Judgment :- The petitioners in all these writ petitions have challenged the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the Government to acquire the lands of about an extent of 1655.92 acres or thereabouts under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter referred to as the Act ’ , for the purpose of setting up an Aromatic Complex and other petro based downstream projects of Madras Refineries Limited, hereinafter referred to as ‘M.R.L. ‘at the approximate cost of Rs.2,500 crores, by invoking the urgency provisions Sec.17(1) and (4) of the Act, while issuing Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act. Since petitioners have raised common grounds in challenging the acquisition proceedings, all writ petitions were heard and disposed of together. 2. In view of the heavy demand for the lands in Manali Village for setting up of an Aromatic complex and other petro-based downstream projects, close to M.R.L., the Government proposed to acquire a large extent of lands situate in six villages viz., Mathur, Manali, Vaikkadu, Amullavoyal, Kosappur and Elanth-acheri Villages. The Government constituted official Committee and that the Committee made a joint inspection of all these villages and identified the patta and poramboke lands to the extent of 1655 and odd acres for setting the aforesaid projects. After analysing the various issues like pollution and environmental implications etc., the Committee took a decision and made recommendations to set up Aromatic complex and other petro based downstream projects with sufficient safeguard therefor. Thereafter, based on the recommendations, the Government by G.O.Ms. No.648, Industries (MID-I) Department, dated 16.9.1989, accorded administrative sanction acquisition/transfer of 1655.92 acres of patta and poramboke lands in the aforesaid villages as detailed hereunder under Part II of the Act. Name of the Village Extent. Mathur 488.79 acres Kosappur 331.42 acres Mullavoyal 304.36 acres Vaikkadu 429.33 acres Elanthancheri 5.74 acres Manali 96.28 acres Total extent --------- 1,655.92 acres. 3. The Government also requested the District Revenue Officer, Chengai-Anna District send necessary land acquisition proposals, for acquisition of the aforesaid lands under Act. It is also provided therein that out of the total extent of lands ordered for acquisition expenses towards cost of an extent of 1015 acres of land including establishment charges thereto could be collected from Madras Refineries Limited and in respect of organisations, as per the present land policy lease rent could be collected from the industries to whom the lands are allotted. It is also specified that the Government nominated SIPCOT Madras, as NODAL AGENCY to coordinate the work relating to the land acquisition allotment of lands to various industries. 4. Soon after the administrative sanction was accorded for acquisition, the Government received representations from the general public and associations pleading for dropping acquisition proceedings. The Government, after due consideration of the representations, their Letter No.590/90-5 (MIDI), dated 7.11.1990 ordered for the exclusion of 49.91 acres land in Mathur Village and rejected the request for outright dropping of the acquisition entire lands in Mathur Village. The Government considered that the lands under acquisition are intended for setting up a major industrial aromatic complex and other downstream projects at a then estimated cost of Rs.1,380 crores in the interest of industrial development of the State and of the public at large. It aims at creation of great employment potential both for skilled and unskilled in addition to the economic development of the State In to establish such an industrial complex early, It was felt essential to provide infrastructure facilities such as road, power supply, water etc., which could be done only entering upon the land intended for the establishment of the industries. The M.R.L., which one of the major participants of the industrial complex, obtained letter of intent for project and requested the land required for the establishment of the project urgently aim of the Government was to promote employment potential and the consequent economic development in the field of petro chemicals for which the feed stock was then available in the adjacent refinery. In order to establish such an industrial complex early, was felt that all infrastructural facilities should be provided at the earliest point of time. was also felt that the establishment of an aromatic complex is a major project and that project could not brook the delay that might be occasioned as a result of holding enquiry contemplated under Sec.5-A of the Act. The experience in the past shows that in a number of cases the landowners have indulged in dilatory tactics thereby delaying the enquiry long period and that the provision of infrastructural facilities cannot brook the delay as lead to escalation of cost and also affect the economic development of the State. The experience in the past shows that in a number of cases the landowners have indulged in dilatory tactics thereby delaying the enquiry long period and that the provision of infrastructural facilities cannot brook the delay as lead to escalation of cost and also affect the economic development of the State. Government considered that any further delay would hamper the setting up of the early and consequently invoked the urgency provisions of the Act for acquiring the lands question. In the circumstances, the Government issued Notification under Sec.4(1) Act, invoking the urgency provisions under Sec.17(1) and (4) of the Act G.O.Ms.Nos.1387, 1388, 1389 and 1390, Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 4.12.1990; G.O.Ms.No.1244 to 1247, Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 13.11.1990; G.O.Ms.No.1314 to 1318, Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 20.11.1990 G.O.Ms.No.1398 to 1401, Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 4.12.1990 in respect lands situated in Mathur Village; G.O.Ms.Nos.1182 and 1183, Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 31.10.1990 in respect of the lands situated in Manali Village; G.O.Ms.No.963, Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 12.9.1990 in respect of the lands situated in Vaikkadu Village; G.O.Ms.No.1263, Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 14.11.1990, G.O.Ms.No.774, Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 31.7.1990, G.O.Ms.No.896, Industries