JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J.—Petitioner by filing this writ petition, on October 10, 1981, under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India has prayed for quashing of Annexure P-34 resolution passed by respondent No. 3 on October 7, 1976, ordering his dismissal from its service as Toll Tax Clerk and the consequent order Annexure P-36, passed by respondent No 2, dismissing his statutory appeal, conveyed to him on June 15, 1977 and the order dated November 6, 1979 Annexure P-38 passed by respondent No. 1 rejecting his representation which was conveyed to the petitioner on November 15, 1979. 2. Petitioner on September 30, 1961 was discharged from the Indian Army, where he was employed as Naik Clerk in 3/4 Gorkha Rifles, after he had rendered fifteen years of service. He was thereafter employed in Cantonment Board Dalhousie on October 15, 1965 as Fire Supervisor. On a post of clerk falling vacant, he applied for being posted against the said post stating that he had passed the Indian Army First Class English and First Class Hindi certificates and was possessed of relaxation in Education qualification as per certificate dated May 31, 1961, which was attached to his discharge certificate On July 5, 1972, the petitioner was promoted as typist-cum record keeper which post he held till his dismissal from service on October 7, 1976, vide Annexure P-34 order. 3. Petitioner, on August 1, 1976, vide Annexure P-9, was informed by respondent No 4 of resolution of respondent No 3 resolving to put him under suspension, pending enquiry, in connection with the allegations of misappropriation of cantonment fund, disobedience and negligence of duty. On September 2, 1976, charge-sheet Annexure P-3 was served upon him, as required under sub-rule (1)of Rule 12 of the Cantonment Fund Service Rules, 1937 (hereinafter called as the rules), framed by respondent No. 1 under the provisions of the Cantonment Act, 1924, It contained charges under the following heads :— (a) absence from duty ; (b) tampering with office record ; (c) negligence in duties and inefficiency ; (d) threatening cantonment staff, thereby committing an offence under section 118 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 and committing offence punishable under Indian Penal Code, 1860 ; (e) dishonesty in preferring wrong T. A. claim and deceiving Cantonment Board regarding educational qualification ; (f) unauthorised acquisition of immovable property ; and (g) indebtedness. 4. 4. Petitioner was called upon to show cause within ten days as to why be be not dismissed from service since his continuance as such was detrimental to the interest of the Board, to submit within the same period, a written statement of his defence to state as to whether he wished to be heard in person. He was informed that in case he wanted to be heard in that case oral enquiry would be held with regard to such of the allegations, which were not admitted in which case he would be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses and lead his own evidence. The petitioner on September 12, 1976, submitted his reply Annexure P-31 refuting ail the charges. After considering the reply of the petitioner, on September 18, 1976, resolution was passed by respondent No 3, resolving to dismiss him from service as his continuance and retention as such was not in the interest of the Board and was considered as detrimental to its efficient administration 5. Annexure P-32 Is the actual show-cause notice dated September 18, 1976, which was sent by respondent No 4 on behalf of respondent No. 3 pointing out to the petitioner that based upon the charge-sheet Annexure P-3 dated September 2, 1976 and his reply, Annexure P-31, dated September 12, 1976, the Board had found him guilty of the following offences :— 1 Absence from duty on July 29, 1976 ; 2. Taking away building plans and some letters to his residence without any authority ; 3. Tampering with toll tax receipts ; 4. deceiving Board regarding educational qualification ; and 5. Unauthorised acquisition of immovable property and Indebtedness Act. It also mentioned that Board had resolved to dismiss him from service and he was to show cause within ten days against this decision. On September 28, 1976, petitioner prayed for supply of copy of Board’s resolution informing respondent No, 4 that he was unable to submit reply without the copy of Boards resolution under which it was decided to give him show cause notice. Instead of supplying copy to him, the petitioner on October 7, 1976, was conveyed by respondent No 4. Annexure P-34 decision of the Board dismissing him from service on the aforementioned grounds and on an additional ground of having mis-appropriated Cantonment fund on July 26, 1976. Instead of supplying copy to him, the petitioner on October 7, 1976, was conveyed by respondent No 4. Annexure P-34 decision of the Board dismissing him from service on the aforementioned grounds and on an additional ground of having mis-appropriated Cantonment fund on July 26, 1976. The petitioner challenged this order by filing statutory appeal Annexure P-35 under Rule 14 of the rules, which was dismissed by respondent No. 2 vide Annexure P-36 order and further representation Annexure P-37 under Rule 14 of the rules to respondent No. 1 was also dismissed and decision dated November 6, 1979, Annexure P-38, was conveyed to him vide Annexure P-39 letter on November 15, 1979. 6. The petitioner has challenged the orders on the ground that his dismissal was in mala fide exercise of powers which had been arrived at in violation of the statutory rules as well as to the rules of natural justice. 7. The allegations of mala fide have been supported by various documents. Main allegations of mala fide are against respondent No. 4, who was the Executive Officer of the Board and respondent No. 5, the office Superintendent and respondent No. 6, an elected member of the Board. It has been alleged that when respondent No. 4 took over the charge of Executive Officer of the Board, he compelled the petitioner to perform the duty of driver in his jeep, in addition to his own duties as clerk-cum-record keeper. Respondent No 4 held the dual charge, namely, the Executive Officer of respondent No. 3 Board as well as Executive Officer, Cantonment Board, Bakloh, which was located at a distance of 34 Kms, from Dalhousie. In the capacity of Executive Officer of respondent No. 3 Board, respondent No. 4 was not permitted to take official jeep to Bakloh without the prior permission of Deputy Director, Military Lands and Cantonment, but the petitioner was compelled to drive the official jeep from Dalhousie to Bakloh and back on his regular visits to Bakloh. Those being the days of emergency, the petitioner was unwilling to drive the vehicle in the absence of proper sanction of the competent authority and when he protested, respondent No. 4 got annoyed and threatened to get the petitioner dismissed from service. Those being the days of emergency, the petitioner was unwilling to drive the vehicle in the absence of proper sanction of the competent authority and when he protested, respondent No. 4 got annoyed and threatened to get the petitioner dismissed from service. To avoid unsavoury situation being created, petitioner proceeded on leave, from February 5, 1976 to March 12, 1976 but even on return from leave petitioner found no change in the attitude of respondent No 4. On March 19, 1976, respondent No. 4 under his own signature, made an order transferring him from the main office to toll tax barrier, Banikhet. 8. While the petitioner was working as clerk-cum-record keeper, numerous irregularities committed by respondent No. 5 were brought by him to the notice of respondent No. 4. According to the petitioner, respondent No. 4 instead of taking note thereof, conveyed the same to respondent No. 5. Thereafter in order to get rid of the petitioner, respondents No. 4 and 5 connived with the help of other office staff The chain of events, which followed later has been narrated by the petitioner as under. 