Judgment :- In this batch of 28 civil revision petitions, the employees of respondents 1 and the petitioners. Individually they have filed 28 suits on the file of the Munsif,Thiruman-galam, questioning their transfer from the places where they were to some other place allegedly with mala fide intention by the respondents, and not administrative reasons. Along with the suits, they have filed interlocutory applications O.39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. for an ad interim injunction restraining the respondents 1 from giving effect to the orders of transfer pending disposal of the suits. 2. The respondents 1 and 2 filed their written statement in the suits as well as counter interlocutory Applications. 3. The learned District Munsif dismissed the Interlocutory Applications on the ground the civil Courts has no jurisdiction. On appeal, the order and decree of the trial court confirmed by the Principal District Judge, Madurai. Hence these revisions. 4. The point that arises for consideration in these revision petitions is whether the civil has got jurisdiction to entertain the suits filed by the revision petitioners? 5. Certain basic facts, which are not in dispute may first be stated. Messrs.Southern Roadways Ltd., is a public limited company, of which the 1st respondent is the Secretary the 2nd respondent is the Chairman and Managing Director. The Southern Roadways has got branches at Madras, Coim-batore, Bangalore, Madurai, Tiruchi, Tirunelveli," Secunderabad and Vijayawada. According to the petitioners, the Southern Roadways operated its own Trade Union under the banner T.V.S. Workers’ ‘Union’, whose office where nominated by the Management itself, and manipulated elections were held inside Company ’ s premises, where the Management would ensure that each branch Company ’ s candidate was not opposed by anybody and in the event of any opposition any such genuine representative, the opposing candidate, as a rule, will be victimised these circumstances, the petitioners are their companions individually never recognized T.V.S. Workers ’‘ Union ’ as a Union at all. 6. While so, at Bangalore, all the piece-rate load-men, who worked for decade converted into contract labourers by imposing fraudulent settlements, and their were terminated. This led to the workmen of the Bangalore Branch to form a representative Trade Union, and in that process steps to form a new Union were February, 1987. 6. While so, at Bangalore, all the piece-rate load-men, who worked for decade converted into contract labourers by imposing fraudulent settlements, and their were terminated. This led to the workmen of the Bangalore Branch to form a representative Trade Union, and in that process steps to form a new Union were February, 1987. The respondents 1 and 2 by systematic intelligence identified workmen, who were showing enthusiasm and taking active interest in the formation Union, and victimised those workmen by gross abuse of disciplinary powers and span of two weeks, eighteen workmen were suspended by levelling false charges wake of this victimisation. Southern Roadways Employees Union, of which the Petitioners are members, was formed at Bangalore. Right from the formation of Union, the respondents have been systematically victimising the members of the Roadways Employees Union by abusing the disciplinary powers, abusing the power transfer and creating financial disincentives. As a matter of fact, in the middle of 1989, petitioners were-transferred to various places, in pursuance of the vindictive attitude part of respondents. The statement filed by learned counsel for the petitioners shows transfer effected in respect of the petitioners, and it is as follows: From the statement filed by learned counsel for revision petitioners, it is seen out members of the Southern Roadways Trade Union at Madras only one was transferred Madras; out of 150 at Coimbatore, two were transferred; out of 196 at Bangalore, were transferred; out of 56 at Madurai, eleven were transferred; out of 58 at Tiruchi, were transferred; out of 20 at Tirunelveli, two were transferred and out of 48 at Salem, was transferred. Out of 47 from Secun-derabad, none was transferred and out of Vijayawada, one was transferred. 7. Totally 28 employees have been transferred to various places. Out of these 20, petitioners in C.R.P.Nos.24 of 1991, 28 of 1991, 3443 of 1990, 3446 of 1990, 3447 of 3448 of 1990, 3450 of 1990, 34 of 1991, 3453 of 1990 and 3456 of 1990 have settled claims. The petitioners in C.R.P.Nos.3455 of 1990 and 29 of 1991 have retired. aforesaid facts were communicated to the learned counsel for the petitioners on 14.121990. 8. The petitioners in C.R.P.Nos.3455 of 1990 and 29 of 1991 have retired. aforesaid facts were communicated to the learned counsel for the petitioners on 14.121990. 8. The respondents in their written statement as well as in the counter filed Interlocutory Applications, pleaded that the petitioners are workmen ’ within the meaning of Sec.2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter to as the Act) and their remedy is only to raise an Industrial Dispute under the Act, civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suits and that the jurisdiction of the civil is impliedly barred. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that where a statute recognizes preexisting right, the jurisdiction of the civil Court will be ousted only in cases where right is created under the statute. According to him, the right to question a transfer employee on the ground of mala fide is a right that existed under the general or law and not under the Act, and in case, it is re-enacted by a statute with a special unless the statute contains the words necessarily excluding the common law remedy, workman has his choice of proceeding either under the statute or under common law. In view of the matter, according to him, the right to question a transfer was a pre-existing prior to the coming into force of the Act, and later on, re-enacted by inserting Sec.2(a) 5th Schedule. 