ORDER D.P.S. Chauhan, J. - Gaon Sabhas, which have been established with a view to develop local self-government in the rural area, owe their existence to the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as the Act'). 2. There is a Gaon Sabha in the district of Allahabad known as Goan Sabha Kalaranpur (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as'the Gaon Sabha'). Respondent No. 2 is its elected Pradhan. 3. The Act conferred on the State Government certain powers of control and supervision over the Gaon Sabhas and the office bearers which find enumeration in Section 95 where under clause (g) gives the power of removal of the persons as mentioned therein including the Pradhan who is one of the office bearers of the Gaon Sabha. Likewise, under clause (gg), the power for the suspension of the persons as mentioned therein including the Pradhan is given. 4. The State Government, in exercise of its power under S. 96A of the Act delegated its power under clause (g) as well as under clause (gg) of sub-section (1) of S. 95 of the Act through separate notifications. The power under clause (gg) was delegated to the Sub- Divisional Officer having jurisdiction subjecting the same to the scrutiny by the Commissioner of the Division as well as by the State itself vide notification No. 5681- 8/XXXIII-2-237-72 dated October 14, 1976 (published in U.P. Gazette, Part 1, dated October 30, 1976) which reads as under: "In exercise of the powers under S. 96A of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (U.P. Act No. 26 of 1947) read with S. 21 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904 (U.P. Act No. 1 of 1904) and in supersession of Government notification No. 16/7-8/XXXIII-23/72 dated August 12, 1974, the Governor is pleased to delegate the powers of the State Government under clause (gg) of sub-section (1) of S. 95 of the said Act to the Sub-Divisional Officer having jurisdiction subject to the condition that any order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer in exercise of the said power, either before or after the date of this notification, shall be revisable by the Commissioner of the Division and also by the State Government. 5. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Soron (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as `the Sub- Divisional Officer'), in purported exercise of the powers under clause (gg), passed an order, on 18-7-1990. 5. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Soron (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as `the Sub- Divisional Officer'), in purported exercise of the powers under clause (gg), passed an order, on 18-7-1990. Suspending the respondent No. 2, Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha. This order was challenged by way of revision No. 23 of 1990 by the Pradhan before the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad (for brevity, hereinafter to be referred to as`the Commissioner') who, while maintaining the order, so far as the same related to the decision for setting up an enquiry against the Pradhan, set aside the same so far the same related to his suspension vide his order dated 18-9-1990. This order of the Commissioner is the subject matter of the present writ petition where under the relief for its quashing is prayed for. 6. The facts, in brief are (a) The respondent No. 2, the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha on the basis of the report of the Naib Tehsildar Soron, dated 18-7-1990, was suspended the same day by the Sub-Divisional Officer and this order of suspension was passed at the stage of formation of opinion by the Sub-Divisional Officer for taking proceedings against the Pradhan under clause (g). (b) The Naib Tehsildar's report, as aforesaid, was regarding the activities of the Pradhan about his encroachment over the Banjar land of the Gaon Sabha in plot No. 232 by making a manure pit and placing a thatch there over and it also contained allegations about annexation by the Pradhan in his chak the chak road of plot No. 318 and the water channel in plot No. 323 as well as for allowing illegal construction over the land of the Gaon Sabha by permitting the person illegal occupation there over. 7. The writ petition, as initially filed, was on behalf of the two persons but on account of it having been dismissed by this court on behalf of the petitioner No. 1, who was the Up Pradhan of the Goan Sabha, survived on behalf of the petitioner No. 2 who is one of the members of the Gaon Sabha. During the course of the consideration of the matter regarding vacation of the ex parte interim order, the parties insisted upon the final disposal of the writ petition itself as counter and rejoinder affidavits had already been exchanged and the matter is cognizable by the single judge. During the course of the consideration of the matter regarding vacation of the ex parte interim order, the parties insisted upon the final disposal of the writ petition itself as counter and rejoinder affidavits had already been exchanged and the matter is cognizable by the single judge. In the circumstances, with the consent of the parties, I propose to decide the petition itself. 8. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Pradeep Chandra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, Sri Radhey Shyam as also the learned standing counsel at longum. