Judgment Bhuvaneshwar Prasad, J. 1. The plaintiffs are the appellants. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 28-6-1984 parsed by Sri Dinesh Narain Pathak, Special Subordinate Judge, Ranchi, in Partition Suit No. 143 of 1982, by which the learned trial court had dismissed the suit with contest but without cost. 2. The plaintiffs-appellants had filed this suit for partition. The case of the plaintiffs, in short, is that both the parties to the suit are governed by Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law in the matter of succession and inheritance. From the genealogical table given as Schedule A to the plaint it would appear that one Prafullo Chandra Roy was the common ancestor. He had three sons and two daughters. Defendant No. 1 Prabodh Chandra Roy is one of his sons. Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are his daughters. They figure as Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in this appeal. The plaintiff Prakash Chandra Roy and Prabodh Chandra Roy the husband of plaintiff No. 2 were also his sons. Plaintiff No. 3 is the daughter of Pradodh Chandra Roy and Defendant No. 4 is his another daughter. 3. The further case of the plaintiffs is that Prafullo Chandra Roy by virtue of a registered deed of sale dated 2*5-9-1940 acquired property fully and particularly described in Schedule B of the plaint. At the time of the purchase the land in question was lying vacant and subsequently Prafullo Chandra Roy constructed a house over the same from his personal fund. Prafullo Chandra Roy died in May, 1960 leaving behind his heirs as mentioned above. One of his sons Prabodh Chandra Roy died in the year 1957 and Plaintiff No. 2 is his widow while Plaintiff No. 3 is his daughter. The parties were joint in possession of the suit property. Plaintiff No. 1 had l/5th interest in the suit property. Plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 and the proforma defendant No. 4 also had l/5th interest in the undividad suit property. The parties were joint in possession of the suit property. Plaintiff No. 1 had l/5th interest in the suit property. Plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 and the proforma defendant No. 4 also had l/5th interest in the undividad suit property. Since the number of family members of the plaintiff went on increasing they demanded partition in joint possession of the suit property and since Defendant No. 1 did not agree to it the suit was brought for partition of the suit property and for drawing up a preliminary and final decree in favor of the plaintiffs and preformed defendant for the allotment of their 2/5th interest in the suit property. 4. Defendant No. 2 Srimati Indira Sengupta, one of the daughter of the common ancestor prafullo Chandra Roy, has filed a written statement in which she has fully supported the case of the plaintiffs. Further she stated that undivided 1/5 th share of this defendant in the suit be allotted to the share of the plaintiffs. Similarly preformed defendant No. 4 in her written statement has supported the case of the plaintiffs. 5. Defendant No. 1 had contested the suit by filing a separate written statement in which he had contended that there was no unity of title and possession between the parties with respect to the suit property. It was further the case of Defendant No. 1 that the suit property was acquired by Prafullo Chandra Roy, the father of this defendant, by virtue of a permanent heritable and transferable Chhaparbandi lease dated 28-9-1940 after which he came in its possession. However, it is incorrect to say that Prafullo Chandra Roy constructed the building over this land out of his own fund. As a matter of fact he had constructed the building out of the funds belonging to this defendant. During his life time in the year 1956 he gave specific portions of the suit property to his sons including Plaintiff No. 1 and thereafter the parties came into exclusive possession of the portions so allotted to them. So far as Defendant No. 1 is concerned, he is coming in separate and exclusive possession of the property towards extreme southern side which was allotted to him, Prafullo Chandra Roy died in the year 1961 and not in May, 1960 as alleged. So far as Defendant No. 1 is concerned, he is coming in separate and exclusive possession of the property towards extreme southern side which was allotted to him, Prafullo Chandra Roy died in the year 1961 and not in May, 1960 as alleged. It would be wrong to say that on his death the plaintiffs and the defendants inherited his interest in the suit property. As stated above, even during his life-time in the year 1954 Prafullo Chandra Roy had allotted specific portions of the suit property to his sons and the southern portion of the suit premises was allowed to the share of Defendant No. 1 who came in its exclusive possession. This defendant is coming in peaceful possession of the premises allotted to him since more than 30 years and even if there is any defect in the title of this defendant the same has been perfected by remaining in possession openly and adversely to the knowledge of all concerned. This defendant made further constructed of three rooms over the suit land at the cost of Rs. 9,250 and