JUDGMENT Mishra, J. - A petition was filed under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act on the Original side of this court for a declaration that there was no arbitration agreement between the petitioner/appellant and the first respondent herein and that the arbitration proceeding entered into by the respondents 3 and 4 under the auspices of the second respondent at the behest of the first respondent was without jurisdiction, illegal, ab initio void and non est. A learned single Judge of this court, after notice and hearing the parties, dismissed the petition. The petitioner/appellant invoked clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this court and preferred an appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge dismissing his petition. At the final hearing of the appeal, however, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent raised an objection as to the maintainability of the appeal and contended that the order of the learned single Judge rejecting the petition under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is not appealable. The Bench hearing the appeal. However, thought that to give a finality to such objection, the matter should be referred to a Full Bench. 2. The Bench hearing the appeal. However, thought that to give a finality to such objection, the matter should be referred to a Full Bench. 2. The original civil jurisdiction of this court as to suits is preserved under clause 12 of the Letters Patent of this court in these words : "And we do further ordain that the said High Court of Judicature at Madras, in exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction, shall be empowered to receive, try, and determine suits of every description if, in the case of suits for land or other immovable property, such land or property shall be situated, or, in all other cases, if the cause of action shall have arisen, either wholly or in case the leave of the court shall have been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the said High Court, or if the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit shall dwell or carry on business or personally work for gain, within such limits; except that the said High Court shall not have such original jurisdiction in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause at Madras, in which the debt or damage, or value of the property sued for does not exceed one hundred rupees." This provision has given to the Court Original Civil jurisdiction to receive, try and determine suits of every description if (a) in the case of suits for land or other immovable property, such land or property is situate within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the Court; (b)(i) in all other cases, if the cause of action has arisen wholly within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the Court; (b)(ii) if the cause of action has arisen in part and if the leave of the court has been first obtained; and (c) if the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit, has dwelt or carried on business or personally worked for gain within the ordinary original jurisdiction of the court, except the cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Small Cause at Madras. Clause 15 the Letters Patent provides for appeal from the original jurisdiction to the appellate jurisdiction of the court and runs as follows : "And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Madras from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, and that not withstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act made (on or after the 1st day of February, 1929) in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the Judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal, but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to us, our heirs or Successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as herein, after provided." It has thus made a judgment passed on the original side of court appealable. It has not been disputed before us and in our opinion, it could not be disputed that the application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, is entertained as a suit and the judgment passed therein attracts the appellate jurisdiction under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this court. This clause gives to the court the appellate jurisdiction not only against the judgment in a suit tried and determined on the original side of the court but also against the judgment delivered in an appeal from the original decree or order of a court subordinate to this court. This clause gives to the court the appellate jurisdiction not only against the judgment in a suit tried and determined on the original side of the court but also against the judgment delivered in an appeal from the original decree or order of a court subordinate to this court. Prior to the enactment of the Arbitration Act, 1940, arbitration proceedings were governed by the Arbitration Act of 1899 and Schedule II of the Code of Civil Procedure. Arbitration Act, 1940 consolidated, amended and repealed 1899 Act and Schedule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and clauses (a) to (f) of Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It set up machinery for all contractual arbitrations Section 39 of this Act provides : "(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act (and from no others) to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the court passing the order. An order : (i) superseding an arbitration; (ii) on an award stated in the form of a special case; (iii) modifying or correcting an award; (iv) filing or refusing to file an arbitration agreement, (v) staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement; (vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an award : Provided that the provisions of this Section shall not apply to any order passed by a Small Case Court. (2) No Second Appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal the Supreme Court." 3. On the question whether the interdict in sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Act operated against an appeal under the Letters Patent, there had been divergence of opinion amongst High Courts, but this court in Radhakrishna Murthy v. Ethirajulu Chetty and Co. (AIR 1945 Madras 184 = 58 LW 510), took the view that there was no further right of appeal under the Letters Patent when a single Judge of the High Court disposed of an appeal under Section 39(1) of the Act. A Full Bench of this court in Mulchand Kewal Chand Daga v. Kissan Dass Gridhardass (74 LW 408), overruled the Judgment in Radhakrishna Murthy v. Ethirajulu Chetty Co. A Full Bench of this court in Mulchand Kewal Chand Daga v. Kissan Dass Gridhardass (74 LW 408), overruled the Judgment in Radhakrishna Murthy v. Ethirajulu Chetty Co. (supra) and held that Section 39 deals only with appeals from orders passed by a court to a superior court and not with appeals "intra-court" and therefore, Section 39(2) does not operate to prohibit an appeal under the Letters Patent against the order of a single judge exercising appellant jurisdiction in an arbitration matter. The matter, however, was finally settled by a judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. ( AIR 1962 SC 256 ). The Supreme Court, dealing with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Punjab High Court having no ordinary original civil jurisdiction and having the Letters Patent appellate power in these words. "And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court ... from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction ...) of one Judge of the High Court ..." said : "By this