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Commissioner has acted illegally while interfering with the order of Sub-Divisional Officer which was just and the grounds for interference by the Commissioner are unsustainable in law. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, resisting the claim of the petitioner, raised four-fold objections, which are preliminary in nature (i) Firstly, the petitioner has no locus standi to maintain the petition; (ii) Secondly, the petitioner having failed to avail the alternative remedy by way of revision before the State Government, cannot maintain the petition; (iii) Thirdly, the order of Sub-Divisional Officer dated 18-7-1990, which has been set aside by the commissioner, was void having been passed without satisfying the requirement of law and restoration of such an order would not be in the interest of justice and, in the circumstances, no writ can be issued; and (iv) Fourthly, the findings of the Commissioner being based on the material on record are findings of facts and cannot be interfered with the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as the Commissioner had held that the suspension of the Pradhan was not reasonable. 11. The submissions so made by the counsel for the parties related to the questions of law and facts have only peripheral relevance in determining the same. I propose to consider the objections as raised by the learned counsel for respondent first. 12. 11. The submissions so made by the counsel for the parties related to the questions of law and facts have only peripheral relevance in determining the same. I propose to consider the objections as raised by the learned counsel for respondent first. 12. The first objection as raised by the learned counsel for the respondent is regarding the locus standi of the petitioner to maintain the petition and in support whereof he has submitted that the petitioner, who is only a member of the Goan Sabha, has, in the present writ petition, challenged the order passed by the Commissioner setting aside the suspension of the Pradhan and by this order he is not in any way affected and none of his personal rights have been put in jeopardy. He was not a party before the Commissioner in revision. According to him, the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this court on account of personal grudge and enmity with the respondent No. 2 and for satisfying his personal gain as the Pradhan filed an objection under 9A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act, 1953, before the Consolidation authority, Soon, against the petitioner, Nanha Lal, and. one Om Prakash, who unlawfully occupied the Goan Sabha land on the basis of farzi Amaldaramad so as to grab the same. On the basis of the report of the Assistant Consolidation Officer dated 25-2-1985 the matter is pending before the Consolidation Officer for adjudication. This fact is admitted in the rejoinder affidavit by the petitioner, but the plea taken is that the matter before the consolidation authority related to title dispute. The petitioner has, thus, come to this court for wrecking his personal vengeance and satisfying his personal interest so that by getting the Pradhan under suspension, he may have easy sailing before the consolidation authority as the U.P. Pradhan, who joined him in the present petition, is in collusion with him. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner took the stand that the petitioner is a person who reported the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer against the Pradhan that the Pradhan is getting the constructions illegally made over the Gaon Sabha land of plot No. 262 in village Tulsipur by permitting Sri Chhedi Lal Gupta and as such he is a person interested in the matter. 14. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 submitted that without admitting anything, even if the petitioner reported the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer against the Pradhan, even then he cannot be said to have a locus standi in the matter so as to approach this court against the order of the Commissioner whereby none of his personal rights have been affected and at the most he can be a witness in the enquiry against the Pradhan, if any conducted, under Clause (g) of sub-section (1) S. 95 of the Act. It was after this that the learned counsel for the petitioner took the stand that he has approached this court in the capacity of a public interest litigation. 15. Goan Sabha is a body corporate in whom the property of the Gaon Sabha is vested. Goan Panchayat of which the Pradhan is the ex-officio Chairman, though not its member, having no right of vote except in the situation of there being a tie and that too in the matters other than election, is the executive body of the Goan Sabha entrusted inter alia with the task to remove encroachment over the public street, public places and property vested in the Goan Sabha, but the Gaon Sabha has not taken steps in the matter. Apart from this Gram Panchayat also acts as Land Management Committee and in this capacity it is charged with the general management, supervision and control over all the property of the Goan Sabha but even the land management Committee has not taken any proceeding against the Pradhan. Under the law, the Pradhan is liable to pay surcharge imposed by the Prescribed authority for the loss, waste or misapplication of the money or property belonging to the Gaon Sabha, if such loss, waste or misapplication is the direct consequence of his negligence or misconduct. These facts go to establish that sufficient safeguard has been provided by the Act for the preservation and protection of the property of the Gaon Sabha. 