constructed a tube-well at the cost of Rs. 4,300 out of his separate fund within the knowledge of the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 2 to 4. It is absolutely incorrect to say that the parties are joint and they are in joint possession of the suit property. It is also wrong to say that plaintiff No. 1 has undivided l/5th interest in the suit property and plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 together with preformed defendant have undivided l/5th share in the suit property. The plaintiffs have no share in the suit property. Since the suit land was the absolute property of the father of this defendant he had every right to allot specific portions of the same to his sons and accordingly he allotted specific portions to his sons in the year 1954. This defendant has got electric and water pipe connections installed in the suit premises at his own cost. He is also regularly paying municipal tax with respect to the premises in his occupation. On these grounds, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 6. The learned trial court framed a number of issues in the suit. He came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were not entitled to get the decree for partition of their share in the suit property. On these grounds, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 6. The learned trial court framed a number of issues in the suit. He came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were not entitled to get the decree for partition of their share in the suit property. He accordingly dismissed the suit without cost in the manner indicated above. 7. In this appeal the appellants have contended that the judgment and decree of the learned court below are against the law as well as against the material on record. The learned trial court had erred in holding that there was a previous partition during the life-time of the father of appellant No. 1 and the respondent No. 1, since the property in question was acquired by Prafullo Chandra Roy predecessor-in-interest of the parties. The learned court below should have held that there could not have been any partition of the same during the life time of Prafullo Chandra Roy. The learned trial court should have disbelieved the story of respondent No. 1 that during the life time of his father the suit property was partitioned amongst his three sons. The salary of respondent No. 1 was only Rs. 30 per month. As such the learned trial court should have disbelieved the story that he got the building over the suit land constructed at the cost of Rupees 10,000 for Rs. 6,000) in the year 1954-55. Even if it is supposed that respondent No. 1 had got any building constructed over the suit land he could not have acquired any title to it by such construction. Even the municipal tax receipts are in the name of the father of appellant No. 1 and respondent No. I. In his evidence respondent No. 1 (D.W. 4) has himself admitted that he did not get his name mutated over the suit property. On these grounds, it has been prayed that the judgment and decree of the learned court below be set aside and the suit be decreed. 8. It is the admitted case of the parties that the suit land was acquired by Prafullo Chandra Roy predecessor-in-interest of the parties, on 28-9-1940. In Paragraph 3 of the plaint it has been stated that he had purchased this land as described in Schedule B of the plaint by virtue of a registered deed of sale. 8. It is the admitted case of the parties that the suit land was acquired by Prafullo Chandra Roy predecessor-in-interest of the parties, on 28-9-1940. In Paragraph 3 of the plaint it has been stated that he had purchased this land as described in Schedule B of the plaint by virtue of a registered deed of sale. This fact has been denied in Paragraph 10 of the written statement of defendant No. 1 in which it has been stated that Prafullo Chandra Roy had acquired the suit property by virtue of a permanent heritable and transferable Chhaparbandi lease through a registered deed of lease dated 28-9-1940 and came into possession of the same. At the time of hearing of this appeal both parties have admitted that Prafullo Chandra Roy had acquired the suit land on the basis of a permanent heritable and transferable Chhaparbandi lease dated 28-9-1940. Hence thus far this appears to be the admitted case of the parties. 9. In Paragraph 4 of the plaint it has been stated that Prafullo Chandra Roy had died in the month of May, 1960. This has been denied in Parapraph 11 of the written statement of the contesting defendant in which he has stated that he had died in the year 1961. Ext. C is the certificate issued from the office of the Chairman, Doranda Notified Area Committee to the effect that Prafullo Chandra Roy had died on 23-5-1961. At the time of hearing of this appeal both parties had conceded that 23-5-1961 is the actual date of death of Prafullo Chandra Roy. 10. It is the admitted case of the parties that they are governed by Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law so far as the succession and possession of the suit property are concerned. In this background I will now proceed to examine the respective cases of the parties. 