Judgment : SOMASUNDARAM, J.: 1. This writ petition is filed under Art.226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of a writ of mandamus for directing the respondent to forebear from invoking the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, hereinafter called the TADA Act, in Crime No.9/5/91 C.B.I./S.P.E./MAS on the file of the respondent. 2. The admitted facts are: In respect of the occurrence on 21.5.1991 at Sriperumbudur relating to the assassination of the former Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi and others, a casein Crime No.329 of 1991 of Sriperumbudur Police Station was registered on 22.5.1991 under Secs.302, 307 and 326, I.P.C., read with Secs.3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act. Subsequently the case was taken up for further investigation by the respondent on 24.5.1991 by S.P.E./C.B.I./Madras which registered Crime No.9/5/91 under the same sections of law. On 31.5.1991 further sections of law were included in the F.I.R. viz.,Sec.120-B, I.P.C. and Sec.3 of the TADA Act. During tine course of investigation the petitioner was taken into custody, he was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chennai Anna District at Chengalpattu on 10.6.1991 and on the same day he was remanded to the judicial custody and the petitioner continued to bean judicial custody. 3. The case of the petitioner as disclosed in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition is as follows: The TADA Act is a special enactment, the intention of which was to confine the applicability of the Act to cessionist and insurgency activities against the State. In the present case, the charge against the petitioner and others is the charge of murder of an individual and it is only an offence punishable under the I.P.C. and, therefore only the penal law of the land can be invoked and that there is no justification for invoking the provisions of the TADA Act, which is a special enactment. The provisions of the TADA Act can be invoked only as an extreme measure when the police cannot tackle the sin action under the provisions of the ordinary penal law. There is no material in the present case to dis close an offence under the provisions of the TADA Act and the respondent is not justified in invoking the provisions of the TADA Act particularly when the materials available with the respondent do not satisfy the essential ingredients of the offence under the TADA Act. 4. There is no material in the present case to dis close an offence under the provisions of the TADA Act and the respondent is not justified in invoking the provisions of the TADA Act particularly when the materials available with the respondent do not satisfy the essential ingredients of the offence under the TADA Act. 4. The respondent filed a counter affidavit contending as follows: The interpretation sought to be placed by the petitioner on the scope and applicability of Sec.3(1) of the TADA Act is not correct. Sec.3 of the TADA Act will get attracted if the act is of such nature as to strike terror in the people or any section of the people and resulting in death or injury to any person or persons. In the instant case, the bomb blast that occurred on 21.5.1991 did cause terror in the mines of people who had gathered at the meeting place at Sriperumbudur and in the surrounding area and also caused the death of the late Shri Rajv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India, a group of nine police officials who were on band bust duty and eight members of the public and injuries to policepersonnel and cithers and, therefore the said acts squarely come within the mischief of the definition of Sec.3 of the TADA Act. The investigation done so far by the respondent and the seizures effected in the case clearly disclose activities of the persons concerned in this case showing their involvement in the office which would attract the provisions of Secs.3 to 5 of the TADA Act. The materials gathered during the course of investigation in the present case clearly attract the provisions of Secs.3, 4 and 5 of the TADA Act and the concerned criminal court had been duly intimated about the inclusion of this offences as and when the materials had come to light. The respondent is justified in invoking the provisions of the TADA Act in the present case. 5. Mr.S.Doraiswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner contended in the first place that the respondent cannot invoke Secs.4 and 5 of the TADA Act and register a case under these sections also, because the incident that took place on 21.5.1991 is not a terrorist act intended to overawe the Government and that the materials on record are not sufficient to charge the petitioners under Secs.3 to 5 of the TADA Act. The learned counsel further contended that the TADA Act can be invoked only when the law enforcing machinery fails and there is no material in this case to show that the law enforcing machinery has failed. The learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that the TADA Act is a special enactment containing the extreme measure to be resorted to only when the police cannot tackle the situation under the ordinary penal faw. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions in Kilavar Hussain v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 56, Ayubkhan Kalandarkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat 1991 Crl.L.J. 1985, Usmanbhai v. State of Gujarat A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 922 and Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jiten-dra Bhimraj Bijja, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1962. We are unable to accept the above contentions of the learned counsel for the petitionerbecause it is not warranted by the language of the relevant provisions of the TADA Act and in view of the pronouncement of the Apex Court in Kathulu Somulu v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1556 and Erram Santosh Reddy v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1672 Sec.2(h) of the TADA Act defines “terrorist” Act and it has the same meaning assigned to it in Sec.3(1) of the TADA Act. Sec.3(1) of the TADA Act reads thus: “Punishment for terrorist acts:(1) Whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substance or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisonous or ncxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substance (whether biological or otherwise) of hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, or as is likely to cause, death of, or injuries to, any persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Government or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits terrorist act.” Sec.3(3) of the TADA Act deals with conspiracy or attempt or abetment or inciting or facilitation of the commission of a terrorist act and Sec.3(3) of the TADA Act runs as follows: “Whoever conspires or attempts to commit or advocates, abets, advises or incite or knowingly facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to a terrorst act shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.” A careful reading of Sec.3(1) of the TADA Act shows that it is not confined only to terrorist act intended to overawe the Government. Sec.3(1) also covers an act of a person who with an intent to strike terror in the people or any section of the people, uses bombs, dynamites or other explosive substances etc., in such manner as to cause or is likely to cause death of, or injuries to any person or persons etc. Sec.3(1) also covers an act of a person who with an intent to strike terror in the people or any section of the people, uses bombs, dynamites or other explosive substances etc., in such manner as to cause or is likely to cause death of, or injuries to any person or persons etc. Inasmuch as the materials collected in this case by the respondent luring the course of investigation disclosed the commission of offences under Secs.3, 4 and 5 of the Act also, the said sections were also incorporated in the F.I.R. for the purpose of further investigation and the same was also duly intimated to the Chief Judicial Magistrates Court, Chengalpattu. Further in the application dated 19.6.1991 submitted by the respondent requesting the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu to remand the petitioner and another to judicial custody, it is specifically stated as follows: “A case in R.C. 9/5/91/S.P.E./Madras under Secs.302, 307, 326, I.P.C. and Secs.3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act was registered on 24.5.1991 against unknown persons and the original F.I.R. was submitted to the Hon’ble Court. ”On 31.5.1991 based on further evidence collected, the offences punishable under Secs.120-B, I.P.C. and Sec.3 of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 were also incorporated and the same was duly informed to this Hon’ble Court.“ It is further stated in the remand report that the petitioner and another were found to be active coconspirators with other accused viz., A-1 to A-4 and others in the commission of the offence alleged against them. Admittedly in the present case several innocent persons including former Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi were killed and several other innocent persons were injured as a result of the bomb-blast. 6. Now it is necessary to refer to the decisions of the Supreme Court relied on by Mr.P.Rajamanickam, learned counsel for the respondent in Kathulu Somulu v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1556 theappellants are the members of C.P.I. (M.L.) Group. On 22.6.1986 on reliable information the S.I. of Police, Chintur with other police personnel proceeded to Goundlakota Village and conducted raids in the forests. While they were returning to Chintur, they found some extremists proceeding towards Hillock near Gonegutta of Kalthur Village. They were chased and the two appellants were apprehended, with one country-made pipe gun (Tapancha) and two country-made bombs and pellets. While they were returning to Chintur, they found some extremists proceeding towards Hillock near Gonegutta of Kalthur Village. They were chased and the two appellants were apprehended, with one country-made pipe gun (Tapancha) and two country-made bombs and pellets. A case was registered under the provisions of the Arms Act and Explosive Substances Act and also under Secs.3 and 4 of ‘TADA’. Panchanamas were prepared for the recovery of the weapons as well as explosive substances. The prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 4. P.W.1 is the S.I. of Police and is a prosecution witness and the P.W.3 is the Panch-witness. The learned Designated Judge accepted the evidence and found the appellants guilty. The Supreme Court while upholding the conviction and sentence as passed by the designated Judge against the appellants held as follows: ”Sec.2(f) defines the Terrorist “act’ and has the meaning assigned to it in Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.3 of TADA’ The Provisions of Sec.3(3) which deals with the conspiracy or attempt or abetment or inciting or facilitation of the commission of a terroist act (sic). The fact that these appellants were found in the group of other persons in the forest area and were seen running away after seeing the police and coupled with the recoveries of the explosive substance including the country-made fire-arms would lead to the inference that the appellants along with other are engaged in conspiracy or in attempt to commit or abet the “terrorist act”. 