clause, a right to appeal except in the cases specified from one Judge of the High Court to Division Bench is expressly granted. But the Letters Patent are declared by Clause 37 subject of the legislative power of the Governor-General-in-Council and also of the Governor-in-Council under the Government of India Act, 1915, and may in all respects be amended or altered in exercise of legislative authority. Under Section 39(1), an appeal lies from the orders specified in that sub-Section and from no others. The legislature has plainly expressed itself that the right of appeal against orders passed under the Arbitration Act may be exercised only in respect of certain orders. The right to appeal against other orders is expressly taken away. If by the express provision contained in Section 39(1), a right to appeal from a judgment which may otherwise be available under the Letters Patent is restricted, there is no ground for holding that clause (2) does not similarly restrict the exercise of appellate power granted by the Letters Patent. If by the express provision contained in Section 39(1), a right to appeal from a judgment which may otherwise be available under the Letters Patent is restricted, there is no ground for holding that clause (2) does not similarly restrict the exercise of appellate power granted by the Letters Patent. If for reasons aforementioned the expression "Second Appeal" includes an appeal under the Letters Patent, it would be impossible to hold that notwithstanding the express prohibition, an appeal under the Letters Patent from an order passed in appeal under sub-Section (1) is competent." After taking note of the conflict of the views of different High Courts, the Supreme Court took notice of the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure particularly, Sections 104 and 105 thereof and said : "Prior to 1940 the law relating to contractual arbitration (except in so far as it was dealt with by the Arbitration Act of 1899) was contained in the Code of Civil Procedure and certain orders passed by courts in the course of arbitration proceedings were made appealable under the Code of 1877 by S. 588 and in the Code of 1908 by S. 104. In 1940, the legislature enacted Act 10 of 1904, repealing Sch. 2 and Section 104(1), clauses (a) to (f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Arbitration Act of 1899. By Section 39 of the Act, a right of appeal was conferred upon litigents in arbitration proceedings only from certain orders and from no others and the right to file appeals from appellate orders was expressly taken away by sub-section (2) and the clause in Section 104 of the Code of 1908 which preserved the special jurisdiction under any other law was incorporated in Section 39. The section was enacted in a form which was absolute and not subject to any exceptions. It is true that under the Code of 1908, an appeal did lie under the Letters Patent from an order passed by a single Judge of a Chartered High Court in arbitration proceedings even if the order was passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, but that was so, because, the power of the court to hear appeals under a special law for the time being in operation was expressly preserved. There is in the Arbitration Act no provision similar to Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which preserves powers reserved to courts under special statutes. There is also nothing in the expression "authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the court" contained in Section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act which by implication preserves the jurisdiction under the Letters Patent to entertain an appeal against the order passed in, arbitration proceedings. Therefore, in so far as Letters Patent deal with appeals against orders passed in arbitration proceedings, they must be read subject to the provisions of Section 39(1) and (2) of the Arbitration Act. Under the Code of 1908, the right to appeal under the Letters Patent was saved both by Section 4 and the clause contained in Section 104(1), but by the Arbitration Act of 1940, the jurisdiction of the court under any other law of the time being in force is not saved; the right of appeal can therefore be exercised against orders in arbitration proceedings only under Section 39, and no appeal (except an appeal to this Court) will lie from an appellate orders." The Supreme Court rejected a contention by counsel for the respondents that some provisions in Section 104 of the Code of 1908, which appear to have been deleted by Section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act, were in fact superfluous and their deletion made no difference in the right of appeal under the Letters Patent. The Supreme Court said : "The clause was enacted with a view to do away with the unsettled state of the law and the cleavage of opinion between the Allahabad High Court on the one hand and Calcutta, Bombay and Madras High Courts on the other, on the true effect of Section 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure upon the power conferred by the Letters Patent. If the legislature being cognizant of this difference of opinion prior to the Code of 1908 and the unanimity of opinion which resulted after the amendment, chose not to include the reservation clause in the provisions relating to appeals in the Arbitration Act in 1940, the conclusion is inevitable that it was so done with a view to restrict the right of appeal within the strict limits defined by S. 39 and to take away the right conferred by other statutes. The Arbitration Act which is a consolidating and amending Act, being substantially in the form of a Code relating to arbitration must be construed without any assumption that it was not intended to alter the law relating to appeals. The words of the statute are plain and explicit and they must be given their full effect and must be interpreted in their natural meaning, uninfluenced by any assumptions derived from the previous state of the law and without any assumption that the legislature must have intended to leave the existing law unaltered, and in our view the legislature has made a deliberate departure from the law prevailing before the enactment of Act 10 of 1940 by modifying the law relating to appeals in Section 39." 4. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. (supra) was considering a case of Letters Patent Appeal against an order in an appeal under Section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and was examining whether the expression "no second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section in sub-section (2) of Section 39" prohibited such Letters Patent Appeal or not. In this judgment the Supreme Court pointed out that as there were are expressions in Section 39(1) and from no others, "the Legislature has expressed itself that the right of appeal against orders passed under the Arbitration Act may be exercised only in respect of certain orders and the right of appeal against other orders is expressly taken away. If by the express provision contained in Section 39 a right of appeal which may otherwise be available under the Letters Patent is restricted, there is no ground for holdings that clause (2) does not similarly restrict the exercise of power granted by the Letters Patent" and said "by Section 39 of the Act, a right of appeal was conferred upon litigants in arbitration proceedings only from certain orders and from no others and the right to file appeals from appellate orders was expressly taken away by sub-section (2) and therefore, in so far as Letters Patent deal with appeal against orders passed in arbitration