Judgment :- JANARTHANAM J. This appeal arises out of an order dated February 10, 1982, by a learned single judge in Application No. 1718 of 1981 in C. S. No. 83 of 1965 on the file of this court C. S. No. 83 of 1965 was one in a partition action of the estate of late Chidambaram Chettiar. Out of seven heirs, one of the heirs, namely, Meenakshi Achi, figuring as plaintiff, brought the said partition action, impleading the rest of the heirs as defendants Nos. 1 to 6. By consent, a preliminary decree had been passed declaring the entitlement of one-seventh share in the said estate to each of them. The estate was burdened with the obligations of meeting the pressing demands of huge arrears of income-tax, wealth-tax, urban land tax, property tax and what not. In order to relieve the pressure on the estate, this court, on April 26, 1977, directed an Advocate-Commissioner to sell two items of immovable properties belonging to the estate, namely, house, ground and premises bearing Nos. 5, 5-A and 5-B, Williams Road, Tiruchirapalli, and a vacant site, known as Kallukuzhi, Tiruchirapalli. Pursuant to the said orders, the Commissioner invited tenders for the purchase of the said items of the properties. He filed a report in the court stating that he received two tenders, one from Muthulakshmi Achi and the other from one Mohammed Ibrahim. Muthulakshmi Achi offered Rs. 3, 85, 000 for the house and 60 paise per square foot for the vacant site. The said Mohammed Ibrahim offered Rs. 3, 90, 000 for the house alone and he was not willing to purchase the vacant site on account of certain technical difficulties arising out of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 (for short "the Act"). Accepting the offer of the said Muthulakshmi Achi on June 28, 1978, the Advocate-Commissioner was directed to sell the house and the vacant site to her, granting her two months' time to deposit the sale price. The Commissioner also took steps to get clearance from the Urban Land Ceiling authorities ; but the efforts so taken ended in dismal failureMeanwhile, one of the heirs, PL. CT. SP. Subramanian; Chettiar (first defendant) was adjudicated insolvent on August 12, 1977 in I. P. No. 75 of 1975 and all his assets and other effects vested in the official assignee. CT. SP. Subramanian; Chettiar (first defendant) was adjudicated insolvent on August 12, 1977 in I. P. No. 75 of 1975 and all his assets and other effects vested in the official assignee. On November 14, 1980, the said order of adjudication was annulled and all his assets and effects were revested in him. He filed Application No. 1718 of 1981 to modify the order passed by this court on June 28, 1978, and direct the Commissioner to divide the house and the vacant site by metes and bounds into seven specific parts and allot one such part to him. He also took out Application No. 1719 of 1981 for stay of issuance of the sale certificate in favour of Muthulakshmi Achi, her nominee or nominees, as per the memo of the Commissioner dated April 7, 1981, pending disposal of the main application. The said Muthulakshmi Achi who is a third party filed Application No. 1936 of 1981 to implead her as a party in Application No. 1718 of 1981. She was ordered to be impleaded as an additional respondent in the said application. Respective learned counsel appearing for Subramanian Chettiar (first defendant/applicant) and Meenakshi Achi (plaintiff/first respondent) raised various grounds before the learned single judge, in support of the relief prayed for in Application No. 1718 of 1981 and they are as follows: (1) Muthulakshmi Achi did not at all deposit the sale consideration as directed in the order dated June 28, 1978, and, consequently, she is not entitled to enforce the same (2) It is the duty of the court to see that, in such matters, the best price is obtained for the estate and since the applicant/first defendant is now prepared to pay Rs. 10 lakhs for the house alone, his offer should be accepted, in preference to the price of Rs. 3, 85, 000 originally offered by Muthulakshmi Achi, which was grossly inadequate and detrimental to the estate(3) Since Muthulakshmi Achi is prepared only to purchase the house for Rs. 3, 85, 000 and not the vacant site, on account of the bar, if any, that might affect the sale by virtue of the provisions of the Act, the sale should not be confirmed in her favour, by issuance of the sale certificate, as respects the house. 