Department, dated 27.8.1990, G.O.Ms.No.903 Industries (MIDI) Department, 28.8.1990; G.O.Ms.No.1187 and 1188, Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 31.10.1990; G.O.Ms.No.964, Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 10.9.1990; G.O.Ms.No.1197, Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 1.11.1996 and G.O.Ms.No.1263, Industries Department, dated 14.11.1990 in respect of the lands situated in Amullavoyal G.O.Ms.No.703, Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 10.7.1990; G.O.Ms.No.767, Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 30.7.1990; G.O.Ms.No.749, Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 24.7.1990 and G.O.Ms.No.769, Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 30.7.1990 in respect of the lands situated in Kosappur Village and the Government Order runs as follows: “Whereas it appears to the Government of Tamil Nadu that the lands specified in schedule below and situated in Mathur Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengai Anna District needed for the purpose to wit for the purpose of setting up an aromatic complex downstream projects of Madras Refineries Limited, notice to the effect is hereby given to whom it may concern in accordance with the provisions of Sub-sec.1 of Sec.4 of the Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1894)---- And whereas it has become necessary to acquire the immediate possession of the specified below the Government of Tamil Nadu hereby directs that the lands be acquired under the provisions of Sub-sec.1 of Sec.17 of the said Act. Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred in Sub-sec.2 of Sec.4 of the said Act, Government of Tamil Nadu hereby authorised the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) VI Aromatic Complex, (M.R.L.) 4, Jeenis Road, Saidapet, Madras-15, his staff and workmen to exercise the powers concurred by the said sub section Under Sub-sec.4 of Sec.17 of the said Act the Government of Tamil Nadu hereby directs in view of the urgency of the case, the provision of Sec.5(a) of the said Act shall not apply this case.” In these circumstances, the petitioners in all these writ petitions have filed the above petitions for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the Notification under Sec.4(1) Act in the aforesaid Government Orders, including that of G.O.Ms.No.648, Industries (MID Department, dated 16.9.1989 wherein the Government accorded administrative sanction this behalf. 5. Mr.R.Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in W.P.No.1444 of 1991 contended that there is a long delay after the Government Order, G.O.Ms.No.648, Industries (MID-I) Department, dated 16.9.1989 according administrative sanction acquiring the lands of about an extent of 1655.92 acres of patta and poramboke lands in villages specified therein, in issuing Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act invoking therein the provisions of Sec.17(1) and (4) of the Act. Learned senior counsel further contended that G.O.Ms.No.648/89, referred to above, do not state any reason to invoke the urgency clause and that the impugned Notifications deprived the petitioners ’ right to put forth their objections against the proposed acquisition. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that there is really no need to dispense with the enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act and that existence of urgency is not furnished and is not explained and that the first respondent, the Government had not applied their mind while issuing Notification under Sec.4(1) of Act by invoking emergency provisions such as Sec.17(1) and (4) of the Act Learned senior counsel also contended that in order to invoke the provision of Sec.17(1) and (4) of the Act, it is necessary that there should be a separate Notification for dis-pensingwith the provision of Sec.5-A of the Act as well as for invocation of Sec.17(1) of the Act. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the Government of India has not yet given its approval establishment of the proposed aromatic complex and that the acquisition of a large area over and above the requirement for the proposed industry and that the public pur specified in the Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act is vague and that the compensation due and payable is not only from the Government or from M.R.L. but from third parties also. 6. Mr.S.Jagadeesan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petition in W.P.No.1865 of 1991, in addition to the submissions made by Mr.R.Gandhi, submitted that there was really, no need to dispense with the enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act. 7. Mr.R.Sundaravaradan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner W.P.No.1955 of 1991 contended that the setting up of an industry such as aromatic complex in a vast and extended area does not by itself create the urgency in order to invoke urgency provisions of the Act under Sec.17(1) and (4) of the Act and that the right available to a citizen under Sec.5-A of the Act is a very valuable right and such right cannot be defeated by. invoking the provisions of Sec.17(1) and the Act and that the invocation of the said urgency clauses should have a nexus to the purpose for which the lands were sought to be acquired, but cannot be related to the extent of the area that are sought to be acquired. 8. Mr.R.Subramaniam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner W.P.No.160 of 1991 contended that the payment of compensation is not only paid by Government and the M.R.L., but also by third parties and the said contention was not denied and consequently acquisition proceedings under the provision of Part II is not sustainable. 9. Mr. T. Dhanyakumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.7882 of and Mr.K.Selvaraju, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.5495 of raised similar contentions as those raised by Mr.R.Gandhi and consequently it is necessary to reiterate the same once again. 10. 9. Mr. T. Dhanyakumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.7882 of and Mr.K.Selvaraju, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.5495 of raised similar contentions as those raised by Mr.R.Gandhi and consequently it is necessary to reiterate the same once again. 