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1991 DIGILAW 788 (MAD)

G. RAMA RAJA v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE, ANNA DISTRICT, MADURAI

1991-10-22

PRATAP SINGH

body1991
Judgment : PRATAP SINGH, J. ( 1 ) THE accused in C. C. No. 264 of 1987 to C. C. No. 268 of 1987 on the file of Special Judicial First Class Magistrate (C. C. I. W.) Madurai, has filed these petitions under Section 482, Crl. P. C. , praying to call for the records in the aforesaid cases and quash the same. ( 2 ) IN C. C. No. 264 of 1987, the respondent has filed the charge-sheet against the petitioner. The allegations in it are briefly as follows : The, accused was the President of Palani Municipality and Private Teachers and Employees Thrift and Credit Society. He was the custodian of the cash and properties of the society: O n 27-8-1983 he did not produce the cash balance of Rs. 16,768. 14 found in the account to. the enquiry officer. He had misappropriated the said amount. Hence he is liable to be punished for offence, under Section 309, I. P. C. In C. C. No. 265 of 1987, the. respondent has filed the charge-sheet against the petitioner for offence under Section 409, I, P, C. , on the allegations that he was, the President of the, aforesaid Society and was custodian of the cash and property of the society and between 14-10-1982 and 12-12-1982 had committed misappropriation to the tune of Rs. 29,012. 34. In C. C. No. 266 of 1987, the respondent has filed charger-sheet against the petitioner for offence under, Section 409, i. P, C. on the allegations that he was the President of the said society and custodian of the cash and properties of the society and that on 14-11-1982, he drew a cheque for Rs. 15,000 to himself and with draw the money and mis-appropriated the said amount and hence he is liable to be punished for offence under Section 409, I. P. C. In C. C. No. 267 of 1987, the respondent has filed the charge-sheet against the petitioner on the allegation that he is the President of the Society and custodian as stated above. In between 28-7. 1882 and 8-11-1982, the accused committed misappropriation of Rs. 1,756. In between 28-7. 1882 and 8-11-1982, the accused committed misappropriation of Rs. 1,756. 15 and hence is liable to be punished under Section 409, I. P. C. In C. G. No. 268 of 1987, the respondent has filed the charge-sheet against the petitioner alleging that he is the President of the said society and custodian as: stated above, that on 29-10-1982, he had collected Rs. 10,093. 07 from members of the Society and without bringing it to the account of the Society, had committed misappropriation of the, said amount and hence is liable to be punished under Section 409, I. P. C. ( 3 ) MR. Hajee P. K. Jamal Mohammed, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner raised some points in his arguments and I shall deal with tbem one by one. Firstly it was argued that the petitioner is not a public servant" within the meaning of Section 21 of I. P. C. and hence on the allegations made in the charge-sheet, he cannot be made liable for offence under Section 409, I. P. C. but only under Section 406, I. P. C. for which the period of limitation is three years from the date of offence and three, years have passed in all the cases and so the proceedings in all the cases are barred by time and are liable to be quashed. The learned Government advocate would counter this argument by stating that petitioner is a "public servant" or alternatively he is an "agent" in as much as the petitioner happened to be the President who is the custodian of the cash and property of the society and he is as well the Treasurer of the Society, as per the by-laws, ( 4 ) TO appreciate the rival contentions, Section 409, I. P. C. needls extraction. It reads as follows :"409; Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent : Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or any dominion over property in his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. "the relevant allegations in the charge-sheets and the relevant by-laws also need extraction to consider this point. In C. C. No. 264 of 1987, the charge-sheet reads as follows :"the accused was the President of MD 27 Palani Municipality and private Teachers and Employees Thrift and Credit Society. He was the custodian of the cash and property of the Society. . . . . In the petition, in para 15, By-law 27 (4) has been extracted which reads as follows :"subject to such resolutions as the Board of Directors may pass from time to time, the several officers of the Society shall have the powers mentioned below : (q) the President shall have the General Control over all affairs of the society and shall be the Treasurer and shall have the custody of the property of the society, including cash. "[emphasis supplied] in the complaint of the Deputy Registrar to the Superintendent of Police, dated 19-2-1985, By-law 22 (B) is referred as per which the President of the society is responsible for the cash of the Society, In Veerappan v. State, 1984 l. W. (Cri.) 67, on identical facts, this court has held that in such circumstances, the president of the Society is liable to be proceeded with for offence under Section 409, I. P. C. In that case, Veerappan was the President of Kuruvikarambai village Agricultural Credit Society. He was convicted by the Sub Divisional Magistrate Mannargudi under Section 409, I. P. C. in that the accused committed criminal breach of trust by misappropriating Rs. 1,06,595 on 9-8-1987 without distributing the said amount to the members of the Society. On appeal, the learned Sessions Judge, altered the conviction from Section 409, i. P. C. into one under Section 406 I. P. C. The state filed an appeal contending that the