Judgment :- This appeal has been preferred by the claimant, against the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Sub Court), Tiruvannamalai, in M.C.O.P.No.49 of 1984. 2. On 22.8.1984 at about 9.30 a.m. an accident took place between a bus TNM 6579 belonging to the 2nd respondent, driven by the 1st respondent and insured with the respondent and a cyclist, Ravi, who was proceeding from Vellore Road, near Periyar statue Tiruvannamalai. In that accident, the cyclist Ravi sustained injuries in his waist, chest stomach and died instantaneously. The appellant is the mother of deceased Ravi according to her, the accident, resulting in the death of Ravi, took place entirely owing rash and negligent driving of the bus TNM 6579 by its driver. The deceased, according appellant, was working under a private Doctor and was earning a salary of Rs.150 besides doing bead work at home, thereby earning another Rs.150 p.m., and was supporting the appellant out of his earnings. Claiming that as a result of the death of her son, Ravi, had lost the benefit of his earnings and support, the appellant prayed that compensation sum of Rs.-50,000 should be awarded to her. 3. In the counter filed by the owner of the vehicle, which was adopted by the driver, the and negligent driving of the bus was denied and it was stated that deceased Ravi drove cycle without regard to the rules of the road and attempted to cross the road and got involved in the accident, which had taken place only owing to the carelessness deceased. The income stated to have been earned by Ravi, was disputed and the amount of compensation claimed was characterised as excessive and exorbitant. The 3rd respondent-insurance company disputed that the vehicle involved in the accident, was insured with it and stated that deceased had driven the cycle negligently and carelessly and lost control and dashed against the side of the bus and that had caused the accident. The compensation claimed by the appellant was also stated to be excessive and exorbitant. 4. The 3rd respondent-insurance company disputed that the vehicle involved in the accident, was insured with it and stated that deceased had driven the cycle negligently and carelessly and lost control and dashed against the side of the bus and that had caused the accident. The compensation claimed by the appellant was also stated to be excessive and exorbitant. 4. Before the tribunal, on behalf of the appellant, Exs.A-1 to A-3 were marked and P.Ws.1 3 gave evidence, while, on behalf of the respondents, the 1st respondent was examined R.W.I. On a consideration of the oral as well as the documentary evidence the tribunal that the accident, resulting in the death of Ravi, was the outcome of the rash and negligent driving of the bus by its driver and the cycle by the cyclist, deceased Ravi and that negligence had to be apportioned at 50:50. Dealing with the compensation awardable appellant, the tribunal found that the annual contribution of deceased Ravi to the appellant could be determined at Rs.1,500 and taking into account the age of the appellant at the of the death of Ravi, it would be appropriate to adopt a multiplier of 25 and on that basis, compensation awardable to the appellant, was determined at Rs.34,500. Consistent with finding on negligence, the tribunal halved the amount of compensation determined passed an award in favour of the appellant for Rs.18,750 together with interest at 12% from the date of claim petition, against the driver, owner and the insurer of the bus as the insurer had not established that the vehicle involved in the accident was not covered by a policy issued by it. In this appeal, the appellant has prayed that the disallowed of the compensation should also be awarded. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that at the time of the accident, deceased Ravi was aged about 14 years and was a ‘Child’ within the meaning of The Children Act, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and such a person could not be properly held to contributed to the accident. Reliance in this connection was placed upon Sec.2(e) of the and the decision reported in Delhi Transport Corporation v. Kumari Lalitha, A.I.R. 1982 558: 1983A.C.J. 253. Reliance in this connection was placed upon Sec.2(e) of the and the decision reported in Delhi Transport Corporation v. Kumari Lalitha, A.I.R. 1982 558: 1983A.C.J. 253. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that though it may be that a distinction requires to be drawn between ‘children’ and when the question of negligence arise, if, on the evidence, it is established that the person involved in the accident, was of such age and understanding, as can reasonably be expected of him to take precautions for his safety, then, contributory negligence could be attributed and it is not an inflexible rule that children could never be held guilty of contributory negligence. Reference in this connection was made by learned counsel to the decision reported in E.Enjanadevi v. Arumugham, 1983A.C.J. 625. 