10. Ms.Malini Ganesh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P.Nos.6725 6726 of 1991 vehemently contended that the petitioners in W.P.No.6125 of 1991 A-Chemical (India) Private Limited, is a company incorporated on 31.7.1989 and that main objects of the company are to manufacture, process, trade and otherwise deal polymers including expandable polystyrens resin, plastics and all other articles made plastics; to manufacture and market all types of insulation products and all polymers and manufacture or deal in mineral wool, rock wool, glass wool, expanded polystyrens etc. said company has planned to set up a unit at Manali for manufacture of 4000 MT expandable polystyrens with financial and technical collaboration with Shin-A Manufacturing Company Limited, that the company had purchased 14.36 acres of land various owners, that the said company submitted an application on 25.4.1989 to Director General of Technical Development for the grant of D.G.T.D. Registration notifying the proposed location of their project at Manali, that the DCTD, Government of India, letter dated 11.5.1989 required the petitioners to furnish a certificate from the Director Industries, Government of Tamil Nadu, stating that the proposed location is developed industrial area, that the petitioners by their letter dated 22.5.1989 applied to the Director Industries and Commerce, that the Director of Industries and Commerce requested Government of Tamil Nadu to issue a letter confirming that the location of the project Manali falls in an industrial area established by the Government prior to 30.6.1988 and to recommend the grant of D.G.T.D. registration to the applicant, that the Government its communication dated 4.7.1989 certified accordingly and forwarded its recommendation for the grant of D.G.T.D. registration and that accordingly D.G.T.D. granted registration 1.11.1989. It is also contended that while the company was proceeding further with implementation of the said project, the Government issued the impugned notification acquiring the lands for the aforesaid purpose of setting up aromatic complex and the based downstream projects. It is also contended that while the company was proceeding further with implementation of the said project, the Government issued the impugned notification acquiring the lands for the aforesaid purpose of setting up aromatic complex and the based downstream projects. Learned counsel further contended that the petitioner had obtained D.G.T.D. registration for setting up an industry and while so the initiation of acquisition proceedings including the lands belonging to the petitioner for the purpose setting up another factory, would in turn defeat the petitioners’ endeavour to put factory there. Ms.Malini Ganesh, learned counsel, apart from the other contentions raised others as above, further contended that there was no total application of the mind invoking the urgency provision, that the Central Government has not given its approval setting up an aromatic complex, that the public purpose specified in the impugned Notification is very vague and uncertain, and that the compensation for the purpose acquisition is also payable by third parties and that the instant acquisition should have initiated under Part VII of the Act and hence vitiated. 11. Mr.V.Prakash, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.5046 of 1991 tended that even assuming that the proposed setting up of an aromatic complex in area of 1666.92 acres at a total cost of 2,500 crores of rupees provides not employment, but also develops the economic interest of the State, that cannot defeat statutory right of the land owners to raise their objections against the proposed acquisition in an enquiry to be under Sec.5-A of the Act and that dispensation of the enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act to be explained and must be justiciable. 12. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.3484 of 1981 contended that the petitioner is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, that the company owned and possessed about an extent of 4.83 acres comprised S.Nos.178/2,178/7 to 14, 178/20, 178/28 and 178/29 in Manali Village, that the petitioner one of the clearing and forwarding and container handling agents at Madras Port that petitioner company proposed to undertake container repairs at its project site, that petitioner obtained land celling clearance from Urban Land Ceiling Authorities G.O.Ms.No.1721, dated 12.11.1987, that the M.M.D.A. by their letter dated 16.8.1988 under Ref.No.916/88 approved the planning permission on making a payment of Rs.42.000 towards approval charges for land and building - vide Receipt No.14990 dated 1.8.1988, Manali Council cleared the proposal after payment of Rs.67,872 vide receipt No. 751/89 dated 1.3.1990, that the petitioner thereafter entrusted the work to a contractor, that construction of the project work as well as warehouse has been in progress, that site office building had been completed and also obtained electricity connection for the office building. It is further contended that the use of the land for industrial purpose is itself a public purpose and when these lands are already used for public purpose, the acquisition of said land for the public purpose of another company defeats the very purpose of petitioners setting up an industrial establishment Learned counsel further contended that cost of the project would be about 1.5 crores of rupees and hence the impugned acquisition proceedings in so far as the petitioner ’ s lands are concerned, by invoking the urgency provisions are not sustainable. Learned counsel reiterated the other contentions put forthother counsel as mentioned hereinabove. Learned counsel further fervently put forth proposition that the Government had also committed that if the petitioner seeks alternative site then the Government, if possible, may provide him an alternative site the industrial complex. At this juncture, learned counsel contended that even assuming in the event of the acquisition proceedings are sustainable, the petitioners should be to continue to carry on the project in the same place either by allotting the same question in their favour or otherwise drop the acquisition proceedings in so far petitioner’s lands are concerned or otherwise by providing alternative site within complex. 13. 