9. On April 22, 1976, petitioner was served with Annexure D letter informing that he had tampered with the record by taking away some important official documents to his house without intimation to his superiors and while working as clerk he had not placed some of the documents in the relevant files but had put the same In different files. Threat of taking disciplinary action was given. Petitioner, on April 28, 1976, submitted reply Annexure E refuting the allegations and explaining his conduct 10. On May 21, 1976, another show-cause notice, Annexure-F, was served upon the petitioner in continuation to Annexure D letter on the subject of tampering with the records and calling upon him to show cause that one of the letters alleged to have been received from Secretary, DSS & A Board, Chamba, with regard to his educational qualification was not traceable in the official record. It was considered as an act of gross negligence of duty rendering him liable to punishment. On May 28, 1976, petitioner submitted his reply Annexure G refuting the allegations. In the same reply, he informed respondent No 4 that respondent No. 5 appears to have mis-placed the said letter with a view to fasten liability upon him. It was considered as an act of gross negligence of duty rendering him liable to punishment. On May 28, 1976, petitioner submitted his reply Annexure G refuting the allegations. In the same reply, he informed respondent No 4 that respondent No. 5 appears to have mis-placed the said letter with a view to fasten liability upon him. It was also pointed out by the petitioner that on an earlier occasion when the matter with regard to tax money, realised and pocketed by an official of the Board, was brought to the notice of the authorities by the petitioner, instead of taking any action against the said official, entire responsibility was sought to be fastened upon him. Petitioner also informed that there appeared to be some deep-rooted conspiracy against him, therefore, he sought an interview with the members of the Board. 11. On June 2, 1976, petitioner was served with another show-cause notice, Annexure I, with respect to over-writings in toll tax receipts. Reply Annexure J’ was submitted to it by the petitioner on June 10, 1976, not only refuting allegations made against him but also pointing out that ever since he took over the charge of the toll tax barrier, leakage in recovery of tax had almost finished and he had been instrumental in not only realising promptly the toll tax from trucks which used to escape at odd hours but had also been in a position to realise fines Feeling not satisfied with this explanation, the petitioner on June 21, 1976 was warned by respondent No. 4 for the irregularities alleged to have been committed by him. 12. On July 13, 1976, vide notice Annexure M, explanation of the petitioner was sought in having charged 0.50 less by way of toll tax from 11-1/2 passengers. On July 16, 1974, again the petitioner was asked by respondent No. 4 to explain as to why he had remmitted Re. I in excess by way of toll tax realisation. On July 27, 1976, vide notice Annexure P. 1 the petitioner was asked to show-cause as to why action be not taken against him for not depositing in time on July 26, 1976, the amount of toll tax collected on July 24 and 25, 1976. I in excess by way of toll tax realisation. On July 27, 1976, vide notice Annexure P. 1 the petitioner was asked to show-cause as to why action be not taken against him for not depositing in time on July 26, 1976, the amount of toll tax collected on July 24 and 25, 1976. To this the petitioner on July 28, 1976, vide Annexure P-5 gave his reply in detail pointing out that Rs 107 which had been collected by Samuel Sunny, Toll Tax Assistant, on July 24, 1976 after 4 p.m. was taken away by him being Saturday, who informed the petitioner that the amount would be handed over on July 26, 1976, before depositing the amount collection of that day On July 26, 1976, Samuel Sunny did not turn up to hand over the money till 1.10 p m., when the matter was brought to the notice of respondent No. 4 by the petitioner. Mr Samuel on being contacted by the petitioner was not in a position to pay the money and at 3 30 p.m. again the matter was brought to the notice of respondent No, 4 by the petitioner and under his direction, he (petitioner), out of his own pocket, deposited the money before 5 p.m. on July 26, 1976. 13. On July 29, 1976, Annexure P-6, notice was served by respondent No. 4 upon the petitioner calling upon him to explain the reasons of his absence from duty. Reply Annexure P-7 dated July 31, 1976 was sent by the petitioner refuting the allegations. Before this reply was submitted by the petitioner, again on July 30, 1976. Annexure P-7, communication was addressed by the petitioner to respondent No. 4, praying for audience with the President of the Cantonment Board on August 2, 1975, to enable the petitioner to bring to his notice the matters concerning his service etc. 14. On August 1, 1976, respondent No. 4, vide Annexure P-9, conveyed to the petitioner the decision of the Board putting him under suspension pending enquiry. Petitioner was informed that his case would be examined in detail by the enquiry committee. 15. 14. On August 1, 1976, respondent No. 4, vide Annexure P-9, conveyed to the petitioner the decision of the Board putting him under suspension pending enquiry. Petitioner was informed that his case would be examined in detail by the enquiry committee. 15. On August 2, 1976, Annexure P-10, communication was addressed to the petitioner, informing him that as he had failed to submit his T A claim for adjustment, therefore, the amount of advance would be deducted from his pay, On the same day, petitioner submitted his T. A, bill for a sum of Rs. 104.60 towards actual bus fare from Dalhousie to Pathankot and back and the actual rail fare from Pathankot and back and the actual rail fare from Pathankot to Meerut Cantt and back alongwith D A. for four days at the rate of Rs, 12 per day. The petitioner submitted claim for Rs 7 having been spent for rickshaw charges at Pathankot and Meerut Cantt. Respondent No. 4 to this bill on July 6, 1976, raised an objection vide Annexure P-11 that the same could not be sanctioned in the absence of receipts from rickshaw pullers. Again on August 10, 1976, communication Annexure-S was addressed by respondent to the petitioner asking him to produce authority as to on what basis he had claimed daily allowance at the rate of Rs, 12 per day. 16. It was on August 10, 1976 that vide letter Annexure P-12, respondent No 4 asked the petitioner to appear before the enquiry committee on August 11, 1976, in connection with the enquiry against his suspension On the same day, two other letters were addressed to the petitioner. Vide Annexure P-13, petitioner was asked to produce Army Class-f certificate of education and vide Annexure P-14 he was asked to submit return of his property. On August 11, 1976, vide letter Annexure P-15, petitioner was asked to give particulars of the service rendered by him prior to his joining the service of respondent No. 3-Board. Vide Annexures P-16 and P-37 which are dated August 13, 1976 and August 19, 1976, respectively petitioner was asked to expedite the rendering of information called for vide Annexures P-13 and P-14. 17. On August 23, 1976, another show-cause notice was served by respondent No. 4 upon petitioner in connection with toll tax barrier receipts and other office record. Vide Annexures P-16 and P-37 which are dated August 13, 1976 and August 19, 1976, respectively petitioner was asked to expedite the rendering of information called for vide Annexures P-13 and P-14. 17. On August 23, 1976, another show-cause notice was served by respondent No. 4 upon petitioner in connection with toll tax barrier receipts and other office record. In the meanwhile, respondent No. 4 came in contact with one Shiv Singh of Sacred Heart School, Dalhousie, an ex-office Superintendent of the respondent-Board and got from him communication Annexure-I, who while giving some information to respondent No 4 appended a note below this letter to the following effect : — "As a result of my personal discussion with your goodself today I have come to know that certain important papers are missing from his personal File as well as of mine Taking in view of his past and present conduct, he should be straightaway thrown off under the Defence Act. I presume he might have played mischief with the missing documents." 