3, 85, 000 and not the vacant site, on account of the bar, if any, that might affect the sale by virtue of the provisions of the Act, the sale should not be confirmed in her favour, by issuance of the sale certificate, as respects the house. (4) On the date when the direction was issued to the Commissioner for the sale of the said two items of properties in favour of Muthulakshmi Achi, the applicant/first defendant had been declared as an insolvent and the order so passed, without impleading the official assignee, as a party, is bad in law. Learned counsel appearing for Muthulakshmi Achi (respondent No. 8) would repel the submissions as raised above and state as follows: The valid and conclusive acceptance of the offer of Muthulakshmi Achi to purchase the house and the vacant site cannot at all be later rescinded and Muthulakshmi Achi is even now prepared to deposit in court the entirety of the amount of Rs. 4, 50, 000 and take the sale certificate, without even insisting on the clearance certificate from the Urban Land Ceiling authorities. Learned single judge had given anxious consideration to the rival submissions as above and ultimately held that there was no warrant for any modification of the order dated June 28, 1978, and consequently dismissed Application No. 1718 of 1981, giving rise to the present action by the first defendant. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant, leaving aside the tenability or otherwise of the reasons adverted to by the learned single judge for the dismissal of the application, would, however, submit that the impugned order of dismissal, culminating in the issuance of the sale certificate in favour of Muthulakshmi Achi, on her depositing the entirety of the sum, is not at all sustainable in law, inasmuch as there are no provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, "the Code") for effecting such sale and issuance of a sale certificate through the court, especially when such sale tantamounts to causing flagrant violation of the sanguine provisions of the Act. In amplification of this argument, he would further submit that though this was not raised as a ground in the grounds of appeal, yet it cannot be stated that such a ground revolving on a pure question of law cannot at all be raised for the first time during the course of argumentsHe would, however, reinforce and reiterate the submission, as raised by him before the learned single judge revolving on the question of non-impleading the official assignee and state thus. Though the appellant/first defendant had been represented by his effective participation in the proceedings at the time when there was direction issued to the Commissioner for the sale of the said two items of properties, yet it could not be said that, at the time when the order dated June 28, 1978, had been passed, he was duly represented, inasmuch as, on that date, the order adjudicating him as an insolvent was in force, vesting his estate in the official assignee who was not impleaded as party representing his estate and, therefore, the order so passed, in his (official assignee's) absence, could not be said to be valid in law, the rudimentary principle of natural justice having been violated in passing an order behind the back of the person affected by the order. He would also make an incidental submission that though Muthulakshmi Achi wears the look of a third party bona fide purchaser, yet, on the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot at all be ruled out of consideration that an assiduous attempt had been made to secret the fact of her being the wife of the third defendant and this startling and puzzling circumstance of suppression of vital facts has, on the grounds of equity, to be construed as an insurmountable obstacle in affixing the seal of approval to the sale in her favour and the issuance of the requisite sale certificate therefor. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents would strenuously repel such submissions. We will now delve deep and give our anxious consideration to the rival submissions of either counsel, in the light of the provisions contained in the Code and the ActThere are certain specific provisions in the Code as respects the sale of movable and immovable properties. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents would strenuously repel such submissions. We will now delve deep and give our anxious consideration to the rival submissions of either counsel, in the light of the provisions contained in the Code and the ActThere are certain specific provisions in the Code as respects the sale of movable and immovable properties. Order 39, rule 6, invests the power to the court to order interim sale of movable property and the said rule reads as follows: "The court may, on the application of any party to a suit, order the sale, by any person named in such order, and in such manner and on such terms as it thinks fit, of any movable property, being the subject-matter of such suit, or attached before judgment in such suit, which is subject to speedy and natural decay, or which for any other just and sufficient cause it may be desirable to have sold at once." * There are also other provisions regarding