10. On this point, both the parties relied on the decision reported in Premier Automobiles v. K.S.Wadke, (1975)2 L.L.J. 445 . According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, facts of the case on hand will fall under the second category out of the four categories enumerated in the decision, where as according to the learned counsel for the respondents, the facts of the case will fall under the third category. Learned counsel for the petitioners also cited two unreported judgments of this court rendered in C.R.P.No.956 of 1983 7.12.1984, T.Natarajan v. Indian Oxygen Ltd.,and A.A.O.No.204 of 1976 on 16.2.1979, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. S.K.Murthy, wherein Sathia-dev, J: according to the petitioners granted relief to an aggrieved employee under similar circumstances. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, relied upon the judgment reported in Kerala Rubber and Reclaims Ltd v. PA. Sunny, (1989)1 Lab.L.N. 679:73 507:1989 Lab.I.C. 964., 12. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, relied upon the judgment reported in Kerala Rubber and Reclaims Ltd v. PA. Sunny, (1989)1 Lab.L.N. 679:73 507:1989 Lab.I.C. 964., 12. Since the rival contentions reduce itself to the aforesaid point, one has to go through these judgments and see to which category the petitioners belong. 13. Justice Sathiadev granted relief in A.A.O.No.204 of 1976 solely on the ground that plaintiff therein could not have raised an Industrial Dispute under Sec.24 of the Act and same would have blossomed out, as an Industrial Dispute if the Union has chosen to the plaintiff ’ s cases therein. But as the Act flow stands, to transfer a workman mala fide one place to another under the guise of administrative or management policy is stated an ‘ Unfair Labour Practice ’ by virtue of Sec.2(ra) of the Act. In the civil revision petition No.956 of 1983, the plaintiff filed the suit for declaration that the defendants are not entitled to withhold or stop the wages of the plaintiff on the alleged disobedience of not doing from a particular day onwards or any other day without providing necessary materials, helpers etc., for carrying out the work, and in contravention of the standing orders. It a case of transfer for mala fide reasons. From the peculiar circumstances of that case, learned Judge came to the conclusion that the dispute therein involved is one of civil and that would come within Sec.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and would not be filed the Industrial Disputes Act. But that is not the case here. It a case of transfer for mala fide reasons. From the peculiar circumstances of that case, learned Judge came to the conclusion that the dispute therein involved is one of civil and that would come within Sec.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and would not be filed the Industrial Disputes Act. But that is not the case here. The facts of the case reported Kerala Rubber and Reclaims Ltd v. P.A.Sunny, (1989)1 Lab.L.N 679: 73 F.J.R. 507:1989 Lab.I.C. 964, are squarely akin to the facts of this case, wherein the learned Chief Malimath, after summarising the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Automobiles case, (1975)2 L.L.J. 445 , referred to above, observed as follows: "In the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court what is required examined is as to whether the right claimed by the respondent to enforce which he has the suit is a common law right or a right created by the Industrial Disputes Act If the claimed is not a common law right but a right created by the Industrial Disputes Act, further question for examination is as to whether the statute which has created the right itself provided for a forum for enforcement of such a right. If the right sought to be enforced is the creature of the Industrial Disputes Act and the forum is also created by that Act for enforcing that right, the civil court will have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. If however, the right sought to be enforced respondent is a common law right and the name is also recognised under the Industrial Disputes Act, then one can avail of the remedy either of approaching the civil court for or the remedy available under the Industrial Disputes Act. If, however, the right is common law right and is not recognised by the Industrial Disputes Act, the remedy would only to approach the civil court. If, however, the right which the respondent seeks to is a creature of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Industrial Disputes Act does not provide remedy for enforcing that right then, also the respondent would be entitled to seek remedy in the ordinary civil court. If, however, the right which the respondent seeks to is a creature of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Industrial Disputes Act does not provide remedy for enforcing that right then, also the respondent would be entitled to seek remedy in the ordinary civil court. So far as the frame of the suit is concerned, the order of transfer is challenged on the that the transfer of the respondent by the petitioners is mala fide and the result victimisation and unfair labour practice and is, therefore, illegal and unjust. It is not that the respondent is claiming a right recognised by the common law as such counsel for the respondents also not in a position to point out if the right claimed recognised as a common law right. Common law does not recognise any limitation power of the master to transfer his employees