JUDGMENT K.K. Birla, J. - Feeling aggrieved by the auction sale dated 24-2-1981, Laxmi Narain has preferred this petition for a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the Auction proceedings and also for not confirming the auction sale. There were some Sales Tax dues on the Firm Gorey Lai Chhotey Lal on account of sales tax assessment orders for the years 1968-69, 1969-70, 1970-71 and 1972- 73. According to the petitioner, his father Chhotey Lal and his uncle Gorey Lal had died in the year 1972. The demand notices for the amount alleged to be due on the firm were served on the petitioner in March, 1978 and a notice dated 19-5-1978 was served on the petitioner for auctioning his agricultural land Chak No. 180 (area 13.55 acres) of village Minaura Kalpi, Pargana Orai, District Jalaun (hereinafter referred to as `the land') for arrears of Sales Tax to tune of Rs. 55,710.31 paise. The auction could not take place. Several dates were fixed. A notice for auction showing an arrear of Rs. 76,694.75 paise was served on him showing date of auction as 24-2-1981 vide Annexure 1 to the writ petition. On the date of auction the bid was closed in favour of Jakir Haq, son of Mohd. Shafi Ansari, Registrar Qanungo, Tehsil Orai, District Jalaun, opposite party No. 6 at Rs. 41,000/-. 2. By this writ petition the legality and validity of this auction sale have been challenged on various grounds by the petitioner which will be considered at the appropriate stages. On the other hand, the contesting opposite parties have supported the legality of the impugned auction sale. Besides, this, the learned counsel for the opposite party No. 6 (hereinafter referred as the contesting opposite party) has raised a preliminary objection. According to him, if the petitioner was aggrieved by the auction sale, he could have moved an application to the Commissioner under Rule 2851 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules and as such the present writ petition is not maintainable on the ground of alternative remedy. 3. Affidavit, counter-affidavits, rejoinder and supplementary affidavit have been exchanged between the parties. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials. 4. The provisions of the Act and the Rules relevant for our purposes are given below. 5. Section 154. 3. Affidavit, counter-affidavits, rejoinder and supplementary affidavit have been exchanged between the parties. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials. 4. The provisions of the Act and the Rules relevant for our purposes are given below. 5. Section 154. - Restriction on transfer by a Bhumidhar (1) Save as provided in subsection (2). no bhumidhar shall have the right to transfer by sale or gift, any land other than tea gardens to any person where the transferee shall, as a result of such sale or gift become entitled to land which together with land, if any, held by his family will in the aggregated, exceed 5.0586 hectares (12.50 acres) in Uttar Pradesh. 6. Rules 281 of Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules (hereinafter referred as Rules) and onwards deal with the sale of immovable property. Rule 281(2A) provides that in the case of sale of a holding the Collector shall auction the holding in lots of 1.26 hectres (3.125 acres) to 5.04 hectares (12.50 acres) after working out and announcing the land revenue and the estimated value of each lot. Rule 285-A provides that every sale under Sections 284 and 286 shall be made either by the Collector in person or by an Assistant Collector specially appointed by him in this behalf. No such sale shall take place on a Sunday or other gazetted holiday, or until after the expiration of at least thirty days from the date on which the proclamation under Rule 282 was issued. The Collector may from time to time postpone the sale. Rule 285-G provides that no sale after postponment under Rule 285A, 285D or 285E in default of payment of the purchase money shall be made until a fresh proclamation has been issued as prescribed for the original sale. Rule 2851 provides that "at any time within thirty days from the date of the sale, application may be made to the Commissioner to set aside the sale on the ground of some material irregularity or mistake in publishing or conducting it; but no sale shall be set aside on such ground unless the applicant proves to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or mistake. (i) ..... (ii) The order of the Commissioner passed under this rule shall be final. (i) ..... (ii) The order of the Commissioner passed under this rule shall be final. Rule 285J provides that on the expiration of thirty days from the date of the sale if no such application as is mentioned in Rule 285H or Rule 2851, has been made or if such application has been made and rejected by the Collector or the Commissioner, the Collector shall pass an order confirming the sale after satisfying himself that the purchase of land in question by the bidder would not be in contravention of the provisions of Section 154. Every order passed under this Rule shall be final. 7. The contention by the learned counsel for the opposite party is that the petitioner is challenging the impugned auction sale on various grounds; namely, firstly that the proper procedure for publishing or conducting the sale proclamation has not been followed, secondly that the auction purchaser is the son of the Registrar Kanungo and therefore. he could not bid in the auction, thirdly that the sale consideration is too much inadequate, and fourthly that the whole attached land could not have been sold in one lot. It is contended on behalf of the contesting opposite party that all these objections relate to the publishing or conducting of the auction of sale, and that under Rule 285(1) the petitioner had the remedy to make an application to the Commissioner and as such in view of this alternative remedy the present writ petition. should be dismissed. 8. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is not a mere case of material irregularity or mistake in publishing or conducting the auction sale but the sale is in contravention of the express provisions of law and that the Collector had no jurisdiction to sell 13.55 acres of land as this violates the provisions of law and it is a case of apparent illegality in the sale. It is next contended that the case will not be covered under Section 2851 and in any case the writ petition cannot be thrown-out on this ground. It is also contended that the writ petition was filed in 1981 and this objection has been raised after about 10 years of filing of this writ petition. It is next contended that the case will not be covered under Section 2851 and in any case the writ petition cannot be thrown-out on this ground. It is also contended that the writ petition was filed in 1981 and this objection has been raised after about 10 years of filing of this writ petition. After considering the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties in this regard we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where the writ petition could be thrown out now on the ground of alternative remedy. 9. The writ petition had been admitted on the 7th May, 1981. The interim order was also passed on the same date. The contesting opposite party filed his counter affidavit in December, 1981. In this counter-affidavit he did not raise the plea of the writ petition being not maintainable on the ground of alternative remedy nor this plea was raised by moving any separate application. The point has been raised for the first time before us alter l0 years of the filing of this petition. In our opinion, this fact in itself will not justify the dismissal of the writ petition now on the ground of alternative remedy. 10. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has relied on the case of Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, reported in AIR 1983 SC 603 and the case of Umesh Chandra v. Sub Divisional Officer, reported in 1990 RD page 412. In the above cited Supreme Court case the writ petitions were dismissed on account of alternative remedy being available to those petitioners as those petitioners which were provided under the Orissa Sales Tax Act. In the case of Umesh Chandra (supra) the High Court did not consider the matter and directed the S.D.O. Kunda to dispose of the petitioners objection. It may further be noted that in the above cited Supreme Court case the writ petitions were rejected on this ground in limine by the High Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court also dismissed the writ petitions preferred before it upholding the above view of the High Court. No doubt in proper cases the writ petitions may be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy but this can not be laid down as an absolute proposition of law that where the plea of alternative remedy is being raised. No doubt in proper cases the writ petitions may be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy but this can not be laid down as an absolute proposition of law that where the plea of alternative remedy is being raised. the Court cannot exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. There is plethora of cases to support the preposition that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition. On the other hand, it is the consensus that the petition will not be thrown out if it has been entertained and has been pending since long. Some of the Supreme Court cases may be referred in this regard. 11. In the case of Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.), reported in AIR 1987 SC 2186 it has been held that at page 2189 "further it is well established that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition, when an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction, the High Court should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. "It will be discussed at the appropriate stage that the present case is not a case of mere material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale but sale has been in violation of the express provisions of law. 12. In the case of Miss Raj Soni v. Air Officer-in-Charge Administration, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1305 : 1990 Lab IC 1161 it has been observed in para l l that It is not necessary and we do not propose to go into the question in this case as to whether the petition is maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution, because this petition has been pending in this court since 1981. The petitioner's claim is just. It will, therefore, be a travesty of justice to send her to any other forum at this stage." It may be further pointed out that in this case also the writ petition was filed in 1981 and was decided in April, 1990 and remained pending for about 9 years. In the case before us also the writ petition has been filed in 1981 and has remained pending for about 10 years. 13. In the case before us also the writ petition has been filed in 1981 and has remained pending for about 10 years. 