13. In reply, learned Advocate General contended that the proposed acquisition is for up an aromatic complex and also for petrobased downstream project of M.R.L. that industrial development in public interest which would create greater employment opportunities, that in order to provide infrastructure] facilities, such as road, power water etc., by entering upon the lands, the lands under acquisition were needed urgently, that the M.R.L. a major participant of the industrial complex requests that the required urgently for establishment of the project with reference to the tetter of obtained by it, that to provide opportunities for a large number of downstream industries with considerable employment potential and that to promote economic development field of petro chemicals for which the feed stock is readily available in the adjacent and that in order to provide infrastructurel facilities which cannot brook the delay as it lead to escalation of cost and affect the economic development of the State the Government initiated acquisition proceedings by invoking the urgency provisions under Sec.17(1) of the act Learned Advocate General further contended that the public purpose specified Sec.4(1) Notification is very specific viz., for setting up an aromatic complex and petrobased downstream industries and it is not necessary that details of, all other industries should be specifically stated in the said Notification. Learned Advocate General contended that the intended acquisition is as a result of the planned development, requires large extent of area in which case, for tile reasons aforesaid, the urgency provisions could be invoked. 14. Learned Advocate General also contended that the contribution for payment of compensation is from the State funds, apart from the contribution made by the M.R.L. is a Government company in which 85% of its share-holdings belong to the Government. Learned Advocate General further contended that paragraph G.O.Ms.No.648, Industries (MID-I) Department, dated 16.9.1989 clearly states that the total extent of land ordered for acquisition, the expenditure towards the cost extent of 1015 acres of land including establishment charges thereto may be collected M.R.L. and in respect of other organisations as per the present land policy, lease rent be collected from the Industries to whom the lands are allotted. Learned Advocate General contended that it is clear from the above that the compensation is being paid by the and the Government and no other third party is under an obligation to pay com and hence Part VII of the Act will not apply to the present case. Learned Advocate General also contended that in view of the request made by the M.R.L., that they are not position to get the renewal of letter of intent, which was renewed from time to time, Government had to invoke the urgency provisions of the Act It is the specific case learned Advocate General that setting up of the aforesaid aromatic complex and petrobased downstream project cannot brook the delay that may be caused, if an enquiry contemplated under Sec.5-A of the Act is proposed to be held. 15. Mr.R.Krishnamurthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of MRL., the respondent herein, impleaded at their instance, contended that the said company applied to the Central Government for grant of letter of intent under the provisions Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1956 for the establishment of aromatic project. It is also contended that the said MRL., had also selected another joint company viz., M/s.Southern Petro Chemicals Corporation Limited (SPIC) as its partner the aforesaid Aromatic Project which had been duty approved by the Government of The Company had required an extent of about 1,600 acres of land. Having regard hazardous nature of the product to be handled and the need for transferring large quantities of naphtha and also receiving back the balance stream to the refinery, the Company requested the Government for acquiring about 1,600 acres of land, adjoining the location of the MRL., in and around Mathur. The Government of India issued a letter of for implementing the Aromatic Project in the year 1987 which was allowed initially period of one year and was extended at the instance of the MRL. MRL explained circumstances under which the intent was obtained viz. when there was stiff competition among various States competing to establish a project of this kind in other parts country. In these circumstances, the MRL initiated action to acquire the necessary lands first step to establish the project and consequently made repeated requests to the Government for the acquisition of the lands identified by them without any further delay an urgency basis. In these circumstances, the MRL initiated action to acquire the necessary lands first step to establish the project and consequently made repeated requests to the Government for the acquisition of the lands identified by them without any further delay an urgency basis. However, the MRL had to make two analysis i.e., to acquire the identified in this behalf and to obtain clearance from the environmental and pollution point view from various State level and Central level authorities and that these authorities required maximum credible accident and consequence analysis and environmental assessment, it is also contended that these two analyses were made with relevance particular area and land and, therefore, unless the identified land was acquired, it was possible to obtain the clearance from the various authorities for the project and that this also required for obtaining the extension of the letter of intent without which the could be implemented. The fourth respondent has furnished detailed of the formalities required to be complied with before setting up the aromatic complex and also the reasons for requiring the lands urgently by invoking the urgency provisions of the Act. 16. In order to sustain the contentions put forward on behalf of the petitioners, Mr.R.Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel refers to the decision in Dora Phalauli v. State Punjab and others, (1979)4 S.C.C. 485 : (1979)3 S.C.J. 338: A.I.R 1979 S.C. 1594, it was held that in order to invoke the provisions of Sec.17(1) of the Act two things must satisfied viz. that the land in respect of which the urgency provision is being applied is or arable and secondly that there is an urgency to proceed in the matter of taking immediate possession and so the right of the owner of the land for filing objection under Sec.5-A of the Act should not be made available to him. It is also observed that the right of a person having any interest in the. property to file an objection Sec.5-A of the Act should not be interfered with in such a casual or cavalier manner. 