6. Before proceeding to consider the aforesaid, submissions, it would be first necessary advert to the question whether deceased Ravi could at all be called a child. From Ex.A School certificate relating to Ravi, it is clearly established that on the date of the accident, was nearly 14 years of age. Presumably, on account of this, learned counsel for appellant was emboldened to rely upon the definition of ‘Child’ occurring in Sec.2(e) of Act. However, this definition would not be of any assistance, for, that had been enacted the purposes of the Act, the object of which, is to provide for the care, protection, maintenance, welfare, training, education and rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent children. The expressions ‘delinquent child’ and ‘neglected child’ have been defined under Secs.2(j) and 2(1) of the Act. From this, it is clear that the definition of a ‘delinquent child’ and a ‘neglected child’ occurring in the Act, have been enacted for purpose of giving effect to the provisions of that act, pro viding for the education rehabilitation, among others, of neglected or delinquent children, as defined in that Act. Having regard to the purpose for which the Act had been enacted, the definition therein, with reference to a ‘child’, cannot be pressed into service, to claim that the deceased in case was a ‘child’ and could not, therefore, be held to have contributed to the accident by own negligence. It would be appropriate at this stage to refer to Win field and Jolowicz Law of Tort (10th Edition, page 111). It would be appropriate at this stage to refer to Win field and Jolowicz Law of Tort (10th Edition, page 111). It has been stated that there is no age below which, a matter of law, it can be said that a child cannot be guilty of contributory negligence. Salmos and Heuston on The Law of Torts, 18th Edition, page 488, it has been pointed that in cases, where contributory negligence is alleged against a child, it is the duty of trial Judge to rule, in each particular case, whether the plaintiff, having regard to his mental development, may properly be exacted to take some precautions for his own and consequently be capable of being guilty of contributory negligence and that would question of fact to be determined on evidence, whether he had fallen short of the which might reasonably be expected from him, having regard to his age and development. The position has been summarised in Clerk & Elndsell on Torts, The Common Law Number 3 Fifteenth Edition, page 577, by stating that in considering whether a taken reasonable care for its own safety, regard must be had to its age, the circumstances of the case and the knowledge of the particular child of the perils to which the defendant negligence has exposed him and there is no age, below which, as a matter of law, said that a child cannot be guilty of contributory negligence. It would thus appear merely on the basis of age, a conclusion regarding the contributory negligence, cannot arrived at, but that would depend upon the facts, circumstances and the evidence available. 7. In this case, regarding the manner in which the accident took place, there is the of P.W.3 stated to be an eye witness to the accident and the driver of the bus, R.W.I. evidence P.W.3 stated that, on the date of accident at about 9.30 or 10 O ’ clock, come to put his mother on the bus to Gingee and was standing near Periyar statue that time, the bus belonging to the 2nd respondent, came driven very fast from east west without sounding the horn and he heard a noise and ran and found that caught in the rear wheel of the bus and the cycle was lying by his side. In examination, P.W.3 admitted that he did not remember, in which bus he put his mother that the accident took place to the east of the periyar statue. A suggestion’ that he witness the accident, was denied by him. In his further cross examination, he admitted only after hearing the noise, he turned and saw and that the noise came from east place, where he was standing and that he could not say whether the boy went against the bus and was caught under the wheel, or, the bus came and dashed against boy. R.W.1 is the driver of the bus and in his evidence, he stated that the accident place to the right side of the Periyar statue at the road junction. His further evidence the effect that he stopped the bus, in order to enable the passengers waiting at the to board the bus and started it after the conductor gave whistle and at that time, dashed against the right side rear wheel of the bus and fell down and he stopped and got down and then gave the complaint to the police. R.W.1 also stated further traffic was heavy and that he parked the bus to the left side of the road and when was about to move, the boy came and his and the wheel had not even completed revolution. In the cross examination, R.W.I deposed that the accident took place about 22 feet away from the statue on the right side and that he did not drive the bus speed and without sounding the horn. R.W.I also stated that no case was registered him and the accident was not due to his rashness or negligence. The claimant, examined P.W.I, stated in her evidence, that her son had studied upto the VI Standard employed under the Doctor, P.W.2, who had provided him with a cycle and that she know whether her son dashed against the rear wheel and her evidence is, therefore, very helpful at all. It would be necessary to refer to