18. It is the case of petitioner that since he had levelled serious allegations of mis-appropriation against respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 6 as regards the Boards Funds etc., they in connivance with the office staff and local traders fabricated further evidence against him. On August 19, 1976, a note was obtained from Daulat Ram addressed by him to the President of the enquiry committee to the effect that after he had appeared as a witness in the enquiry, threat was advanced to him by the petitioner On receipt of this note, respondent No. 4, on the same day made a complaint to the police On the basis of which proceedings under section 10/ of the Code of Criminal Procedure were launched against him in the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Dalhousie, After having come to know of this, petitioner on September 10, 1976, addressed Annexure P-19 communication to respondent No 4 informing that allegations made by Daulat Ram were baseless and it would have been appropriate had he been afforded an opportunity before proceeding further in the matter. On September 20, 1976, petitioner appeared in the proceedings but ultimately vide order Annexure P-18, Sub-Divisional Magistrate on April 20, 1977, ordered the dropping of proceedings. 19. On September 20, 1976, petitioner appeared in the proceedings but ultimately vide order Annexure P-18, Sub-Divisional Magistrate on April 20, 1977, ordered the dropping of proceedings. 19. On August 25, 1976, a note was procured from Satish Kumar, Daftry, by respondent No, 1 to the effect that the petitioner had used abusive language against the office, On August 28 1976, another note was obtained from the said Daftry in which respondent No. 4 was informed that on January 30/1976, the petitioner was seen getting down at Banikhet from Patbankot-Dalhousie bus. According to the petitioner this note was obtained with a view to falsify him with respect to the T. A. bill claim submitted by him that on January 31, 1976, he had performed journey from Meerut to Pathankot. 20. It is the case of the petitioner that evidence was fabricated by respondents No. 4 and 6, after he had been put under suspension, to create a charge of his being indebted to various traders of Dalhousie. In support of this averment communications Annexures F-I dated August 2, 1976, G-i dated August 23, 1976, H-l and I-i both dated August 28, 1976 and J-l dated August 30, 1976 have been produced purported to have been sent by respondent No. 6, Shri Attar Singh Prem Pujari Contractor, Dr. Jagan Nath Palaha, Sohan Lal and Anil Kumar Sharma, respectively to respondent No. 4 pointing out that the petitioner was indebted to each one of them for a sum of Rs. 802 07, Rs. 45000, Rs. 200 00, Rs 57.66 and Rs. 139 02, respectively towards balance price of ration, cloth, medicines etc Incidently, it may be observed here that respondent No. 6 is a local trader at Dalhousie and other persons stated hereinabove are also local traders of Dalhousie. 21. On September 3, 1976. Annexure P-20, letter was sent to the petitioner alleging in subordination and asking him to explain as to why disciplinary action to be not taken against him. The allegations were to the effect that office procedure was not followed while submitting letters for signatures of respondent No, 4. The same were got signed by the petitioner directly from the Cantonment Executive Officer. Details of three letters, allegedly to have been got signed directly by the petitioner on May 10, June 27, and July 19, 1974 were also given. The same were got signed by the petitioner directly from the Cantonment Executive Officer. Details of three letters, allegedly to have been got signed directly by the petitioner on May 10, June 27, and July 19, 1974 were also given. Petitioner replied vide Annexure P-21 pointing out that he on the instructions of the then Executive officer got signed the letters directly. On the same day, yet three other letters, Annexures P-22, P-23 and P-24, were addressed to the petitioner asking him to expedite sending reply to the earlier communications. Through Annexure-P-24, the petitioner was threatened with strict disciplinary action in having made a report to the Intelligence Department against the staff of the Cantonment Board, which conduct of the petitioner was considered as an offence under the Official Secrets Act, 1923 and Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964 Reply, Annexure P-25, was sent by the petitioner to this communication. Vide Annexure P-26, dated September 10, 1976, petitioner in continuation of his letter dated September 9, 1976, informed that complaint made by him to the Intelligence Department was not false but was based on facts and pertained to the mis-use of power by respondent No. 4. An extract from the said communication is reproduced hereunder :— “1. Shri Chatree Ram, Litter coolly an employ of the Board has been engaged by your goodself for doing the domestic work as a private servant and that he takes the lunch of your children to the Convent School daily. 2. Shri William S/o Shri Bawa a sweeper of the Board is engaged to take your children to the school daily and get them back after school hours. 3. The jeep of the Board is being used for private purposes. On 7/9/1976 at 17.40 hours the jeep was taken by you outside the Cantonment area towards Bathree without prior approval or sanction of the GOC-in-Chief, Northern Command which was seen by me just above the Himachal Bus Stand 4. The Jeep of the Bakloh Cantonment was used by your goodself on 4 September, 1976 while coming from Bakloh which was returned back to Bakloh from the Toll Barrier at Banikhet. This jeep was also used by your goodself without prior sanction of the GOC-in-Chief, Northern Command.” 22. The petitioner on August 29, 1976, addressed letter Annexure P-27, to the President of respondent No. 3 Board pointing out numerous irregularities and misappropriation of the Cantonment funds. This jeep was also used by your goodself without prior sanction of the GOC-in-Chief, Northern Command.” 22. The petitioner on August 29, 1976, addressed letter Annexure P-27, to the President of respondent No. 3 Board pointing out numerous irregularities and misappropriation of the Cantonment funds. It is on the basis of the aforementioned narration of events that the petitioner has alleged that the proceedings got initiated and action taken against him was the result of mala fide and false and concocted evidence. 23. In support of his plea of violation of mandatory provisions of rules and failure to adhere to the principles of natural justice while dismissing him from service, the petitioner has highlighted the following circumstances. 24. The charge-sheet was served with a pre judged and pre-determined mind. The penultimate paragraph of the charge-sheet has been relied upon in support of this contention ; which reads as under :— “Under the above circumstances, it is proved beyond doubt that your conduct is unbecoming of a Cantonment Fund Servant. Therefore, you are directed to show cause within 10 days from the receipt of this charge-sheet as to why you should not be dismissed from service, since your continuance in the service is detrimental to the interest of the Board. You are hereby required to submit within 10 days from the receipt of this charge-sheet, a written statement of your defence, if any and to state whether you wish to be heard in person. If you so desire, an oral enquiry shall be held, and at that enquiry, oral evidence shall be heard to such of the allegations as are not admitted and you shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses to give evidence in person and to such witnesses called as you may wish, proved that the oral enquiry committee for special and sufficient reasons refuse to call a witness. A list of defence witnesses and further documents required by you if any, should be supplied to the Executive Officer alongwith your written statement of defence." 