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Gauhati High Court · body

1991 DIGILAW 74 (GAU)

Mahendra Kumar Lohia v. Sitaram More

1991-04-11

S.N.PHUKAN

body1991
This application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is for quashing the criminal proceeding registered as C.R.Case No. 3260 of 1984 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate,1st Class,Nagaon. 2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows : The petitioner No.! herein filed a complaint petition on 3.8.1981 under section 407/34 IPC against' the opposite party herein along with three other persons. Finally the above petition came up before the learned Court on 21.9.1984 and on that date the complaint was dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant, namely - the petitioner No-1 herein. Thereafter, the present complaint was filed by the opposite party on 7.11.1984 under section 500/34 IPC against the petitioner No. I and other two persons, viz, petitioner Nos.2 and 3 before this Court, The complaint petition filed in the proceeding is at Annexure-U and me initial statement is at Annexure-III to this petition. by the impugned order dated 7.1U9S4 passed in the present criminal proceeding, the learned Judicial Magistrate after recording the statement of the complainant directed issuance of summons under section 500/34 IPC against all the three petitioners herein. Hence the present petition. 3. Dr. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners averred that in view of section 468 CrPC the present complaint petition is barred by limitation, inasmuch as the original complaint by the petitioner No 1 herein was filed on 3.8.1981, whereas the present petition was filed on 7.U.1984, i.e. more than three years after the cause of action On the other hand Mr. A.C. Sarra, learned counsel for the respondent has urged that as the finial order in the earlier case was passed on 27.9.81, the present petition was within time as on and from the said date, the cause of action arose in view of the final order passed. 4. Under section 500 IPC the maximum period of imprisonment is two years. Section 468 CrPC is a bar to taking cognizance after the period of limitation as specified in the said section. The period of limitation for the present offence is three years in view of the maximum punishment under section 500 IPC (clause (c) of sub-section 2 of section 468;. In this con­nection, Mr. Sharma has placed reliance in the decisions of the Apex Court. 5. The first decision referred_ to is Surinder Mohan Vika] vs. Ascharj Lal Chopra, AIR 1978 SC 986 . In this con­nection, Mr. Sharma has placed reliance in the decisions of the Apex Court. 5. The first decision referred_ to is Surinder Mohan Vika] vs. Ascharj Lal Chopra, AIR 1978 SC 986 . In that case also the order of Magistrate was challenged on the ground that the Magistrate could not take cognizance of the offence under section 500 IPC as the period of limitation prescribed by section 468 CrPC had expired. It may be stated that the High Court over­ruled the objection on the ground that cause of action arose on the date when the earlier cases was finally decided. This view of the High Court was rejected by the Apex Court, holding that the limitation will start from the date of filing of earlier complaint petition and not from the date ot final disposal of the case. The relevant portion in paragraph 6 of the judgment runs as follows : “As has been stated, sub-section (1) of section 469 of the Code specifi­cally provides that the period of limitation prescribed in section 468 in relation to an offenders, shall commence (inter alia) on the date of the offence. It would therefore allow that the date of the offence was March 15,19/2, when the defamatory complaint was filed in the court of the Magistrate, and that was tae starting paint for the purpose of calculating the three years period of limitation. The High Court clearly erred in taking a contrary view." Mr. Sharma also placed reliance in other decision of the Apex Court viz State of Punjab vs. Sarvvan Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1054 and two decision of this Court, viz s-State of Assam vs. Abdul Samad, (1985) 2 GLR 500, and Uamasanehi Mittal vs. State of Assam, ( 1987 ) 1 GLR 266. 6. I need not quote the ratio laid down in the above three decisions placed before this Court as the present case is squarely covered by the decision of the Apex Court in S. M. Vikal (snpra). 7. 6. I need not quote the ratio laid down in the above three decisions placed before this Court as the present case is squarely covered by the decision of the Apex Court in S. M. Vikal (snpra). 7. Situated thus, I hold from the reading of sections 469 and 468 CrPC that for the purpose of limitation as specified in section 468 CrPC, the limitation starts on the date of the offence or where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or where it is not known by whom the offence is committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence. In the case in hand the alleged offence under section 00 IPC came to the knowledge of the opposite party on the date when the complaint was filed, i.e. on 3 8 1981. As stated above, the period of limitation prescribed under section 468 CrPC for the present offence is three years. But the present complaint petition was filed on 7.11.1984 and as such it is clearly barred under section 468 CrPC and no Court can take cognizance of such offence. 8. In view of the above, the impugned order being an illegal one cannot stand. Accordingly, the petition is allowed by quashing the impugned criminal proceeding/and the rule is made absolute.