed building in favour of the petitioner shall not be made for the next eight weeks to come. Rule in these terms made absolute, with parties being left to bear their own costs. Petition allowed. -----