Judgment :- Mishra, J. The appellant, herein was the caveator/defendant in a proceeding under and 276 of the Indian Succession Act for the grant of Letters of Administration regarding the estate of late K.Venkatachary as per his last dated 9.3.1974. The testator died on 11.7.1976. The defendant/appellant filed a caveat 24.11.1982. The application filed for Letters of Administration was converted as T.O.S.No.9 of 1982. The plaintiff (executor of the will) claimed that he was the grandson of the testator through his only deceased son. According to him, the testator executed his last will sound disposing state of mind, he (plaintiff) being the sole legatee under the will directing him to arrange for the marriage of his two sisters and to maintain his widow. The attestors of the will however were dead. The plaintiff claimed that he had arranged for marriages of his two sisters as directed in the will and that the two loans remained payable on the house property. 2. The caveator/defendant/appellant, however, objected to the prayer stating that testator had left two daughters of whom she was one. The testator’ s son had pre him (testator) leaving the plaintiff and his two sisters. Even when the testator was alive, plaintiffs sister Ambujam was married on 8.5.1974 and the second sister was married 1980 after his demise. The defendant’s mother had also died. The main objection was the testator never executed any will at all on 9.3.1974 or at any lime before his death that the will was unnatural and improper. The defendant also alleged that no provision been made by the testator for the defendant as alleged in the will. Elucidating the case the defendant, it was also said that the testator had no testamentary capacity to write will. He was affected by paralysis since 1973. The sickness had taken a serious turn year 1974 when he completely lost his senses. The signatures in the will were not those the testator. He had a settled handwriting. The signatures thus might have been forged. 3. In the course of the hearing, three issues were framed, namely: 1. Whether the will dated 9.3.1974 was executed by the testator while he was in a and disposing state of mind? 2. Whether the will is vitiated for the reasons stated in the written statement? 3. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? 4. Learned trial judge, who considered issue Nos. Whether the will dated 9.3.1974 was executed by the testator while he was in a and disposing state of mind? 2. Whether the will is vitiated for the reasons stated in the written statement? 3. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? 4. Learned trial judge, who considered issue Nos. 1 and 2 together has held, “Hence, it is found on these issues that the will dated 9.3.1974 was executed by the testator while he was in a sound and disposing state of mind and that the will is not vitiated for reasons stated in the written statement. ” Having so answered the first two issues he has concluded on the third issue that the plaintiff was entitled to the grant of Letters of Administration as prayed for, but was not eligible costs against the defendant in the circumstances of the case and accordingly decreed favour of the plaintiff for the grant of Letters of Administration of the will. 5. The main challenge before us has been that the plaintiff failed to prove the will, contents arid execution in accordance with law. Learned counsel has drawn our attention the rule of special proof of a will in Sec.63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, reads as follows: “Sec.63, Every testator, not being a soldier employed in an expedition or engaged in warfare or an airman so employed or engaged or a mariner at sea, shall execute his according to the following rules; ............ (c) The will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark, or of the signature of such other person; each of the witnesses shall sign the will the presence of the testator but it shall not necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no particular of attestation shall be necessary. ” 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that in the absence of proof of a attestation which could come only from the mouth of the attestor, on the set of evidence the witnesses it should not be held that the document has been properly proved. ” 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that in the absence of proof of a attestation which could come only from the mouth of the attestor, on the set of evidence the witnesses it should not be held that the document has been properly proved. argument has been advanced before us even though it is known that the attesting witnesses were dead and were not available to depose. Learned counsel for the appellant made detailed and strenuous argument on the language of Sec.63 quoted above and Sec.67 Evidence Act read with Sec.68 thereof, which together make it obligatory that if a is alleged to have been signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much document as is alleged to be in that person’s handwriting must be proved to handwriting or if that document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of execution, if there be an attesting witness alive and subject to the process of the being capable of giving evidence, Sec.69 of the Evidence Act takes care of proof attesting witness is found. It reads: "If no such attesting witness can be found, or if the document purports to executed in the United Kingdom, it must be proved that the attestation of one witness at least is in his handwriting, and that the signature of the person executing document is in the handwriting of that person." All that is required thus in a case in which no attesting witness can be found is to attestation by bringing on record the evidence of a witness that the attestation handwriting of that person, who was described as the attesting witness and that he his signature. 