JUDGMENT V.P. Bhatnagar, J.—This Election Petition has been filed by Dr. Rajan Sushant under the Representation of People Act, 19M (for short, the Act) challenging the election of respondent 1. Shri Sujan Singh Pathania to the Himachal Pradesh 36-Jawali Legislative Assembly constituency held on 27-2-1990. A declaration has been sought that the aforesaid election is void on the ground that corrupt practice has been committed by respondent 1. It has been further prayed that respondent 1 be also disqualified for a period of six years under sections 8 and 8-A of the Act and that a declaration be issued that the petitioner himself stands duly elected. 2. Pursuant to a number of preliminary objections raised by respondent 1, the following preliminary issues were framed on 8-10-1990 :— 1. Whether the Election Petition is liable to be dismissed on account of objections adverted to in Registrars orders dated 20-4-1990 and 12-6-1990 ? O. P. R. 1 2. Whether the Election Petition does not contain concise statement of material facts as provided under section 83 (1) (a) and the information stipulated in section 83 (1) (b) of the Representation of People Act ? If so, its effect O. P. R. I 3. Whether the averments made in the Election Petition do not constitute the grounds within the ambit of section 100 (I) and section 101 of the Representation of People Act ? If so, its effect. (X P. R- 1 4. Whether the affidavit filed in support of corrupt practices is not in accordance with law ? If so, its effect. O. P. R. 1 5. Whether the Election Petition and Annexures and Schedule attached thereto have not been signed and verified in accordance with law ? If so, its effect. O. P. R. 1 6. Whether the copy supplied to respondent i is not the true copy of the Election Petition ? If so, its effect. O. P. R. 1 The above issues except issues Nos. 2 and 3 were decided by this Court by its order, dated 15-1-1991. The decision on issues 2 and 3 was deferred in view of the following observations made in that order :— "It has been fairly conceded by Shri Indar Singh, learned Counsel for respondent 1, that some of the averments as made in the election petition fully meet the requirements of law, specially sections 100 (1) and 101 of the Act. The decision on issues 2 and 3 was deferred in view of the following observations made in that order :— "It has been fairly conceded by Shri Indar Singh, learned Counsel for respondent 1, that some of the averments as made in the election petition fully meet the requirements of law, specially sections 100 (1) and 101 of the Act. With respect to those averments, concise statement of material facts also stands given. However, there are other averments which do not fully meet the requirements of law. If so, it is manifest that the election petition in any case will have to be proceeded with and decided atleast keeping in view these averments which are complete. In other words, the election petition cannot be dismissed at the present stage of the proceedings. In view of the above position Shri Indar Singh, learned Counsel for respondent 1, has stated that he will have no objection in case the decision of issues 2 and 3 at the present stage of the proceedings is deferred but that partie heard and findings given in any case before recording of evidence on merits This would be necessary to cut short the evidence on averments which may not constitute corrupt practice as defined under the Act or which cannot be pressed into service for the reason that concise statement of material facts in relation thereto was not given at the proper time. It is obvious that such a decision would be required to be given only if respondent 1 does not succeed in having the election petition dismissed in limine as a result of the other objections. No exception can be taken to the above mode. The hearing of the parties on these issues and the decision are consequently deferred." As the decision against preliminary issues other than issues 2 and 3 did not entail the dismissal of the election petition and the petitioner complied with the operative part of the order, dated 15-1-1991 by amending the verification clause as also by way of filing a fresh affidavit in the prescribed form, the parties were heard in detail on issues 2 and 3. Both these issues are inter-connected and have to be disposed of together. Both these issues are inter-connected and have to be disposed of together. It is specially so because, at the time of hearing arguments, Shri M. L. Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, made a statement that he would not press for a declaration under section 101 of the Act to the effect that the petitioner has been duly elected. In other words, the relief sought by the petitioner has been confined to a declaration that the election of respondent 1 is void under section 100 (1) (b) of the Act. It is clear that the objection raised by respondent I and incorporated in the above-mentioned two issues is that the averments made in the election petition do not constitute the ground of corrupt practice as laid down in section 123 of the Act and that the election petition is liable to be dismissed as it does not contain concise statement of material facts as also material particulars within the ambit of section 83 (i) (a) and (b) of the Act. 3. The law with respect to the points incorporated :in issues 2 and 3 is well-settled. An election petition has to be dismissed as provided in section 86 (I) of the Act if the provisions of sections 81. 