the evidence of the employer deceased Ravi, examined as P.W.2. He stated that the deceased had been employed him for about 4 or 5 months prior to his death and the cycle involved in the accident, his. It would be necessary to refer to the evidence of the employer deceased Ravi, examined as P.W.2. He stated that the deceased had been employed him for about 4 or 5 months prior to his death and the cycle involved in the accident, his. From the evidence, referred to above, it is seen that deceased Ravi had studied standard and was aged about 14 years at the time of the accident and had been cycle of P.W.2 at atleast for 4 or 5 months prior to the accident. P.W.3 had clearly in his evidence that he cannot say whether the bus hit the cyclist or the cyclist hit and even according to his version, he turned and saw only after hearing the noise eastern side. The testimony of P.W.3 had not been believed by the tribunal for two viz., (1) the improbability of P.W.3 standing near the Periyar statue for the purpose putting his mother on a bus for Ginges and (2) the hearing of the noise by P.W.3 having turned and seen thereafter. In so far as the first reason is concerned, the was not quite right, for, it is the evidence of R.W.1 that the bus was stopped to enable passengers waiting on the left side of the road to board it and that was near the statue. However, in so far as the second respondent is concerned, the tribunal was quite right in concluding that P.W.3 not have actually witnessed the accident, for, even, according to his version, he actually see the accident taking place, but only after “ hearing the noise, he turned follows that by the time P.W.3 heard the noise from the eastern side and turned the accident had happened and in that sense, P.W.3 could not have seen the happen so as to speak to the manner in which the accident took place. The evidence would also show that the bus had not moved very far after picking up the passengers had just started to move and at that time, the cyclist came on the rear and hit against bus and that that area was subjected to heavy traffic. The evidence would also show that the bus had not moved very far after picking up the passengers had just started to move and at that time, the cyclist came on the rear and hit against bus and that that area was subjected to heavy traffic. Though P.W.3 might not have witnessed the accident and R.W.1 had also not seen the accident, for, the cyclist, to him, came from the rear and hit against the right side of the bus the indisputable that the accident had taken place and the cyclist had lost his life instantaneously. evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 referred to earlier, would show that the deceased had provided with a cycle by P.W.2 and considering the age of the deceased and the experience gained by him in driving a cycle, particularly, in that locality of heavy traffic, it follows the accident could not have taken place, if the deceased had taken every care and precaution to observe the normal speed as well as the rules of the road, while driving the Likewise, R.W.1, while starting the stationary bus and moving on the main road, also have taken care to see that there was no vehicle coming near the bus to its right obvious that R.W.1 also failed to observe care and caution and that had led to the accident. 8. It would be appropriate in this connection to refer to some decisions, which have a on this question. In Srinivasan v. Parasivamurthy, A.I.R. 1976 Karn. 92, the question whether a boy of six, injured in an accident, could be guilty of contributory negligence. the evidence, it was found that when the boy was standing just near a fact-path, the of the lorry struck the boy and that constituted a clear case of rash and negligent driving the part of the owner of the vehicle. That decision cannot, therefore, be taken as laying that merely because in that case the injured boy was six years old, contributory negligence cannot be attributed to him. In Govinda Prasad v. Sujit Chowmick, A.I.R. 1978 Cal. school going student of about 14 years of age, was found, on the evidence, contributed to the accident and the negligence was apportioned between the student conductor of the bus in the ratio of 1:2. In Govinda Prasad v. Sujit Chowmick, A.I.R. 1978 Cal. school going student of about 14 years of age, was found, on the evidence, contributed to the accident and the negligence was apportioned between the student conductor of the bus in the ratio of 1:2. In that case also it was found that the body, 14years, tried to board the bus and just caught hold of the handle of the front door, the conductor gave the bell and the bus started moving, resulting in the boy losing and falling down and the rear wheel of the bus running over his right leg. In view evidence, the Calcutta High Court held, agreeing with the tribunal, that it was due negligence of the conductor of the bus and also the contributory negligence of the boy, the accident had happened and the fixation of the proportion, was also quite This case clearly illustrates that merely on the basis of age, it cannot be held contributory negligence should be ruled out. In A.R.Gandhi v. A.K.Diwan, A.I.R. 1979 14, after referring to some English