17. Learned counsel also refers to the decision State of Punjab and another v. Gurdial and others, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 319, wherein it was held as follows: “ ...It is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man ’ s property is a serious matter and smaller the man the more serious the matter. 17. Learned counsel also refers to the decision State of Punjab and another v. Gurdial and others, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 319, wherein it was held as follows: “ ...It is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man ’ s property is a serious matter and smaller the man the more serious the matter. Hearing him before depriving him is reasonable and pre-emptive of arbitrariness and denial of this administrative fairness constitutional anathema except for good reasons. Save in real urgency where public interest does not brook even the minimum time needed to give a hearing land acquisition authorities should not, having regard to Arts.14 and 19, burke an enquiry under Sec.17 of the Act: a slumbering process, pending for years and suddenly exciting itself into immediate taking, makes a travesty of emergency power.” 18. In Chinnamma and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, I.L.R. (1985)3 Mad. A.I.R. 1986 Mad. 55, a Division Bench of this Court held that it cannot be stated as a proposition that only if the matter cannot brook a delay of 30 days, urgency provisions be invoked and the invocation of urgency provisions will have to depend upon circumstances of each case. It was also observed that when there was no application of by the Government before the urgency provisions of the Land Acquisition Act were invoked and the enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act had been dispensed with mechanically by Government without application of their mind, the notifications under Sec.17(1) and (4) the subsequent notification of declaration of acquisition under Sec.6 were rendered and as such were liable to be quashed. It is also observed that the compensation is to out of the public revenues, which is to be paid through the SIPCOT, which has nominated as an agency to carry out the project in question. It is also observed that the compensation is to out of the public revenues, which is to be paid through the SIPCOT, which has nominated as an agency to carry out the project in question. It is also observed that SIPCOT is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, the acquisition have been done under Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act and not under Part II of the can be said that an answer to this question will depend upon the source from where compensation comes whether from the public revenue or whether it comes from company and since it has been held already that the compensation is to come out public revenues, which is to be paid through the SIPCOT, which has been nominated agency to carry out the project in question and in such cases Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be invoked and only Part II of the Act could be invoked. 19. A Division Bench of this Court in Muthu Gounder v. Government of Madras represented by its Secretary, Home Department and another, (1968)2 M.L.J. 349 , held that dispensation of an enquiry under Sec.5-A can mean only avoidance of the delay in waiting objections and considering the same and making a report thereon and the Government finally deciding to make a declaration under Sec.6(1). The question in each case Government to consider when it desires to invoke Sec.17(4) would be whether facts conditions exist or require that would not brook the delay which would be caused by Sec.5-A. A decision on that question will have to be taken on proper material and objective manner, neither capriciously nor whimsically. The question of urgency is always the Government to decide and will not ordinarily be justiciable. But when the Court is upon to see whether the power in invoking urgency provisions has been properly exercised, has necessarily to examine whether the decision to invoke the provisions was based material and was neither arbitrary nor capricious nor mala fide. If there were facts on a fair and reasonable conclusion can be formed this Court will decline to interfere, though may take a different view on the question of urgency. But where ex facie the decision arbitrary, as the. facts cannot possibly furnish a basis for any conclusion to invoke urgency provisions, this Court has to step in and declare the action to be illegal. But where ex facie the decision arbitrary, as the. facts cannot possibly furnish a basis for any conclusion to invoke urgency provisions, this Court has to step in and declare the action to be illegal. imperative that Sec.4(1) notification should indicate if urgency provision was to be invoked. It is not necessary State Government to go further and specify in Sec.4(1) notification whether the urgency under Sub-sec.(1) or Sub-sec.(2). It would be open to the State Government to specify particular provision for urgency for the first time in Sec.6 declaration. 20. Learned counsel also refers to the decision Yesho Nathu Mahajah and anotherState of Maharashtra and others, A.I.R. 1980 Bom. 2. 21. That was a case where acquisition for the purpose of providing house sites for landless workers and their and for extension of gaothan by invoking the emergency provisions of the Act. considering the scope of the power of the State in invoking the urgency provisions, a Bench of the Bombay High Court observed as follows: "....That a given purpose is laudable is not by itself sufficient to vindicate the application urgency clause so as to obviate even the minimum requirement of a hearing. Purpose as providing house sites or extension of gao than cannot be said to spring into existence overnight unless, of course, it is a result of some unexpected, exceptional or extraordinary situation on development such as, for instance, an earthquake or flood or some clear-cut time-bound project likely to be rendered ipso facto nugatory and infruc even such lapse of time as would occur in the case of an acquisition sans or without the urgency clause. While applying the urgency clause, the State should, indeed, act with considerable care and responsibility." (Para 5) "...It would normally not be open to this Court to substitute its own judgment in place of that of the acquiring authority on the question of existence of urgency and the consequent application of urgency clause if the Court finds that there