16. These facts go to establish that sufficient safeguard has been provided by the Act for the preservation and protection of the property of the Gaon Sabha. 16. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his submission that h e has approached this court by means o f the present writ petition in the capacity of a public interest litigation for which he has placed reliance on the case of the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Gupta v. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 and relied on the following passage at Page 194 : "22. We would, therefore, hold that any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty or from violation of some provision of the Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and observance of such constitutional or legal provision. This is absolutely essential for maintaining the rule of law, furthering the cause of justice and accelerating the pace of realisation of the constitutional objective "Law" as pointed out by Justice Krishna Iyer in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344 : 1980 Lab IC 1367 is a social auditor and this audit function can be put into action when some one with real public interest ignites the jurisdiction." In the present case, since the Act itself has provided for the redressal of any injury to the property of the Gaon Sabha through the machinery created thereunder as well as under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, no breach of public duty or violation of the provisions of the Constitution or law has been stated either in the petition or canvassed during the course of argument. 17. 17. However, the Supreme Court while holding the principle that the Court has to invent new methods and new strategy for the purposes of providing access to justice to large masses of people who are denied their basic human rights and to whom, freedom and liberty have no meaning, has observed that But we must hasten to make it clear that the individual who moves the court for judicial redress in cases of this kind must be acting bona fide with a view to vindicating the cause of justice and if he is acting for personal gain or private profit or out of political motivation or other oblique consideration, the court should not allow itself to be activised at the instance of such person and must reject his application at the three hold, whether it be in the form of a letter addressed to the Court or even in the form of a regular writ petition filed in court." He has also made a reference of the case of Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802 and also of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ummed Ram, AIR 1986 SC 847 and also the case of Full Bench of this Court Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, 1983 UPLBEC 756 : AIR 1984 All 46 . Those cases, in the background of the facts of the present case, have no relevance, as the present case is covered by the following observation of the Supreme Court made in Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 420 at Page 424 : "Public interest litigation cannot be invoked by a person or body of person to satisfy his or its personal grudge and enmity. If such petitions under Article 32, are entertained it would amount to abuse of process of the Court, preventing speedy remedy to other genuine petitioners from this court. Personal interest cannot be enforced through the process of this court under Article 32 of the Constitution in the garb of a public interest litigation. Public interest litigation contemplates legal proceedings for vindication or enforcement of fundamental rights of group of persons or community which are not able to enforce their fundamental rights on account of their incapacity poverty or ignorance of law. Public interest litigation contemplates legal proceedings for vindication or enforcement of fundamental rights of group of persons or community which are not able to enforce their fundamental rights on account of their incapacity poverty or ignorance of law. A person invoking the jurisdiction of this court under Article 32 must approach this court for the vindication of the fundamental rights of affected persons and not for the purpose of vindication of his personal grudge or enmity. It is duty of this court to discourage such petitions and to ensure that the course of justice is not obstructed or polluted by unscrupulous litigants invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court for personal matters under the garb of the public interest litigation. 18. Thus it is not a case where the petitioner can be allowed to maintain the petition as a public interest litigation. 19. The second submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is regarding non-availing of alternative remedy by the petitioner as provided under the aforesaid notification by way of revision before the State Government as, according to him, the order passed by the Commissioner in revision is further revisable by the State Government. Thus, the question for consideration is whether, under the said notification, two revisions are provided and the order of the Commissioner is further revisable by the State Government. 