S. R. BHARGAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revision has arisen in curious circumstances. ( 2 ) REVISIONIST Lakhan Lal Baronia is Principal of a college at Lalitpur. Opposite Party No. 2 Krishna Nandan Prasad Sinha is a teacher in the same college. University of Bundelkhand appointed opposite party No. 2 Krishna Nandan Prasad as examiner and sent some answer books of B. A. in the year 1984 to him. It sent the railway receipt under separate Registered Post. For the purposes of this case it is not disputed that revisionist took delivery of the Registered envelope and answer books. He examined the answer books and realised remuneration from the University. Opposite Party No. 2 Krishna Nandan Prasad filed criminal complaint against the revisionist and a clerk of Post Office for offences under Sections 379, 403, 420, 427 and 461 read with Section 109, I. P. C. Revisionist was summoned. His plea was that during relevant period opposite party No. 2 was not available at Lalitpur as he had gone to Patna in connection with the death of his mother. He sent letter to the University intimating the above fact and then the University directed him to the delivery of registered envelope and the answer books and examine the answer books. Hence he took delivery, examined the answer books and realised his remuneration. Krishna Nandan Prasad moved an application for summoning Despatch Register and Register of Letters received from the revisionist. Obviously the purpose was to belie the defence case. It is not disputed that revisionist did not produce the register before the Magistrate. Then opp. party No. 2 Krishna Nandan Prasad moved application u/s. 340, Cr. P. C. for filing Criminal complaint by the Magistrate against the revisionist for offence u/s. 175, I. P. C. ( 3 ) DESPITE objections by the revisionist learned Magistrate allowed application under S. 340, Cr. P. C. and directed filing of complaint against the revisionist for offence u/s. 175, I. P. C. ( 4 ) AGAINST this, revisionis went up in appeal before the Sessions Judge u/s. 341, Cr. P. C. The learned Sessions Judge was of the view that the revisions" was required to produce register as Principal of the college and not in personal capacity. He had accepted the cost. He was bound to get the register produced before the court. The learned lower appellate court dismissed the appeal. P. C. The learned Sessions Judge was of the view that the revisions" was required to produce register as Principal of the college and not in personal capacity. He had accepted the cost. He was bound to get the register produced before the court. The learned lower appellate court dismissed the appeal. Against this, the present revision has been filed. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the opposite parties it was contended that in view of S. 341 (2) revision is not maintainable. This sub-section lays down that an order u/s. 340 subject to any order passed u/s. 341 should be final and should not be subjected to revision. On behalf of the revisionist it was contended that the proceedings before the Magistrate u/s. 340 and in appeal before the Sessions Judge u/s. 341 were incompetent. S. 340 lays down enquiry only in respect of any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 195, Cr. P. C. offence u/s. 175, Cr. P. C. lies in cl. (a) (i) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 195 and not in cl. (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 195. This position of the law is quite correct. Hence for the sake of satisfaction Magistrate could have made any enquiry and filed complaint. But that order could not be u/s. 340, Cr. P. C. Hence appeal u/s. 341, Cr. P. C. was not at all competent. The Sessions Judge could have treated the appeal only as revision and so the bar against revision contemplated in S. 341 (2), Cr. P. C. cannot be attracted. I am in agreement with the contention advanced on behalf of the revisionist. ( 6 ) THEN the question arises if the order of the Sessions Judge is deemed to have been passed in a Revision whether a second revision would be barred by S. 397 (3 ). I am of the opinion that second revision would certainly be barred. ( 7 ) IT was vehemently urged on behalf of the revisionist that this Court may invoke its inherent power u/ S. 482, Cr. P. C. and quash the orders of the Sessions Judge and the Magistrate for filing complaint because the matter goes to the root of the maintainability of the complaint. It was contended on behalf of the revisionist that for offence u/ S. 175, Cr. P. C. and quash the orders of the Sessions Judge and the Magistrate for filing complaint because the matter goes to the root of the maintainability of the complaint. It was contended on behalf of the revisionist that for offence u/ S. 175, Cr. P. C. the person required to produce document must be legally bound to produce or deliver up the documents before the court of public servant. It was then contended on behalf of the revisionist that he himself was accused in the complaint case. U/ Art. 20 (3) of the Constitution he could not be compelled to be a witness against himself and produce or deliver up the registers before the Magistrate. He was legally not bound to produce or deliver the register. Hence non-production of the register would not be an offence u/ S. 175. Fact that revisionist accepted the cost of Rs. 30. 