were present before the acquiring authority factors and considerations relevant thereto. The acquiring authority is after all the best judge of the situation and its decision, basically subjective, would normally not he interfered with by this Court. The acquiring authority is after all the best judge of the situation and its decision, basically subjective, would normally not he interfered with by this Court. But where no factor is disclosed and no consideration revealed, where the Court is left in the dark and the aggrieved person left in the lurch, application urgency clause is put in serious jeopardy, it stands exposed to Court’s interference and renders itself liable to be struck down. The very sine quo non for sustenance of urgency clause is absent". (Para 7) "...But when application of urgency clause is challenged, the minimum expected from the State is a disclosure of the circumstances that weighed with it while doing so. Abstract justification replete with conjectures is no answer. In the absence of any such relevant facts and circumstances of which the Court even otherwise could have taken judicial notice, conclusion would follow that the urgency clause was applied without any warrant. It is not possible to successfully sustain the State action in that behalf." (Para 9) 21. In Narayan v. State of Maharashtra, (1977)1 S.C.C. 133 : (1977) S.C.C. (Crl.) 49: (1977) 1 S.C.R. 763: A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 183, it is observed as follows: "In the case before us, the public purpose indicated is the development of an area for industrial and residential purposes. This, in itself, on the face of it, does not call for any such action, barring exceptional circumstances, as to make immediate possession, without holding even a summary enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act, imperative. On the other hand, such schemes generally take sufficient period of time to enable at least summary inquiries under Sec.5-A of the Act to be completed without any impediment whatsoever to the execution the scheme. Therefore, the very statement of the public purpose for which the land was to be acquired indicated the absence of such urgency, on the apparent facts of the case, as require the elimination of an enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act. (Para 40) 22. Therefore, the very statement of the public purpose for which the land was to be acquired indicated the absence of such urgency, on the apparent facts of the case, as require the elimination of an enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act. (Para 40) 22. A Division Bench of this Court in the decision The State of Tamil Nadu v. Mohammad Yousuf, (1990)2M.L.J. 149, held that the public purpose specified in the notification under Sec.4(1) i.e., "for development of the area by construction of houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board" conveys no ideas as to the specific purpose for which the site was to be utilised and that the mere mention in the Notification that the land was being acquired for development of area by construction of houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board is wholly insufficient and conveys no idea as to the specific purpose for which the site was to be utilised and held that the Notification suffers from the vice of vagueness, indefiniteness or grounds. 23. From the ratio deducible from the above authorities, it is clear that before invocation the urgency provision for initiation of acquisition proceedings, there must be an urgency proceed in the matter of taking immediate possession and so the right of the owner land for filing an objection under Sec.5-A of the Act should not be made available to him that it cannot be stated as a general proposition that only in cases where the acquisition land cannot brook even a delay of 30 days the urgency provision can be invoked and invocation of urgency provisions will have to depend upon the circumstances of each is also clear that the question of urgency is always for the Government to decide and ordinarily be justiciable and that the Court should examine whether the decision to the provision was based on material and was neither arbitary nor capricious nor The fact that the Court can make a different view on the question of urgency on the available material will not prevail over the formation of the opinion by the Government available material. It is purely within the realm of the Government to decide about urgency on the facts and circumstances of the case. The acquiring authority is the best of the situation and its decision, basically subjective, would normally not be interfered by the High Court. It is purely within the realm of the Government to decide about urgency on the facts and circumstances of the case. The acquiring authority is the best of the situation and its decision, basically subjective, would normally not be interfered by the High Court. The Court cannot go into the question of adequacy or sufficiency material with which the Government formed the opinion about the urgency. 24. By way of reply, learned Advocate General refers to the decision of the Supreme Narayan’s case, wherein it was observed as follows: "Now, the purpose of Sec.17(4) of the Act is, obviously, nor merely to confine action to waste and arable land but also to situation in which an inquiry under Sec.5-A will serve useful purpose, or, for some overriding reason, it should be dispensed with. The mind Officer or authority concerned has to be applied to be the question whether there urgency of such a nature that even the summary proceedings under Sec.5-A of should be eliminated. It is not just the existence of an urgency but the need to dispense an inquiry under Sec.5-A which has to be considered." [Page 38] 25. Learned Advocate General also refers to the decision in V.Doraiswami Pillai (died) another v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others, A.I.R. 1990 Mad. 321, Division Bench of this Court held as follows: "These decisions go to show that in the absence of any oblique motive, the question whether the purpose is a public purpose or not, and whether the urgency provisions could invoked or not are nor for judicial review. Hence, in the light of these authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel petitioner, as referred to earlier, cannot be of any assistance to hold that the pre- delay or the post-notification delay by officialdom would always constitute a ground to vitiate the invocation