11. In Paragraph 3 of the plaint it has been stated that after acquiring the suit land Prafullo Chandra Roy had constructed a building over the same out of his personal fund. This paragraph has been replied in Paragraph 10 of the written statement of the contesting defendant in which it has been stated that it would be incorrect to say that Prafulla Chandra Roy constructed building over the suit land out of his own fund. This paragraph has been replied in Paragraph 10 of the written statement of the contesting defendant in which it has been stated that it would be incorrect to say that Prafulla Chandra Roy constructed building over the suit land out of his own fund. As a matter of fact, Prafullo Chandra Roy during his life-time had constructed the building over the suit land out of the funds belonging to defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 has been examined as D.W. 4. In Paragraph 1 of his evidence itself he has stated that in the year 1953 he got a house constructed over the suit land out of his own fund. Thus a departure in this regard in the case of Defendant No. 1 can be noticed. While according to the written statement it was Prafullo Chandra Roy who got the building constructed over the suit land out of the fund of this defendant; in his evidence D.W. 4 has stated that it was he who had got the building over the suit land constructed from his personal fund. In Paragraph 2 of his evidence he further stated that in the year 1954 during the life time of his father he got two rooms constructed. Subsequently, in the year 1978 he got three rooms constructed over the suit land. Thus clearly the case of defendant No. 1 on this point does not appear to be consistent. No paper of the plan has been produced in the court to show that it was Defendant No. 1 who got this portion of the house constructed after getting the plan thereof approved by the Notified Area Committee. In Paragraph 6 of his evidence D.W. 1 has stated that he had spent Rs, 6,000 over this construction. In his written statement he has not disclosed the amount which he is said to have spent over this construction. No doubt in the pleading evidence need not be pleaded but if the evidence of D.W. 2 is to be believed it was he who had advanced a sum of Rs, 2,000 to defendant No. 1 for this construction. He has further stated that the plan for this construction was approved by the Notified Area Committee in the name of Prafullo Chandra Roy. This borrowing of a sum of Rs. 2,000 from D.W. 2 has nowhere been disclosed by Defendant No. 1 in his written statement. 12. He has further stated that the plan for this construction was approved by the Notified Area Committee in the name of Prafullo Chandra Roy. This borrowing of a sum of Rs. 2,000 from D.W. 2 has nowhere been disclosed by Defendant No. 1 in his written statement. 12. In paragraph 10 of the written statement of defendant No. 1 it has been stated that during his life-time Prafullo Chandra Roy sometime in the year 1954 gave specific portions of the property in the suit to his sons including this defendant and the parties came in exclusive possession of the portions so allotted to them. It has further been stated that this defendant is coming in separate and exclusive possession of the property towards extreme southern side which was allotted to him. As stated above, Prafullo Chandra Roy had three sons and two daughters. The facts stated in paragraph 10 of the written statement simply goes to show that Prafullo Chandra Roy, during his life time, had divided the suit property amongst his sons. As noticed above, Prafullo Chandra Roy had two daughters also and from this statement made in paragraph 10 of the written statement it would appear that ha had deprived his daughters from his properties in the partition which he got affected in the year 1954 itself. Another thing to be noticed in this connection is that the statement in this regard made in this paragraph by defendant No. 1 is blissfully vague. He has not stated which portions of the suit property were allotted to other sons of Prafullo Chandra Roy. He has simply stated that the parties came in exclusive possession of the portions so allotted to them. The question that may arise in this connection would be how much was allotted to each of his sons in the suit property. Defendant No. 1 has not disclosed this fact. Since he has come with a story of previous partition it was for him to clearly state this fact. His failure to do so will lead to adverse inference. In this connection a reference may be made to the evidence of D.W. 4. In paragraph 6 of his evidence he has stated that this partition was oral. At the time of the partition there was no measurement ot the suit property. Only southern portion was allotted to him and northern portion was allotted to his two brothers. In this connection a reference may be made to the evidence of D.W. 4. In paragraph 6 of his evidence he has stated that this partition was oral. At the time of the partition there was no measurement ot the suit property. Only southern portion was allotted to him and northern portion was allotted to his two brothers. He has further admitted that he did not get his name mutated over the portion allotted to him. According to him at the time of this