25. On August 10, 1976, petitioner was put under suspension. On September 2, 1976, charge-sheet was served imputing as many as seven charges. Misappropriation of Cantonment funds was not one of the charges. On September 12, 1976, Annexure P-31, reply to the charges was submitted by the petitioner. On August 10, 1976, petitioner was put under suspension. On September 2, 1976, charge-sheet was served imputing as many as seven charges. Misappropriation of Cantonment funds was not one of the charges. On September 12, 1976, Annexure P-31, reply to the charges was submitted by the petitioner. Instead of enquiring into the charges, by mere perusal of the same, decision, Annexure R/8 was taken on September 18, 1976 to dismiss him from service. The resolution of respondent No. 3 in extenso may be quoted as under :— "Letter of Shri Bir Bahadur Thapa dated 12/9/1976 has been gone into in detail and it is resolved that his continuance and retention in the Contonment Board service is not in the interest of the Board and is detrimental to the efficient administration of the Board. Hence, he should be dismissed from service. 10 days notice be issued to him, asking him to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from the service. Show cause notice to be served on Shri Bir Bahadur Thapa, placed before the Board as at Appendix A is approved." (Emphasis supplied) 26. After this decision, the petitioner was served, on the same day, with letter Annexure P-32, which also deserves to be quoted below to appreciate his contention : "Based on the Charge-sheet issued to you vide this office letter No. CBD/2/BBT/1 dated 2/9/1976 and your reply dated 12/9/1976 to the charge-sheet, the Board finds you guilty of following i — (a) Absence from duty on 29/7/1976. (b) Taking away a building plan and letters of Compounders seeking for appointment in Cantonment Board Hospital to your residence without any authority. (c) Tampering following Toll Tax receipts— Receipt No. 82/42, dated 20/5/1976 Receipt No. 82/70, dated 20/5/1976 Receipt No. 82/180, dated 24/5/1976 Receipt No. 82/201, dated 24/5/1976 Receipt No. 82/268, dated 26/5/1976 Receipt No. 82/334, dated 28/5/1976 (d) Deceiving Board regarding educational qualifications. (e) Unauthorised acquisition of immovable property and indebtedness. 2. You stated in your letter dated 12/9/1976 that you do not want to be heard in person, 3. The Board resolved that your continuance and retention in the service is not in the interest of the Board and resolved that you should be dismissed from the service. 4. (e) Unauthorised acquisition of immovable property and indebtedness. 2. You stated in your letter dated 12/9/1976 that you do not want to be heard in person, 3. The Board resolved that your continuance and retention in the service is not in the interest of the Board and resolved that you should be dismissed from the service. 4. You are hereby required to show cause within 10 days from the receipt of this letter as to why you should not be dismissed from the service." (Emphasis supplied) 27. On receipt of the above communication, the petitioner prayed for supplying him a copy of the Boards resolution to enable him to file reply to the same but he was not supplied the same. On October 7, 1976 respondent No. 3f passed the following resolution, dismissing the petitioner from service with immediate effect. The resolution reads as under :— "Resolution.—It is resolved that the Board is of the opinion that the retention of Shri Bir Bahadur Thapa, Toll Tax Clerk, the Cantonment Board Service is detrimental to the efficient administration of the Cantonment and his continuance in the service is not in the interest of the Board because of following charges :— (a) Misappropriation of Cantonment Fund Money on 26-7-1976. (b) Absence from duty on 29-7-1976, (c) Taking away a building plan of Survey No. 54 and applications of compounders seeking appointment in Cantonment Board Hospital to his residence without any authority, (d) Tampering following Toll Tax Receipts. Receipt No. 82/42, dated 20-5-1976 Receipt No. 82/70, dated 20-5-1976 Receipt No. 82/180, dated 24-5-1976 Receipt No, 82/201, dated 24-5-1976 Receipt No. 82/268, dated 26-5-1976 Receipt No. 82/334, dated 28-5-1976 (e) Deceiving Board regarding educational qualification. (f) Unauthorised acquisition of immovable property and indebtedness. As such, Shri Bir Bahadur Thapa, Toll Tax Clerk is dismissed from the Cantonment Board service with immediate effect i. e. 7-10-1976 (A. N.) Final order of dismissal to be served on Shri Bir Bahadur Thapa placed before the Board is at Appendix ‘A is approved." In pursuance to the above resolution, order Annexure P-34 was served upon the petitioner. 28. On the strength of the above averments, it has been contended by the petitioner that mandatory procedure contained in Rules 11 and 12 of the rules has not at all been followed. 28. On the strength of the above averments, it has been contended by the petitioner that mandatory procedure contained in Rules 11 and 12 of the rules has not at all been followed. Neither the charges levelled against him were enquired into as provided in Rule 12, nor he was afforded an opportunity of being heard Charge of mis-appropriation of Cantonment funds was not one of the charges in the charge-sheet. The same was also not the subject-matter when the Board took its decision Annexure R-8 on September 18, 1976 and the same could not have been made the basis of final resolution dated October 7, 1976. 29. The writ petition has been contested by the respondents, who have filed separate replies respondents No. 1 to 3 have filed their reply on the affidavit of Shri B. A, Thayalan, Cantonment Officer, Dalhousie Cantonment Board and respondents No, 4 to 6 have filed their joint return on their respective affidavits. The stand taken by the respondents is almost similar An objection that the writ petition suffers from delay and laches has been taken alleging that the writ petition has filed after a period of almost of two years of the passing of the final order by the Govt of India, Ministry of Defence on November 6, 1979, which was communicated to the petitioner on September 15,1979. It has been contended that grounds explaining inordinate delay are totally false, flimsy and baseless and do not merit consideration. On merits, the contention is that the petitioner was rightly dismissed from service as he was found guilty of having misappropriated the Cantonment funds which finding had been arrived at in an enquiry conducted in accordance with the provisions of the rules and the charges levelled against the petitioner in the charge-sheet stood duly proved. The petitioner was given full opportunity to defend himself in consonance with the principles of natural justice and since the petitioner had declined to avail of the opportunity of personal hearing, it was not necessary to hold further enquiry in support of the charges. 30. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records. The objection with regard to delay and laches deserves to be dealt with in the first instance. It was almost after two years of the passing of the final order that the writ petition was filed. 30. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the records. The objection with regard to delay and laches deserves to be dealt with in the first instance. It was almost after two years of the passing of the final order that the writ petition was filed. Petitioner in para 27 of the petition has explained the circumstances explaining the delay. According to him, after the receipt of order Annexure P-38 in the third week of November 1979, legal advice was sought by him at Chamba, which he could not get till September 1980, when late Shri Des Raj Mahajan, Advocate, advised him to contact Shri D. K. Khanna, Advocate at Shimla. On being contacted Shri Khanna wanted all the relevant documents in order to highlight the plea of mala fide on the part of respondents No. 4 to 6 including certified copy of the judgment of the court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate dated April 20, 1977, in proceedings under section 107, Cr. P. C. After collecting the information and obtaining necessary documents, petitioner reached Shimla on January 10, 1981. Since the High Court was to close for winter vacation, he was advised to have the record got typed. The petitioner decided to get the same cyclostyled daring the winter vacation of the High Court After vacation, the petitioner learnt that Mr. Khanna had met with an accident at Ahmedabad and was not available at Shimla. In April 1981, the petitioner brought the entire material to the office of Mr. Khanna and kept the record there but Mr. Khanna was not available. In the month of July 1981, Mr. Khanna was in a position to draft the writ petition but it was noticed by him that the Annexures required to be attached to the writ petition had neither been typed/cyclostyled on one side of the paper nor on the requisite judicial paper as prescribed under the rules of the High Court. Mr. Khanna desired the petitioner to procure judicial papers from Dalhousie and get the Annexures typed/cyclostyled thereon and asked to contact him after summer vacation of the High Court. Due to the serious illness of his wife, the petitioner could not contact his counsel immediately after June 21,1931 and it was only on October 9, 1981 that he could reach Shimla and file the writ petition on October 10, 1981. 