Judgment :- These appeals are against an order in Application No. 5064 of 1990 in C.S. No. 963 of 1990. The learned trial judge has granted the prayer in the application and accordingly made an order of temporary injunction restraining the appellants, their men, agents or any other person acting on their behalf or claiming under or through them from dealing with the suit property in any manner either by sale, mortgage, lease or by putting up superstructures on the suit land or otherwise using it pending disposal of the suit. He has also awarded cost of Rs. 1,000/- in favour of the plaintiff. 2. C.S. No. 963 of 1990 is a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale dated 12.10.1986. According to the plaintiff respondents 1 to 5 agreed to sell their property of an extent of 70 acres and 70 cents at the rate of Rs. 1,35,000/- per acre in S. Nos. 103/1 and 103/3 in Shortrium village of Kanathur Reddikuppam, Tiruporur, the sale being subject to obtaining a sanction from Court as the interest of a lunatic was involved in the transaction. According to the plaintiff, the land was required for construction of a beach resort. Competitor appellant in O.S.A. No. 123 of 1991 (6th respondent in the application No. 5064/90), however, induced the respondents 1 to 4 in the application appellants in O.S.A. 122 of 1991 to enter into a fresh agreement. Respondents 1 to 5 committed breach of the agreement by not coming forward to sell the property to the plaintiff although they had received a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- in advance and that the plaintiff-respondent had taken all necessary steps to construct a building for beach resort. Alleging that respondents 1 to 5 were trying to alienate the property at the behest of the 6th respondent, the plaintiff-respondent filed the suit and accordingly applied for an interim injunction pending disposal of the suit. The learned single Judge issued an ex parte order of interim injunction on 10.10.1990 and has made it absolute under the impugned order. 3. The learned Trial Judge has applied the three cardinal principles and found that plaintiff-respondent has got a prima facie case, that the balance of convenience is in its favour and that there would be great hardship to it which cannot be compensated in terms of money. 4. 3. The learned Trial Judge has applied the three cardinal principles and found that plaintiff-respondent has got a prima facie case, that the balance of convenience is in its favour and that there would be great hardship to it which cannot be compensated in terms of money. 4. We do not propose in these appeals to traverse any of the findings of fact recorded by the learned trial Judge. The principles applied as tests to hold in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, as applied by the learned trial Judge would be in a suit for injunction and/declaration and consequential injunction, but not in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale. An agreement for sale of immovable property has been recognised as a right in equity. S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, states: “53-A: Part performance :— Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, states: “53-A: Part performance :— Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract; and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that the contract though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a r ight expressly provided by the terms of the contract, provided that nothing in this section shall effect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.” S. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act which defines ‘sales of immovable property’ also defines ‘contract for sale’ thus: “Contract for sale: A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property”. These two provisions together leave no manner of doubt that there is no right under a contract for sale except to sue for its enforcement and that possession in part performance of the contract in the hands of the transferee shall also not defeat any transfer to a third party who had no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof. Courts, in India, have been repeatedly, asked to examine the extent of the right under S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. They have almost on every time reiterated that in legal parlance, this provision, cannot be used as a sword. Courts, in India, have been repeatedly, asked to examine the extent of the right under S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. They have almost on every time reiterated that in legal parlance, this provision, cannot be used as a sword. It can be only used as a shield. It cannot be used as a weapon of offence. It can be used only as a shelter of defence under law. 5. A Bench of the Patna High Court in N.P. Tirupathi v. Dayamanti Devi AIR 1988 Patna 123 has stated about it in these words:— “The claim of the petitioner in this application is that after the execution of the deed of agreement, he continued to remain in possession not qua tenant but debors the tenancy in his own right as a transferee. To put it in legal parlance, S. 53-A T.P. Act was sought to be used as a sword and not a shield as a weapon of offence rather than a shelter of defence under the law. That is entirely not permissible under the statutory and salutary provisions of S. 53-A T.P. Act, which does not envisage eviction under the Control Act to be inhibited by filing of a prior suit by the adversary claiming a title on the basis of alleged deed of agreement of sale and desirous of getting a decree for specific performance of contract therein. It is well-settled that S. 53-A T.P. Act can be used only as a shield and not as a sword. 