82 or 117 have not been complied with. What happens if other mandatory provisions such as those contained in section 83 (1) (a) and (b) are not followed ? There being no provision in the Act on this point, recourse has to be taken to section 87 and the procedure laid down in the Civil Code has to be looked into for adjudication of such controversies. The election petition thus becomes liable to be rejected under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure in case the finding returned is that it discloses do cause of action. 4. Section 83 (1) speaks of three requirements contained in Clauses (a), (b) and (c), only first two referred to Clauses (a) and (b) being relevant for this case- There is no manner of doubt that if concise statement of material facts is not given in the election petition, it is liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule II of the Code of Civil Procedure for disclosing no cause of action. An election petition would be deemed to disclose cause of action only if it contains such facts which if proved would result in allowing that election petition Such facts are material facts within the ambit of section 83 (1) (a) and, if established, the petitioner would be entitled to the relief claimed. As regards section 83 (I) (b), lacuna, if any, in furnishing material particulars can be removed by way of amendment but without raising new ground of challenge or adding a new corrupt practice. Reliance in the matter may be had from the law laid down in Balwant Singh v. Lakshmi Narain and others, AIR 1980 SC 770 ; Samant N. Balakrishna, etc. v. George Fernandez and others etc,, AIR 1969 SC 1201 ; Udhay Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, AIR 1976 SC 744; Azhar Hussain v Rajiv Gandhi, AIR 1986 SC 1253 and Lalit Kishore Chaturvedi v. Jagdish Prasad Thada and others, AIR 1990 SC 1731. 5. The specific averments made in the election petition may now be dealt with one by one to find out whether the provisions of section 83 (I) (a) and (b) of the Act have beea met. 6. The sum and substance of para 3 of the petition is that a specific allegation has been made applicable to all instance of corrupt practice contained in paras 4 to 21, that the acts committed by respondent 1, his election agent and other persons are with the consent of respondents 1 and/ or his election agent. Here, it may be stated that respondent I did not appoint any election agent and the averments to that extent are in the nature of surplusage. What requires to be noticed is that the consent of respondent 1 with respect to acts constituting corrupt practice has been specifically alleged with respect to all the instances which have been given, as stated above, in paras 4 to 21. 7. Para 4 (a) invokes bribery as described in section 123 (I) of the Act. It reads— “That on 2-2-1990 at village Dhameta the respondent No. 1 promised construction of a culvert on a nallah near the Sr. Secondary School situated in tae said village, in a meeting, at about 11 p. m. which was attended amongst others, by Sbn Rajinder Pal Dogra and Arvind Mahajan of village Dhameta. It reads— “That on 2-2-1990 at village Dhameta the respondent No. 1 promised construction of a culvert on a nallah near the Sr. Secondary School situated in tae said village, in a meeting, at about 11 p. m. which was attended amongst others, by Sbn Rajinder Pal Dogra and Arvind Mahajan of village Dhameta. The villagers present at the meeting were told by the respondent No. I on the said date that if they vote for him, he is ready and willing to bear the entire cost on construction of the said culvert. The said offer of the respondent No. 1 was willingly accepted by the villagers present and construction of the said culvert was started by the respondent No. 1 through his men on and from the following day Not only building materials have been provided by the respondent No. 1 but he has also borne the cost of construction also. This act of the respondent No I amounts to bribery and is a corrupt practice within the meaning of section 123 (i)(A) (b) (ii) of the Act. One of the essential ingredients of bribery is that the gift, offer or promise of any gratification should be with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing an elector to vote or refrain from voting. Learned Counsel for respondent 1 has urged that there is no specific allegation to the effect that any of the villagers present at the meeting was an elector or a voter and, therefore, the contents of para 4 (a), when read as a whole, do not constitute bribery and corrupt practice within the ambit of section 123 (1) of the Act. This argument appears to be devoid of any force since respondent 1 is alleged to have told the villagers that if they vote for him he would bear the entire cost of construction of the culvert in question. Votes could be sought only from the voters. Out of the villagers, two persons have also been specifically named The only other contention urged on behalf of respondent 1 for striking off para 4 (a) is that this incident is stated to have taken place on 2-2-1990 whereas the list of validly nominated