JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal against the judgment of learned Additional Sessions Judge. Kishangarhwas, Distt. Alwar, dated 15-12-1988 whereby he convicted the accused appellant for offence under Section 376, IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of the payment of fine to further undergo one year's RI. 2. Briefly the facts giving rise to this appeal are that the accused was a Teacher in Government Primary School, Jhiwana. He was charged for committing rape on his own student Ku. Mithlesh aged 11-12 years in school premises on 30th April, 88 in the Noon at 1'O Clock. He, therefore, was tried for offence under Section 376 IPC. The learned Sessions Judge after thoroughly discussing the evidence came to this conclusion that case of the prosecution is established beyond all manners of reasonable doubt and it was none other than the accused who committed rape on Ku. Mithlesh aged about 11 to 12 years. Her statement was found to have been corroborated by the medical evidence available. He filed the appeal against his conviction and sentence. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant challenged the conviction of the accused on the ground that since the accused has not sustained any injury and there are no marks of violence, then it cannot, be said that it is a case of rape. His further submission is that her statement is not corroborated by the medical evidence to the effect that no injuries on the private parts of the accused have been detected. We are unable to be persuaded by the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, in as much as the circumstances in which girl had been found virtually senseless in the school premises by her relatives, coupled with her own statements and medical evidence a very strong convincing evidence is available on record. There is no warrant to arrive at a conclusion other than what the trial Court has arrived. We find no justification after going through the entire evidence to interfere with the findings of conviction recorded by the learned trial Court. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant then submitted that the sentence passed by the learned trial Court is excessive. There is no warrant to arrive at a conclusion other than what the trial Court has arrived. We find no justification after going through the entire evidence to interfere with the findings of conviction recorded by the learned trial Court. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant then submitted that the sentence passed by the learned trial Court is excessive. His submission is that learned trial Court has not considered various decisions of this Court and the Honb'le Supreme Court in properly construing the provisions of Section 235 (2) Cr.P.C. It is submitted that it is essential for the trial Court to give proper opportunity to the accused to lead the evidence on the question of sentence. If, that is not done, the same is violative of the provisions of Section 235 (2) Cr.P.C. 5. We have considered this aspect of the matter and are of the opinion that trial Court have not construed the provisions of Section 235 (2) Cr.P.C. in true perspective. Section 235 (2) Cr.P.C. reads as under:- "If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of Section 360, hear the accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to law." 6. The intention underlying this provision is that the Court punishing the accused must consider the question of sentence seriously, and all efforts should be made to see that all relevant facts and circumstances having a bearing on the question of sentence, are brought on the record, considered and reflected upon in the order passed, much less in the case or where accused is sought to be sentenced to imprisonment for life or capital punishment, the provision has to be construed more strictly. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Allauddin Mian and others, Sharif Mian and another v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1989 SC 1456 ) have observed as under:- "In our justice delivery system several difficult decisions are left to the presiding officers, sometimes, without providing the scales or the weights for the same. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Allauddin Mian and others, Sharif Mian and another v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1989 SC 1456 ) have observed as under:- "In our justice delivery system several difficult decisions are left to the presiding officers, sometimes, without providing the scales or the weights for the same. In cases of murder, however, since the choice is between capital punishment and life imprisonment, the legislature has provided a guide-line in the form of sub-section (3) of Section 354 of the Criminal P.C., 1973......" "When the law casts a duty on the Judge to state reasons, it follows that he is under a legal obligation to explain his choice of the sentence. It may seem trite to say so, but the existence of the `special reason clause' in the above provision implies that the court can, in fit cases, impose the extreme penalty of death which negatives the contention that there never can be a valid reason to visit an offender with the death penalty, no matter how cruel, gruesome or shocking the crime may be." "The requirement of hearing the accused is intended to satisfy the rule of natural justice. It is a fundamental requirement of fair play that the accused who was hitherto concentrating on the prosecution evidence on the question of guilt, should, on being found guilty, be asked if he has anything to say, or any evidence to tender on the question of sentence." 7. This is the reiteration of view their Lordships have been taking before also as in the opinion of the Court a sentencing decision has far more serious consequences of the offender and his family members, than in the case of a purely administrative decision, therefore, the principle of fair play must apply with greater vigour in the case of the former than the latter. Shri P.M. Bakshi, Member, Law Commission of India and Honorary Professor, Indian Law Institute, New Delhi, in his Sentencing and the Supreme Court published in the Journal of the Indian Law Institute, (Vol. Shri P.M. Bakshi, Member, Law Commission of India and Honorary Professor, Indian Law Institute, New Delhi, in his Sentencing and the Supreme Court published in the Journal of the Indian Law Institute, (Vol. 32 : 4) has summarised as under:- "It is suggested that as a general rule, the trial Court should, after recording the conviction, adjourn the matter to a future date and call upon both the prosecution and the defence to place the relevant material bearing on the question of sentence before it, and thereafter pronounce the sentence to be imposed on the offender. The judgment, if one may say so, with respect, should go a long way towards giving highly useful guidance, revealing a practical approach backed by adequate juristic thinking." 8. In this view of the matter we find that while passing order about sentence, the learned trial Court has followed the mandate of law more in breach than observance. We, therefore, deem it proper to remand this case to the trial Court while maintaining the conviction,to afford an opportunity to the party to lead evidence about the quantum of sentence and then decide the question afresh. 9. The appeal is, therefore, partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant is maintained but the sentence is set aside. The case is remanded to the trial Court with direction to decide the question of quantum of sentence afresh without any delay. The accused who is in jail shall be continued to be in judicial custody and will be produced before the trial Court on 2lst October, 1991. The record of this case shall be remitted to the trial Court forthwith. It will be open to the trial Court to obtain fresh bail bonds from the accused if he deems so proper, and pass proper order for his remand till then the bail bonds produced in this Court shall be operative. *******