6. S. 15 of the Specific Relief Act states who may obtain specific performance. S. 16 of the above Act states when specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person. It is well-settled that S. 53-A T.P. Act can be used only as a shield and not as a sword. 6. S. 15 of the Specific Relief Act states who may obtain specific performance. S. 16 of the above Act states when specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person. S. 19 states what relief can be claimed against parties and persons in these words: “Except as provided by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may be enforced against:— (a) either party thereto; (b) any other person claiming under him by a little arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract; (c) any person claiming under a title which, though prior to the contract and known to the plaintiff, might have been displaced by the defendant; (d) when a company has entered into a contract and subsequently becomes amalgamated with another company, the new company which arises out of the amalgamation; (e) when the promoters of a company have, before its incorporation, entered into a contract for the purpose of the company and such contract is warranted by the terms of the incorporation of the company; Provided that the company has accepted the contract and communicated such acceptance to the other party to the contract.” S. 20 states thus:— “ Discretion as to decreeing specific performance :— (1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. (2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance:— (a) Where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant/which he did not foresee; whereas its non-performance could involve no such hardship on the plaintiff; (c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance.” S. 21 of the Specific Relief Act says that in a suit for specific performance of a contract, the plaintiff also may claim compensation for its breach, either in addition to, or in substitution of such performance. Coming to the rule applied for perpetual injunction, S. 38 of the said Act says that when any such application arises from contract, the Court shall be guided by rules and provisions contained in Chapter II. S. 41 of the said Act states: “1. Injunction when issued: An injunction cannot be granted:— (a) to restrain any person from prosecuting a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of a suit in which the injunction is sought, unless such restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings; (b) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought; (c) restrain any person applying to any legislative body; (d) to restrain any person from instituting any proceeding in a criminal matter. (e) to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced; (f) to prevent, on the ground of nuisance, an act of which it is not reasonably clear that it will be a nuisance; (g) to prevent continuing breach in which the plaintiff acquired; (h) when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding except in case of breach of trust; (i) when the conduct of the plaintiff or his agents has been such as to disentitle him to the assistance of the Court; (j) when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter”. 7. 7. Speaking on the role that these provisions will play in dealing with a prayer for temporary injunction under Order 39, Rule 2 C.P.C., a Bench of the Patna High Court in Kaiyanpur Lime Works v. State of Bihar AIR 1951 Patna 226 has stated: “I do not think that an order of injunction should be granted in order to disturb the status quo . There cannot be any doubt that the appellant has no right to immediate possession, and the appellants title would accrue after the contract has been specifically performed. In referring to English decisions on the subject, one must bear in mind that the English doctrine of an equitable estate, on a contract for sale does not apply in India, and the law of India does not recognise such equitable estates. For the reasons given above, I do not think that the principle laid down in Promotha Nath v. Jagannath Kishore 17 C.L.J. 427 = 16 I.C. 359 applies in the present case. The other decision on which the learned Advocate General relied in Subba Naidu v. Haji Badsha Sahib 26 Mad 168 = 13 MLJ. 13. There also the facts were entirely different, and the question considered was the distinction between a permanent injunction granted under the Specific Relief Act and a temporary injunction granted under the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure. .. I think that the learned Advocate General is putting his case too high when he contends that where a prima facie case has been made out by showing that there is a fair question for trial, a temporary injunction must follow restraining the contracting defendant from dealing with the property. Where an order of injunction should or should not issue will, in my opinion , depend on the facts of the case, and the Court must also consider the questions of irreparable or serious injury and balance of convenience. We have also been addressed on the question whether the appellant can be sufficiently compensated by money in respect of any loss suffered before specific performance of the contract. The learned Advocate General has drawn our attention to S. 12, Explanation and Ss. 54 and 56, Specific Relief Act, (Old Act) (Courts comment). We have also been addressed on the question whether the appellant can be sufficiently compensated by money in respect of any loss suffered before specific performance of the contract. The learned Advocate General has drawn our attention to S. 12, Explanation and Ss. 54 and 56, Specific Relief Act, (Old Act) (Courts comment). He has also drawn our attention to S. 19, Specific Relief Act which says that any