proceedings, they must be read subject to the provisions of Sections 39(1) and (2) of the Arbitration Act". They appear to mean that as in the case of an appeal to any other court in an arbitration proceeding, there would be appeals only against such orders which are enumerated in sub-section (1) of Section 39, there would be no appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, if the High Court itself is the trial Court in place of any other Court subordinate to it. Some High Courts have so read the judgment in the case of Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. (supra) and held that there is no right of appeal against an order passed in an arbitration proceeding, if the order does not fall under any of the categories enumerated in sub-section (1) of Section 39 of the Act. 5. A learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court rejected certain applications for appointment of an Umpire under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act as well as for appointment of Receiver on the ground that a part of the cause of action had allegedly arisen within the original civil jurisdiction of the court and leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent had not been obtained. Appeals were preferred against the said orders under clause 15 of the Letters Patents. Three contentions were raised in support of the appeal, namely (1) the order appealed was not an order passed under Section 39(1) of the Act; (2) under sub-section (1) of Section 39, only appeal from one court to another court is contemplated and not intra-Court, and (3) an appeal does not lie under sub-section (1) of Section 39, but still lies under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Rebati Ranjan v. Suranjan ( AIR 1963 Cal 642 ) held on the first point that appointment of a Receiver in an arbitration proceeding can only be made under Section 41 of the Arbitration Act read with Schedule II. It cannot be made under any other provision of law because the Arbitration Act is a complete Code in itself. Where an application is made invoking the Court's jurisdiction under this provision, then an order allowing such application or dismissing such application for whatever reason must be deemed to be an order made/under the said provision and not outside it and answered the other two contentions saying : "These two points may be conveniently dealt with together. Where an application is made invoking the Court's jurisdiction under this provision, then an order allowing such application or dismissing such application for whatever reason must be deemed to be an order made/under the said provision and not outside it and answered the other two contentions saying : "These two points may be conveniently dealt with together. On both these points, there was a conflict of decisions between several High Court, but this conflict has now been set at rest by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. (supra) ...... in view of the Supreme Court decision it is unnecessary for us to enter into the merits or demerits of the conflicting decisions of various High Courts. In our opinion, the point raised has now been finally determined by the Supreme Court in the decision aforementioned, and we must respectfully follow the same. That being so, we must hold that no appeal lies in the present case and the appeal must be dismissed upon this preliminary point." 6. A Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Mandir Nandi Keshwar v. Gram Sabha ( AIR 1973 H.P. 1 ), however, considered a preliminary objection that an appeal against an order granting an interim injunction restraining the appellants from getting a contract executed through another contractor until the dispute was decided by the Arbitrator was not maintainable. The Bench observed. "The power to grant the interim injunction is specifically conferred by Section 41(b), and our brother Chet Ram Thakur traced his power to grant the interim injunction to Section 41(b). Now, an appeal under Section 39(1) of the Indian Arbitration Act lies against only those orders which are specifically enumerated therein and against no other, and a perusal of Section 39(1) will show that an order under Section 41(b) is not an appealable order. It is pointed out by the appellant that the present appeal has been preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and not under Section 39(1), As to that, it has been laid down in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. (supra) that the Letters Patent cannot be resorted to in order to sustain an appeal against an order under the Indian Arbitration Act. That is also the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Rebati Ranjan Chakravarti v. Suranjan Chakravarti (supra). (supra) that the Letters Patent cannot be resorted to in order to sustain an appeal against an order under the Indian Arbitration Act. That is also the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Rebati Ranjan Chakravarti v. Suranjan Chakravarti (supra). For the same reason, in our opinion, no appeal will lie under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 7. Before, however, we advert to the question before us, we may take notice of certain observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben ( AIR 1981 SC 1786 = 94 LW 91 SN), a judgment which we think, has said a great deal on the subject. In this judgment, a reference has been made to the judgment in the case of Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. (supra) as well as to Sections 39(1) and (2) of the Arbitration Act. A passage has been extracted and incorporated in this judgment from the judgment in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. (supra) as under, "The intention of the legislature in enacting sub-section (1) of Section 104 is clear; the right to appeal conferred by any other law for the time being in force is expressly preserved, this intention is emphasised by Section 4 which provides that in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary nothing in the Code is intended to limit or otherwise affect any special jurisdiction or power conferred by or under any other law for the time being in force. The right to appeal against judgments (which did not amount to decrees) under the Letters Patent, was therefore not affected by Section 104(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908." and upon this, (the Supreme Court) said : "Thus, this court has clearly held that the right to appeal against judgments under the Letters Patent was not affected by Section 104(1) of the Code of 1908 and the decision therefore fully supports the argument of Mr. Sorabjee that there is no inconsistency between the Letters Patent jurisdiction and Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code of 1908." After saying so and referring to yet another judgment of the Supreme Court in Shankerlal Aggarwala v. Shankarlal Poddar (AIR 1965 SC 256), in which, while construing the provisions of Section 202 of the Indian Companies Act, certain observations had been made on the question, namely, what the word 'judgment' may mean for the purpose of the Letter Patent appeal, the Supreme Court said : "There are a number of other Acts also which confer additional powers of appeal to a larger Bench within the High Court against the orders of a trial judge. Take for instance, a case under the Arbitration Act. Suppose in a suit the matter is referred to arbitration and after the award is filed by the Arbitrator certain objections are taken, under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act an appeal would lie to a larger Bench from the order of a single judge disposing of the objections taken by the parties against the award." Section 39 runs thus .... : "It cannot be contended by any show of force that the Order passed by the trial judge being an interlocutory order, no appeal would lie to the Division Bench or that the provisions of the Arbitration Act giving a right of appeal to a litigant from the order of a trial judge to the Division Bench in any way fetter or override the provisions of the Letters Patent." Has the Supreme Court not read in the judgment in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. (supra) that Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an enabling provision giving additional right of appeal to a litigant from the order of the trial judge and not a provision, which restricts the appeals to the orders falling under Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure ? 