The Kotson Engineering Corporation,Partnership Firm represented by its Partner Sri Ch. Sambasiva Rao v. The General Manager, Southern Railway,Madras-600 003
1991-10-08
A.R.LAKSHMANAN
body1991
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- The suit was filed by the plaintiff above named under Sec.20 of Arbitration direct the defendant to file the agreement in relation to contract No.22/CN/81, 24.3.1981 entered into between them and appoint arbitrators and make an reference under Sec.20(4) of the Act. 2. The case of the plaintiff in short: The plaintiff, which is a partnership entered into an agreement with the defendant to some work on 16.3.1981. The plaintiff completed the project with various difficulties. defendant failed to make payment inspite of repeated demands made. There were series exchanges of letters between parties. The plaintiff refused to sign the final bill unless rates for the items which have been mentioned in the agreement are settled. 3. By letter dated 9.9.1990 the plaintiff requested the defendant to refer the matter arbitration as the matter of reference in relation to the contract. The defendant in reply, dated 16.1.1991 stated that the dispute cannot be referred to arbitration in view lapse of time. According to the plaintiff any final settlement of Bill can be made only subject to physical verification of the contract work which has been completed at the final stage such event has not been occurred in this case. Inspite of various reminders and requests defendant failed to measure the work done by the contractor. Hence, the defendant that the plaintiff failed to claim the money due for him within 90 days from the date of Letter of Intimation is wholly unsustainable. The plaintiff has made various claims totalling Rs.12,88,664 under various Heads as illustrated fully in the present suit itself. The defendant did not favourably respondent to the request. It is in those circumstances, the plaintiff been compelled to file the present suit under Sec.20 of the Act. The defendant in reply to letter dated 9.9.1990 stated on 16.1.1991 that the matter cannot be referred to arbitration. 4. The plaintiff’s claim is resisted by the Railway Administration. They filed a counter affidavit, dated 20.6.1991. The plaintiff filed a reply, dated 16.8.1991 and a rejoinder behalf of the defendant has also been filed on 27.8.1991. 5.
The defendant in reply to letter dated 9.9.1990 stated on 16.1.1991 that the matter cannot be referred to arbitration. 4. The plaintiff’s claim is resisted by the Railway Administration. They filed a counter affidavit, dated 20.6.1991. The plaintiff filed a reply, dated 16.8.1991 and a rejoinder behalf of the defendant has also been filed on 27.8.1991. 5. The defendant ’ s cases as stated in the counter in nutshell is as follows: (a) The entire proceeding is not legally sustainable; (b) The plaintiff had accepted the rates and after having accepted the rates, it is not open the plaintiff to take up any further claim on the same; (c) The plaintiff was addressed by the concerned Executive Engineer and others calling him to come and sign the final Bill and final Riders as detailed in their communications, dated 19.1.1984, 25.4.1984, 5.5.1984, 1.6.1988 and 8.3.1990. (d) There had been Letters and Telegrams to that effect. (e) The plaintiff had to prefer the claim within a period of 90 days of receiving intimation from the Railway Administration that the final Bill is ready for payment. If he does not prefer to claim within 90 days, the Contractor is deemed to have waived his claim and defendant Administration shall be discharged and released of all the liabilities under contract in respect of the claims. (f) Inspite of the defendant giving notice to the plaintiff for signing the final Bills January, 1984 onwards followed by reminders upto 8.3.1990, the plaintiff had never turned up for signing the final Bill nor he had submitted his claims if any within 90 days 16.1.1984 or atleast within 90 days from 8.3.1990. Hence, the defendant on 16.1.1991 refused to grant any arbitration, when the contractor came up with a request on 9.9.1990; (g) The claim if any is barred by limitation. 6. In the reply affidavit the plaintiff has taken the following stand: (a) Plaintiff has not received full payment from Railways; (b) Plaintiff has not signed the final Bill because the final Bill has not yet been prepared the Railways; (c) According to plaintiff, the items mentioned in detail in his reply affidavit in paragraph sub-paragraphs 1 to 6 have not been followed to fulfil and prepare the final Bill; (d) Clause 64(1)(3) is not applicable for the present case as no final Rider agreement been prepared. 7.