20. A bare perusal of the notification reveals that it is the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer suspending the Pradhan is made revisable by the Commissioner and also by the State Government and no other order. Moment the order of Sub-Divisional Officer is set aside in revision by the commissioner, the same becomes no nest and there is no question of further revising the same by the State Government. However, the things would he necessary for consideration in the matter. (i) regarding the position of the merger of the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer in the order of the Commissioner passed in revision; (ii) regarding the meaning of the words 'and also' used in the said notification and whether these words can mean and further'. 21. The question of merger came up for consideration in Madan Gopal Rungta v. The Secretary to the Government of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1513 . 21. The question of merger came up for consideration in Madan Gopal Rungta v. The Secretary to the Government of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1513 . In that case, the order of the State Government rejecting the application for grant of mining lease was sought to be reviewed before the Central Government under R. 57 of the Minerals concessions Rules and the Central Government rejected the case. The High Court on being approached against the order of the State Government under Article 226 of the constitution of India rejected the petition where against the Supreme Court was approached by way of special Leave Petition contending that the Central Government has merely dismissed the review petition and the effective order rejecting the application for grant of mining lease was that of the State Government and the High Court, thus, had the jurisdiction to grant a writ. The contention was negatived and it was held by the Supreme Court that the High Court was right in taking the view that it had no jurisdiction to issue a writ as the final order was that of the Central Government which was not within its territorial jurisdiction. The ratio of the decision is that it was the order of the Central Government dismissing the review petition, which was the final order into which the order of the State Government had merged. This case was considered by the Supreme Court in a subsequent case of Shankar Ram Chandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat, AIR 1970 SC 1 . So is the position here. The order of the Sub-Divisional Officer got merged. In the order of the Commissioner passed in revision notwithstanding the fact whether the Commissioner had affirmed the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer or set aside the same and the position, thus, becomes clear that when the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer gets merged into the order of Commissioner then, under the said notification, there is no question of further revision against the same before the State Government. 22. Now I come to the second limb of the submission according to which it is to be seen as to what is the meaning of word `and also' as used in the said notification and whether the same can mean `and further'. 22. Now I come to the second limb of the submission according to which it is to be seen as to what is the meaning of word `and also' as used in the said notification and whether the same can mean `and further'. It is clear that the object of the notification is not to provide the remedy one after the other but it is a safeguard, which the State Government, in its wisdom considered appropriate to impose upon the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, who holds a position much lower in executive heirarchy, making it subject to the scrutiny by the Commissioner who holds a much higher position in the executive heirarchy and also by itself so that the elected person may not be treated in light manner or in arbitrary fashion as any curtailment of right is an injury to an elected person as his term practically stands curtailed and he is not in a position to enjoy the same inspite of being the representative of the popular will If the words `and also' are interpreted as and further then the order of the Commissioner becomes revisable, but such a meaning would be contrary to the context of the notification which has made only the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer revisable. 23. Maxwell on the interpretation of Statute, XII Edition at page 232, on the use of the word `and' and `or' has said "In ordinary usage 'and' is conjunctive and .of disjunctive. But to carry out the intention of the legislature it may be necessary to read 'and' in place of `or' and Vice versa." Further, the dictionary meaning of the word `also' as given in shorter Oxford English Dictionary, III Edition, Vol. I, page 58 and the Webster III new International Dictionary, Vol. II, Page 62 is as likewise. 24. Thus if the words 'and also' are interpreted and given meaning 'or likewise', then it harmonizes the context of revisability of the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. Thus the said notification has not provided for two revisions. Only one revision is provided against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and the same may be preferred either before the Commissioner or the State Government. 25. Thus the said notification has not provided for two revisions. Only one revision is provided against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer and the same may be preferred either before the Commissioner or the State Government. 