person suing for the performance of a contract may also ask for compensation for its breach, either in addition to or in substitution for such performance. Personally, I do not see any reason why the appellant cannot be compensated by money for any loss he may suffer, provided the appellant is entitled to compensation in addition to specific performance, under the law, as to which I express no opinion at this stage. If, as I have already stated, there is no question of stopping the quarrying operations during the pendency of the suit for specific performance , the question of compensation will remain whether an order of injunction is or is not passed. It cannot surely be urged that in a suit for specific performance the plaintiff is entitled to ask, during the pendency of litigation, that the defendant in whom the legal title still vests should be restrained from using the property . If the plaintiff were so entitled then in a suit for specific performance the defendant would be required to vacate the property which he had contracted to sell or lease. That surely cannot be the law.” 8. The above view of the Patna High Court has a worthy companion in a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Krishna Moorthy v. Paramasiva A.I.R. 1981 Madras 310, where a similar question to the one posed before us in a suit for specific performance was involved and it was observed as follows: “Apart from this factual aspect there is one other impediment in the way of the respondent from getting the relief of temporary injunction in his suit for specific performance. Even assuming that the plaintiff was given possession of the suit properties on the date of the agreement of sale by the first defendant, the question still is whether the plaintiff could claim the relief of injunction based on S. 53-A of the Transfer of property Act. Even assuming that the plaintiff was given possession of the suit properties on the date of the agreement of sale by the first defendant, the question still is whether the plaintiff could claim the relief of injunction based on S. 53-A of the Transfer of property Act. Admittedly, in this case the plaintiff has not yet got title t o the properties. He can get title to the properties only if he succeeds in the suit and obtains sale deed in respect of the properties. It is well established that an agreement of sale does not create any interest in the property which is subject matter of the agreement. Therefore, the plaintiff if at all can claim only an equitable right based on S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore the relief of temporary injunction claimed by the plaintiff pending the suit can be taken to have been claimed by the plaintiff only on the basis of S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act as mere possession of the plaintiff of the suit properties on the date of the suit cannot be taken to enable him to obtain injunction from the Court. If that will be the case even a trespasser in possession can approach the Court and ask for an injunction to protect his possession. Therefore, we have to treat the plaintiffs application for temporary injunction pending the suit as an application for claiming equitable relief under S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. If the application for injunction is so treated, then the plaintiff cannot be granted the relief for the reason that S. 53-A can be used to resist the defendant when he seeks to dispossess the plaintiff. It is well established that S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act provides for a passive equity and not for an active equity. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot seek his relief of injunction in a Court of law based on S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act though he can use S. 53-A to debar the transferor who has agreed to sell the property from claiming any right in respect of that property. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot seek his relief of injunction in a Court of law based on S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act though he can use S. 53-A to debar the transferor who has agreed to sell the property from claiming any right in respect of that property. It is well established that the right conferred by S. 53-A is a right available to the defendant only to protect his possession and on the basis of that section the defendant cannot claim any title and it merely operates as a bar to the plaintiff to ascertain his title. Though in English law the equity of part performance is an active equity which the plaintiff in possession may enforce in an independent suit for proceeding, such as a suit for specific performance or for an injunction to restrain dispossession, such equity is not available after the amendment of the Transfer of Property Act in the year 1929. In this case, the plaintiff used his right under S. 53-A not as a shield but as a sword. Hence, the plaintiff is not entitled to the injunction sought for by him”. 