8. We shall come back to Shah Babulal Khimji's case and the judgment of the Supreme Court a bit later. Before that we do a little more prospecting under which the law on the subject will give us a better understanding of the problem. Prior to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, there were two Codes, one, of 1877 and the other, of 1882. Before that we do a little more prospecting under which the law on the subject will give us a better understanding of the problem. Prior to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, there were two Codes, one, of 1877 and the other, of 1882. In the 1877 Code, Section 588 provided for appealable orders under clauses (a) to (t) and said that an appeal from any order specified in that section would lie to the High Court or when an appeal from any other order is allowed by the chapter, it would lie to the court to which an appeal would lie from the decree in the suit in respect of which such order was made or when such order is passed by a court other than the High Court, then to the High Court. Section 588 read with Section 589 of the 1877 Code would show that the statute made no distinction between appeals to the High Courts from the District Courts in the mofussils or internal appeals to the High Courts under the Letters Patent. Section 591 of the said Code, however, provided that except the orders mentioned in Section 388, no further appeal could lie from any order passed by any court in exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction in these words : "591. No other appeal from orders, but error therein may be set forth in memorandum of appeal against decrees. Except as provided in this chapter, no appeal shall lie from any order passed by any court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction but if any decree be appealed against, any error, defect or irregularity in any such order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal." 1877 Code thus provided for appeals against certain specific orders and/or against decrees. It did not contemplate any other appeal except those mentioned in Sections 588 and 591. This Code was replaced by the Code of 1882, but the provisions remained the same. 9. It did not contemplate any other appeal except those mentioned in Sections 588 and 591. This Code was replaced by the Code of 1882, but the provisions remained the same. 9. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Sonbai v. Ahmedbhai Habibhai ((1872) 9 Bom HCR 398), and a Bench of this court in Rajgopal In re ((1886) ILR 9 Mad 447), took the view that under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, an appeal to the High Court from an interlocutory order made by one of the judges could be filed only in those cases in which an appeal was allowed under the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, under Sections 588 and 591. The Privy Council, however, in the case of Hurrish Chunder Chowdry v. Kali Sundari Debia ((1882) 10 I.A. 4), while considering Section 588 made the following observations :- "It only remains to observe that their Lordships do not think that Section 588 of the Act X of 1877, which has the effect of restricting certain appeals, applies to such a case as this, where the appeal is from one of the Judges of the court to the full court." This judgment gave rise to a serious conflict of opinions in the High Courts in India. The High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay as well as this court took the view that the decisions of the Privy Council permitted appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, against orders which did not fall in the list of the appealable orders under Section 588 of the Code (See Chappan v. Moidin Kutti ((1899) ILR 22 Mad 68), Toolsee Money Dassee v. Sudevi Dassee ((1899) ILR 26 Cal 363), and Secretary of State v. Jehangir ((1902) ILR 4 Bom 342) : The Allahabad High Court, however, took a different view and held that, if an order was not appealable under Sections 588 and 591 of the Code of 1877, it could not be appealed against even under the Letters Patent of the High Court in Banno Bibi v. Nehdi Hussain ((1989) ILR 11 All 375), and re-affirmed in Muhammad Naim-ul-Lahkhan v. Insan Lahkhan (ILR 14 All 226). 10. 10. Commenting upon this conflict, in Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra), the Supreme Court has said : "With due respect we would like to point out that the pointed and terse observations of the Privy Council did not leave any room for any doubt or speculation in the matter. While construing Section 588, the Judicial Committee in Hurrish Chunder Chowdry's case (supra) had made it clear that appeals would lie under Section 588 to the High Court and the section did not contain any restriction to the effect that appeal against the orders of the trial judge mentioned in Section 588 would not lie to a larger Bench of the High Court. In other words, the Privy Council intended to lay down sicarly that Section 588 did not affect nor was it inconsistent with the provisions of the Letters Patent and hence those orders of the trial judge which fell beyond Section 588 could be appealable to a large Bench under the Letters Patent if those orders amounted to judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Therefore, the views taken by the Calcutta, Bombay and Madras High Courts, referred to above, were undoubtedly correct. At any rate, since a fresh controversy had arisen, the legislature stepped in to settle the controversy by enacting the new Section 104 in the Code of 1908. Section 104 made it clear that appeals against orders mentioned in Orders 43, Rule 1 were not in any way inconsistent with the Letters Patent and merely provided an additional remedy by allowing appeals against miscellaneous orders passed by the trial judge to a large Bench. In other words, the legislature gave full statutory effect to the views of the Calcutta, Bombay and Madras High Courts. Even after the introduction of Section 104, the conflict between the various High Courts still continued as to whether or not Section 104 would apply to internal appeals in the High Court. That is the question which we shall now discuss." 