decisions the resulting position was summarized 20 thus: ” A distinction must be necessarily drawn between children and adults when the question contributory negligence arises, for, a child cannot be expected to be as careful for safety as an adult. Where a child is of such an age as to be unable to fend for himself be naturally ignorant of danger, or where in doing an act which contributed to the he was only following the instincts natural to his age and the circumstances, he is not of contributory negligence. A child should be found guilty of contributory negligence is established as a matter of fact on the evidence on record that he is of such an understanding as reasonably to be expected to take precautions for his own safety blame for the accident could be necessarily attached to him. In cases of road accidents, must be borne in mind that a child is not possessed of the road sense or the experience elders. In cases of road accidents, must be borne in mind that a child is not possessed of the road sense or the experience elders. Even if it transpires that he was taught road discipline either at home or at school that, therefore, if he had bestowed some thought, he would have realized that it was to take reasonable care for his own safety, still a normal child would not be held culpable view of his propensity to forget altogether what has been taught to him if something else is uppermost in his mind. A normal child is always momentarily forgetful of the perils of crossing and walking on a regretfully though, and under such circumstances, if he failed to notice even an on coming vehicle and got hurt by it, he cannot be held guilty of contributory negligence. In such case, the question of the duty of the driver of the vehicle must be examined with greatest precision and unless the driver is in a position to show on establishment of primary facts he was driving the vehicle in such a manner that he could have brought it to a standstill case of emergency and that the accident was inevitable or unavoidable, the inference of negligence and his alone must be raised almost as a matter of course." After observing as above, the court proceeded to consider the evidence relating to manner in which the accident took place and it was found that having regard to the nature the vehicle, which was involved in the accident, and the fact that it came from behind without even sounding the horn and hit the boy, that was not a case, in which, such a can be expected to be careful for his own safety and the only inference that could be drawn was that the negligence was that of the driver of the vehicle alone. It is thus seen ultimately, the question depends upon the appreciation of evidence relating to the manner, which the accident took place and whether the victim and the driver of the vehicle, on part, had taken every reasonable precaution in the matter of driving the vehicles and observing the rules of the road and even if it is found, on the evidence, the victim boy not taken every precaution reasonably expected of him, then, there is nothing to preclude the court from holding that he had also contributed to the accident by his own negligence the decision reported in Delhi Transport Corporation v. Kumari Lalitha, A.I.R. 1982 Del. 1983A.CJ. 253, strongly relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant, a girl of 8 years, was found by the tribunal to have contributed 20% to the accident, which was, on appeal vacated by a learned single Judge. On further Letters Patent Appeal, the question whether the girl of 8 years, could at all be blamed for the accident, on the ground of contributory negligence, it was pointed out that in considering whether a child had taken reasonable for its own safety, regard must be had to the age of the child, the circumstances of the and the knowledge of the particular child of perils to which the defendant’s negligence exposed her and that there is no age, below which, as a matter of law, it can be said that child cannot be guilty of contributory negligence. The decision further proceeded to agree with the conclusion arrived at by the single Judge on an analysis of the evidence that eight year old girl was not at all to be blamed for the accident on the ground of contributory negligence. It is also further significant that the girl could not have contributed to accident, had also been concluded as found in para 10 of that judgment. Thus, the aforesaid decision does not in any manner support the very broad proposition put forward by learned counsel for the appellant that deceased Ravi, who was aged 14 years at the time of accident, could not at all have contributed to the accident, It now remains to consider only decision relied on by learned counsel for the respondents, reported in E.Enjanadevi Arumugham, 1983 A.C.J. 625. In that case, a boy aged about 12years,was travelling on carrier of a cycle, when he was knocked down from behind and run over. In the course of claim proceedings, one of the questions, which arose, was regarding the rash and negligent driving of cycle and the tribunal recorded a finding that though the driver of the car, rash and negligent in driving the vehicle, the accident was also owing to the contributory negligence