7. It is conceded in the rejoinder filed by the defendant that the plaintiff had respondended to any of their request and signed the final Bill or the Rider because, according to them the plaintiff knew pretty well that no amount was due and payable by the Railways. They reiterated the claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation and that the plaintiff ought to have made claim within three years from 31.7.1982. 8. On the above pleadings, I have heard the arguments of Mr.Subba Reddy for plaintiff Mr.V.R.Gopalan, learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the Railway Administration. 9. Mr.Subba Reddy invited my attention to Clause 63 of the agreement between parties this action. The said clause is reproduced hereunder: “63. All disputes and differences of any kind whatsoever arising out of or in connection the contract, whether during the progress of the works or after their completion and whether before or after the determination of the contract, shall be referred by the contractor to Railway and the Railway shall within a reasonable time after their presentation make notify decisions thereon in writing. The decisions, directions, classification, measurements, drawings and certificates with respect to any matters the decisions of which is specially provided for by these or other special condition given and made by the Railway, or by Engineer on behalf of the Railway, are matters which are referred to herein as matters’ and shall be final and binding upon the contractor and shall not be set aside account of any informality, omission, delay or error in proceedings, in or about the same on any other ground or for any other reason and shall be without appeal.” 10. According to him, the said clause is couched in very wide terms and it covers disputes and differences of any kind whatsoever arising out of or in connection with contract whether during the progress of the works or after their completion and whether before or after the determination of the contract.
According to him, the said clause is couched in very wide terms and it covers disputes and differences of any kind whatsoever arising out of or in connection with contract whether during the progress of the works or after their completion and whether before or after the determination of the contract. He further submitted that the argument the learned counsel for the Railways that the claim is barred by limitation is wholly untenable since according to him petitions like the present one are governed by Art.137 of Limitation Act 1963 and that the Limitation period is three years from the date of accrual right to apply and that the said right accrues on the date of arising of cause of action that it is for the arbitrator to decide if the claim is barred by limitation by a time bar clause providing for a special period of limitation. According to Mr.Reddy, the right accrues with refusal by the defendant to make a reference, i.e, from the date of repudiation of contract. 11. Per contra, Mr.V.R.Gopalan learned Senior Advocate mainly contended that the demand was made out of time and that the question of repudiation does not arise against demand made after the period of Limitation. 12. Both parties have cited a number of decisions in support of their respective case. I that it is unnecessary for me to deal with the citations cited by the respective parties for following reasons. 13. In order to attract the provision of Sec.20 of the Act the following conditions must satisfied: (a) The parties must have a valid and subsisting arbitration agreement between them; (b) The agreement was executed before the Institution of a suit relating to the subject matter of the agreement; (c) Existence of a difference to which the agreement applies; (d) The application is made to a court having jurisdiction in the matter to which agreement relates. Under Sec.20 of the Act, the Court has to ensure about the existence of an agreement between parties and the covering of the dispute by that agreement. existence of a dispute is absolutely essential for a reference under Sec.20. 14. In the present case, the nature of dispute is clearly set forth in the affidavit. opinion, sufficient cause is shown to this Court to make an order of reference relevant provisions of the Act.
existence of a dispute is absolutely essential for a reference under Sec.20. 14. In the present case, the nature of dispute is clearly set forth in the affidavit. opinion, sufficient cause is shown to this Court to make an order of reference relevant provisions of the Act. The agreement between parties provides for referring matter in dispute to arbitration. The agreement is binding upon the parties and hence view it should be made as a rule of the Court. As stated supra the arbitration clause is couched in very wide terms and it covers disputes and differences of any kind whatever. 15. In my opinion, a dispute exists between parties and hence it should be referred arbitration. The arbitrators will have to see whether the claims made by the contract tenable and the defence raised by the Railways is acceptable or not in the circumstances of the case and under the general conditions of contract. As stated above Court is called upon to decide whether the parties have a valid agreement, whether there is any dispute and whether agreement executed before the institution of the suit relating to the subject matter of the agreement. Once it is found out that all the above conditions are satisfied the court has a duty both parties to the agreement to arbitration as contemplated under the agreement. 16. In my opinion, when difference and dispute exist between parties, they have referred to arbitration. This Court is not expected to deal with the matter on merits the point of Limitation) and decide whether the claim made by both parties are true Hence, I refrain from doing so and only to refer the dispute for arbitration as provided the agreement. Hence, I am not able to accept the contention of Railways and hold arbitration is the only remedy to resolve the dispute between parties which in my squarely comes within the agreement as rightly contended by Mr.Subba Reddy. 17. The Railway Administration is directed to follow the procedure in accordance relevant provisions of general conditions of the contract and appoint two arbitrators to all the disputes and differences that have been raised by the contractor. The arbitrators appointed shall decide the disputes within four months from the date of entering upon reference. The procedure in regard to appointment of the arbitrator shall be complied within six weeks from to-day. 18.