partition his elder brother was also alive. Thus the evidence of D.W. 4 on this point appears to be far from satisfactory. If really there was any such partition which got effected by Prafullo Chandra Roy this could not nave been done without actual measurement of the suit property and allocation of different shares amongst his sons. The story of this partition as given by Deiendam No. 1 (D.W. 4) does not inspire confidence and P.W. 4 has failed to discharge tm owns cast on mm. 13. I have pointed out above that the parties were governed by Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law. Under this circumstance 1 would like to briefly summaries the law with respect to heritable property of a deceased Hindu governed by Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law. It is well-settled that the property of a deceased Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga law passed by succession and not by survivorship. This will include even his share in undivided property. According to the Mitakshara law each son acquires by his birth an equal interest with his father in all ancestral property held by the father, and on the death of the father the son takes the property, not as his heir, but by survivorship. According to the Dayabhaga law, the sons do not acquire any interest by birth in ancestral, property. Their rights arise for the first time on the fathers death. On the death of the father they take such of the property as is left by him, whether separate or ancestral, as heirs and not by survivorship. As such there can be no coparcenary in the strict sense of the word between a father and sons according to the Dayabhaga law, so far as ancestral property is concerned. 14. On the death of the father they take such of the property as is left by him, whether separate or ancestral, as heirs and not by survivorship. As such there can be no coparcenary in the strict sense of the word between a father and sons according to the Dayabhaga law, so far as ancestral property is concerned. 14. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 , which applies to Hindus governed by both the schools has brought about some radical changes in the law of succession without abolishing the joint family and joint family property. The effect of that enactment is very far-reaching in case of a Mitakshara co-parcenary as will be seen from Sec. 6 of that enactment which applies only to persons governed by the Mitakshara law. So far as succession according to Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law is concerned Sec. 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is relevant, according to which the property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of this Chapter: firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class I of the Schedule. According to if the heirs named in Class I of Schedule are son; daughter; widow; mother; son of a predeceased son; daughter of a predeceased son; son of a predeceased daughter; daughter of a predeceased daughter; widow of a predeceased son; son of a predeceased son of a predeceased son; daughter of a predeceased son of a predeceased son; widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son. 15. According to the Dayabhaga law, the foundation of a coparcenary is laid on the death of the father. So long as the father is alive, there is no coparcenary in the strict sense of the word between him and his male issues, it is only on his death leaving two or more male issues that a corparcenary is first formed. The effect of the Hindu Succession Act, 1936, is not to abolish or disrupt the Dayabhaga joint family. But the share of a coparcener in the coparcenary property (as in case of his separate property) will devolve by succession according to the provisions of that Act upon the heirs therein specified. The effect of the Hindu Succession Act, 1936, is not to abolish or disrupt the Dayabhaga joint family. But the share of a coparcener in the coparcenary property (as in case of his separate property) will devolve by succession according to the provisions of that Act upon the heirs therein specified. In case of a male Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga school dying intestate and leaving ancestral property, of which, he was the absolute owner, such property also will devolve by succession upon the heirs specified according to the provisions of Hindu Succession Act. 16. It may, however, be noticed in this connection that the essence of a coparcenary under the Mitakshara law is unity of ownership. On the other hand, the essence of a corparcenary under the Dayabhaga law is unity of possession. It is not unity of ownership at all. The ownership of the coparcenary property is not in the whole body of coparceners. Every coparcener takes a defined share in the property, and he is the owner of that share. That share is defined immediately the inheritance falls in. It does not fluctuate with births and deaths in the family. Thus if a person dies leaving behind three sons, each son will take one-third and each one will be the owner of his one-third share. The sons will, therefore, become coparcener in the sense that their possession of the property inherited their father is joint. It is the unity of possession that makes a coparcener. So long as there is unity of possession, no coparcener can say that a particular one-third of the property belong to him; that he can say only after a partition. According to the Dayabhaga law partition consists in splitting up joint possession and assigning specific portions of the property to the several corparceners. According to the Mitakshara law, it consists in splitting up joint ownership and in defining the share of each coparcener. 