11. Proceeding to consider the effect of Section 104 in the Code, the Supreme Court first stated : "To begin with, it is not disputed that a trial judge has to follow the entire procedure laid down by the Code of 1908 starting from the presentation of the plaint right up to the delivery of the judgment. Proceeding to consider the effect of Section 104 in the Code, the Supreme Court first stated : "To begin with, it is not disputed that a trial judge has to follow the entire procedure laid down by the Code of 1908 starting from the presentation of the plaint right up to the delivery of the judgment. The only difference in the assumption of jurisdiction by the High Court is that a suit of a particular valuation has to be instituted in the High Court rather than in the District Court. Secondly, it is indisputable that any final judgment that the trial judge passes deciding the suit one way or the other amounts to a decree and under the provisions of the Letters Patent an appeal lies to a larger Bench which normally is, a Division Bench as provided for under the Rules made by various High Courts. Thirdly, the Letters Patent itself does not define the term 'judgment' and has advisedly not used the word 'decree' in respect of any judgment that may be given by the trial judge." 12. After referring to Section 5 of the Code of 1908 and extracting it, the Supreme Court has said : "The importance of this section is that wherever the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are sought to be excluded by any special enactment which may be silent on the point, the State Government can by notification apply the provisions of the Code of Revenue Courts. A bare perusal of this section would clearly reveal that excepting Revenue Courts all other Civil Courts would normally be governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of procedure. Section 4(1) of the Code of 1908 which is a saving provision clearly provides that in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary the provisions of the Code do not limit or affect any special or local law. Thus, the test contained in Section 4 is not applicable in the instant case because even if the Letters Patent of the High Court be deemed to be a special law as contemplated by Section 4, the provisions of Section 104 do not seek to limit or affect the provisions of the Letters Patent." 13. Thus, the test contained in Section 4 is not applicable in the instant case because even if the Letters Patent of the High Court be deemed to be a special law as contemplated by Section 4, the provisions of Section 104 do not seek to limit or affect the provisions of the Letters Patent." 13. The observations of the Supreme Court extracted above establish that this Court's view in Chappan v. Moidin Kutti (supra) on the role of Section 588 of the 1877 and 1882 Code is correct. The incorporation of the new provision in Section 104 in 1908 Code or the provision in Section 105(1) thereof saying : "Save as otherwise expressly provided, no appeal shall lie from any order made by a court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction, but where a decree is appealed from, any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal." according to the Supreme Court, was intended only to settle the controversy which had arisen on account of the judgments of the Allahabad High Court in Banno Bibi v. Mehdi Hussain (supra) and Muhammad Naim-ul-lah Khan v. Ihsanul-Lah Khan (supra). The absence of the provisions in Section 104 however was felt of no consequence in determining the effect of the restriction in Section 588 of the Code 1877 or 1882 Code and in the words of the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra). "We might also reiterate that prior to the Code of 1908, in the Code of 1877 an identical provision like Order 43, R. 1, also existed in the shape of S. 588 which was absolutely in the same terms as Order 43, R. 1 and its various clauses. Of course, S. 104 was conspicuously absent from the Codes of 1877 or 1882. Of course, S. 104 was conspicuously absent from the Codes of 1877 or 1882. As indicated earlier the question of the application of S. 588 (now Order 43 Rule 1) was considered as early as 1882 in Hurrish Chunder Chowdry's case (supra) where the Privy Council in very categorical terms observed thus : It only remains to observe that their Lordships do not think that S. 588 of Act 10 of 1877, which has the effect of restricting certain appeals, applies to such a case as this, where the appeal is from one of the Judges of the Court to the Full Court." 14. The Full Bench of this Court in Chappan v. Moidin Kutti (supra) answered the reference whether an appeal under S. 591 of the 1882 Code was maintainable when S. 588 had restricted appeals to certain types of orders only. In the words of one of the Judges constituting the Bench, it was observed. "The words of S. 588 are "from no other such order" and I have no doubt that it is in reference to these words that their Lordships of the Privy Council in their judgment in Hurrish Chunder Chowdry v. Kali Sundari Dobia say :- "It only remains" to observe that their Lordships do not think that S. 588 of Act X of 1877, which has the effect of restricting certain appeals, applies to such a case as this, where the appeal is from one of the "Judges of the High Court to the Full Court." On this reference I conceive that it is no part of our duty to consider the particular order out of which the reference to the Full Bench is made and without doing so it is in my opinion impossible to say whether the order in question is appealable or not. The result of this judgment (so far as it applies to the question before us) appears to me to come to this, that if the order made by a single Judge only amounts to an order such as is intended by Chapter 43 of the Code, it is not appealable unless it is within S. 588, but if it amounts to more and is a judgment, then it is appealable; in other words, that the right given by S. 15 of the Letters Patent to appeal from the order of a single Judge is only limited by the Code to such orders as do not amount to a judgment whereby the rights of the parties are concluded, but, where this is the case, the order amounts to a judgment within the meaning of S. 15 of the Letters Patent (Desouza v. Coles (3 M.H.C.R. 384), and an appeal lies." 15. Cl. 37 of the Letters Patent of this Court which has been referred to in the course of the arguments states, "Regulation of Proceedings - And we do further ordain that it shall be lawful for the said High Court of Judicature at Madras from time to time to make rules and orders for the purpose of regulating all proceedings in civil cases which may be brought before the said High Court, including proceedings in its Admiralty, Vice-Admiralty, testamentary, intestate and matrimonial jurisdiction, respectively : Provided always, that the said High Court shall be guided in making such rules and orders as far as possible by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, being an Act passed by the Governor-General-in Council, and being Act No. VIII of 1859, and the provisions of any law which has been made amending or altering the same, by competent legislative authority for India." 16. Art. 225 of the Constitution says, "Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of powers/conferred on that Legislature by this Constitution, the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in. Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution : Provided that any restriction to which the exercise of original jurisdiction by any of the High Courts with respect to any matter concerning the revenue or concerning any act ordered or done in the collection thereof was subject immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall no longer apply to the exercise of such jurisdiction." 