7. In Erram Sarsh Reddy v. State of A. P. Erram Sarsh Reddy v. State of A. P. , A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1678the Supreme Court, after going through the evidence ofP. Ws. 1,2 and 5 found that the prosecutions established that when the police raided the premises of the appellants, one of the appellants hurled a bomb on them and when the appellants surrendered, fre-arms and explosives were recovered from them. On the said finding the Supreme Court held as follows: ”That being so, the ingredients of Sec.2(f) as well as Sec.3(1) are attracted. Sec.3(1) is very wide and covers any act which strikes terror in the people or section of the people would attract the said provisions. On the said finding the Supreme Court held as follows: ”That being so, the ingredients of Sec.2(f) as well as Sec.3(1) are attracted. Sec.3(1) is very wide and covers any act which strikes terror in the people or section of the people would attract the said provisions. The fact that the accused were armed with the fire-arms as well as explosive substance and also hurled a bomb on the police who were in the premises would go to show that the offence of the accused was to strike terror in the people or a section of the people including the police.“ The ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above applies to the facts of the present case and in this context it is relevant to refer to the following averments in para 8 of the counter-affidavit: ”In the present case, with the materials on record relating to the activities of the persons who are concerned in this case and who are involved in a well designed plan to use bomb and explosive to create scare and panic and commit a terrorist act and in that situation to commit murder of the former Prime Minister of India and the person who are likely to be along with him in that scene at that time and in that explosive situation to make themselves scarce and thereafter to screen the offenders involved in this case and to attempt to escape the clutches of law and has dexterously executed the scheme of conspiracy and thereby achieved their object, it cannot be said that on the facts of this case the provisions of TADA Act will not apply.” 8. Now let us examine the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1962 the Supreme Court while holding that the prior statement made by theaccused that he wanted to create terror with the intention to eliminate the rivals and gain supremacy in the underworld so that they may be known as the bullies of the locality and would be dreaded as such, does not constitute a terrorist act, observed as follows: “It would have been a different matter if to strike terror some innocent persons were killed. In that case the intention would be to strike terror and the killings would be to achieve that objective.” In the instant case the bomb blast that took place on 21.5.1991 did cause terror in the minds of the people who had gathered at the meeting place at Sriperumbudur and also has caused the death of late Shri Rajiv Gandhi, a group of nine police officials and 8 members of the public. Therefore, the ratio of the decision in Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1962is not helpful to the petitioner. 9. In Kilavar Hussain v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 56 the Apex Court while dealing with a case of communal clash acquitted the accused holding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond the shadow of doubt that the appellants committed the offences under Sec.3(2)(i) of the TADA Act read with Sec.34, I.P.C. Sec.302 read with Secs.436/149, 449, 143 and 148, I.P.C., and set aside the conviction of the appellants. Similarly in Usmanbhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 922 there was a civil dispute between the two rival groups resulting in an armed clash between them and in such a case the provisionsof the TADA Act were sought to be invoked. The Supreme Court took the view that the provisions of the TADA Act cannot be invoked in such cases. 10. In Ayubkhan Kalandarkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat Ayubkhan Kalandarkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat, 1991 Crl.L.J. 1085 a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court while dealing with a case between rival groups came to the conclusion that the materials available on record in that case do not disclose the commission of an offence under Sec.3 of the TADA Act. In these circumstances, it has to be held that the four decisions referred to above and heavily relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not helpful to the petitioner. 11. In these circumstances, it has to be held that the four decisions referred to above and heavily relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not helpful to the petitioner. 