on grounds of mala fides, victimization unfair labour practice. We must also bear in mind that a contract of service is not specifically enforceable under the ordinary common law. If the master is not willing to employ servant, he cannot be compelled to employ him. But, after the Industrial Disputes enacted, new rights and liabilities have been created restricting the unfettered common rights of the master in dealing with the workmen in this behalf. Under the Industrial Act, notwithstanding the unwillingness of the master, he can be forced to continue servant in his service. So far as the question of transfer is concerned, the legislature has made express provision safeguard the interests of workmen. Sec.25-T in Chapter V-C of the Industrial Disputes contains a prohibition against unfair labour practice and reads as follows: "25-T. Prohibition of unfair labour practice:No employer or workman or a trade whether registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (16 of 1926) or not, shall commit unfair labour practice." The expression "unfair labour practice" has been defined in Sec.2(ra) of the Act to mean of the practices specified in the Fifth Schedule to the Act. The Fifth Schedule enumerates various unfair labour practices statutorily recognised. Item No.7 of the Fifth Schedule, which is relevant, may be extracted as follows: "7. The Fifth Schedule enumerates various unfair labour practices statutorily recognised. Item No.7 of the Fifth Schedule, which is relevant, may be extracted as follows: "7. to transfer a workmen mala fide from one place to another, under the guise of following management policy." Thus it becomes clear that there is a statutory prohibition engrafted the Industrial Disputes Act prohibiting transfer of a workman mala fide from one place another under the guise of following management policy. Thus, a valued right had been created by the statute in favour of the workmen from being subjected by his employer to transfers mala fide under the guise of following a management policy. This is a right which has been created by the Industrial Disputes Act in favour of workmen restricting the unfettered right of the management in the matter of effecting transfer of his employees. The obligation not to transfer a workman mala fide from one to another under the guise of management policy was not recognised under the common law. That right is now created by the statute. The right which the petitioners claim to enforce in the suit flows from Sec.25-T of the Industrial Disputes Act read with item No.7 of the Schedule." 14. The next question for examination is as to whether the Industrial Disputes Act created a forum for enforcing this statutory right in the matter of transfer as defined Sec.2(ra) read with Sec.25-T of the Act. Sec.7-A deals with matters that can be dealt by Industrial Tribunals. The matters that can be dealt with by Industrial Tribunals enumerated in third schedule and the matters that can be dealt with by a Labour Court enumerated in the second schedule. Item 6 of Second Schedule deals with all matters other than those specified in the third schedule that view of the matter, disputes that arise as a result of mala fide transfer squarely under the second schedule, and in fact, the petitioners have initiated proceedings Industrial Dispute. However, the Government declined to refer the matter. The petitioners have once again applied to the Government for review of their decision. In these circumstances, even if the facts of this case give a right of election to the petitioners, petitioners having elected to get redress of their grievance by initiating proceedings under the provisions of the Act, I find, they are not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court. 15. In these circumstances, even if the facts of this case give a right of election to the petitioners, petitioners having elected to get redress of their grievance by initiating proceedings under the provisions of the Act, I find, they are not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that unless they succeed in getting matter referred, it cannot be brought under the doctrine of election. Initiation proceedings, according to him, under the Act, will not be a step-in-aid. I do not agree the learned counsel for the petitioners. If his contention is accepted, that only if he succeeds in getting the matter referred to the forum created by the Act it can be construed initiation of proceedings and in case if they fail in their attempt it will not be taken ‘proceeding’ , it will be opposed to reason. Any initiation to get redress under the provisions of the Act should be construed as a ‘proceeding’ and having elected to initiate a proceeding, the petitioners cannot be permitted to say that the initiation made by them is not ‘ proceeding ’ since they failed in their attempt to get the matter referred to the forum created under the Act. I find even if the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners accepted, having elected to get redress under the provisions of the Act and having failed their attempt, they have no right to invoke the jurisdiction of the civil court. Apart from I find the facts of the case will not fall under category 2 out of the four categories stated the Supreme Court in the Premier Automobiles case, (1973)2 L.L.J. 445 , referred to above. The facts of the case squarely fall within the facts of the case referred to in the judgment the Kerala High Court, and the ratio decidendi laid down by the Kerala High Court will apply to the facts of this case on all fours. As such I find the civil court has no jurisdiction entertain the suits. 16. In the result, all the civil revision petitions are dismissed. However, I direct each party to bear their own cost. V.K--- Petitions dismissed.