of urgency provisions under the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In the instant matter, factual particulars taken into account justify the ‘need’ to invoke urgency provisions on the date when the decision was taken i.e., because of the conditions found to be prevailing in the colony, it was felt that if a S.5-A enquiry is to be held, it would delay in taking possession of the property and that the circumstances were such that there was need to dispense with Sec.5-A enquiry." [Para 26] 26. A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in the decision Brij Bhushan Goswami v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AI.R. 1990 All. 15, observed as follows: "So far as the third argument to the effect that the Planned Industrial Development cannot be said to be the public purpose, which required urgent section is concerned, it also lacks force. Unemployment is increasing day by day arid position is becoming acute and. unless State can quickly provide avenues for employment the whole social order might be adversely affected. Establishment of industries is one of the important means for providing employment to the people. Industrial development, as such is one of the public purposes, which are to be executed with utmost urgency so as to provide opportunities for employment and reduce the social tension in the society. A Division Bench of this Court in the case Rajbali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1983 All. 78, has upheld dispensing of the inquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act for the purposes of Planned Industrial Development by holding general interest of the Public requires industrial development to be made so that not some of the people living there are given employment but also their living standard may upgraded. Thus, the Government was fully justified in applying the provisions of Sec.17(4) the Act and thereby dispensing with the inquiry under Sec5-A of the Act." [Para 5] 27. In Manubhai Jehtalal Patel and another v. State of Gujarat and others, (1983)4 S.C.C. 553 , it was observed as follows: "......The first contention canvassed by him on behalf of the appellants is that the State Road Transport Corporation is a company within the meaning of the expression Companies Act as well as in Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act and this being an acquisition for a company it was obligatory to comply with the provisions contained in Part VII as Company Acquisition Rules and that admittedly having not been done, the acquisition contrary to law, illegal and invalid. Land is indisputably acquired for the benefit of State Road Transport Corporation which is a company. Even where land is acquired company, the State Government has the power to acquire land for a public purpose revenue of the State. In other words, this is an acquisition for public purpose contribution from the State revenue. Land is indisputably acquired for the benefit of State Road Transport Corporation which is a company. Even where land is acquired company, the State Government has the power to acquire land for a public purpose revenue of the State. In other words, this is an acquisition for public purpose contribution from the State revenue. The State is acquiring land to carry out public with the instrumentality of the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation. It is acquisition for a company with the funds exclusively provided by the company which attract Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act. In our opinion, the High Court is right in the conclusion that neither Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act nor the Company Acquisition Rules would be attracted. Therefore, we are in agreement with the conclusions reached the High Court." [Para 3] 28. Learned Advocate General also refers to the decision in Rajbali and others v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1983 All. 78, wherein it was observed as follows: "The notifications have clearly stated that the purpose of acquisition that is, the Industrial Development of district Basti. It was not necessary to mention in notifications the various industries which were intended to be set up. It could not be at the time of issuing of the notifications under Secs.4 and 6 to specify area which assigned to each individual industrialist for setting up a particular industry in which be interested. The word "planned" has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary as a scheme accomplishing a purpose. Anything which is antithesis of haphazard development amounts planned development. Hence the notifications gave indication of the purpose in detail and it is, therefore, not possible to hold that either the notifications under Sec. notifications under Sec.6 suffer from the defect of vagueness." [Para 2] 29. Learned Advocate General has attempted to distinguish the judgment of the Bench of this Court in the State of Tamil Nadu and another v. A.Mohammed Yousuf others, (1990)2 M.L.J. 149 , referred to hereinabove, by stating that the public specified in the impugned notification is specific and contains all the particulars setting up of an aromatic complex and also petro based downstream project. The very well explained and there is no vagueness and consequently the decision of the Bench of this Court, referred to above, cannot be said to be applicable to the instant. 30. The very well explained and there is no vagueness and consequently the decision of the Bench of this Court, referred to above, cannot be said to be applicable to the instant. 30. The ratio that is deducible from the aforesaid decisions is that the Authority concerned has to apply its mind to the question whether there is an urgency of such a nature that the summary proceedings under Sec.5-A of the Act should be eliminated and it is not existence of an urgency but the need to dispense with an inquiry under Sec.5-A which be considered. The question as to whether, the purpose is a public purpose or not, for judicial review. The pre-notification delay or the post-notification delay by officialdom would not always constitute a ground to vitiate the invocation of urgency provisions. It is only the urgency that was prevailing on the issue of notification that is relevant for the purpose of consideration of invocation of It is also not necessary to mention the various industries which were intended to be and that it could not be possible at the time of issuing of the Notifications under Secs.4 to specify area which would be assigned to each individual industrialist for setting particular industry in which he may be interested. Establishment of industries is one important means for providing employment to the people and that the industrial development as such is one of the public purposes which are to be executed with urgency so as to provide opportunities for employment and reduce the social tension society and in which case the Government would be justified in applying the provi Sec.17(4) of the Act and thereby dispensing with the inquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act. contribution is made from out of the public revenue, it cannot be considered that acquisition is for a company, but the State is acquiring the land to carry out public with the instrumentality of the agency of the State and hence Part VII of the Act cannot attracted. 