the sale of movable property found traceable to Order 21, rules 74 to 81, and the details of those provisions need not at all be elaborated here for the purpose of the instant case. The sale of immovable property, in execution of the decree is legally permissible and to this effect, there is a provision under Order 21, rule 82, which prescribes. "Sales of immovable property in execution of decrees may be ordered by any court other than a court of small causes." * Order 21, rules 83 to 96, prescribe the procedure to be followed in such sales. Barring these provisions, there is no other provision, except the provision, as adumbrated in section 151 of the. Code, dealing with the inherent powers of the court. Section 151 does not confer a new power in the court, but makes statutory recognition of the inherent power of the court to do certain things ex debito justitiae. Such a power is not to be exercised casually and, if at all, is to be exercised with circumspection and not to violate any rule of law or equity. Section 151 does not confer a new power in the court, but makes statutory recognition of the inherent power of the court to do certain things ex debito justitiae. Such a power is not to be exercised casually and, if at all, is to be exercised with circumspection and not to violate any rule of law or equity. There can be no justification in applying the powers of the inherent jurisdiction to introduce a new form of procedure for which no provision is made by lawFor the direction by the court, in the instant case, to the Commissioner to order sale of two items of the suit properties in final decree proceedings, for meeting the pressing demands of the estate in discharging the huge tax arrears, the aforesaid provisions of Orders 21 and 39 cannot at all be made applicable and further, no other provision is available, except the invoking of the inherent jurisdiction under section 151, which, in our view, is also not applicable, as the inhering of such a power in the court would tantamount to introducing a new form of procedure for which no provision is made in the Code and, if at all any provision is traceable for such sale of property in a partition action, reference may be made to section 2 of the Partition Act (Act IV of 1893), wherein it is legally permissible to effect such sale in case a division of the property cannot reasonably or conveniently be made. The case on hand is not one falling within the purview of section 2 of the Partition Act. In this context, useful reference may be made to the decision in Muthusamy Gounder v. A. P. Kaithamalai Gounder [1976] TLNJ 191 ;1973 AIR(SC) 643, 1972 (2) SCC 721 , 1973 (1) SCR 904 , 1973 UJ 245 , 1976 (2) MLJ 373. In that case, the lower court, after taking into consideration the Commissioner's report and the objections filed by the respondent, directed the Commissioner to sell the property among the sharers, after giving one month's notice to counsel for both the parties and the successful bidder among the sharers shall be permitted to set off his share against the sale price and deposit the balance. Aggrieved by the said order, the defendant preferred a revision to this court, which considered the question whether the court has inherent jurisdiction, apart from the Partition Act, to pass an order as it thinks just and convenient. This court, after placing implicit reliance on the Division Bench decision of this court in O. S. A. No. 108 of 1966, which was affirmed by the apex of the judicial Administration of the country in R. Ramamurthi Aiyar v. Raja V. Rajeswararao, 1973 AIR(SC) 643, 1972 (2) SCC 721 , 1973 (1) SCR 904 , 1973 UJ 245 , 1976 (2) MLJ 373, said thus (see 1973 AIR(SC) 643, 1972 (2) SCC 721 , 1973 (1) SCR 904 , 1973 UJ 245 , 1976 (2) MLJ 373, 377). "It is clear from the discussion and the decision rendered in O. S.A. No. 108 of 1966 that the court will not have inherent powers, apart from the Partition Act, to pass orders in respect of a partition suit. I am in complete agreement with the arguments advanced by the petitioner's counsel to the effect that O. S. A. No. 108 of 1966 is the authority for the proposition that the court will not have any inherent powers, apart from the Partition Act, in respect of partition suits. Thus, it is clear the court below has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law. The lower court ought to have decided the case as per the provisions of section 2 of the Partition Act and should not have ordered auction of the suit property in between the sharers." * In the light of the above decision, it goes without saying that this court is not clothed with the power to order sale of immovable property through the Advocate-Commissioner appointed by the court in final decree proceedings and issue a sale certificate therefor. Consequently, it follows that all