17. So far as the concept of partition is concerned, according to the true notion of a Mitakshara family no individual member of that family, while it remains undivided, can predicate about the joint property, that he has a certain definite share, one-third or one-fourth partition, according to that law, consists in ascertaining and defining the shares of the coparceners. 17. So far as the concept of partition is concerned, according to the true notion of a Mitakshara family no individual member of that family, while it remains undivided, can predicate about the joint property, that he has a certain definite share, one-third or one-fourth partition, according to that law, consists in ascertaining and defining the shares of the coparceners. In other words, it consists in a numerical division of the property by which the proportion of each coparcener in the property is fixed. 18. According to the Dayabhaga law, on the other hand, each coparcener has, even while the family remains undivided, a certain definite share in the joint property of which he is the absolute owner. The property is held in defined shares, though the possession in the joint possession of the whole family. Partition, according to that law, consists in separating the shares of the coparceners, and assigning to the coparceners specific portions of the property. 19. From what has been stated above it would become clear that a person governed by the Dayabhaga law is the absolute owner of the property possessed by him. During his life-time his sons cannot claim any share. In the present case as will appear from the written statement of defendant No. 1 the father had already partitioned his property amongst his sons. As stated above, the case of defendant No. 1 on this point, is tar from satisfactory, I have also noticed that in any such partition during the life-time of the father he could not have ignored the shares of his daughters. As a matter of fact, the very conception of partition during the life-time of the father is alien to Dayabhaga law. In any view of the matter, defendant No. 1 has completely failed to show that there was any such partition in which specific shares were allotted to the sons of Prafullo Chandra Roy. Since he has come forward that this story the onus was on him to prove this fact. He has singularly failed to do so. Moreover, the appellants have contended that during the life-time of Prafullo Chandra Roy, ms sons were not entitled to get a snare in the property of their father. They cannot be said to be us co-owners along with their father. As such any such family arrangement or partition required registration and it could not be oral. Moreover, the appellants have contended that during the life-time of Prafullo Chandra Roy, ms sons were not entitled to get a snare in the property of their father. They cannot be said to be us co-owners along with their father. As such any such family arrangement or partition required registration and it could not be oral. This is a circumstance against the case of defendant No. 1. 20. In this connection a reference may be made to paragraph 8 of the judgment of the learned trial court. In this paragraph the learned trial court has taken into consideration the evidence of defendant No. 1 (D.W. 4) that he got the house constructed over the suit land from his separate fund and his father had allotted the southern portion of this land to him whereas northern portion was allotted to the plaintiffs and other defendants. As stated above, there is no such case in paragraph 10 of the written statement according to which it was the father who got the house constructed in the year 1954 though it was defendant No, 1 who had met expenses over this construction. Similarly, in paragraph 10 of the written statement it has not been stated that northern portion of the suit land was given to the plaintiffs. D.W. 4 has tried to develop this story in his evidence which cannot be believed. So far as D.W. 2 is concerned, he had stated that in the year 1953 it was D.W. 4 who got the house constructed over the suit land from his own fund. This story cannot be believed for the simple reason that there is no such case made out in the written statement of defendant No. 1. 