16-a. It is enough for our purpose to notice that Letters Patent jurisdiction of this Court is saved under this Article of the Constitution and that its jurisdiction to regulate its proceedings including its appellate power is preserved, subject to the provisions of the Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by the Constitution. Until any contrary legislation, Letters Patent will continue to provide for appeals against judgments on the Original Side of the Court and judgments of a judge of this Court in appeals against the original decree of a Court subordinate to this Court. In Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra), the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that appeals against appealable orders under Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure are permissible under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of the Court not because the Code provides for such appeals only, but also because it is fair to hold that such orders which are declared appealable by the Court are judgments. The Supreme Court has, in the judgments, referred to a Full Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Mathura Sundari Dassi v. Haran Chandra Shaha (AIR 1916 Cal 361), to come to the said conclusion and quoted a passage from that judgment which reads : By the terms of S. 117, the Code is made applicable to the High Court, and Order 43, Rule 1 gives a right of appeal in the very case under discussion. But it is said that this Code and the rules made under it do not apply to an appeal from a learned judge of the High Court. I cannot follow that argument. It is part of the defendant's case that Order 9, Rule 8 applies. That order is in effect a part of the Civil Procedure Code. But it is said that this Code and the rules made under it do not apply to an appeal from a learned judge of the High Court. I cannot follow that argument. It is part of the defendant's case that Order 9, Rule 8 applies. That order is in effect a part of the Civil Procedure Code. It seems to me strange that the plaintiff should be subjected to Order 9, Rule 8 and be liable to have his suit dismissed for want of appearance, yet when he has had his suit dismissed under one of the rules of the Code and wants to call in aid another of the rules which-when his application for reinstatement has been refused-gives him a right of appeal against that refusal, he is met with the argument that he cannot call in aid that rule because there is no appeal from the learned Judge of the High Court under the Civil Procedure Code. I think this is not a true view or a reasonable construction to put upon the Code and the rules made under it. In my judgment, the Code and the rules do apply and the plaintiff has a right of appeal and woodroffe, J. made similar observations." "Whether or not as a question of jurisdiction an appeal lies under clause 15 of the Letters Patent in a case in which an appeal is allowed under the Code, I think it may be said that there are prima facie grounds for holding that an appeal should be held to lie under the Letters Patent where it is allowed under the Code; for the fact that the legislature has in the Code allowed an appeal in a particular case, affords to my mind prima facie ground for supposing that. That case is of a class which this Court considers appealable under its Letters Patent ... Looking at the nature of the order appealed from, I think I should hold that it is appealable as a 'judgment' under the Letters Patent." and Mookherjee, J., observed thus : "The term "Rule" which finds a place in S. 117 is defined in clause (18) of S. 2 of the Code to mean "a rule contained in the First Schedule or made under S. 122 or S. 125". Our attention has not been drawn to any such rule which makes Order 43, Rule 1, clause (c) in applicable. On the other hand, Order 49, R. 3 which excludes the operation of other rules, lends support to the contention of the appellant that Order 43, Rule 1, clause (c) is applicable to the present appeal. S. 104 of the Code of 1908 is materially different from S. 588 of the Code of 1882. It provides that "an appeal shall lie from the orders mentioned in the first clause of that section and, save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of the Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders." The effect of Section 104 is thus, not to take away a right of appeal given by clause 15 of the Letter Patent, as not applicable ... I hold accordingly that this appeal is competent under clause (c), Rule 1, Order 43 of the Civil P.C. I am further of opinion that the appeal is competent also under clause 15 of the Letters Patent." 17. The procedural law relating to arbitration which had previously been codified under the Code has since been codified and amended in the Arbitration Act, 1940. If a reference is made to the provisions in Section 104 of the 1908 Code and then the words in Section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act are taken notice of, one may have the impression that the Arbitration Act has intended to exclude from the appellate Letters Patent jurisdiction of the Court quite a few types of orders which otherwise were judgments, appealable under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. But when we make a closer examination and take notice of the provisions in the Code of 1877 and the Code of 1882 and find that Sections 588 and 591 together carried on almost a similar inhibition to appeals against orders in the arbitration proceedings, which were not covered by the orders providing for appeals like Section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, we are made to think that it cannot be contended by any show of force that the words in Section 39(1) that "an appeal shall lie from the following orders under this Act and from no others to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the court passing the order" would fetter or override the provisions of the Letters Patent. It is in this way only that the observation of the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra) "It cannot be contended by any show of force ... that the provisions of the Arbitration Act giving a right of appeal to a litigant from the order of a trial judge to the Division Bench in any way fetter or override the provisions of the Letters Patent." has been made. 18. We have already noticed that the arbitration rules which were originally in the Code of Civil Procedure have been separately codified in the Arbitration Act. It is no doubt an act of competent legislature. In sub-section (2) of Section 39, it is said that no second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court. The legislature has in this clearly introduced a bar to the second appeal, whether under the Letters Patent or otherwise. In sub-section (1), however, it has given a right to litigate in providing for appeals against specific types of orders and from no others. Can this be held to be a provision inhibiting like sub-section (2) any right of appeal available under any other statute ? This was not a question before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. (supra). This was also not a question directly arising in Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra). Can this be held to be a provision inhibiting like sub-section (2) any right of appeal available under any other statute ? This was not a question before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. (supra). This was also not a question directly arising in Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra). In the latter case, the Supreme Court was greatly concerned with the types of orders which are appealable as judgments under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 19. In Umaji v. Radhikabai ( AIR 1986 SC 1272 ), a Bench of the Supreme Court became concerned with the question whether under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Chartered High Court, an appeal lay to a Division Bench against a judgment in a proceeding under Art. 226 or Art. 227 of the Constitution. While so, coming to the clause 15 of