JUDGMENT 1. - This is a criminal Misc. application filed by the petitioner for recalling the order passed by this Court in S.B. Cr. Revision Petition No. 129/91 dismissing the revision filed by the petitioner against his conviction for the offence under section 7 read with S. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act upheld by the Sessions Judge, Tonk The revision petition was heard on 8th July, 91 and was dismissed on merits. 2. In this Misc. application, it has been stated that one of the points urged before this Court during the course of arguments in the revision was that under section 16(A) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, it has been provided that all cases under that Act will be tried summarily by the Magistrate empowered by the State Government. The petitioner was tried for the offence treating the case as a warrant case and as such, the trial was illegal. It has further been stated that when the revision petition was argued, the notification dated 5th March, 1977, issued by the State Government under section 16(A) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was not available and the counsel for the petitioner was under an impression that there was no dispute before the court as to whether any notification under section 16(A) had been issued or not. Now the petitioner had filed along with his application, a notification dated 5th March, 77 issued by the State Government whereby the State Government empowered all Chief Judicial Magistrates, Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrates and Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrates functioning at sub divisional headquarters to try summarily offence under sub-section (1 of S. 16 of the Act. It is, therefore, said there has been a factual error apparent on the fact of the record in this Courts order dated 8th July 91 passed in the revision. The petitioner has, therefore, prayed that the revisional order dated 8th July, *91, passed by this Court, may be recalled and the revision be heard afresh and thereafter, order as may be deemed just and proper, be passed. 3. The first question that arises is whether such an application is maintainable in law for recalling this Courts revisional order dated 8th July, 91 passed on its merits. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to some reported decisions including some decisions of this Court. 3. The first question that arises is whether such an application is maintainable in law for recalling this Courts revisional order dated 8th July, 91 passed on its merits. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to some reported decisions including some decisions of this Court. The first decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is in State of Bombay v. Nilkanth Shripad Bhave & anr. (AIR 1954 Bombay 65 ). In that case, the matter before the Bombay High Court was an application by the State of Bombay to expunge certain remarks made by Sessions Judge, North Satara while dealing with a bail application. The remarks that were made by the Sessions Judge were about ;he Magistrate before whom the case was pending. The question before the full Bench of the Bombay High Court was whether there was any jurisdiction in the High Court to entertain such type of application. Their Lordships held that in such types of cases, the High Court could exercise inherent powers under section 561A of the old Code. Their Lordships relied upon two decisions of the Privy Council in Emperor v. Nazir Ahmed AIR 1945 PC 18 ); and Jairam Das v. Emperor ( AIR 1945 PC 94 ) wherein the view had been taken that S. 561 A of the old Code merely safeguards all powers which already existed in the High Court. S. 561 A gives the power to the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It was of the view that High Court has the widest jurisdiction to pass orders to secure the ends of justice and that S. 561A of the old Code must give the power to High Court to entertain applications which are not contemplated by the Cr. P.C. Therefore, if the High Court feels that ends of justice require that an order should be made in an application, although the application is not contemplated by the Cede, the High Court will entertain the application and make the necessary orders to secure the ends of justice. P.C. Therefore, if the High Court feels that ends of justice require that an order should be made in an application, although the application is not contemplated by the Cede, the High Court will entertain the application and make the necessary orders to secure the ends of justice. It was further laid down that inherent powers which the High Court possess is, in proper cases, even though no appeal or revision may be preferred to the High Court, to judicially correct the observations of the lower Court by pointing out that the observations made by the Magistrate were not justified or were without any foundation or were wholly wrong or improper. Expunging of remarks font a judgment constitutes the inherent power of any superior court and, therefore, it is also inherent power of the High Court. It would appear from going through this judgment that the precise question before the Bombay High Court was, whether the High Court has jurisdiction under its inherent powers to expunge the remarks made by the Sessions Judge about the Magistrate before whom criminal case was pending. No effective order had been passed by the sessions Judge which could be complained of by any party nor was there any finding given by the Sessions Judge which could be challenged before the High Court. In such circumstances, it was held that the High Court had inherent powers to entertain an application to expunge the remarks made by the subordinate Court if the ends of justice so required. It was clarified that the inherent jurisdiction is not intended to substitute the opinion of the High Court or the opinion of the lower Court. In the present case, the application is not for expunging any remark made by a subordinate Court. 