21. I have briefly referred to some documents proved on behalf of defendant No. 1. Exts. A, A/1 and A/2 are municipal tax receipts issued in the year 1982, 1983 and 1981 respectively in the name of defendant No. 1. In this connection it may be mentioned that D.W. 4, in his evidence, has clearly admitted that as yet he has not got his name mutated over the portion of the suit land allotted to his share by his father. If that is so how is it that these municipal tax receipts could be issued in the name of defendant No. 1, Probodh Chandra Roy. If that is so how is it that these municipal tax receipts could be issued in the name of defendant No. 1, Probodh Chandra Roy. This shows that these documents were obtained only for the purposes of the suit. According to the case of defendant No. 1 he has spent a sum of Rs. 4,300 for installing a hand pump over the suit land. In support of this contention he has produced Ext. D which is a receipt dated 5-2-1982 issued by Tulsi Ministry. There is absolutely no mention in Ext. D to show the place where the hand pump was installed. There is nothing in it to connect this receipt with the suit land. Similarly, Ext. is a receipt for a sum of Rs. 9,230 issued by one Sk. Sarful in favor of defendant No. 1 towards the cost of certain construction work and casting of R.C.C. roof. In Ext. B also there is absolutely no mention of the fact where this house was constructed. Neither Tulsi Ministry nor Sk. Sarful has been examined to state where and at what place they had carried out the works as mentioned in Exts. D and B, respectively. Hence Exts. B and D do not go to show that they relate to any portion of the suit land. 22. I will next refer to paragraph 10 of the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge. In this paragraph he has referred to three decisions of Madras and Patna High Courts, in support of the contention of defendant No. 1 that in case an oral partition between co-owners the same does not expressly require such a partition to be in writing. It is obvious that the learned Subordinate Judge has committed a grave mistake in extending the principles laid down in those decisions to the present case. As pointed out above, the parties are governed by Dayabhaga School of Hindu law and not by Mitakshara Hindu Law. It has been noticed that under Dayabhaga law the son does not get a right during life-time of the father and he inherits the property of his father by succession and not by survivorship. Hence these decisions are of no avail so far as the case of defendant No. 1 is concerned. 23. -- --(Peddu Reddlar V/s. Kothanda Reddi, is a Single Bench decision of Madras High Court. Hence these decisions are of no avail so far as the case of defendant No. 1 is concerned. 23. -- --(Peddu Reddlar V/s. Kothanda Reddi, is a Single Bench decision of Madras High Court. In this decision it has been held that an oral partition between co-owner is valid in law and the Transfer of Property Act itself does not expressly require such a partition to be in writing. This decision, however, cannot be applied to the present case for the simple reason that here there is no question of an oral partition between co-owners. As noticed above, the father and sons cannot be said to be co-owners of the properties under Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law. Hence this decision is of no avail to defendant No. 1. Since the present case is not a case of co-owners the ratio of this decision would not be applicable. 24. The learned trial court has further placed reliance on the case of Mukhram Rai V/s. Chandradeep Rai AIR 1936 Pat 68. This was a case from Shahabad where the parties were governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu law. The plaintiffs case was that they and the defendants were co-partners of a joint family governed by the Mitakshara School and that the properties sought to be partitioned were all joint family properties. The defendants on the other hand contended that there had been disruption of the family long before the institution of the suit and the properties had been partitioned some 90 years before the suit. Both the courts below held that the parties had separated in status many years before the suit though the lower appellate court had disbelieved the defense case that there was a partition about 90 years ago. It was held that where parties have been in exclusive possession, and are exercising rights of ownership over separate blocks of land for a long time the Court might will presume that these lands have already been divided and rights of parties defined in regard to them in such a manner as to preclude their being re-partitioned. As noticed above, in the present case the parties are governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law. Defendant No. 1 has been able to prove the previous partition during the life time of his father. As noticed above, in the present case the parties are governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law. Defendant No. 1 has been able to prove the previous partition during the life time of his father. He has not been able to lead evidence to show that he is in exclusive possession over southern portion of the suit land by constructing a house over the same. Under this circumstance, these decisions are of no avail to defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 has also taken the plea of acquiring a valid title by adverse possession over the suit land. As stated above, defendant No. 1 has not been able to prove the exclusive possession over the portion of the suit land as claimed by him. As such the question of acquiring any title by adverse possession over the same will not arise. 