candidates was prepared on 7-2-1990. Respondent 1 was, therefore, not a candidate, as defined in section 79 (b) of the Act, on 7-2-1990. Respondent 1 was, therefore, not a candidate, as defined in section 79 (b) of the Act, on 7-2-1990. It has been contended that any act done prior to 7-2-1990 cannot constitute corrupt practice at all by a candidate because respondent 1 was not then a candidate. This argument, in my opinion, also must be rejected. The reason is not far to seek. It cannot be denied that if a candidate offers gratification to another person not to stand at an election he would be guilty of having committed corrupt practice. Now, such an offer has to be made before the preparation of the list of validly nominated candidates and the person making such an offer would, strictly speaking, not be a candidate within the ambit of section 79 (b), 8. As a result, both objections raised on behalf of respondent I with respect to untenability of para 4 (a) are rejected. 9. In para 4 (b) respondent 1 is stated to have paid a sum of Rs. 2,000 as gift to the villagers of Lalwana in Gram Panchayat Khatiyar with the object of directly inducing the electors to vote for him Names of the villagers, however, have not been given. Shri M.L Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, conceded at the time of arguments that para 4 (b) may be struck off under the provisions of Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. As regards para 4 (c) respondent 1 is stated to have offered a cheque of Rs. 5,000 to the Pradhan and General Secretary of the Mahila Mandal Dhameta to induce them directly for voting in his favour and the objection raised is that there is no allegation that the said two persons were electors. The objection has to be rejected because an offer made with the request that they should vote for respondent 1 means that the persons to whom the offer was made were the voters. Moreover, such an offer can be made even to a person other than a voter with the object of inducing an elector to vote or refrain from voting. Para 4 (c), therefore, contains a concise statement of material facts and also has the requisite particulars thereby meeting the provisions of section 83 (1) (a) and (b). 11. Moreover, such an offer can be made even to a person other than a voter with the object of inducing an elector to vote or refrain from voting. Para 4 (c), therefore, contains a concise statement of material facts and also has the requisite particulars thereby meeting the provisions of section 83 (1) (a) and (b). 11. Coming to para 5, the allegations are "that the respondent, with a view to bolster up his chances at the forthcoming election, made an offer and/or promise of gratification to construct tubewells at various villages, namely, Maira, Bharmar, Takoli, Sunet, Hadwal, during public meetings held in the respective villages on various dates from 8-2-1990 to 25-2-1990, if they promise to vote for him and no one else at the election". Thereafter the names of various witnesses present in each village have been given. I am inclined to agree with the learned Counsel for respondent 1 that the allegations are of vague nature. Exact dates of various meetings have not been given Moreover there is no allegation that respondent I held out that he would construct the tubewells by spending money from his own pocket. The possibility that respondent 1 merely stated that he would persuade the Government in the construction of tubewells cannot be ruled out and a promise of public action is not a corrupt practice. The allegations contained in para 5, therefore, do not constitute sufficient cause of action It is, therefore, ordered that this para be struck off under the provisions of Order VI, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12. Para 6, according to the averments made, constitutes a threat within the ambit of section 123 (2) and, therefore, a corrupt practice inasmuch as one Giridhar Gopal is alleged to have threatened the petitioner that he would be shot dead in case there are any signs of respondent 1 losing in the election. Two objections have been raised about this para. First objection is that the threat is stated to have been held on 11-1-1990, that is, much before the date of filing the nominations. The second objection is that it has not been alleged that the threat was held out by Giridhar Gopal with the consent of respondent 1. Two objections have been raised about this para. First objection is that the threat is stated to have been held on 11-1-1990, that is, much before the date of filing the nominations. The second objection is that it has not been alleged that the threat was held out by Giridhar Gopal with the consent of respondent 1. Both these objections lack any basis because in para 3 of the election petition the consent of respondent 1 has been alleged with respect to all the instances given in paras 4 to 21. That the threat was held on 11-1-1990 is also no reason to strike off this para which is ordered to be retained. 