order altering the charge from Section 409, I. P. C. to 406, I. P. C, was illegal. In that case, also, as per by-law 27, the accused was the president of the society and custodian of all the properties of the society including cash and he has made responsible for the same. There was no Treasurer for the society. In that case, also, as per by-law 27, the accused was the president of the society and custodian of all the properties of the society including cash and he has made responsible for the same. There was no Treasurer for the society. In the above case, Justice Singaravelu has held that under the definition of the term "public servant", Clause 12 of Section 21, I. P. C. , the petitioner will come since it includes every person in the service or pay of a local authority. The learned Judge also has, pointed out that the accused was president of the Credit Society entrused with property and also dominion over the property in the way of his business as an "agent" and he was specially empowered to transact business including cash and under the bylaws of the society and the resultant position is that petitioner is an agent, entrusted with dominion over the property. Being an "agent", in case of criminal breach of trust, he is liable to be punished under Section 409, I. P. C, the portions which I have extracted above would show that petitioner is placed on exactly similar position. So he comes within the category of "agent" which would bring him within the fold of Section 409, I. P. C. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner would rely upon S. S. Dhanoa v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 1395 , in which the apex court has held that the definition of "public servant" in Section 21, Clause 12 of i. P. C. does not induce civil servants working on deputation with cooperative society and hence sanction under Section 107 of the Act is not necessary for his prosecution. This ruling of the Supreme Court has been referred to in Veerappan v. State, 1984 L. W, (Crl.) 67,referred to supra. On facts, I have held that petitioner herein will be an "agent" and so he comes within Section 409, I. P. C. 1 or offence under Section 409. I. P. C. the sentence of imprisonment would extend to ten years. While so, the question of limitation would not at all arise and I am clear that none of the charge-sheets suffers from the bar of limitation. I. P. C. the sentence of imprisonment would extend to ten years. While so, the question of limitation would not at all arise and I am clear that none of the charge-sheets suffers from the bar of limitation. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that the Deputy Registrar is no: an aggrieved party and so the date of his report under Section 64 of the Act viz, 23-8-1984 cannot be taken as the date from which the period of limitation is to be computed and in support of his contention, he relied upon the ruling reported in Sulochana v. State Registrar of Chits Madras, 1978 Cri. LJ 116, in which it was held that the complaint preferred by the Registrar in discharge of his official duty is different in character and nature from the complaints preferred by person aggrieved by the commission of the offence that the former is not to be confused with the latter and the latter alone is a relevant one while considering the question of limitation. In the case before me, in view of what I have held that offence will fall under Section 409, I. P C. , this question does not arise for consideration and I do not consider it. In the same ruling, this Court has held that the power to condone delay can be exercised even after taking cognizance of the offence beyond the period of limitation and that condonation of delay is not a pre-condition to taking cognizance of the offence after limitation. It was also held that power under Section 473 is an overriding power and is not limited to time factor of condonation. So even assuming that at the time of taking cognizance of the offences by the trial Magistrate, there was any bar of limitation that can be condoned even after taking cognizance of the offence and the initial cognizance is not vitiated. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would further contend that Section 106 of Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 provides that every offence under the said Act shall be deemed to be non-cognizable and no prosecution shall be prosecuted without the previous sanction of the registrar and that no previous sanction of the Registrar was obtained in this case and no permission was obtained under Section 155 (2), Crl. P. C. for investigating a non-cognizable case and hence the entire investigation is vitiated. The offence alleged in all the cases is under Section 409, I. P. C. In respect of an offence under the Co-operative Societies Act, the requirements -of Section 106 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, is necessary and not for an offence under Section 109, I. P. C. So I am unable to accept this contention. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the charges are only under Section 409, I. P. C. and it is triable by ordinary court having local jurisdiction and Special Judicial Magistrate cannot take cognizance of the offence. From the records I find that charge-sheet was originally filed before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dindigul and later it was transferred to the Court of Judicial Magistrate (C. C. I. W.), Madurai, So cognizance was first taken only by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dindigul. May be there is any administrative order for transfer to the other Magistrate. So this contention is not available. ( 9 ) IN view of the above, all the petitions fail and are dismissed. Petition dismissed.