7. In one of the earlier judgments of this Court in Ponnuswamy v. Kalyanasundara, 1930 Mad. 770:125 I.C. 231, this aspect of the case has been considered and it is case where the executant denied putting his signature or mark, as follows: "No doubt "signature" generally includes "marking" in cases where the person concerned unable to write his name; but how to prove execution by a marksman when he same? 770:125 I.C. 231, this aspect of the case has been considered and it is case where the executant denied putting his signature or mark, as follows: "No doubt "signature" generally includes "marking" in cases where the person concerned unable to write his name; but how to prove execution by a marksman when he same? Could it be done only by the evidence of that attesting witnesses or strangers able to say the they were present and saw the executant put his mark, or who speak admissions made by the executant about his having executed the same. The document question is not one which is required by law to be attested, though as a matter of witnesses have attested the document as witnesses (two as witnesses, and the writer, and possibly also as a witness, as stated by the lower appellate court). Supposing witnesses are all dead, or have proved hostile, or are not available, and the court on independent evidence before it that the writing of the document is that of the that the signatures on the document are the signatures of the attesting witnesses, to the court in these circumstances to presume that the document was properly though the executant denied execution and denies having put his mark, when there direct evidence of any person examined in the case who is able to swear that the put his mark to the document." and after extensive examination of the law on the subject, observed: "If from the circumstances of the case, the courts are inclined to do so. Whether particular case the courts should do so or not would depend upon the nature circumstances in each case. While there is the possibility of the attestors colluding and putting their signatures to a forged document, especially where the executant marksman and thus committing fraud on courts, there is the other possibility of a document executed by a marksman and properly attested being found to be impossible proved when the attestors are dead. To avoid such extreme cases on both sides, courts to be guided by all the circumstances of the particular cases before them. To avoid such extreme cases on both sides, courts to be guided by all the circumstances of the particular cases before them. All that I concerned to point out is, that there appears to be no rule of law which prevents the from holding the execution of a document to be proved when the signatures of the witnesses had been proved to their satisfaction, having regard to all the circumstances case." 8. Ponnuswamy v. Kalyanasundara, A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 770:1251.C. 231, was not one in the document was required by law to be attested. Yet, it lends support to a rule of evolved by the courts that in such cases also where attestation is required by law, the are not powerless to accept proof of attestation of a document as provided under Sec.69 the Evidence Act. 9. A learned single judge of the Bombay High Court in Nooruddin v. Mohamed Oomer, 1956 Bom. 641, considered in such circumstances the effect of this provision in the Act and said: "The panchanama is signed by the petitioner in Tamil as "S.M.Nooruddin" and it is by two witnesses, one Saiyed Shah Mahomed Inayathullah Quadri, Head Kazi of George Town, Madras Presidency and another Tajammul Hussein Imam. Now, both these attesting witness were, dead before the question of the genuineness or otherwise of this document arose. The Kazi died on 1942 and Tajammul in 1943, and M.Mahomed Omar Sayed in favour the so-called panchanama has been made and who was the father of the opponent died on 17.12.1942." Undoubtedly the petitioner denied the signature on this document and it was essential the document should be proved. In the circumstances of the case, the proof that forthcoming of this document’ was the evidence of three witnesses, one was Vikhayatulla, who was the son of Kazi Inayathullah. He identified the signature of his as well as the signature of Tajammul and stated that the body of the writing is handwriting of one Munshi Abdul Gani who died in 1937. Nothing was brought out cross-examination of Kazi Vikhayatulla which would affect either his credibility or shake evidence in any other manner. The second witness who was called was Mahomed Yusuf, was the nephew of Tajammul Hussain Iman and he identified the signature of Tajammul and stated that Tajammul died in 1943. He further stated that he was present when the panchanama was made saw him sign. The second witness who was called was Mahomed Yusuf, was the nephew of Tajammul Hussain Iman and he identified the signature of Tajammul and stated that Tajammul died in 1943. He further stated that he was present when the panchanama was made saw him sign. He further stated that he actually saw the applicant sign and he was when the Kazi signed. In the cross-examination of this witness again nothing was which would go to his discredit nor was any fact elicited which would affect his evidence chief." "In addition to these two witnesses, one Sheik Dawood was called who is a maternal the opponent. He was living with the opponent’s father and taking part in the business member of the family. He only deposed to the fact that the deceased father of the had shown him the document in 1937. Now, ignoring the evidence of Kazi Vikhayatulla Mohamed Yusuf is by itself sufficient to establish that the document was executed petitioner, because there is no other conceivable way in which proof of the document have been given as Kazi Inayathullah and Tajammul are both dead and the father opponent is also dead." 10. In yet another judgment of this Court in Rajavenkataramayya v. Kamisetti Ghattayya, M.L.J. 