31. Due to the serious illness of his wife, the petitioner could not contact his counsel immediately after June 21,1931 and it was only on October 9, 1981 that he could reach Shimla and file the writ petition on October 10, 1981. 31. As noticed above, according to the respondent, the grounds set out explaining the delay are only flimsy and are not sufficient enough to enable this Court to exercise discretion in his favour as the petitioner has not acted bonafide. It has further been contended that in order to get relief under the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, he ought to have approached the Court without any delay and not later than one year of the passing of the final order and since the petitioner has come up after two years, in the absence of satisfactory explanation of delay, the petition deserves dismissal. 32. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that since the writ petition was admitted in the presence of the learned Counsel for the respondents and in case such a plea of laches is allowed to permitted to be raised and to prevail at this stage of the proceedings when the writ petition has been pending for long, it can put the petitioner beyond limitation even for pursuing the alternate remedy by way of suit. Another submission made on behalf of the petitioner was that delay is not an absolute bar and since he bad given reasonable and probable explanation for the delay in invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, the relief should not be refused on a technical objection, more particularly, when the impugned order is void and nullity because of violation of mandatory provisions of law and the petitioner had approached the Court within a period of three years of the final order, which period is prescribed for filing suit in a civil court for claiming a decree for declaration even if it is termed to be voidable order. 33. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that since the writ petition once had been admitted in the presence of the respondents cannot be entertained at this stage is not sustainable, since we find that there is nothing on the record to show that the question of delay and laches was considered when the writ petition was filed or admitted. The writ petition came up before the Division Bench only on November 9, 1981, when it was admitted. It was not admitted after a show-cause notice. Respondents had not filed their return till then Question of delay and laches was neither agitated, nor it was noticed Since there was no adjudication of such a plea at the time of admission, we see no ground for debarring the respondents to urge the plea of delay and laches at this stage In our view we are fortified by a decision of a Hull Bench of this Court in Shamsher Singh Kanwar and another v. The Union of India etc, ILR 1973 HP 10 6, wherein it was held that a decision by the Court on a question of laches at the time of admitting a writ petition cannot bar the respondent, who was not heard in the matter at that stage, from raising a plea of laches during final hearing of the writ petition. 34. The next question requiring consideration is whether in the absence of any specific statutory rule prescribing a period of limitat ion for filing the petition for writs of certiorari under Art 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court will be justified in rejecting a petition for writ of such a nature, if the same is not filed within a period of six months or one year of the final order as suggested by the learned Counsel for the respondents. There is no limitation prescribed for petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is well settled that under Article 226 the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ is discretionary and powers under Article 27 are not greater than the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Grant of relief being discretionary, it can be refused on the ground of delay and laches The Full Bench in Shamsher Singh Kanwars case (supra) cited with approval the doctrine of laches from Corpus Scandum, Vol. 30-A, para 115 pp. 31.43, as follows :— "The doctrine of laches is founded in equity. It provides a defence in equity and has existed as such since the beginning of equity. It cannot be invoked where the statute prescribes a period of limitation In contrast with a statute limitation, equity does not fix a specific period but considers the circumstances of each case. 31.43, as follows :— "The doctrine of laches is founded in equity. It provides a defence in equity and has existed as such since the beginning of equity. It cannot be invoked where the statute prescribes a period of limitation In contrast with a statute limitation, equity does not fix a specific period but considers the circumstances of each case. The doctrine of laches is based on the injustice which might result from the enforcement of long neglected rights, the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of ascertaining the truth of the matters in controversy and doing justice between the parties, and on grounds of public policy, its aim being the discouragement for the peace and repose of society, of stale and antiquated demands and it is based on the maxims : Nothing can call equity into activity but conscience, good faith, and diligence, Equity aids the vigilant not those who slumber on their rights. He who seeks equity must do equity, and, he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations and is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In determining whether in any particular case there ate laches, consideration must be given to the element of laches, and to various incidental matters, notably the relation of the party charged with laches to the right in controversy, the character of the evidence by which plaintiffs right is sought to be established, the nature of the right asserted and the relief asked, and the nature of the proceeding resorted to......” 35. The Supreme Court in Narayani Debt Khaitan v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No MO of 1964 decided on September 22, 1964, ruled that no bard and fast rules can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. This being a matter which must be left to the discretion of the High Court and like all matters left to the discretion of the Court, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. 36. This being a matter which must be left to the discretion of the High Court and like all matters left to the discretion of the Court, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. 36. While approving the ratio in the case of Narayani Debt Khaitan’s case (supra), it held in Durga Prasad v Chief Controller of Import and Export, AIR 1970 SC 769, that it is essential that persons who are aggrieved by the orders of Government should approach the High Court after exhausting the remedies provided by law, rule or order with utmost expedition. One ground for refusing relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner has filed ihe petition after inordinate delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation. 