13. In the case of Tamil Nadu Cauvery Neerppasana Vilaiporugal Vivasavigal Nala Urimai Padhugappu Sangam v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1316 even though the State of Tamil Nadu was not a petitioner but a respondent, the Hon'ble Supreme Court went to the extent of treating the State of Tamil Nadu as a petitioner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that at page 1318. "In view of the fact that the State of Tamil Nadu has not supported the petitioner entirely and without any reservation and the Court has kept the matter before it for about 7 years, now to throw out the petition at this stage by accepting the objection raised on behalf of State of Karnataka that a petition of a society like the petitioner for the relief indicated is not maintainable would be ignoring the actual state of affairs would be too technical an approach and in our view would be wholly unfair and unjust." 14. In the case of Hirday Narain v. Income-tax Officer, Bareilly, reported in AIR 1971 SC 33 as well where the petitioner had filed writ petition instead of availing statutory remedy and the High Court entertained the petition and gave hearing on merits. It has been held that the petition cannot be rejected on the ground of statutory remedy being not availed of. It may be mentioned that in the case before us also the petition had been admitted in 1981 (thereby entertained) and has been heard. 15. In the case of State of U.P. v. M/s. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 1977 SC 1132 it has been held that at page 1134 "moreover there is no rule of law that the High Court should not entertain a writ petition where an alternative remedy is available to a party. It is always a matter of discretion with the Court and if the discretion has been exercised by the High Court not unreasonably or perversely, it is the settled practice of the Supreme Court not to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the High Court. 16. Therefore, this will depend on the facts and circumstances of the individual case. It is always a matter of discretion with the Court and if the discretion has been exercised by the High Court not unreasonably or perversely, it is the settled practice of the Supreme Court not to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the High Court. 16. Therefore, this will depend on the facts and circumstances of the individual case. As pointed out earlier in this case the writ petition had been admitted in May, 1981 even in the counter-affidavit filed in Dec. 1981 this plea was not raised nor any application for dismissing the writ petition on this ground was ever made. On the other hand. this plea was raised for the first time merely after about 10 years of the admission of the writ petition. In our opinion, in these circumstances it is not a fit case where the writ petition could be dismissed on this ground. Apart from this, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that it is not a mere case of material irregularity or mistake in publishing oral conducting the auction sale but it is a case where the sale is totally void and illegal ands has to be totally ignored and, therefore, inspite of the provisions of Rule 285 (I) this Court can and should look into the matter, can not be brushed aside lightly. 17. Section 154 of the Act quoted above clearly provides that no transfer can be made in favour of a person who as a result of such sale will become entitled to land which together with land if any, held by his family will in the aggregate exceed 12.50 acres in U.P. In the instant case the land measuring 13.35 acres has been ordered to be auctioned in one lot. The result is that auctioning 13.55 acres of land in one lot is directly in contravention of Section 154 of the Act because in that case the auction purchaser will be bhumidhar of more than land permitted by law. Therefore. the auction sale is clearly in contravention of Section 154 of the Act. Under Rule 281(2A) also it is clearly provided that it should also be made clear that only these persons would hid in the auction, acquisitions of land by whom would not contravene the provisions of Section 154. Therefore. the auction sale is clearly in contravention of Section 154 of the Act. Under Rule 281(2A) also it is clearly provided that it should also be made clear that only these persons would hid in the auction, acquisitions of land by whom would not contravene the provisions of Section 154. Therefore, it is also obvious that auctioning whole land in one lot has not only violated the first para of sub-rule 2A but also the second para of this sub-rule. This glaring illegality is not merely some material irregularity or mistake in publishing or conducting the sale and goes to the very root of the auction sale making it completely void. In our opinion on this ground also, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the opposite party deserves to be rejected. 18. On the merits of the case itself, the impugned auction has been challenged on more than one ground. The main contention raised is that the impugned auction is in violation of Section 154 of the Act and Rule 281(2A) and is void. This aspect has already been discussed above. We find that the impugned auction is illegal and void on this ground and in our opinion the impugned auction deserves to be quashed on this ground alone. 