the Letters Patent in this judgment, the Supreme Court has said : "Clause 15 forms part of a group of clauses consisting of clauses 11 to 18 headed "Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court." Clause 12 deals with original jurisdiction as to suits and clause 13 with extra-ordinary original civil jurisdiction while clause 14 deals with joinder of several causes of action. Though the marginal note to clause 15 was the same as that to the old clause 14, a most material change was made in clause 15 by providing that intra-court appeals would lie "from the judgment (not being a sentence or order passed or made in any criminal trial) of one Judge of the said High Court, or of one Judge of any Division Court." The word "Judgment" in clauses 15 is not qualified in any way as to the jurisdiction in which it is given except that it should not be a sentence or order passed or made in any criminal trial, thus excluding judgments given in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. Criminal jurisdiction is provided for in clauses 22 to 29. Various other jurisdictions conferred upon the High Courts, except ordinary and extraordinary civil jurisdiction, also feature in clauses subsequent to clause 15. Marginal notes or headings to groups of sections cannot control the meaning of a section if the section is unambiguous and its meaning plain. Criminal jurisdiction is provided for in clauses 22 to 29. Various other jurisdictions conferred upon the High Courts, except ordinary and extraordinary civil jurisdiction, also feature in clauses subsequent to clause 15. Marginal notes or headings to groups of sections cannot control the meaning of a section if the section is unambiguous and its meaning plain. Not only is the wording of clause 15 unambiguous but there is a strong intrinsic evidence in that clause itself to show that it applies to all jurisdictions mentioned in different clauses of the Letters Patent, whether preceding clause 15 or subsequent thereto, except those expressly excluded by clause 15 itself. Had it not been so, there would have been no need to exclude expressly a judgment from a sentence or order passed or made in any criminal trial from the purview of clause 15. Further, under clause 15 an appeal also lies against the judgment of one judge of any Division Court where the Judge are equally divided in opinion. under the unamended clause 36, in such a case the opinion of the senior judge was to prevail and under clause 15 a appeal lay against has judgment. A Division Bench may hear an original matter or an appeal from a Subordinate Court. The omission from a clause 15 of the words." "In all cases of original civil jurisdiction" which occurred in clause 14 made the judgment of the senior judge of the Division Bench appealable whether it was given in an original matter or in an appeal from a subordinate court even though the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of decisions given in civil cases by subordinate courts is conferred by clause 16 which in numerical order follows clause 15. Such was the view taken by a Full Bench of seven Judges of the Calcutta High Court in Ranee Shurno Moyee v. Luchmeepat Doogul ((1867) 7 Suth WR 52) as far back as January 23, 1867. Since then all the Chartered High Courts have taken the same view and have held that unless excluded from the purview of clause 15, an intra-court appeal lies under that clause against the judgment delivered in the exercise of any of the jurisdictions conferred by the Letters Patent, whether by a clause preceding or succeeding clause 15. Since then all the Chartered High Courts have taken the same view and have held that unless excluded from the purview of clause 15, an intra-court appeal lies under that clause against the judgment delivered in the exercise of any of the jurisdictions conferred by the Letters Patent, whether by a clause preceding or succeeding clause 15. When clause 15 was substituted by Letters Patent dated December 9, 1927, the marginal note was changed to "Appeal to the High Court from the Judges of the court". This change brought the marginal note in conformity with what clause 15 provides. There has also been unanimity among the Chartered High Courts that the word "judgment" in clause 15 embraces not only judgments given in the exercise of jurisdictions specifically mentioned in the Letters Patent but also in the exercise of jurisdictions not so mentioned. For instance, the jurisdiction to commit for contempt is not expressly mentioned in the Letters Patent but the Calcutta High Court in Mohendra Lal Mitter v. Anundo Commar Mitter ((1897) ILR 25 Cal 236), and the Bombay High Court in Collector of Bombay v. Issac Penhas ((1947) 49 Bom LR 709 = AIR 1948 Bom 103 (FB)), have held that an order made by a single Judge committing a person for contempt is appealable under clause 15. Similarly, in Mahomedalli Allabux v. Ismailji Abdulji ((1926) 28 Bom LR 471 = AIR 1926 Bom 332), the Bombay High Court held that an appeal lay from an order passed by a single Judge directing a writ of habeas corpus to issue and in Raghunath Keshav Khadilkar v. Poona Municipality ((1944) 46 Bom LR 675 (SC) = AIR 1945 Bom 7), it held that an appeal lay under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the issue of a writ of certiorari by a single Judge. Revisional jurisdiction is not expressly mentioned in clause 15 but as the Chartered High Courts were entertaining intra-court appeals from judgments given in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, when the Letters Patent were amended in 1919 an intra-court appeal from an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction was expressly excluded. Revisional jurisdiction is not expressly mentioned in clause 15 but as the Chartered High Courts were entertaining intra-court appeals from judgments given in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, when the Letters Patent were amended in 1919 an intra-court appeal from an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction was expressly excluded. Similarly, to prevent intra-court appeals from an order passed by a single Judge in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act of 1915-1919, an appeal from such an order was expressly barred by the amending Letters Patent of March 11, 1919. It should be remembered that the Government of India Act of 1915-1919 was a Constitution Act and, therefore, the jurisdiction which was conferred upon the High Court by Section 107 of that Act was jurisdiction conferred upon them by a Constitution Act. The above view consistently held by the High Courts has found favour with this court. In National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd. (1953 SCR 1028 = AIR 1953 SC 357 ), this court, after considering the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act of 1915-1919, which are in their content similar to the corresponding provisions of the Constitution of India, held that under that Act, the Bombay High Court possessed all the jurisdictions that it had at the commencement of that Act and could also exercise all such jurisdictions that would be conferred upon it from time to time by the legislative power conferred by that Act and, therefore, unless the right of appeal was otherwise excluded, an intra-court appeal lay under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court. The same, of course, would apply to the Letters Patent of the Calcutta and Madras High Courts. The Letters Patent establishing the Lahore High Court constitute the Charter of the Punjab High Court. Clause 10 of those Letters Patent is in pari materia with cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of the Chartered High Courts." 