216:A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 662. in which the writer of the document examined as stated that the attesting witnesses did not sign in his presence but his evidence was be false and the handwriting of the attestors was proved, this Court held: "All the parties to the document are dead but one and it has been found that he evidence. The handwriting of the attestors has been proved and this presumption, absence of rebutting evidence is that they actually witnessed the execution of the dead." 11. We have referred to the above citations only to assure ourselves that it contended by any stretch of imagination that in cases where attesting witnesses were a will could not be proved otherwise. The method in such a situation will be one as under Sec.69 of the Evidence Act. 12. We have referred to the above citations only to assure ourselves that it contended by any stretch of imagination that in cases where attesting witnesses were a will could not be proved otherwise. The method in such a situation will be one as under Sec.69 of the Evidence Act. 12. Reverting to the facts of this case and the evidence that has found favour learned trial judge, we notice that to prove the signatures of the deceased attestors, documents were produced by P.W.1 (Exs.P-2 to P-4, P-21 and P-22), the books and his father in which his father had put his signatures and he himself deposed that contained the signature of his father as one of the attesting witnesses. defendant/appellant did not dispute the evidence of this witness. Similarly, another P.W.2, produced Exs.P-5 to P-8 in which his father had signed and identified his signature the will. His evidence was also not disputed by the defendant/ appellant. Learned upon this said, "P.W.I has deposed that Ex.P-1 found in Ex.P-10 will is the signature in the handwriting his father, G.V.Raghavan and P.W.2 has deposed that Ex.P-1 (Q) in Ex.P-10 will signature in the handwriting of his father, S.V.Ardhanari. In Exs.P-1 and P residential address of the two attestors are given as No.l7-A and No.17, Motilal T.Nagar, Madras-17 respectively, P.W.I has deposed that his father was residing in Motilal Street in the house adjacent to the house of the testator, Venkatachari and father had purchased No.17-A, Motilal Street house property in 1962. P.W.2 has that his father was residing in the house of the testator, K.Venkatachari as a tenant on a rent of Rs.150 roughly for about 17 years before the death of his father. The above of P.Ws.1, 2 are not disputed by the defendant. Thus the two attestors are not strangers one was a tenant and the other was a neighbour at the time and date of the execution of the will, viz., 9.3.1974. Therefore, Ex.P-10 will should have come into before the death of the two attestors. One attestor died in January, 1978. Therefore, it should have come into existence subsequent to January, 1978. To prove the signatures of the attestors, P.W.I has Exs.P-2 to P-4, P-21 and P-22, the books and letters of his father in which his father his dated signatures on 1.5,1969, 1.5.1977, 10.12.1977, 6.7.1970 and 19.6.1960, respectively. One attestor died in January, 1978. Therefore, it should have come into existence subsequent to January, 1978. To prove the signatures of the attestors, P.W.I has Exs.P-2 to P-4, P-21 and P-22, the books and letters of his father in which his father his dated signatures on 1.5,1969, 1.5.1977, 10.12.1977, 6.7.1970 and 19.6.1960, respectively. The signatures found in Exs.P-2 to P-4, P-21 and P-22 are identical with signatures found in will, Ex.P-10. Similarly P.W.2 has produced Ex.P-5 to P-8 in father had signed on 26.3.1972, 31.1.1974, 26.3.1972 and 5.9.1970 respectively are completely identical with the signature in Ex.P-l(a) found in the attestation in The defendant has not disputed the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 on those points. Therefore, can be safely concluded that Ex.P-10 has been attested by P.Ws.1’ s father G.V.Raghavan P.W.2’ father S.V. Ardhanari." 13. Learned counsel for the appellants has taken us through the evidence of witnesses including the documents. There is slight difference in the alignment signature of the testator when compared to those found in Exs. P-11 and P Learned trial judge has also noticed this difference in the alignment. But he has also notice of the fact that the testator had become very old in 1974. In one of the documents (Ex.P-12) a mortgage deed executed by him, he had affixed his left thumb impression 6.12.1975. In that he had stated the reason "due to old age and shivering of my am not in a position to affix my signature, though I used to sign previously. I now left thumb impression." There has been a gap of about two months between Exs.P 10. Ex.P-10 had come into existence about two months after the execution of Learned trial judge has said upon that, "Therefore, it is possible that on account of the tremority and old age, the handwriting began to be shaky and hence his signature found in Ex.P-10 is somewhat though identical with his admitted signatures found in Ex.P-11 as well as in Exs.P 20." 14. Apart from the above, and we say so with respect, the learned trial judge noticed correctly that the witnesses who were examined hand no reason to depose of the execution of the will but for the reason of a dispute as to the attestation and of signature by the testator. All relevant facts have been taken into consideration learned trial judge. All relevant facts have been taken into consideration learned trial judge. Nothing has been shown to us to take a different view argument except a casual reference to the suspicious circumstances has been before us. So far as suspicious circumstances are concerned, learned trial judge into each one of them and found that they do not have any effect upon the genuineness the will. We do hot find any merit in the appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed costs. Appeal dismissed.