25. In this connection it may be noticed that D.W. 2 had himself admitted in paragraph 5 of his evidence that defendant No. 1 had got the house constructed over the suit land by spending Rs. 6,000 from his own rocket though the plan was not passed by the Municipality. So far as the subsequent construction in the year 1978 is concerned here also defendant No. I has not been able to produce the sanctioned plan for this construction approved by the Municipality. All these circumstances go against the case of defendant No. 1 about his exclusive possession over a portion of the suit land. Also D.W. 4 has admitted that as yet he has not been able to get his name mutated in the municipal record over the share of the land allotted to him. These are circumstances against the case of defendant No. 1 with respect to the previous partition and his exclusive possession. 26. In paragraph 10 of the judgment the learned trial court has also referred to the case of Arjun Mahto V/s. Monda Manatain -- . This is a Division Bench of this Court. In this case also the parties were governed by Mitakshara law and not by Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law and hence the ratio of the decision of this case will also not apply to the present case. This is a Division Bench of this Court. In this case also the parties were governed by Mitakshara law and not by Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law and hence the ratio of the decision of this case will also not apply to the present case. It hanas been held in this case that the general principle is that every Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved; but this presumption can be rebutted by direct evidence or by course of conduct. This principle will apply in the case of persons governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law and not by Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law. Further it has been held in this that no formal document of partition was available. Still the partition could be proved by the intention of the parties manifested by their subsequent conduct and by their sole and independent enjoyment of the properties. While in the present case defendant No. 1 has not been able to show his independent and sole enjoyment of the portions of the suit land alleged to be allotted to him, it may be noticed in this connection that this case will not apply to the present case since here the parties were governed by Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law. 27. Before concluding I would like to refer to paragraph 12 of the learned trial court. In this paragraph a reference has been made to the evidence of P.W. 2 to the effect that the amount of expenses over construction of the house was maintained by his father. Obviously, under this circumstance, it was not for him to disclose from where the bricks, cement, sand were arranged or the names of laborers and masons engaged in this construction. Though P.W. 2 has stated that the amount of expenses for construction of this house was maintained by this father the learned trial court has proceeded to draw adverse inference on account of the failure of the plaintiffs to produce the accounts of the expenditure. It is obvious from the statement of P.W 2 that any such register was not in his possession but in possession of his father. Hence on his failure to produce no adverse inference can be drawn. It is obvious from the statement of P.W 2 that any such register was not in his possession but in possession of his father. Hence on his failure to produce no adverse inference can be drawn. Further a reference has been made to paragraph 5 of his evidence in which he has admitted that he had locked three rooms in the premises since 1972 and that he has admitted that there is a water connection in the disputed premises but he cannot say the amount of water tax. Also he appears to have been admitted that the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 have got separate electric meter in the portions occupied by them. These things are, however, not of much consequence since a tenant can also get electric meter installed in his name in the tenanted premises and that will not confer any title on him over the same. The electric connection or water connection are taken for convenience and persons taking them cannot claim any title over the house simply because these connections stand in their names. As stated by P.W. 2 he is not at the suit premises since 1972, since when three rooms are locked. Hence no adverse inference from these things can be drawn. 28. From the detailed discussions made it becomes clear that the judgment under appeal cannot be sustained. It further appears that the plaintiffs are entitled to claim partition over the suit properties in the manner indicated by them. 29. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the learned trial court are set aside. The suit is decreed on contest with cost throughout at the minimum prescribed scale against the contesting defendant and ex parte without cost against rest. The hearing fee will be Rs. 250 Let a preliminary decree for the partition of 1/5th share of plaintiff No. 1 and another 1/5t h of plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 along with pro forma defendant in the suit property be drawn up.