20. The same, of course, would apply to the Letters Patent of the Calcutta and Madras High Courts. The Letters Patent establishing the Lahore High Court constitute the Charter of the Punjab High Court. Clause 10 of those Letters Patent is in pari materia with cl. 15 of the Letters Patent of the Chartered High Courts." 20. The words in clause 44 of the Letters Patent and in Art. 225 of the Constitution of India, which undoubtedly make the appellate jurisdiction of the court subject to the law made by a competent Legislature, however, have to be understood as explained by the Supreme Court in Umaji's case (supra) as follows : "Article 225 of the Constitution is by its term made "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Constitution." Thus, under Article 225 the jurisdiction of the existing High Court and the law administered by them and the powers of the High Courts to make rules and to regulate the sittings of the court and of members thereof sitting singly or in Division Courts have been preserved and continued subject to the provisions of the Constitution and of any law made by the appropriate Legislature. According to the Full Bench the words "subject to" create a limitation upon the jurisdiction and powers of the existing High Courts. This is not a correct interpretation. Article 225 follows a pattern established by earlier legislation. Under Section 9 of the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, the jurisdiction and powers of the High Courts were made subject to the legislative powers of the Governor General of India in Council. Clause 44 of the Letters Patent of 1865 earlier made the provisions of the Letters Patent subject to the same legislative powers and after the amendment of the said clause by the amending Letters Patent of March 11, 1919, subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General in Legislative Council and also of the Governor-General in Council. Under S. 106(1a) of the Government of India Act, 1915-1919, the Letters Patent of a High Court could be amended from time to time by the Crown by further Letters Patent. Under S. 106(1a) of the Government of India Act, 1915-1919, the Letters Patent of a High Court could be amended from time to time by the Crown by further Letters Patent. Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935, continued the jurisdiction of the existing High Courts subject to the provisions of part IX of that Act, the provisions of any order in Council made under the Act or any other Act and the provisions of any Act of the appropriate Legislature enacted by virtue of the powers conferred on that Legislature by that Act. In the same way, Article 225 is made subject to the provisions of the Constitution and the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by the Constitution. The opening words of Article 225 "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of the powers conferred on that Legislature by this Constitution" only mean that Article 225 is subject to what is provided in the Constitution and in any law made by an appropriate Legislature. The words "subject to" cannot be construed, as the Full Bench has done, as referring only to a provision limiting or restricting the jurisdiction of the existing High Courts. They also include a provision which enlarges the jurisdiction and powers of the existing High Court. Article 225, therefore, comprehends within its scope not only the jurisdiction which the existing High Courts possessed immediately prior to the commencement of the Constitution but also the jurisdiction and powers which the other Articles of the Constitution, such as Articles 226, 227 and 228, confer upon the High Courts ... All that the qualifying phrase in Article 225 means in that if a particular jurisdiction of an existing High Court is one conferred by ordinary legislation, it can be affected, either by way of abridgement or enlargement, by a law made by the appropriate Legislature and if it is one conferred by the Constitution, it can only be so affected by a Constitutional amendment. What has escaped the notice of the Full Bench is that a provision for a right of appeal is not one which in any manner limits, abridges, takes away or adversely affects the power of the High Court under Article 226 or 227. What has escaped the notice of the Full Bench is that a provision for a right of appeal is not one which in any manner limits, abridges, takes away or adversely affects the power of the High Court under Article 226 or 227. Such a provision merely regulates the exercise of the powers under these Articles. The position which emerges from the above discussion is that under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Chartered High Courts from the judgment (within the meaning of that term as used in that clause) of a single Judge of the High Court an appeal lies to a Division Bench of that High Court and there is no qualification or limitation as to the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the single Judge while passing his judgment, provided an appeal is not barred by any statue (for example, Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908) and provided the conditions laid down by clause 15 itself are fulfilled. The conditions prescribed by clause 15 in this behalf are : (1) that it must be a judgment pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act of 1915, and (2) it must not be a judgment falling within one of the excluded categories set out in clause 15." 21. The decision in Umaji v. Radhikabai (supra) on the nature of the appellate power of the court under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this court thus concludes that at appeal will lie against the judgment of the single Judge of the court to a Division Bench if the conditions prescribed by clause 15 in this behalf are satisfied and when there is no specific bar by any statute for filing such appeal like one under Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, a provision similar to one in Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and not sub-section (1) thereof. 22. 22. In the context of the origin of the Letters Patent appellate power of this court and the scope and ambit of the appeal against a judgment on the Original Side of the court, we have no hesitation in holding that, if all the conditions for an appeal against a judgment under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are satisfied and when there is no specific bar, merely because some other law is providing appeals against certain types of orders and says that against the other orders, there shall be no appeal to a court, it cannot be inferred that even if it is appealable under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, since it is not appealable under Section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, there shall be no appeal. The Letters Patent law being a special law, it shall prevail against any general law, so long as there is no specific abridgement, amendment or repeal by a competent Legislature. The reference is answered accordingly. 23. As oral prayer for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court has been made. Since in our opinion, there is no question of law to be decided by the Supreme Court and nothing of public importance is involved in this case, which has not already been decided by the Supreme Court, we do not find any merit in the prayer. The prayer is accordingly rejected. Pursuant to the above OPINION of the Full Bench, the case coming up for hearing before the Division Bench (Mishra and Janarthanam, JJ.), the court delivered the following judgment.