25. The third submission as raised is that the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer was void and against such an order no interference was called for under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In this connection, he has elaborated his argument that when the order was passed, no proceedings under clause (g) of sub-section (1) of S. 95 of the Act were pending against the Pradhan and no action was contemplated against him. To appreciate the argument, it is apt to consider the provision of clause (g) and clause (gg), which are as under : "95. Inspection. (1) the State Government may (g) remove a member of Nyaya Panchayat or a joint Committee or Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti, an office-bearer of a Gaon Sabha or a Panch, Sahayak Sarpanch or Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat if he (i) absents himself without sufficient cause for more than three consecutive meetings or sittings, (ii) refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting for any reason whatesoever or if he is accused of or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude. (iii) has abused his position as such or has persistently failed to perform the duties imposed by the Act and rules made thereunder or his continuance as such is not desirable in public interest, or (iv) being a Sahayak Sarpanch or a Sarpanch of the Nyay Panchayat takes active part in politics, or (v) suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in clauses (a) to (m) of S. SA; (gg) Suspend a Pradhan or Up-Pradhan or a member of Gaon Panchayat or joint Committee or Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti or a Panch, Sahayak Sarpanch or Sarpanch of Nyay Panchayat against whom proceedings under clause (g) are pending or contemplated or against whom prosecution for an offence, which in the opinion of the State Government involves moral turpitude, is pending : Provided that an order of suspension under this clause shall not affect the right, if any, of the Pradhan or the Up-Pradhan, as the case may be, to take part in the proceedings o a meeting convened under S. 14 and to vote at such meeting." 26. In clause (gg), the language used is "proceedings under clause (g) are pending or contemplated or against whom prosecution for an offence, which, in the opinion of the State Government involves moral turpitude, is pending." The submission is that in the normal sense the word contemplated connotes proposed, postulated or anticipated. The word contemplated should have preceded the word pending as the proceeding would become pending only after contemplation and in this connection the learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon R. 49A of the U.P. Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeals) Rules, 1930 and R. 12 of the Central services (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules, 1957, wherein the word 'contemplated' is used first and pending is used subsequently and on this basis he submits that the deviation from the normal user of the word has significance. Thus, it becomes necessary to find out that as to whether the change of sequence of the user of the word 'pending or contemplated' in the context of the provisions of clause (gg) will make any difference. This deviation of course, makes one to think that the word `contemplated is used in a changed sequence, must have the meaning other than proposed, postulated or anticipated and where for it becomes necessary to analyse clause (g) and clause (gg). 27. Clause (g) provides for three situations for removal of a person. (i) By holding an enquiry after affording an opportunity to the person concerned for finding out the truth about his guilt and thereafter on the basis of the finding of the enquiry to propose action against him. (ii) When no enquiry for finding out the guilt of the person has to be conducted under clause (g) but only an action for removal of the person has to be taken after the guilt has been settled elsewhere otherwise than in proceedings under clause (g); and (iii) where no guilt has to be established either under clause (g) or elsewhere and if the person is accused or charged for offences involving moral turpitude can be proceeded straightway for removal. In the back ground of the aforesaid three situations or stages envisaged under clause (g), clause (gg) has to be analysed as the same also provides for three situations for the purpose of suspension. In the back ground of the aforesaid three situations or stages envisaged under clause (g), clause (gg) has to be analysed as the same also provides for three situations for the purpose of suspension. In clause (g), for example take the case of a person who is to be removed on the ground of suffering from any disqualifications mentioned in clause (g) clauses (a) to (m) of S. 5A. S. 5A provides for disqualification, but S. 6A provides that the decision on the question of disqualification of a person by the authority prescribed therefor is made final subject to the appeal. Thus, in this clause, no enquiry for finding out the disqualification of a person has to be made but the straightway action for removal has to be passed. So in all these situations, it is not necessary that the enquiry against a person must be started but without resort to any enquiry the action of removal