13. The threat of massacre stated to have been held out by respondent I to the public at large in a meeting held on 8-2-1990 is totally vague and does not constitute interference with the electoral rights of any specific voters. Respondent 1 is stated to have incited his supporters to use violence etc. for ensuring his success but it is not mentioned as to in what manner the violence is to be shaped. Names of some witnesses are given but that is immaterial. The allegations, therefore, do not constitute undue influence and it cannot be said that the contents of para 7 give rise to a cause of action. It is, therefore, ordered to be struck off. 14. As regards para 8, there are specific allegations of threat of physical harm having been held out to the petitioner, although mere disruption of a meeting does not constitute corrupt practice and is merely an electoral offence. All the same, there are no grounds to delete para 8. 15. Para 8 (a) also cannot be struck for the same reason as given against para 8. 16. Towards the end of para 9 specific allegations have been made that threat of physical harm was given to the petitioner and supporters of respondent 1 wanted to incapacitate him. This para is also ordered to be retained. 17. The allegations in para 10 of the petition are in the nature of disrupting a public meeting. In view of the law laid down in Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh and others, AIR 1985 SC 89, disruption of a public meeting may constitute an electoral offence but is not a corrupt practice. 17. The allegations in para 10 of the petition are in the nature of disrupting a public meeting. In view of the law laid down in Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh and others, AIR 1985 SC 89, disruption of a public meeting may constitute an electoral offence but is not a corrupt practice. Para 1 (us, therefore, struck off under Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 18. The ground contained in para 1) was given up by learned Counsel for the petitioner and is, therefore, ordered to be deleted. 19. Para 12 (a) pertains to disrupting of an election meeting of the petitioner. It does not constitute corrupt practice as stated above Para 12 (b) was in fact not pressed by Shri M. L. Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, himself. Para 12 (a) and (b) are, therefore, ordered to be deleted. 20. Para 13 (a) was also not pressed by Shri M. L. Sharma and is, therefore, ordered to be deleted. 21. In para 13 (b) one Shri Prem Singh, Vice-President of the Bharatiya Janata Party, Jawali constituency, is stated to have been visited by some Congress (f) workers and abused and threatened with dire consequences if he did not stop canvassing for the petitioner. They even indulged in the act of throwing stones on his house. In this para it has not been alleged that Prem Singh was an elector. The allegations made do not furnish a cause of action so as to constitute corrupt practice. This sub-para is, therefore, ordered to be deleted. For similar reasons paras 13 (c) and (d) are also to be deleted. In fact sub-paras 13 (c) and 13 (d) were not pressed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner at all. 22. As regards para 14, the allegations are totally vague. No date and time of threat has been given. There is no averment that the threat was given to the candidate or any other person in whom the candidate or the elector was interested. Therefore, it discloses no cause of action. This para is as a result ordered to be deleted. 23. The perusal of para 15 brings out the allegations that respondent 1 created a belief or tried to create belief in the mind of the electors that they shall become an object of divine displeasure it they voted against him. Therefore, it discloses no cause of action. This para is as a result ordered to be deleted. 23. The perusal of para 15 brings out the allegations that respondent 1 created a belief or tried to create belief in the mind of the electors that they shall become an object of divine displeasure it they voted against him. There is no justification for striking off this para which is ordered to be retained. 24. Paras 16 and 16 (a) are ordered to be struck off because no hatred or enmity could possibly be created between different communities by the contents of pamphlet ‘A as alleged by the petitioner. Also, no specific act has been attributed to respondent 1. 25. The contents of para 17 are totally vague. It is not stated as to the place where the messages were conveyed or speeches delivered. The place, date and time of the message also have not been given. This para is, therefore, ordered to be deleted. 26. Para 18 basically pertains to preventing Shri Kewal Singh Pathania to enter village Hadwal and not allowing him to canvass for the petitioner. This does not constitute corrupt practice at all and is, therefore, ordered to be deleted. 27. Paras 19, 20 and 21 cannot but be ordered to be deleted for the reason that there is no allegation that the printed material was ever distributed. If not, it cannot constitute publication within the ambit of section 123 (4) of the Act. 28. As a result of the reasons given above issues 2 and 3 are partly decided in favour of respondent 1 and paras 4 (b), 5, 7, 10,11, 12 (a) and 12 (b), 13(a), (b), (c) and (d), 14 and 16 to 21 are ordered to be struck off under Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure and paras 4 (a) and (c), 6, 8, 8 (a), 9 and 15 to be retained as disclosing complete cause of action. The case be now listed on 4-6-1991 for framing of issues on merits. Order accordingly