JUDGMENT - DAUD S.M., J.:---This petition Article 226 of the Constitution takes exception to Exh. A being an order dated 28th July, 1986 passed by the 2nd respondent, the Collector of Bombay, Prohibition and Excise Department. 2. Laxman Shankar More was licensed to sell country liquor in the country liquor shop situated at Dhavda Chawl, Hingwala Lane, Ghatkopar, Bombay-75. The licence bore the Registration No. CL. III/206. More addressed a letter to the 2nd respondent on 29th December, 1975 expressing a desire to take the petitioner as a partner in the country liquor shop aforementioned. He as also the petitioner addressed communications to the 2nd respondent which are at Exhs. C and D. As required by the authorities, petitioner submitted an affidavit at Exh. E and the deed of partnership which is at Exh. G. The proposal made by More and the petitioner was accepted and the original licence Exh. H, which formerly stood in the sole name of More, was amended to show the petitioner as a partner in the business covered by the licence. More was ailing and seriously at that. For this reason, on 4th April, 1977, he addressed Exh. I to the 2nd respondent expressing a desire to withdraw from the partnership leaving the petitioner wholly the owner and conductor of the country liquor shop. Before the Government could reply or took it upon itself to reply, More passed away on 14th February, 1980. The death of More was intimated to the 2nd respondent by Exh. K. The licence continued as before showing More to be the licensee with petitioner occupying the status of a partner. Suddenly on 17th April, 1986, the 2nd respondent addressed Exh. L to the petitioner calling upon him to disprove the belief entertained by the authoro i.e. the 2nd respondent, that the original licensee was not conducting the business himself but had passed on the benefit/privilege unto the petitioner for which reason the said licence had become ripe for suspension or cancellation. Petitioner made a representation informing the 2nd respondent of all that had transpired and seeking that the licence be transferred to his name. This was not acceptable to the 2nd respondent who justified the refusal on the ground "It is the Government's policy not to transfer any excise licence to the name of a person who is not a member of the original licensee's family". This was not acceptable to the 2nd respondent who justified the refusal on the ground "It is the Government's policy not to transfer any excise licence to the name of a person who is not a member of the original licensee's family". Petitioner was called upon to close down the business and hand over the entire unsold stock to the 3rd respondent. Impugning that order passed on 28th July 1986, the petitioner came to Court and obtained interim relief in terms of prayer (a) of the petition. 3. The contention taken by the petitioner is that the impugned order is arbitrary and without the force of law. Respondents have not filed a return and the only four contentions raised by Counsel representing them are (i) that the grant or refusal of a licence to vend liquor is entirely within the discretion of the Government; (ii) if the Government refused to grant a licence or renewal thereof to a licensee, the aggrieved person has no cause of action to approach a Court for redress; (iii) the petitioner is already holding a foreign liquor licence (FL) albeit one standing in the name of his father, who has died and from whose name, it is proposed to be transferred to the names of the petitioner, his mother and brother; and (iv) that the petitioner has come to this Court without exhausting the statutory remedy provided under section 137 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 (Act). 4. To take up the last point first, section 137 provides the remedy of an appeal to a person aggrieved by orders passed by any Prohibition Officer, Collector or Commissioner. In the present case, against the order of the 2nd respondent, the petitioner could have gone in appeal to the State Government. However, Exh. A which is the impugned order, gives the impression of the 2nd respondent acting in consonance with the policy formulated by the State Government. If that be correct, and, on that subject there is no dissenting voice from the respondents, the remedy of preferring an appeal against the impugned order to the State Government would be something in the nature of an appeal from Caesar to Caesar. If that be correct, and, on that subject there is no dissenting voice from the respondents, the remedy of preferring an appeal against the impugned order to the State Government would be something in the nature of an appeal from Caesar to Caesar. When the authorities speak of a person taking recourse to Article 226 only after exhausting other remedies, what they contemplate on the subject of other remedies, are remedies which are meaningful and capable of rendering relief unto him. In the present case the 2nd respondent purports to speak the mind of the State Government and therefore, driving the petitioner to approach the State Government against the impugned order, would be of no assistance. Consequently, this point raised on behalf of the respondents has to be negatived. 5. The second plea advanced by the respondent is one resting upon facts. There is no return and no documents have been tendered to establish even a foundation for the alleged ineligibility of the petitioner to a country liquor licence because he either holds or is a beneficiary direct or indirect of an FL licence which also is in the process of being transferred. In the absence of proper material no countenance can be given to the plea raised. 