can straightway be proceeded with and if the straightway action is to be proceeded, then there is no question of any pendency of enquiry into the fact of guilt or contemplation of enquiry for finding out the guilt and in this background, it appears the word 'Contemplated' has been used subsequent to the word 'pending' in clause (gg) and the same obviously has the meaning other than proposed, postulated or anticipated. However, in the circumstances of the controversy, as has been generated in the present case, it is worthwhile to take shelter of the dictionary. In the New Lexicon Webster Dictionary Deluxe Encyclopaedia Edition, the word 'contemplated' is shown to have the meaning 'proposed' to consider with a view to decision'. It also supports the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent and also what has been stated above, as under clause (g) there are three different stages. One Stage is of making for enquiry finding out the guilt of the person than to take decision on the basis of the finding of the guilt. The other is no enquiry for finding out the guilt of the person has to be conducted but only the decision regarding his removal has to be taken. One Stage is of making for enquiry finding out the guilt of the person than to take decision on the basis of the finding of the guilt. The other is no enquiry for finding out the guilt of the person has to be conducted but only the decision regarding his removal has to be taken. It makes the user the word 'contemplated' in clause (g), thus, clear that first in such cases as provided under clause (g), which requires the establishment of guilt of a person an enquiry has to be conducted and the other is which requires no establishment of the guilt of a person than only a decision regarding his removal has to be taken. And as such the word 'contemplated' in clause (gg) is not used in the sense of proposed, postulated or anticipated. 28. Further, in view of what has been discussed above, under clause (g) a person can be suspended only in case an enquiry into the facts for finding out his guilt has to be made. when such proceedings against him have been pending by some positive act and in such a situation the law has not provided for suspension before start of the proceedings. In the present case, an enquiry against the Pradhan, the respondent No. 2, to find out his quilt regarding the allegations against him has not been started or set in motion and the decision for removal could be taken only thereafter. So it is not a case of any contemplated action against the Pradhan but the suspension of a Pradhan in such a situation is without jurisdiction as no enquiry proceedings under clause (g) were set in motion against him and, thus, the order of his suspension was null and void. 29. The fourth submission of the learned counsel for the respondent can be dealt with by coupling the same with the submission of the petitioner. In the impugned order the commissioner has made the basis that the Pradhan was not given opportunity before his suspension by the Sub-Divisional Officer and, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner under clause (gg) no opportunity for suspending the Pradhan is required by law. In the impugned order the commissioner has made the basis that the Pradhan was not given opportunity before his suspension by the Sub-Divisional Officer and, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner under clause (gg) no opportunity for suspending the Pradhan is required by law. This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner has got substance as under clause (ii) of the proviso to sub-section (4) of S. 95 of the Act, which is as under the words 'prima facie' is used : "(4) Where any Gaon Sabha, Gaon, Panchayat, joint committee or Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti is superseded the State Government may appoint such person or persons to exercise and perform the powers and duties thereof as it may deem fit. Provided that. (i) no action shall be taken under clause (f), clause (g) or clause (h) except after giving to the body of person concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed. (ii) no action shall be taken under clause (gg) on the ground that proceedings under clause (g) are pending or contemplated unless the State Government is prima facie satisfied that the grounds on which action is proposed under that clause". 30. If a particular legislation intended to give an opportunity at the stage of suspension then they would have used the word `prima facie'. There afore, for suspending a Pradhan under clause (gg) no opportunity is required by law. However, according to the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, the order of the Commissioner is not based on this sole ground. The commissioner has also taken into consideration the merits of the matter that the order was not just as there was no material on record regarding the fact that the Sub-Divisional Officer took any action against the Pradhan for the alleged breaches. No proceedings under S. 122B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land reforms Act was initiated. It is finding of fact recorded by the Commissioner that that the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer was not just and the same cannot be interfered with even other wise in discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 31. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.