00 is irrelevant. Acceptance of cost would not operate as estoppel against constitutional provision. ( 8 ) ARTICLE 20 (3) of the Constitution is a protection to the accused against compulsory testimonial. It incorporates the theory nemo tenetur seipsum prodere. No Man is bound to accuse himself. It confers immunity from compelling an accused person to be a witness against himself by giving self-incriminating evidence. At one time it was considered that this theory extends only to oral testimony. But gradually it has been extended to documentary evidence. In M. P. Sharmas case, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Swarnalingam Chettiar v. Assistant Labour Inspector Karaikudi, AIR 1956 Madras 165 held that a summons could not be issued u/ S. 94 of the old Code to the accused for production of certain documents in his possession irrespective of the fact whether those documents contain some statement of the accused made of his personal knowledge and accordingly the summons issued to the accused to produce certain documents was quashed. Supreme Court commented upon this case in the case of V. S. Kuttan Pillai v. Ramakrishanan, AIR 1980 SC 185 . Their Lordships said. Supreme Court commented upon this case in the case of V. S. Kuttan Pillai v. Ramakrishanan, AIR 1980 SC 185 . Their Lordships said. "what was kept open in Sharmas case whether a person accused of an offence could be served with a summons to produce documents was decided when it was observed that immunity from self incrimination would not comprehend the mechanical process of producing documents in court which may throw a light on any of the points in controversy but which do not contain a statement of the accused based on his personal knowledge. " ( 9 ) IN the case of State v. Prabhu Singh 1964 (2) Cr. LJ 199 the question was whether the order requiring the production of a document by an accused person is hit by the prohibition contained in Art. 20 (3 ). The answer to this question was if the document is such as, "is not his statement conveying his personal knowledge relating to the charge against him. ", he may be called upon by the Court to produce that document. But if the order relates to a document which contains any statement of the accused based on his personal knowledge, the order for the production will attract the constitutional bar against testimonial compulsion. ( 10 ) CASE of Official Liquidator, the Popular Bank Limited v. I. K. Madhava Naik, AIR 1965 SC 654 does not help in the present case. In this case it was held that an order u/ S. 45g of the Banking Companies Act for public examination of any person of a Banking Company is not void as violating Art. 20 (3) of the Constitution of India, because there is no accusation in a proceeding u/s. 45g resulting in an order for public examination. ( 11 ) IN the case of State of Gujarat v. Shyamlal Mohan Lal Choksi, AIR 1965 SC 1251 it was held that one of the fundamental canons of the British system of the Criminal Jurisprudence and the American Jurisprudence has been that the accused should not be compelled to incriminate himself. The Indian legislature was aware of the above fundamental canon of criminal jurisprudence because in various sections of the Criminal Procedure Code it gives effect to it. The Indian legislature was aware of the above fundamental canon of criminal jurisprudence because in various sections of the Criminal Procedure Code it gives effect to it. Then their Lordships referred to the case of Kalu Oghad, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1808 and said that an accused person cannot be compelled to disclose documents which are incriminatory and based on his knowledge. Both in this case and the case of V. S. Kuttan Pillai v. Ramakrishanan (supra) general search and seizure were held to be not violating Art. 20 (3 ). ( 12 ) NOW reverting back to the facts of the case it would be useful to reproduce the contents of the application moved on behalf of opposite party No. 2 for summoning registers from the revisionist "the undersigned complainant begs to pray to this Honble Court to kindly direct the accused Lakhan Lal Baronia who is Principal of Nehru Degree College, Lalitpur to produce the following documents which are relevant in due discharge of justice in the personal case. "the following documents are in possession of the accused as a principal. (1) The Despatch Register in which the despatch of the letter dated 25-4-1984 allegedly written by the accused to the Registrar, Bundelkhand University, Jhansi is recorded. (2) The Register in which the receipt of the letter dated 7-5-1984 allegedly written by the Registrar, Bundelkhand University, Jhansi to the accused is recorded. " ( 13 ) IT thus admitted by opposite party No. 2 that the Registers were in possession of the revisionist, who was an accused in the case. Whether he was in possession as principal or not would not make any difference to the protection of Art. 20 (3) of the Constitution. Reverting back to the defence propounded by the revisionist it would be worthwhile to mention that if the entries of the letter sent and letter received were in the Registers they were in the knowledge of the revisionist. Their omission would have been equally in the knowledge of the revisionist. If the letters were entered in the Register they corroborated the defence case but if the entries were not there they would be destructive of the defence case. Their omission would have been equally in the knowledge of the revisionist. If the letters were entered in the Register they corroborated the defence case but if the entries were not there they would be destructive of the defence case. When the entries or omissions were in the knowlege of the revisionist as accused and production could bring in his statement against his defence, it has to be said that the revisionist was required to produce documents which in his knowledge contained his incriminating statement or statement destructive of his defence. I hold that in the circumstances of the case the Registers could not have been summoned from the revisionist and the summoning order was repugnant to Art. 20 (3 ). It is thus evident that the revisionist could not be legally compelled to produce Register and his failure to produce the Register did not constitute offence u/ S. 175, I. P. C. ( 14 ) IN result, I hold that it is abundantly clear that no offence u/s. 175, IPC was made out against the revisionist. Hence the orders of the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge for filing complaint for offence u/s. 175, I. P. C. are illegal and void and any complaint filed in pursuance thereof would simply amount to unnecessary harassment and abuse of process of law. ( 15 ) HENCE, in result, treating this revision as application u/s. 482, Cr. P. C. I quash the orders of the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge and any complaint filed in pursuance thereof. Application allowed. .