37. The Supreme Court in M/s, Trilokchand Motichand and others v. H. B. Munshi Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay and another, AIR 1970 SC 898, while considering the question as to whether any period of limitation could be fixed for entertaining petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution, held that the court would not inquire into belated and stale claims or take note of evidence of neglect of ones own rights for a long time The party claiming Fundamental Rights must move the court before other rights of innocent parties emerge by reason of delay on the part of the person moving the court. The court held that there is no period prescribed for filing such petitions but each case has to be examined on its own merits and the question is one of discretion of the court to follow from case to case. Standard of utmost expedition was considered as sine qua non for such claims. It was ruled that the party aggrieved must move the court at the earliest possible time and explain satisfactorily all semblance of delay In paras 10 and 11 of the report, it held :— "If then there is no period prescribed what is the standard for this Court to follow ? I should say that utmost expedition is the sine qua non for such claims. The party aggrieved must move the Court at the earliest possible time and explain satisfactorily ail semblance of delay, I am not indicating any period which may be regarded as the ultimate limit of action for that would be taking upon myself legislative functions. I should say that utmost expedition is the sine qua non for such claims. The party aggrieved must move the Court at the earliest possible time and explain satisfactorily ail semblance of delay, I am not indicating any period which may be regarded as the ultimate limit of action for that would be taking upon myself legislative functions. In England a period of 6 months has been provided statutorily, but that could be because there is no guaranteed remedy and the matter is one entirely of discretion. In India I will only say that each case will have to be considered on its own facts. Where there is appearance of avoidable delay and this delay affects the merits of the claim, this Court will consider it and in a proper case hold the party disentitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction. Therefore, the question is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit. A case may be brought within Limitation Act by reason of some article but this Court need not necessarily give the total time to the litigant to move this Court under Art 32. Similarly in a suitable case this Court may entertain such a petition even after a lapse of time. It will all depend on what the breach of the Fundamental Right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose.” 38. In the case of Kamini Kumar Das Chaudhary v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 20609 which was a case of a dismissed employee, who filed petition after a period of three years of his dismissal, the question of delay and laches was considered by the apex Court holding : “the rule that delay defeats the rights of a party to seek redress, by means of prerogative writ under Article 226 of the Constitution, could be held to be abrogated merely because, if the claim had been brought in a Civil Court, the period of limitation would not have expired. The question in such cases is always whether relief under Article 226 of the Constitution could more justly and properly be given than by leaving the parties to the ordinary remedy of a suit. The question in such cases is always whether relief under Article 226 of the Constitution could more justly and properly be given than by leaving the parties to the ordinary remedy of a suit. A case in which a tax is imposed under a clearly void Saw is different from one where seriously contested questions of fact have to be decided before an order of dismissal could be held to be void- In the case before us, the most that the High Court could have done was to quash the order of dismissal and to leave the authorities free to take proceedings afresh against the appellant. The appellant would then have got another long period of years in front of him to go on contesting the validity of proceedings against him until he bad gone past the age of retirement in such cases, it is imperative, if the petitioner wants to invoke the extraordinary remedies available under Article 226 of the Constitutions that he should come to Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. If there is delay in getting an adjudication a suit for damages actually sustained by wrongful dismissal may become the more or even the only appropriate means of redress. Every case depends upon its own facts.” 39. In the case of Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and others v. The State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1974 SC 259, while considering the question of delay and laches in presenting writ petition challenging the order of promotions, the Supreme Court, following the ratio in Trilokchand Motichands case (supra) held that the rule which says that a court may not inquire into belated or stale claims is not a rule of law but rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. The question is one of discretion to be followed on the facts of each case. It also held that the principle on which the court proceeding in refusing relief to the petitioner on the ground of lashes or delay is that the rights which have accrued to the others by reasons of delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay. 40. It also held that the principle on which the court proceeding in refusing relief to the petitioner on the ground of lashes or delay is that the rights which have accrued to the others by reasons of delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay. 40. In the case of P. S. Sadashivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1976 (!) SLR 53, which has been relied upon by the respondents, the Supreme Court held that no period of limitation has been prescribed within which a party may approach the court for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. However, after considering the facts of that case, in which an order of promotion had been challenged, it gave a word of caution by observing that a person aggrieved by an order of promoting Juniors over his head should approach the court atleast within a period of six months or at the most one year of such promotion. It did not lay down in the said judgment that the jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot be exercised at all in a case in which petition has been filed after a lapse of one year as contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents. 41 In an earlier judgment in Chandra Bhushan v. Deputy Director Consolidation, U. P. AIR 196? SC 1272, it was observed that a rule of practice cannot prescribe a binding rule of limitation. It may only indicate how discretion will be exercised by the Court in determining whether having regard to the circumstances of the case, the applicant has been guilty of laches or undue delay. 42. In the light of the principles laid down in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar s and Trilokchand Motichands cases (supra), it has to be seen as to whether due to delay in filing the petition any right hasaccrued in favour of the respondents that they would be prejudicially affected in case the writ petition is entertained and decided on its merits and whether there is satisfactory explanation for the delay. 43. In the case in hand, as will be observed in the later part of the judgment we find and are of the view that the impugned orders of dismissal of the petitioner are void due to the breach of the mandatory provisions of rules and the same are of no legal existence. 43. In the case in hand, as will be observed in the later part of the judgment we find and are of the view that the impugned orders of dismissal of the petitioner are void due to the breach of the mandatory provisions of rules and the same are of no legal existence. Even the explanation offered by the petitioner, in view of what has been mentioned above is satisfactory and cannot be said to be unreasonable one, since we find that at no stage the petitioner slept over the matter. The details given by him explaining the delay are plausible. 