4. The next decision relied upon is the full Bench decision in Raj Narain v. State (AIR 1959 Allahabad 315 ). The question referred to the Full Bench was whether the Court had power to revoke, review, recall or alter its own earlier decision in criminal revision and rehear the same ? If so, in what circumstances ? The majority judgment stated that S. 369 of the old Code dealt with the pronouncement of the judgment in every trial in any criminal court of original jurisdiction. If so, in what circumstances ? The majority judgment stated that S. 369 of the old Code dealt with the pronouncement of the judgment in every trial in any criminal court of original jurisdiction. S. 369 of the old Code provided in general that, a court after it had signed its judgment, shall not alter and review the same except to correct a clerical error. Sections 24 of the Code state that the rules contained in Chapter XXVI of the Code applicable to the judgment of an appellate court, other than a High Court. It was, therefore, held that S. 424 made it clear that the rule contained in Chapter XXVI of the Code referred to the juogment of a criminal court of original jurisdiction. It also made it clear that those rules will apply to the judgment of an appellate court other than a High Court. There was nothing in Chapter XXXII of the Code dealing with reference and revision which made the provision of S. 369 of the Code applicable to the orders passed by the courts of revision. Reliance was placed in this judgment in the observations of Das, J in the decision reported in AIR 1955 SC 633 . at page 639 wherein it was stated that, in view of the scheme, there was no manner of doubt that the provisions of the section collected in Chapter XXVI were concerned with judgments pronounced by the trial court. It was held that the High Court has power under section 561A to alter or review the same judgment also provided that it was necessary to do so to give effect to any order under the Cr. P.C. or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. 5. In Ganeshram V. State of Rajasthan (1968 RLW 496 ), this Court also held that the High Court may entertain an application under section 561A of the old Code where it feels that ends of justice so require. In Ganeshrams case, an appeal had been filed by the State against the judgment of the Magistrate. Bikaner and the High Court set aside the acquittal and convicted the petitioner in that case under section 325 IPC and awarded him rigorous imprisonment for one year. In Ganeshrams case, an appeal had been filed by the State against the judgment of the Magistrate. Bikaner and the High Court set aside the acquittal and convicted the petitioner in that case under section 325 IPC and awarded him rigorous imprisonment for one year. Then an application under section 561A Cr P.C. was moved on behalf of the petitioner praying that the order of conviction passed by the Court be set aside as his counsel could not attend the court on the day when the appeal was decided and be allowed to argue the appeal. By another application, it was further prayed that in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, the court may extend the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. The learned Single Judge of this Court relied upon the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Rajnarains case (supra) and held that the High Court has inherent power under section 561A of the Code for securing the ends of justice or for preventing abuse of the process of the Court and to give effect to any order under this Code. It would be a matter of determination of court in each and individual case whether the circumstances pertaining in that case make out that purpose and make it inherent on the court to exercise such a power to achieve the objects mentioned in the section. The Full Bench decision of this Court in Hahu v. State of Rajasthan ( 1987 (I) RLR 1 ) laid down that where a judgment is given in absence of appellant or his counsel and the case is decided on merits, powers under section 482 of the present Code can be exercised. The Full Bench also held that the word recall is different from the power of altering or reviewing the judgment. 6. It may be stated that power of review of a judgment is a creature of statute. A judgment cannot be reviewed unless the statute gives power to the court to review the judgment on any ground. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is no power of review of judgments given to the court. In the present Code of Criminal Procedure, Chapter XXV11 deals with judgment. S. 353 provides that judgment in every trial in any Criminal Court of original jurisdiction shall be pronounced in open Court by the presiding officer. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is no power of review of judgments given to the court. In the present Code of Criminal Procedure, Chapter XXV11 deals with judgment. S. 353 provides that judgment in every trial in any Criminal Court of original jurisdiction shall be pronounced in open Court by the presiding officer. S. 554 deals with the language and contents of the judgment. S. 355 deals with judgment by Metropolital Magistrate. S. 362 from part of S. XXVII and it states that save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. S. 387 of the present Code provides that the rule contained in Chapter XXVII as to the judgment of a Criminal Court of original jurisdiction shall apply, so far as may be practicable, to the judgment in appeal of a Court of Session or Chief Judicial Magistrate. It is pertinent to note that there is difference of language between S 424 of the old Code, of Criminal Procedure and S. 387 of the present Code. In S. 421 of the old Code, there were the words other than a High Court. However, these words were not kept in present S. 387. In the present S. 357, the words substituted were to the judgments in appeal of a Court of Session or Chief Judicial Magistrate. However, this change in the words does not, in substance, affect scope of S 87 and it is applicable to the appellant judgment given by a Court of Session or Chief Judicial Magistrate and not to the High Court It is pertinent to note that provision of Chapter XXVII of the new Code were made applicable to the judgment or order of the High Court as it had been made applicable to the appellate judgment of the Court of Session or Chief Judicial Magistrate. 7. It has already been observed that no express power of review in :he Code of Criminal Procedure. The only power reserved in the High Court is that under section 482 Cr. 7. It has already been observed that no express power of review in :he Code of Criminal Procedure. The only power reserved in the High Court is that under section 482 Cr. P.C. and this power is exercised by the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is, therefore, competent for the High Court to exercise its inherent powers for any od the, three purposes mentioned in S. 482 Cr. P.C. 8. In the present case, one of the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the revision was heard that the case against the petitioner under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was tried by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Tonk as a warrant case and not by way of summary trial. The learned counsel had relied upon S 16A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1951. At that time, the petitioners counsel did not produce before this Court any notification of the State Government empowering the Judicial Magistrate Tonk to try summarily offences under section 16 (1) of the Act. It was observed in the revisional judgment "it was not at all shown that there was a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class at Tonk who was special empowered by the State Government to try the offences under sub-section (') of S. 16 in a summary way. In the absence of such a special power, the Judicial Magistrate. Tonk, offence will have to be tried as a warrant case and not in a summary way." 9. During the course of hearing of the revision, the counsel for the petitioner had referred to two decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court and also a decision of this Court in Man Singh V. State of Rajasthan. However, these decisions were distinguished on 'he ground that in Man Singhs case, the judgment went to show that the petitioner was not aggrieved against the conclusion of the Magistrate that the trial of the offence being summary trial, the Magistrate could not have acted on the evidence recorded by the other Magistrate as provisions of S. 326 (3) Cr. P.C. were not applicable. P.C. were not applicable. In one of the Punjab & Haryana case, it was clear from the decision that unless a Judicial Magistrate was special empowered to try the offence under section 16 (I) of the Act in a summary way, no question of holding trial in that manner would arise. 10. Now along with this petition, the petitioner has filed a notification of the State Government dated 5th March, 1977 which mentions that the State Government has empowered the Judicial Magistrate functioning at some divisional headquarters to try offences summarily. While deciding the revision, this Court had not gone into the question whether the trial was good or bad even if the case was tried as a warrant case, even if there existed a notification under section 16A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, That question may still have to be considered. Since, however, now a notification dated 5th Mar., 77 has been brought on record, it is proper and in the interest of justice, to recall this Courts order dated 8th July, 91 passed in S.B. Cr. Revision Petition No. 129/91 and to rehear the revision. 11. I, therefore, allow this application and recall this Courts order dated 8th July, 91 in S. B. Cr. Revision Petition No. 129/91, and direct that the revision may be re-registered and may be listed for hearing. *******