JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav 1. These three analogous writ petitions (being Writ Petition Nos 20351 of 1986, 4624 of 1989 and 7264 of 1989 (hereinafter referred as first, second and third writ petitions respectively), involve similar questions of law, hence it is convenient to dispose them of by a common judgment. 2. Whether the Kalyan Karyalaya, Gita Press, Gorakhpur is an 'industry' and whether the domestic enquiry having been held to be legal and not vitiated, the punishment of dismissal was correctly reduced and was it justified under the circumstances of the case, are the short questions for determination in these writ petitions. The Labour Court vide its award dated 20-9- 86 has held that Kalyan Karyalaya, Gita Press was covered with the definition of the word 'industry' as defined under section 2 (k) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (for short the Act). A true copy of the award has been filed as Annexure-5 The second writ petition has been filed against the award dated 20-9-86, already impugned in the first writ petition and also the award dated 14-2-89. The third writ petition has been filed by the workmen claiming back wages. 3. The services of Chandra Shankar Ojha, a workman respondent no 2 were restrenched by order dated 20-9 84 passed by the management. A reference was made under section 4 (k) of the Act and an award was given holding that the enquiry was correct, but nevertheless the retrenchment order was substituted with the order of reinstatement with no back wages and with a direction that even during the period of suspension the workman shall be entitled only to subsistence allowance. The writ petition has been filed by the workman challenging a part of the award against him. 4. Some factual matrix appear to be imperative. Govind Bhawan Karyalaya is registered under the Societies Registration Act and has its office at 151, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Calcutta. The certificate of registration has been renewed from time to time. The object of society is to promote and spread the principles of Hindu religion among the general public, Hindu religious education, the spread the use of pure articles for the protection of Hindu religion, to publish books and articles to further and carry into effect the aforesaid object of the society. The Kalyan Karyalya and Gita Press, Gorakhpur are the units of the Govind Bhawan Karyalaya. Respondent no. The Kalyan Karyalya and Gita Press, Gorakhpur are the units of the Govind Bhawan Karyalaya. Respondent no. 2, the workman was employed in Kalyan Karyalaya, Gorakhpur. The Industrial Employment (standing Orders) Act, 1946 is applicable to the petitioner and it has been adopted In para 11 it mentions about leave, whereas para 22 of the standing Order enumerates acts of omissions which may be treated as misconduct. Para 22 (a) mentions about wilful insubordination or disobedience, whether alone or in combination with another or notice prescribed by law or rules having force of law. (c) inciting while the premises of the industrial establishment any workman to strike w (y) Insubordination malingering, deliberate delaying of production or carryo out of order. Para 23 of the Standing Orders provides that any person who is adjudged to be guilty of misconduct is liable to be summarily dismissed without notice or compensation in lieu of notice. Respondent No. 2 workman raised a dispute that his services were illegally retrenched on 20-9-84 from the employment of the petitioner. The State Government made a reference under section 4 (k) of the Act to the effect whether the termination of service of the workman by the employers by order dated 20-9-84 was valid or legal ? If not, to what benefit/compensation the workman was entitled to get ? the reference was registered as Adjudication Case No. 240 of 1985 by the Labour Court, Gorakhpur. After permitting the employer and the workman to file their written statements evidence was led and, the witnesses were examined. The workman denied the charges and the allegations of misconduct against him. The Labour Court held under the award dated 14-2-89 that even though the charges were proved, the domestic enquiry was not vitiated, but the punishment of termination or retrenchment from service was not justified, and it was reduced to reinstatement with no back wages and during the period Of suspension the workman was entitled to subsistence allowance, Against this ward the present petition have been filed. Sri V. M. Sahai. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that Kalyan Karyalaya, Gita Press as not an industry, as defined under section 2 (k) of the Act as there was no process of manufacturing, rather its main object was to propogate Hindu religion and spiritual attainment. Consequently it cannot be said to be a business, trade or undertaking. Sri V. M. Sahai. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that Kalyan Karyalaya, Gita Press as not an industry, as defined under section 2 (k) of the Act as there was no process of manufacturing, rather its main object was to propogate Hindu religion and spiritual attainment. Consequently it cannot be said to be a business, trade or undertaking. Reliance was placed on The Bangalore Water Supply and Sewarage Board v. A Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC 969, which was d decision rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. The main consideration relevant for our purpose is to be traced at page 584, para 125, as to whether a charitable institution can be an industry. In that connection three suppositions of the institution were considered in para 26. The first was one where the enterprise, like any other, yields profits but they are siphoned off for altruistic objects. The second is one where the institution makes no profit but hires the services of employees, as in other like businesses, but the goods and services, which are the out put, are made available at low or no cost to the indigent needy, who are priced out of the market. The third is where the establishment is oriented on a humane mission fulfilled by men who work, not because they are paid wages, but because they share the passion for the cause and derive job satisfaction from their contribution. The first two are industries, the third was held to be 'not industry' We are concerned with the third variety pointed out in that judgment and to ascertain as to whether the case of petitioners is covered by the third species. Reliance was also placed on an unreported judgment of this Court rendered by Hon'ble brother S. K Dhaon, 3. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7860 of 1982 where the Satsang Sabha was not held to be industry, under section 2 (k) of the Act. It was urged by the learned counsel that as the main object of the petitioners was to propagate Hindu religion and spiritual gains, consequently it was not an industry. 5. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7860 of 1982 where the Satsang Sabha was not held to be industry, under section 2 (k) of the Act. It was urged by the learned counsel that as the main object of the petitioners was to propagate Hindu religion and spiritual gains, consequently it was not an industry. 5. Sri Shyam Narain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, urged that no doubt the object of the petitioner was to propagate Hindu religion and the workmen have been paid wages, but the Standing Orders Act is applicable out of which the misconduct has been quoted and no workman is employed just for the sake of passion or no workman including respondent no. 2 is working without any payment of wages. Reliance was placed on. Bangalore Water and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and others (supra); Miss A Sundararabal v. Govt, of Goa Damon and Diu, AIR 1988 SC 1700 , Gopal v. Admn. Officer, M. P Khadi and Village Industries Board, 1986 SC 504, Rama Kant Misra v. State of U. P., AIR 1982 SC 1552 and also on 1988 IF LR, 719. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties I am of the view that the present petition must fail. With regard to the first point as to whether the Kalyan Karyalaya is an industry, suffice it to say that it has employed as many as 240 workmen. The object of the petitioner 1 and 2 is to propagate Hindu religion, publish books and articles, to further and carry into effect the aforesaid object of the society etc. besides imparting Hindu religious education. This is not a case where the workmen dedicate their services solely for the purposes of humane-mission and they share the passion for the cause and derive job satisfaction from their contribution. This was the third category of charitable institution which was held under para 126 in the judgment of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra), and was held to be an industry. Consequently in view of the ratio in that Supreme; Court case the petitioners 1 and 2, could not be covered with the definition of industry as given under section 2 (j) of the Act. Consequently in view of the ratio in that Supreme; Court case the petitioners 1 and 2, could not be covered with the definition of industry as given under section 2 (j) of the Act. In Radha Satsang Sabha in Writ Petition No. 786 of 1982, decided by learned brother S. K. Dhaon, J. (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners 1 and 2, the facts were entirely different. Radha Satshang Sabha was not held to be an industry. In the present case the facts are totally different from Radha Satsang Sabha's case. The object of petitioners is to propagate Hindu religion and to impart Hindu religious education, but the establishment of the petitioners cannot be said to be oriented on humane mission fulfilled by men who work not because they are paid wages, but because they share the passion of job and derive job satisfaction from their contribution. Considering the activities of the petitioners in respect of publishing of books, maintaining press, employing workmen, paying wages, may be that there was no gain or profit out of the books or publications, rather solely dedicated to propagate the Hindu religion. But the nature of the activities pertaining to press are material. 