44. It is not disputed by the respondents that petitioner did not try to seek legal advice from local lawyer at Chamba, who referred him to Shimla to contact Mr Khanna. it is also not disputed that Mr. Khanna could not come to Shimla after winter vacations due to his serious Sent or that thereafter the writ of the petitioner did not fall ill. Nori2htAccrued to the respondents by reason of delay in filing the writ petition. The Supreme Court in the State of Madhya Pradesh v Syed Qamarali 1967 SLR 228 held a suit for recovery of pay filed after seven years of dismissal to be within a period of limitation since the order of dismissal was found To have been made in breach of mandatory provisions of rules, which was held to be void and of no legal assistance. 45. Even if it be assumed that the order of dismissal cannot be termed to be void but was voidable and was required to be set aside, even in that case the period of limitation prescribed under the law of limitation for setting aside avoidable order under the residuary Article 113 of the Limitation Act is three years and not one year as contended on behalf of the respondents. Since the petition was filed within a period of two years of the passing of final order, it cannot be said that limitation for filing the suit in a civil court for setting aside the impugned orders had already expired when the writ petition was instituted in this Court. 46. Since the petition was filed within a period of two years of the passing of final order, it cannot be said that limitation for filing the suit in a civil court for setting aside the impugned orders had already expired when the writ petition was instituted in this Court. 46. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case we are of the clear opinion that there is no inordinate delay in filing the writ petition by the petitioner and there is no element of laches in presenting the same The petitioner has successfully and satisfactorily explained the delay, which explanation we hereby accept. Now coming to the merits of the case. The attack of the petitioner is two-fold. Firstly, that there has been violation of the mandatory provisions of rules while passing the impugned orders of dismissal and secondly that the entire proceedings are mala fide. The petitioner in the matter of service was governed by the rules. Rule 11 thereof, inter alia, provides that penalty of removal or dismissal from the Boards service made for good and sufficient reasons which are to be recorded in writing, be imposed on a servant by the Board. A proviso to this rule further envisages that no servant shall be removed or dismissed otherwise than on proof of dishonesty or of repeated neglect or disobedience of order, or continued inefficiency or of insolvency or habitual indebtedness or of any other circumstance by reason of which the Board may be of an opinion that his retention in service would be detrimental to the efficient administration of the Board. 47. Rule 12 which deals with the procedure to be followed before an order of dismissal is passed, reads as under : "12. 47. Rule 12 which deals with the procedure to be followed before an order of dismissal is passed, reads as under : "12. (1) No order of dismissal, removal or reduction shall be passed on a servant (other than an order passed on facts which have led to his conviction in a criminal court) unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action, and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges, which shall be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and of any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the case, and a list of documents and witnesses by which each charge is to be sustained. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in a written statement of his defence and to State whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires or if the authority appointing the servant so directs an oral inquiry shall be held. At that enquiry oral evidence shall be heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted, and the person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses to give wish provided that the authority conducting the enquiry may, for special and sufficient reason to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. The proceedings shall be completed within a period of four months from the date of suspension of the servant or communication of the charge or charges on which it is proposed to take action against him, whichever is earlier; Provided that on representation by the Board supported by reasons for the delay in completion of the proceedings, the Officer Commanding-in-Chief the Command may, if he thinks fit extend the period for completion of the proceedings, whether the aforesaid period of four months has expired or not. (2) A copy of the findings and grounds thereof shall be delivered to the servant personally or by registered post. (2) A copy of the findings and grounds thereof shall be delivered to the servant personally or by registered post. (3) In the event of the servant appealing, the whole proceedings, together with his service book, if any, shall be forwarded with the memorandum of appeal (4) The provisions of sub-rule (1) and (2) shall not apply where the person concerned has absconded, or where it is for other reasons impracticably to communicate with him ; and where there is a difficulty in observing fully the requirements of the said sub-rules all or any of the provisions of the said sub-rules may, for special and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, be waived, if no injustice is likely to be caused to the person charged." 48. A reading of the rule shows that before an order of dismissal is passed, a person has to be informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action He is to be afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself The grounds are to be reduced in the form of charges, which are required to be communicated in writing to him with the statement of allegations on which each charge is based and the circumstances which it proposes to take into consideration in passing the order. Thereafter the servant is required to put in a written statement of his defence within a reasonable time and to State as to whether he desires to be heard in person If the person so desires or if the authority appointing so directs, an enquiry is required to be held in which oral evidence is to be led on such of the allegations which are not admitted. In the said inquiry an opportunity is to be afforded to cross-examine the witnesses and to lead evidence in defence Record of such evidence is required to be maintained. Copy of finding of enquiry is required to be delivered to the person against whom action is proposed to be taken. 49. As we have noticed in the earlier part of the judgment, petitioner was placed under suspension pending enquiry, on August 1, 1976, Charge-sheet Annexure P-3 was served upon him on September 2, i976 Written statement of his defence to the charges Annexure P-31 was submitted by the petitioner en September 12, 1976. 49. As we have noticed in the earlier part of the judgment, petitioner was placed under suspension pending enquiry, on August 1, 1976, Charge-sheet Annexure P-3 was served upon him on September 2, i976 Written statement of his defence to the charges Annexure P-31 was submitted by the petitioner en September 12, 1976. On September 18, 1976, notice Annexure P-32 was served upon the petitioner informing him that the Board had found him guilty, which decision was arrived at by it on the perusal of reply submitted by the petitioner. He was asked to show cause as to why he be not dismissed. On October 7, 1976, Annexure P-34, order was passed dismissing the petitioner from service. No enquiry whatsoever was held as envisaged in Rule 12 of the rules although in the order of suspension as well as in charge-sheet Annexure P-3, it was clearly stated that an enquiry would be held with respect to such of the charges which are not admitted, in which it was proposed to examine number of witnesses. The petitioner in his written statement did not admit any of the charges. The charges were not inquired into, nor any opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to lead any defence. The contention of the respondents is that another enquiry was held, of which Annexure P-29 is the report dated September 7, 1976 and doling that enquiry the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and lead his