proceedings taken and orders passed for the sale of the two items of property through the Advocate-Commissioner are ab initio void as being done without any jurisdiction and no sale certificate in favour of Muthulakshmi Achi, in the instant case, could be granted. Consequently, it follows that all proceedings taken and orders passed for the sale of the two items of property through the Advocate-Commissioner are ab initio void as being done without any jurisdiction and no sale certificate in favour of Muthulakshmi Achi, in the instant case, could be granted. Even assuming for argument's sake that the sale effected by the court is valid, it is pertinent to point out at this juncture that the issuance of a sale certificate, on the facts and circumstances of the case, would have the effect of tarnishing the image of the court, being the guardian of law. Admittedly, the said two items of properties are in excess of the ceiling area as per the provisions of the Act. It is also not in dispute that the strenuous efforts taken by the Advocate-Commissioner to get exemption from the provisions of the Act ended in dismal failure. In such situation, if the court decides to issue the sale certificate in respect of the two items of property, coming within the purview of the Act, massacre of law is at the altar of the precincts of the court. In other words, it tantamounts to scuttling the law's action and fostering law's inactionThis apart, the passing of the order dated June 28, 1978, without impleading the official assignee, representing the estate of the appellant/ first defendant, an insolvent then, cannot at all be said to be valid in law, being in violation of the principles of natural justice, in passing an order behind the back of the person affected by the order, as rightly contended by learned counsel for the appellant. To top it all, there are materials available on record to point out that Muthulakshmi Achi is not a bona fide third party purchaser and, on the other hand, she is none else than the wife of the third defendant and this aspect of the matter had been suppressed by the ingenious device of furnishing particulars regarding her address in all material records such as affidavits, official correspondence, etc., by stating that she is "so and so" with a prefix "Tmt.", thereby indicating her marital status, but without disclosing her husband's name and what she would do in a queer way is that she chooses to identify herself as the daughter of "so and so" and despite such assiduous attempts at concealment, her real status as the wife of the third defendant emerged to the surface, on the facts and circumstances of the case. The first defendant would file objections to the memo filed by the Commissioner dated April 7, 1981, for a direction to issue a sale certificate and therein he would make a categorical assertion that she is the wife of the third defendant and this aspect of the matter had not at all been controverted by the said Muthulakshmi Achi and from this, we are not far wrong in coming to the conclusion that she had taken all precautions to conceal her identity as the wife of the third defendant right through, with a sinister purpose and that perhaps was the reason that she chose to describe her status as the daughter of "so and so", without mentioning her husband's name, who in the circumstances of the case, cannot be anyone other than the third defendant and this sort of a device, we feel, is nothing but a clever attempt made in a dexterous fashion to retain the properties within the family-fold by scuttling the provisions of the Act, without seemingly making an appearance to the outside world thereforIt is stated at the Bar that Muthulakshmi Achi had deposited in court the entirety of the amount and the same had been utilised in discharging the tax burden and other liabilities of the estate. All canons of fairness, justice, equity and good conscience demand that the third party, the so-called bona fide purchaser, Muthulakshmi Achi, should be adequately compensated by making the said amount, stated to have been parted by her, available to her with a reasonable rate of interest. This can be done, only in the adjustment of equities, at the time of final decree proceedings, in allotting specific portions in the two items of the suit property to the individual sharers. As already indicated, each of the sharers is entitled to one-seventh share in the said two items of properties and in working out equity, each sharer has to bear the brunt of equal burden in discharging the dues of Muthulakshmi Achi with reasonable rate of interest, which we fix, in the circumstances of the case, At 15 per cent. per annum from the date of deposit till realisation. The appeal is disposed of accordingly, but, in the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.