7. In Miss A. Sunderambal v. Govt. of Goa, Daman and Diu, AIR 1988 SC 1700 , the school was held to be an industry within the meaning of section 2 (j) of the Act, but teachers were not held to be workmen. In Des Raj v. State of Punjab, AIR 1988 SC 1182 , the scope of definition of 'industry' under section 2 (j) or section 2 (k) to the following effect was considered : "any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen." 8. Even though this definition was amended later but the same does not appear to have been enforced. The wider import was attracted even more clearly when we look at the letter part of definition which refers to calling etc. The definition was intended to include within its scope what might not strictly be called a trade or business ventures. Even though this definition was amended later but the same does not appear to have been enforced. The wider import was attracted even more clearly when we look at the letter part of definition which refers to calling etc. The definition was intended to include within its scope what might not strictly be called a trade or business ventures. In the case of Des Raj v. State of Punjab, (supra), other relevant case law including five Judge Bench in D N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee, AIR 1953 SC 58 , and three Judge Bench in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR i960 SC 10, where Gajendragadkar, J. observed ; "There in another point which cannot be ignored. Section 2 (j) or section 2 (k) of U. P. Industrial Disputes Act does not define industry in the usual manner by prescribing what it means : the first clause of the definition gives the statutory meaning of industry and the second clause deliberately refers to several other Items of industry and brings them in the definition in an inclusive way. It is obvious that the words used in an inclusive definition denote extension and cannot be treated as restricted in any sense." 9. The scope of definition was elaborately considered in Gymkhana Club Case, AIR 1968 SC 554 . What is to be emphasized is to that the definition is "inclusive". In Craies on Statute Law (Seventh Edition), page 213, it was stated that where the word defined is declared to mean so and so, the definition is explanatory and prima facie restrictive. In other words, where the word defined is declared to include (as in the present case) so and so, the definition is extensive. In statutory interpretation by Sir Rupert Cross (London Butterworths page 103), it was stated as follows : "The word 'includes' indicates an extension of the ordinary meaning which continues to apply in appropriate cases. The word 'includes' is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occuring in the body of the statutes, and when it is so used these words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not such thing as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include, Dilworth v. Stamps Commissioner, 1889 AC 99 at page 105-6. 10. 10. In Central Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojonath Ganguly, AIR 1986 SC 1751, it was observed that in the definition clause "includes" is not exhaustive and includes in the definition those which could not have been included ordinarily. What is to be noticed is that the Legislature has designedly used the expression "includes" and avoided to use "means" under Sec. 2 (k) just with a view to make the definition of industry, mere comprehensive than what was stated as calling service, employment etc. 11. Considering the nature of activities including the publication of religious books, almost on nominal basis, maintaining press, employing workmen for running the press, those workmen including Chandra Shankar Ojha. The activities pertaining to the press are material. The workmen get wages and pay and other emoluments. The provisions of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 is applicable to petitioners, including workmen. The workmen do not work for passion or satisfaction of religion (or Dharmik avam Adhyatmik sukh) satisfaction, but to get wages and salary etc. Under these circumstances, the Kalyan Karyalaya and Gita Press (the units of Govind Bhawan Karyalaya) is industry within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the Act. 12. As regards the other submissions, suffice It to say that Section 11-A was added by Act No. 45 of 1971 in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central) with a view to reduce the punishment provided to a workman whose retrenchment or dismissal was held to be legal or there was no defect in the domestic enquiry. In the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, section 6 (2-A) was added. The Provisions of sections 6 (2-A) are set out below. "6 (2-A) : An award in an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman may direct the setting aside of the discharge or dismissal and reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions if any, as the authority making the award may think fit, or granting such other relief to the workman including the substitution of any lesser punishment for discharge or dismissal, as the circumstances of the case may require.'' 13. Before adverting to the interpretation of Section 11-A of the Act (Central) and Sections 6 (2-A) of the Act, it has to be borne in mind that Section 11-A of the Central Act and Section (2-A) of the Act have been added with greater social object to be attained through legislation. The approach to a statute of predominant social nature has to be made in that light. The court must take a broad view of the background and policy of the statute in question. In such matters the approach of the court has to be different. (See Summars v, Sacford Corporation, 1943 AC 283 at p. 293; Okarka Bs. Brant London Borough Council, (1967) 1 QB 42 ; and Brown v. Brash and Ambrose, (1948) 1 All. ER 922. 