9. We are, however, aware of a dissent to the view expressed by a Bench of this Court in Krishnamoorthy v. Paramasiva AIR 1981 Madras 310by a learned Judge of the Bombay High Court in Venkat Dharmaji v. Viswanath AIR 1983 Bombay 413 and the view of the Calcutta High Court in Muktakesi Dawn v. Haripada Mazumdar AIR 1988 Calcutta 25. In the Calcutta decision it has been stated that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale also temporary injunction can be granted. In the Calcutta decision it has been stated that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale also temporary injunction can be granted. In the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Venkat Dharmaji v. Vishwanath 4 we find that the learned Judge only took notice of the rules of injunction to say that there is no bar under the Civil Procedure Code which can be invoked in support of the proposition that a plaintiff suing for specific performance cannot obtain any injunction whatsoever and that if there is no bar in the Civil Procedure Code and if the application for temporary injunction is solely governed either by Order 39, rules 1 and 2 or in the alternative by invoking the inherent powers of the court under S. 151 C.P.C., there is no justification to treat such an application as an application for relief of injunction as provided by S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act But then, there is absolutely no reason stated why the learned Judge thought that he should dissent from the view taken by the Madras High Court. No one can question the jurisdiction of this court to grant temporary injunction even in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale. While applying to exercise the discretion, it would necessarily take the court to the various provisions governing the suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of immovable property. Presence of power alone is not enough to exercise it. It is the exercise which is controlled by judicial discipline. Courts who always advise that all adjudications must conform to the rules of equity, and discretion must always be exercised within the bounds of law, cannot merely because there is power to do a thing do that thing. The decision in Kayanpur Lime Works v. State of Bihar AIR 1951 Patna 226 and the decision in Krishnamoorthy v. Paramasiva AIR 1981 Madras 310 would appear to take a principled stand to be applied in determining as to whether there is any balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff or it is in favour of the defendant. There is no reason why we constituted a co-ordinating Bench do not follow the law stated by this Court in Krishnamoorthy v. Paramasiva AIR 1981 Madras 310. There is no reason why we constituted a co-ordinating Bench do not follow the law stated by this Court in Krishnamoorthy v. Paramasiva AIR 1981 Madras 310. The Calcutta High Courts view is not essentially in conflict with the view taken by the High Court of Patna and the High Court of Madras. In Muktakesi Dawn v. Haripada Mazumdar AIR 1988 Calcutta 25 all that is stated is: “It is true that the doctrine of lis pendens enunciated in S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act takes care of all pendente lite transfers; but it may not always be good enough to take fullest care of the plaintiffs interest vis-a-vis such a transfer. Where suit is one for specific performance of sale in respect of the suit property and if the defendant is not restrained from selling the property to a third party and accordingly, a third party purchases the same bonafide for value without any notice of the pending litigation and spends a huge sum of the improvement thereof for construction thereon the equity in his favour may intervene to persuade the Court to decline, in the exercise of its discretion, the equitable relief of specific performance to the plaintiff at the trial and to award damages only in favour of the plaintiff. It must be noted that R. 1 of O. 39 of the Code clearly provides interim injunction restraining the alienation or sale of the suit property and if the doctrine of lis pendens as enacted in S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act was regarded to have provided all the panacea against pendente lite transfers, the Legislature would not have provided in R. 1 for interim injunction restraining the transfer of suit property. Order 1 of Rule 39, clearly demonstrates that notwithstanding the Rules of lis pendens in S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, there can be occasion for the grant of injunction restraining pendente lite transfers in a fit and proper case.” 10. It is indeed noticeable that the contract upon which the plaintiff has instituted the action in the Court was yet to be formalised by the permission of the Court as the interest of a lunatic is involved. Even if the agreement is assumed to have been proved it cannot be said that there has been any kind of interest conveyed to plaintiff. Even if the agreement is assumed to have been proved it cannot be said that there has been any kind of interest conveyed to plaintiff. The allegations in the plaint are yet to be proved. The law, as we have already noticed, does not defeat a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale merely because a third party intervenes as a purchaser. Court has full power to declare any sale to a third party invalid in case a specific performance decree is found necessary. Court, for the very same reason, may decline to grant a decree for specific performance if there is a third party purchaser present and equity is in his favour. These are questions to be fully gone into only in the trial of the suit. On the principles of law, as we have noticed above, it is not possible to hold in favour of the plaintiff that the balance of convenience lies in its favour and that unless injunction is granted, it is likely to suffer irreparable or serious injury. There are no such facts disclosed in the plaint or in the application, for temporary injunction, upon which we should depart from the ordinary rule that until specific performance decree is granted, no interest of the plaintiff should be recognised in the suit property. 11. For the reasons as above, we are of the opinion that the impugned order is vitiated for non-application of the principles that control the discretion of the Court in granting temporary injunction in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of immovable property. 12. In the result, the impugned order is set aside and appeal are allowed.