on the part of the deceased and in that view, the negligence was apportioned 70: 30 between the driver of the car and the cyclist. In considering the propriety of fixation of the proportion of the negligence and the liability for payment of compensation, was pointed out on a consideration of the evidence that the cyclist was also negligent the tribunal was right in the view it took that the car driver and the cyclist should be for the accident, which could be apportioned at 70: 30. This case also illustrates that of the victim cannot be the sole or exclusive guide to determine the question of contributory negligence in relation to an accident. In the light of the principles laid down in the decisions and considering the available evidence regarding the manner, in accident took place, the tribunal cannot be stated to have committed any error that the rash and negligent driving of the cyclist Ravi and that of the bus by its driver, had caused the accident and that negligence has to be apportioned at 50:50. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant next contended that the tribunal had fixed the amount of compensation awardable to the appellant at a low and meagre amount. Referring evidence of P.Ws.l and 2, learned counsel submitted that deceased Ravi was earning not than Rs.300 every month and considering his age at the time of his death and also the of the claimant, it would be just, proper and fair that compensation, as claimed by appellant, should be awarded to her. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the tribunal was justified in awarding to the appellant a sum of Rs.18750 the basis that the annual contribution of the deceased to the appellant could be determined at Rs.1500 and that too for 25 years and that the award does not deserve to be disturbed. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the tribunal was justified in awarding to the appellant a sum of Rs.18750 the basis that the annual contribution of the deceased to the appellant could be determined at Rs.1500 and that too for 25 years and that the award does not deserve to be disturbed. 10. Though deceased Ravi was aged about 14 years at the time of his death, it is seen the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 that he had been earning. According to P.W.I, the deceased had two sources of income, viz., earning from his employment under P.W.2 and by beedies in leisure time. P.W.I stated that he was earning about Rs.300 in all. In examination, P.W.I was not able to give the name of the person, under whom, deceased Ravi was stated to have been rolling beedies. A suggested that deceased Ravi did not anything at all by rolling beedies, was denied by P.W.1. P.W.2 is a Homeopathic under whom, the deceased was employed and according to him, the deceased was working under him for about 4 or 5 months between 8 a.m. and 12.30 p.m. and 4.00 p.m. to p.m. and that he had paid him Rs.150 p.m. towards salary. In cross-examination P.W.2 denied the suggestion that he did not pay to deceased Ravi Rs.150 p.m. by way of Indeed, nothing has been elicited from P.W.2 to discredit his testimony that he was to the deceased Rs.150 p.m. In so far as the earnings of deceased Ravi from rolling beedies are concerned, though P.W.I was not in a position to name the person, under the deceased was stated to have been rolling beedies, such earnings by the deceased not improbable or unacceptable, particularly, having regard to the availability of leisure for the deceased before 8 a.m. and between 12.30 and 4 p.m. and after 8.30 p.m. there is no evidence to establish that deceased Ravi was earning Rs.150 p.m. by beedies, yet, having regard to the time that was available at his disposal, it is quite probable that part of it was devoted to the rolling of beedies and in that process, the deceased have earned at least Rs.2.50 per day or Rs.75 p.m. in addition to the salary he was receiving from P.W.2. In other words, the total monthly earnings of the deceased could be fixed Rs.225 and deducting one third, out of this, towards his personal expenses, the monthly contribution of the deceased ‘to the appellant could be fairly, justly and reasonably be at Rs.150 or the annual contribution at Rs.1,800. At the time of the death of Ravi, appellant was aged about 35 years, and at best, the appellant could have expected deceased son to have supported her for the next 25 years or at any rate upto her 60th In other words, the multiplier to be adopted in this case could be fixed at 25 and the contribution to the appellant owing to the sudden death of her son Ravi in the could be fixed at Rs.45,000. In view of the finding on the question of negligence, the payable to the appellant by way of compensation could be only one half of this amount, Rs22,500. In other words, the appellant would be entitled to recover from the respondents, compensation in a sum of Rs.22,500 together with interest at 12% p.a. on that amount 15.10.1984 till date of payment, credit being given to payments, if any, made meanwhile. The civil miscellaneous appeal is allowed in part, to the extent indicated and the award the tribunal will stand modified accordingly. There will be no order as to costs in this Appeal allowed in part.