14. In Othevath Lakshmi Amma v. N. G. Naiyer, JT (1990) 3 SCC 230 dated 19-4-90, it was held that in social legislation with benevolent provisions the dominant purpose of the statute, the intention of legislature and the policy underlying has to be considered while construing the provisions. In the workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India Pvt. Ltd. v. The Management, AIR 1973 SC 1227 , it was held under para 31, page 1240 as follows : "We are aware that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation enacted in the interest of employees. It is well settled that in construing the provision of a welfare legislation, courts should adopt, what is described as a beneficient rule of construction. If the constructions are reasonably possible to be placed on the section, it follows that the constitution which furthers the policy and object of the Act and is more beneficial to the employees, has to be preferred. Another principle to be borne in mind is that the Act in question which intends to improve and safeguard the service conditions of an employee, demands an interpretation liberal enough to achieve the legislative purpose." 15. I am accordingly of the considered opinion that Section 6 (2-A) and other provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act have to be interpreted as a social welfare legislation, consistent with the policy and object of the Act and an interpretation more beneficial to workmen/employees was to be preferred. 16. I am accordingly of the considered opinion that Section 6 (2-A) and other provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act have to be interpreted as a social welfare legislation, consistent with the policy and object of the Act and an interpretation more beneficial to workmen/employees was to be preferred. 16. Under Section 6 (2-A) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act or Section 11-A of the Central Industrial Disputes Act provides a deviation from the earlier provision before the Amendment. In case misconduct was established, earlier the Tribunal has no power to interfere with the punishment imposed by the management. In view of the amended provision even though the misconduct is proved or findings of the domestic enquiry are sustained, nevertheless the Tribunal may take the view that the order of discharge or dismissal is not correct and may award the workmen a lesser or lenient punishment. In other words, the Tribunal has now wide power to interfere with the punishment and substitute it with lesser punishment even though misconduct is proved. In Rama Kant Misra v. State., (1982) 3 SCC 346 , it was observed as follows : "A tribunal or the court has to be satisfied that even if some misconduct is proved and a penalty has to be imposed, the extreme penalty of dismissal or discharge was not justified under the facts and circumstances of the case, meaning thereby that the punishment was either disproportionate or heavy or excessive " 17. In H. M. T. v. Mohd. Usman, (1984) 1 SCC 152 , it was held that where the punishment imposed by the employer is disproportionately excessive, the labour court or the tribunal in exercise of its descretion under section 11-A or Section 6 (2-A) can reduce the punishment. The stoppage of increment for two years imposed by the Labour Court while setting aside the order of dismissal by the employer was held not to open to interference by the Supreme Court. 18. In the present case also even though looking to the nature of misconduct in connection with inciting the employees to go on strike and similar other matters, the Labour Court has reduced the punishment of dismissal to that of reinstatement with no back wages and for subsistence allowance to respondent no. 2. 18. In the present case also even though looking to the nature of misconduct in connection with inciting the employees to go on strike and similar other matters, the Labour Court has reduced the punishment of dismissal to that of reinstatement with no back wages and for subsistence allowance to respondent no. 2. That punishment cannot be said to be execessive and I do not agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that no interference should have been made in the order passed by the employer in the domestice enquiry. Sri Sahai was quite emphatic to assert that the ratio of the case reported in AIR 1971 SC 22 was applicable. In that case also it was urged that as the workman was in service for more than 27 years and just on the charge of blowing whistle which led to stoppage of work in the factory, the order of dismissal passed by the management was not justified. In that case the Supreme Court did not accept the submission to reduce the punishment of dismissal and that was a case decided prior to the amendment of Section 11-A in the Central Act and section 6 (2-A) of the U. P. Act. Keeping in view the provisions of section 11-A added to the Central Act and section 6 (2-A) of the Act, where the power has been given to the Labour Court to reduce the punishment if the same was excessively disproportionate to the charges levelled or the misconduct proved. In the present case the order passed by the Labour Court has correctly been passed. Under the circumstances of the case while the workman was under suspension, the only subsistence allowance has been directed to be paid and that appears to be just. 19. At the close the answer to the question proposed is that the Kalyan Karyalaya, Gita Press, Gorakhpur. is an ''industry" within the meaning of section 2 (k) of the Act and the punishment of dismissal reduced to that of reinstatement with no back wages was justified under the circumstances of the case. 20. In view of the premises aforesaid and applying the Aristotalean and Baconian reasonings, these petitions lack merit and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. The interim stay is vacated. Petitions dismissed.