19. The auction was also challenged on the ground of violation of Rule 285B. Though not necessary this aspect may also be discussed. Admittedly, the contesting opposite party is the son of Mohd. Shafi Ansari Registrar Kanungo Tehsil Orai, District Jalaun. The land in question is situate in Tehsil Orai. rule 285B inter alia provides that no person employed by or subordinate, to, such officer shall either directly or indirectly, bid for, acquire or attempt to acquire the property sold or any interest therein. Such officer refers to any officer having any duty to perform in connection with any such sale. Sale proclamation for Z.A. Form No. 74 which has been filed before us at the time of the arguments and also the auction proceedings (Annexure-3) clearly show that the auction sale has been ordered by the S.D.O. Orai. Clearly, enough, the father of the respondent No. 1 is subordinate of the S.D.O. Orai. Counter-affidavit of the contesting opposite party will show that at the time of the auction he was hardly 20 years old. Clearly, enough, the father of the respondent No. 1 is subordinate of the S.D.O. Orai. Counter-affidavit of the contesting opposite party will show that at the time of the auction he was hardly 20 years old. Annexure-4 of the counter-affidavit of the contesting opposite party will show that he does not own any other land. In the circumstances, the contention on behalf of the petitioner that the Supervisor Kanungo had attempted to purchase this property in auction indirectly through contesting opposite party has force, and this will effect the validity of the impugned auction. Though not raised during the arguments or behalf of the contesting opposite party, it may be mentioned that in Annexure- 4 to the counter-affidavit an attempt has been made that the opposite party No. 6 and his two bothers have purchased this land in auction. The bid has been made by the opposite party No. 6, the money has been deposited by him and as such the averments in this affidavit that it was purchased by him and his brothers cannot be accepted for a moment. Rather, it appears that the contesting opposite party was alive to the illegality of the auction of 13.55 acres of land in favour of one person and has most probably therefore, tried to set up this case in the affidavit filed before the S.D.O. Orai. As pointed out earlier no contentions to that effect have been made before us. Here the case of the contesting opposite party is that the land has been purchased in auction by him. 20. Besides these grounds, the petitioner has also challenged the impugned auction on the ground that the sale proclamation was not properly published and conducted and that the land has been auctioned for grossly inadequate amount. 21. As regards the point regarding publication of the sale, under Rule 286 the sale proclamation has to be in Z.A. Form 74. Under Rule 285A at least thirty days should expire from the date on which the proclamation is issued. The Collector may also from time to time postpone the sale. Under Rule 285 G no sale after postponement is to be made until a fresh proclamation has been issued as prescribed for the original sale. In the instant case, the sale was previously postponed more than once as is clear from the narration of facts. The Collector may also from time to time postpone the sale. Under Rule 285 G no sale after postponement is to be made until a fresh proclamation has been issued as prescribed for the original sale. In the instant case, the sale was previously postponed more than once as is clear from the narration of facts. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the sale proclamation was published in the Newspaper on the date fixed for auction and there was not a gap of thirty days as required under the Rules. This contention cannot be accepted. From the sale proclamation dated 24-1-1981 produced before us it is clear that there is a gap of thirty days from the date of its issuance and the date fixed for the auction. 22. As regards the conduct of sale,'it has already been held above that it was against the spirit of Rule 285B. Apart from this, as averred in para 14 of the petition, the circle rate was Rs. 8000/- and the value of land, according to it will 'come to Rs. 10840/-. In the counter affidavit, the circle rate has not been specifically denied. Therefore, clearly enough. it is grossly inadequate, in our opinion. The auction of large area of 1355 acres of land limits the number of bidders. In the instant case there were only few bidders in the auction. If the land would have been auctioned in more lots, in our opinion it would have fetched substantially more price. Therefore, in our opinion, auctioning the whole land in one lot, besides being an illegality, has also resulted in material irregularity in the conduct of sale. Clearly enough if the sale would have been conducted in a proper manner it would have brought much more sale money. In case of sale by lots, it was also likely that whole land might not have been needed to be sold to meet the liability. Therefore, in our opinion, the material irregularity has resulted in substantial injury to the petitioner and the auction is bad on this ground also. 23. It was further contended that the further proceedings of realisation of the money had been stayed by the Finance Minister by an order dated 6th February 1981 (Annexure 3) to the writ petition, such auction could have not been held. 23. It was further contended that the further proceedings of realisation of the money had been stayed by the Finance Minister by an order dated 6th February 1981 (Annexure 3) to the writ petition, such auction could have not been held. It is not necessary to consider this aspect in view of the discussion on other points. 24. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned auction dated 24th February, 1981 is quashed. However, the respondents Nos. 1 to 5 are free to further proceed in the matter in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.