11. We had occasion to go into this very question in W.P.Nos.8893 and 9288 of 1991 filed by the petitioner himself and by the order dated 29.7.1991 after repelling the similar contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner we have held that the respondent is justified in invoking Secs.3 to 5 of the TADA Act as the materials collected by the respondent in the course of investigation of the case warranted the invention of the provisions of the TADA Act. 12. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent is established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act; under Sec.2 of the Act, the Central Government may constitute a special police establishment for the investigation of an offence noticed under Sec.3, as per Sec.3 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, the Central government may by notification in the gazette specify the offences and which class of offences to be investigated by the respondent and under Sec.5 of the Act, the Central Government by order extend to any area, the powers and the jurisdiction of the Delhi Special Police Establishment for the purpose of investigation. The learned counsel further contended that in the present case no notification under Sec3 was published in the gazette granting power to the respondent to investigate into the present case and no order under Sec.5 was issued granting power to this respondent t o investigate matter in the State of Tamil Nadu and hence the respondent cannot invoke the provisions of the TADA Act, There is no merit in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner also. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, the Government of India have issued a notification No.228/8/1989 ABD 3 Government of India dated 7.9.1989 under Sec 3 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act empowering the members of the S.P.E. to investigate offences under the TADA Act, 1987 and the rules made therein. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, the Government of India have issued a notification No.228/8/1989 ABD 3 Government of India dated 7.9.1989 under Sec 3 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act empowering the members of the S.P.E. to investigate offences under the TADA Act, 1987 and the rules made therein. The Government of India with the consent of the State Government of Tamil Nadu issued notification No.228/18/1987 dated 8.8.1989 under Sec.5 read with Sec.6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act extending the powers and jurisdiction of the members of the S.P.E. to the whole of the State of Tamil Nadu for investigation of offence under the TADA Act and the Rules made thereunder. Further the Government of Tamil Nadu by its notification dated 22.5.1991 and the Government of India by its notification dated 23.5.1991 authorised the S.P.E., C.B.I, to investigate the case in Crime No.329 of 1991 of Sriperumbudur Police Station under Secs.302, 307 and 326, I.P.C., and Secs.3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act for attempt, abetments and conspiracies in relation to or in connection with the said offences and any other offence committed in the course of the same transaction arising out of the same facts in regard to the said case. In these circumstances, it has to be held that the respondent has been clothed with all the powers of investigation under the TADA Act. 13. Thirdly Mr.S.Doraisamy, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that under Sec.154, Crl.P.G any information about the commission of an offence should be reduced in writing and shall be entered in a book; in the present case, the respondent has registered a case in Cr.R.C.No.9/5/91 only for the offences under Secs.302, 307 and 326, I.P.C. and Secs.3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and thereafter the Respondent has not altered the F.I.R. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, as along as the F.I.R. is not altered, the Respondent will not have the power and jurisdiction to proceed under the provisions of the TADA Act. We are unable to accept the third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner also. We are unable to accept the third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner also. As already pointed out, the case registered by Sriperumbudur Police in Crl.No.329 of 1991 regarding the assassination of the late Shri Rajiv Gandhi and others was transferred to S.P.E.C.B.I, for further investigation which registered Crl.R.C.No.9/5/91 under Secs.302, 307 and 326, I.P.C. and Secs.3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent after the registration of this case in Crl.R.C.No.9/5/91, further investigation was done and when materials were available during the course of investigation attracting the provisions of Secs.3 to 5 of TADA Act the criminal court the inclusion of these offences for investigation. Further, the alteration of the F.I.R. is not a condition precedent particularly when the intimation to the concerned Court about the inclusion of the offences under Secs.3 to 5 of the TADA Act in the investigation was done in accordance with the law. 14. In view of the above discussion we have to hold on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the invocation of the TADA Act in the present case is legally sustainable and the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this writ petition. Therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, it is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.