defence in which he was found to have mis-appropriated Cantonment funds. We find that mis-appropriation of Cantonment funds was not one of the charges on which it was proposed to take action against the petitioner. This enquiry was not directed against the petitioner on any of the charges referred to in the charge-sheet (Annexure P-3) but was a sort of general investigation to find out the involvement of the officials of the Board in the matter of mis-appropriation of Cantonment funds. This enquiry preceded the serving of charge-sheet upon the petitioner and was merely an investigation. This enquiry preceded the serving of charge-sheet upon the petitioner and was merely an investigation. Before initiating this enquiry, neither any charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner, nor the procedure contained in Rule 12 was followed Charges served upon the petitioner were other than those which were the subject-matter of this enquiry During the course of the hearing of the writ petition, we had asked the learned Counsel for the respondent to make available the original record so as to enable us to ascertain as to whether any enquiry followed after serving the charge sheet Annexure P-3. It was fairly conceded by the learned Counsel for the respondent that no such enquiry as envisaged under Rule 12 of the rules was conducted after the charges had been served upon the petitioner and the investigation which was conducted prior to serving of charges as well as the scope thereof was not the same which was the subject-matter of the charge-sheet. . 50. In view of this we find that the impugned order of dismissal, Annexure P-34, has been passed in clear violation of the mandatory provision of Rules 11 and 12. It was, however urged by the learned Counsel for the respondents that since the petitioner had in his reply Annexure P-31 stated that he did not want an opportunity of being heard in person therefore, it was not necessary for the Board to have held an enquiry as envisaged in Rule 12, This contention has been made merely to be rejected. The relevant portion of the reply Annexure P-31 reads as under :— "In the light of above, I beg to state that I do not want to be heard in person as it will be merely a khana puri business as it is evident from the various letters issued to me from time to time that the Cantonment Board authority are trying their best to dismiss me and my all efforts will be in vain " 51. Reading of the entire contents of Annexure P-31 coupled with the above quoted portion, are indicative of a situation where the petitioner can be said to have lost all patience and being a frustrated person stated that since the Board by already disclosing its mind before preparing charge-sheet to dismiss him from service and thereafter, without framing any charge, enquiry was got conducted from a committee of which respondent No. 6 was one of the members against whom serious allegations of financial irregularities had been levelled by him, therefore, giving him personal hearing would be nothing but a farce Assuming that the petitioner had declined any personal hearing, it cannot be said that it gave any right to the Board to act contrary to rules Proviso to Rule 11 as discussed above says that no servant shall be removed or dismissed otherwise than on proof of dishonesty, neglect, inefficiency, insolvency, habitual indebtedness etc Proof of such charges imply proof on enquiry on evidence in which proper opportunity is afforded Mere allegation without anything further cannot take the place of proof of allegations. 52. The events occurring after the petitioner had been put under suspension on August 1, 1976, till the date when he was dismissed from service as has elaborately been stated while dealing with the facts of the case above, are sufficient to conclude that dismissal of petitioner was due to mala fides on the part of respondents Nos. 4 to 6 Evidence appears to have been created, solicited and fabricated to implicate him on false pretexts. There was nothing against the petitioner till he proceeded on leave in the month of February, 1976 The letter which respondent No. 4 procured from a retired Cantonment Executive Officer, Annexure L is indicative of the mind of respondent No. 4, who denied the allegation that the petitioner at any point of time was asked by him to drive the Boards jeep in addition to his own duties. The letter Annexure L dated August 24, 1976 supports the version of the petitioner that in addition to his own duties he was asked to drive the Boardss jeep and in view of the petitioners driving the same necessity of additional driver was not felt at that time. The letter Annexure L dated August 24, 1976 supports the version of the petitioner that in addition to his own duties he was asked to drive the Boardss jeep and in view of the petitioners driving the same necessity of additional driver was not felt at that time. Respondent No. 6 against whom very serious allegations of financial irregularities in Cantonment funds bad been levelled by the petitioner in August, 1976 appears to have collected evidence about the petitioners indebtedness Respondent No. 6 is a local trader in Dalhousie. Appendix F-I to J-I are the chits/ letters from him and other traders, all addressed to respondent No. 4 on various dates in August with almost similar wordings, leaving no manner of doubt that ground of petitioner being indebted to them was being created. Letters which originated after the petitioner joined his duties on availing leave are addressed to him by respondent No. 4 bringing out old and stale matters as an excuse for initiating disciplinary proceedings against him on one pretext or the other. Circumstances of the case are such which leave no manner of doubt that the action against the petitioner was the outcome of prejudicial mind of respondent No. 4 against him for various reasons which the petitioner has tried to highlight in Annexures P-26 and P-27 53. We have mentioned in brief about the mala fides which are writ large on the face of record simply in order to project the prejudicial mind vith which respondent No 4 appears to have been acting. Otherwise as proved on record, we have held that the impugned order Annexure P-34 dismissing the petitioner from the Boards service is not only against the principles of natural justice but also in violation of the mandatory provisions of the rules. 54. The jurisdiction of this Court being supervisory and limited to see that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It is not of a Court of appeal over the decisions of the authorities holding a departmental inquiry. It is concerned to determine whether the inquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to procedure prescribed in that behalf and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. It is not of a Court of appeal over the decisions of the authorities holding a departmental inquiry. It is concerned to determine whether the inquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to procedure prescribed in that behalf and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The order can be quashed and set aside if it is found that the same had been passed in violation of statutory provisions of law or in violation of principles of natural justice or by an authority not competent to do it Since, we find that the order had been passed against the petitioner in utter violation of the procedure laid down in Rule 12 of the rules and that too on the grounds which were not made the subject-matter of charge-sheet, we quash and set aside the order of dismissal. Annexure P-34 and subsequent orders as well. 55. Since we have quashed and set aside the order of dismissal, the consequences which shall follow are that the petitioner will be deemed to have continued in the service with all consequential benefits. We have been informed that during the pendency of the writ petition the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation, therefore, he will be entitled to all consequential benefits, such as arrears of pay and other pensionary benefits available in accordance with law, as if the impugned orders had not been passed. 56. The petitioner shall have his costs of this petition which are quantified at Rs. 1,000. Set aside the dismissal order.