The arbitrators appointed shall decide the disputes within four months from the date of entering upon reference. The procedure in regard to appointment of the arbitrator shall be complied within six weeks from to-day. 18. In fact in Jiwnani Engineering Works v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 Cal. 228, that in an application under Sec.20, the question whether the claim had become barred not was to be decided. At page 230 of the report it was stated: “ .........There is a good deal of substance in the contention that the claim now sought referred to arbitration is barred by limitation. But the Supreme Court has observed case of Wazir Chand v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 990, that in an application Sec.20 of the Arbitration Act, the Court was not concerned with the question whether claim sought to be referred to arbitration was barred by limitation or not. That was a within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators to decide. The same views was reiterated Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Usman v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 474. Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Kerala S.E. Board v. T.P.Kunhailumma, 1977 S.C. 282, did not approve of the view of the Supreme Court in the cases mentioned before that application under Sec.20 will not be governed by the limitation prescribed Limitation Act. But the Supreme Court was there dealing with question whether application under any Act other than C.P.C. Art.137 of the Limitation Act will be applicable not. The Supreme Court was not dealing in the last mentioned case with question the contention that the claim was barred by limitation or not before the arbitrator relevant consideration for refusing an application under Sec.20 of the Arbitration Act, In the aforesaid view of the matter, it must be held that the question whether a barred by limitation or not before the arbitrator is not a relevant consideration for under Sec.20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. This contention urged on behalf of the respondent, therefore cannot be accepted. ” 19. Thus it is seen that the question whether a claim is barred by limitation or not before arbitrator is not a relevant consideration for an, order under Sec.20 of the Arbitration 1940. This contention urged on behalf of the Railways by Mr.V.R.Gopalan, therefore be accepted. 20.
This contention urged on behalf of the respondent, therefore cannot be accepted. ” 19. Thus it is seen that the question whether a claim is barred by limitation or not before arbitrator is not a relevant consideration for an, order under Sec.20 of the Arbitration 1940. This contention urged on behalf of the Railways by Mr.V.R.Gopalan, therefore be accepted. 20. In regard to the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the Railways on the application of Art.137 of the Limitation Act, in an application under Sec.20 of the Limitation Act, Courts have held that the Art.137 of the Limitation Act applies from the time the right to apply accrues. The period of limitation is three years from the time the right to apply accrues. Similarly, the Gujarat High Court has also held in Gujarat State Fertilizers Co. Ltd. Deepak Nitrite Ltd., A.I.R. 1979 Guj. 83, that Art.137 of the Limitation Act fully applies to a petition under Sec.20 of the Arbitration Act. 21. In my opinion all that Art.137 lays down is that Limitation Act shall apply to the proceedings before the Arbitrator and it has nothing to do with the application for appointment of an arbitrator. There is no provision in the Arbitration Act, which lays down within which time an application for arbitration should be made. The application for arbitration, in my view can only when the dispute arises between the parties to the Agreement. Art.137 which is a Article will apply to a petition under Sec.20 of the Act and hence the period will years from the time the right to apply accrues and the time begins to run from "when the right to apply accrues’ . In this case the right to apply accrues to the plaintiff his demand to refer the dispute to arbitration. 22. In the instant case, there were innumerous correspondences and letters between There can be negotiations between parties and all sorts of correspondence. But when they came to the conclusion that they cannot resolve the dispute between them can be said that a dispute or difference arises between parties. 23. That stage has come in this case. The argument of Mr.Subba Reddy is well founded. 24. In the result, the suit is decreed as prayed for. The entire matter is arbitration as provided in the Contract between parties.
23. That stage has come in this case. The argument of Mr.Subba Reddy is well founded. 24. In the result, the suit is decreed as prayed for. The entire matter is arbitration as provided in the Contract between parties. The arbitrators shall be within six weeks from to-day and as indicated in paragraph supra and the entire proceedings shall be completed within four months from the date of Arbitrators entering reference. No costs. Suit decreed.