6. The only point of substance left is that the petitioner does not have any legal right to the relief claimed by him. Now no authorities are necessary for the proposition that trade in liquor is the prerogative of the Government and that it is not subject to any curbs in the matter of regulating or restricting this trade. Nonetheless, it is not immune from the responsibility to act with fairness and rationality. In the instant case there was nothing surreptitious or secretive about More taking petitioner into partnership with him for the conducting of the business covered by the CL licence granted to him. Both the partners complied with the conditions imposed upon them by the authorities and succeeded in getting the petitioner's name incorporated in the licence as a partner of More. For quite sometime the two of them were allowed to carry on the business without any restriction. Suddenly came notice at Exh. L accusing the deceased licensee of having passed on the benefit/privilege to a person other than the one entitled to vend liquor under the licence granted by the 2nd respondent. For quite sometime the two of them were allowed to carry on the business without any restriction. Suddenly came notice at Exh. L accusing the deceased licensee of having passed on the benefit/privilege to a person other than the one entitled to vend liquor under the licence granted by the 2nd respondent. By this time More had died and this fact had been intimated to the 2nd respondent. In spite of this knowledge of the passing away of More, the 2nd respondent addressed the notice to the said dead person. Be that as it may, petitioner gave a reply and pointed out the true position. This was that he had come on the scene with the knowledge and consent of the 2nd respondent, that More had expired and that the death of More had been duly intimated to the authorities. The policy refers to in Exh. A has no statutory force. All that could be referred to in remote support of the so-called policy was Rule 28 of the Maharashtra Country Liquor Rules, 1973, and a term of the licence under which More was doing business. Rule 28 speaks of the Collector permitting the transfer of a licence from one name to another or admitting or deleting the name of any partner after the licence has been granted. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents, the rule speaks of may which implies that the Collector has the discretion to either permit or refuse to permit the transfers contemplated by the rule. But may does not mean that Collector can do what he wants and that too without any rhyme or reason. The authorities have to act reasonably. Here, the petitioner was permitted to join More in the running of the business for which a licence had been issued in the name of running of the business for which a licence had been issued in the name of More alone. More's death was intimated and More himself wanted to retire from the business because of the failing health. His death was duly intimated to the authorities and the petitioner was allowed to carry on the business for 5 to 6 years after More's passing away. Until then the Collector saw no reason to prohibit the carrying on of the business covered by the licence standing in More's name. His death was duly intimated to the authorities and the petitioner was allowed to carry on the business for 5 to 6 years after More's passing away. Until then the Collector saw no reason to prohibit the carrying on of the business covered by the licence standing in More's name. Nothing had been done by the petitioner to suddenly sway the Collector's mind into the giving of the show cause notice and proceeding to decide that it was contrary to Government's policy to transfer any excise licence to the name of a person who was not a member of the original licensee's family. Words used in Exh. A if they correctly reflect the Government's policy give room to believe that the Government wants to perpetrate dynasties in the liquor trade. That, I hope, is not the intention of the Government for if any such idea is being entertained by it, it would be a gross violation of a basic principle for which the Indian Constitution stands. But apart from that the policy has not been reduced to anything acceptable in law and cannot therefore be given countenance to. Next is the reliance placed upon the term of the licence granted to More which contains the usual permissibility to the authority granting the licence to renew or not to renew the same and cancel it as and when considered necessary. But these are standard clauses and do not confer upon the authorities and unrestricted power which respondent No. 2 believes he possess. All that the permissibility clause implies, is, that discretion is given to the authorities, but on the understanding that the discretion will be exercised in consonance with reasonableness and fair play. None of the reasons given by the respondents in justification of Exh. A can be accepted. Petition succeeds and Exh. A is hereby quashed. Respondent No. 2 is directed to renew the CL licence, if applied for, by the petitioner as and when the occasion arises provided, however, the said petitioner is not in any way disentitled to the renewal thereof. Rule in these terms is made absolute with parties being left to bear their own costs. Petition allowed. -----