JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition is directed against the order dated 17.3.1980 (Annexure 5) passed by the Labour Court, Kota on an application filed by non-petitioner No. 1 under Section 33(6)(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereafter referred to as 1947 Act). 2. Petitioners are the partners of firm M/s. Bhuralal Lalchand which was carrying on its business in Bahadur Bazar, Kota. Non-petitioner No. 1 Nonni Chand Jain was employee with the firm for some time. He moved an application and Section 33(6)(2) of 1947 Act before the Labour Court, Kota and made a claim for a sum of Rs. 14184/-, which according to the non petitioner No. 1 was not paid by the petitioners although he was entitled to the same. A reply to that application was filed on behalf of the petitioners. In the said reply several objections were raised on behalf of the petitioners, one of which was that an application had earlier been filed before the payment of wages. Authority, Kota and the same was dismissed in 1986. 3. The non petitioner No. 1 filed his affidavit on prove his claim. He was not cross-examined on behalf of the petitioners. No evidence was led before the non-petitioner No. 2 by the petitioners. The application filed by the non petitioner No. 1 was decided ex-parte on 17.3.1980 by the non petitioner No. 2 and it was ordered with the petitioners shall pay a sum of Rs. 14184/- to the non petitioner No.1. 4. Shri Prem Ashopa learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the non petitioner No. 2 had acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the application under Section of 1947 Act because the provisions of the Rajasthan Shop & Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 were applicable to the case of the petitioners and non petitioner and in view of the provisions containing in that Act, the general provisions containing 1947 Act could not have been to be invocked by the non petitioner No.1. This argument of Shri Ashopa is directly answered by the decision of the Supreme Court in National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. Shri Kishan Bhageriya and others (AIR 1988 Supreme Court - Page 329) . This argument of Shri Ashopa is directly answered by the decision of the Supreme Court in National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. Shri Kishan Bhageriya and others (AIR 1988 Supreme Court - Page 329) . In the said case the question of repugnancy and question of conflict between the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Rajasthan Shops & Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 had arisen for consideration for the Supreme Court, after detail consideration of the scope of two enactments Hon'ble Supreme Court recorded the following conclusion:- "Learned counsel on that in this case, there had been an application as indicated above under Section 28A of the Rajasthan Act and which was dismissed on ground of limitation. Shri Shankar Ghosh tried to submit that there would be inconsistency or repugnancy between the two decisions, one given on limitation and the other if any relief is given under the Act. We are unable to accept this position, because the application under Section 28A of the Rajasthan Act was dismissed not on merit but on limitation. There is a period of limitation provided under the Rajasthan Act of six months and it may be extended for reasonable cause. But there is no period of limitation as such provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, that will be curtailment of the rights of the workmen or employees under the Industrial Disputes Act. In the situation Section 37 declares that law should not be construed to curtail any of the rights of the workmen. As Poet Tennyson observed "freedom broadens from precedent to precedent" so also it is correct to State that social welfare and labour welfare broadens from legislation to legislation in India. It will be a well-settled principle of interpretation to proceed on that assumption and Section 37 of the Rajasthan Act must be so construed. Therefore, in any way the Rajasthan Act could be construed to cartail the rights of the workmen to seek any relief or to go in for an adjudication in case of the termination of the employment. If that is the position in view of the provisions 6 months' to me in Section 28A of the Rajasthan Act has to be ignored and that cannot any being effect inasmuch as it curtails the rights of the workman under the Industrial Disputes Act and that Act must prevail. If that is the position in view of the provisions 6 months' to me in Section 28A of the Rajasthan Act has to be ignored and that cannot any being effect inasmuch as it curtails the rights of the workman under the Industrial Disputes Act and that Act must prevail. In the premises, there is no conflict between the two Acts and there is no question of repugnancy". 5. In view of aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court the argument of Shri Ashopa that application filed by the non petitioner No. 1 could not have been entertained under the provisions of 1947 Act must be rejected. 6. Shri Ashopa then urged with the application filed by the non petitioner No. 1 before the non petitioner No. 2 was barred limitation and that once he had filed an application under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, he was not entitled to file a fresh application under 1947 Act. None of these pleas were raised before the non petitioner No. 2 and therefore no finding has been recorded by the non-petitioner No. 2 on these aspects of the matter. In my view when the petitioner had not argued this point before the non petitioner No. 2, it would be deemed that petitioners had abundoned the plea of limitation. So far as the application filed before the payment of wages authority is concerned it is to be noted that the same was dismissed in default. No order had been passed on the merits by the competent authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The principles of res judicata and estoppel are not applicable to industrial adjudication. 7. The learned Judge Labour Court, Kota has discussed the facts and carefully examined the case and has given very cogent reasons for passing the impugned order. In my view no failure of justice has been occasioned in passing of the impugned order by the non-petitioner No.2. The order dated 17.3.80 passed by non-petitioner No. 2 does not suffer from any error of law apparent on the face of record which warrants interference in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. Thus, I do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the non petitioner No. 2. The writ petition is there fore dismissed. No order for costs. 8. Thus, I do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the non petitioner No. 2. The writ petition is there fore dismissed. No order for costs. The stay order passed by the Court automatically stands vacated and the petitioner shall pay the remaining amount to the non-petitioner No.1 immediately.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******