31. Mr.R.Krishnamoorthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, refers to the decision, Hari Singh and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1984 S.C. 1020; (1984)2 S.C.C. 624 , wherein it was held that even the post notification delay will not vitiate the acquisition proceedings initiated by invoking the emergency provision under Sec.17(4) of the Act. 32. 31. Mr.R.Krishnamoorthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, refers to the decision, Hari Singh and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1984 S.C. 1020; (1984)2 S.C.C. 624 , wherein it was held that even the post notification delay will not vitiate the acquisition proceedings initiated by invoking the emergency provision under Sec.17(4) of the Act. 32. Learned counsel for the fourth respondent also refers to the decision in Deepak etc. v. Lt.Governor of Delhi and others, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1721: (1984)4 S.C.C. 308 , it was observed as follows: "The other ground of attack is that if regard is had to the considerable length of time on interdepartmental discussion before the notification under Sec.4(1) was published, would be apparent that there was no justification for invoking the urgency clause Sec.17(4) and dispensing with the enquiry under Sec.5-A. We are afraid, we cannot with this contention. Very often persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired various representations to the concerned authorities against the proposed acquisition. bound to result in a multiplicity of enquiries, communications and discussions leading delay in the execution of even urgent projects. Very often the delay makes the problem and more acute and increases the urgency of the necessity for acquisition. It is, therefore, not possible to agree with the submission that mere pre-notification delay would render invocation of the urgency provisions void." [Para 8] 33. In A.Venkatachalapathy v. The State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Revenue Department and another, (1986)2 M.L.J. 327, Court held that the question as to whether urgency exists or not is a matter solely determination of the Government and it is not a matter for judicial review. 34. In Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2077, it was follows: "It was contended by Dr.Singhvi that the acquisition was really for the co-operative societies which are companies within the definition of the word ‘company’ in Sec.3(e) Act and, therefore, the provisions of Part VII of the Act should have been complied with. the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court were of the view acquisition was not for ‘ company ’ . We see no reason to differ from their view. the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court were of the view acquisition was not for ‘ company ’ . We see no reason to differ from their view. The mere that after the acquisition the Government proposed to hand over or, in fact, handed portion of the property acquired for development to the co-operative Housing societies not make the acquisition one for ‘company’. Nor are we satisfied that there is any the contention that compensation to be paid for the acquisition came from the consideration paid by the co-operative societies. In the light of the averments in the counter affidavit in the writ petitions here, it is difficult to hold that it was co-operatives which provided fund for the acquisition. Merely because the Government allotted a part of the property co-operative societies for development, it would not follow that the acquisition was for co-operative societies and therefore; Part VII of the Act was attracted." [Para 24] 35. In Ishwarlal Girdharalal Joshi etc. v. State of Gujarat and another, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. it was observed as follows: "The Government was not called upon to the answer the kind of affidavit which was filed the petition because bare denial that Government had not formed an opinion could not an issue. Even if Government under advice offered to disclose how the matter was dealt the issue did not change and it was only this: Whether any one at all formed an opinion if he did whether he had the necessary authority to do so." 36. The law deducible from the aforesaid authorities is very clear to the effect that the and post notifications delay will not vitiate the proceedings initiated by the Government invoking the urgency provisions and that the formation of the opinion in invocation urgency provision is not open to judicial review and if the contribution is made from public revenue then the proceedings initiated under the Act would not attract Part VII Act even if the lands are allotted to the company and if any person with an authority formed the opinion that would suffice the purpose. 37. 37. In the instant case, it is well explained that the Government had constituted Committee and that the Committee made a field inspection and identified the suitable to the extent of 1655 acres in Mathur, Manali, Vaikkadu, Amullavoyal, Kosappur Elanthancheri Villages for establishing an aromatic complex and other petrobased downstream projects of M.R.L. in Manali Area and also obtained clearance from the Pollution Control Board and thereafter the Government by G.O.Ms.No.648, Industries (MID Department, dated 16.9.1989 accorded administrative sanction for acquisition/transfer 1655.93 acres of patta and poramboke lands in the villages specified hereinabove under II of the Act. Thereafter, on representations received from the villagers to drop acquisition proceedings the Government had to take the necessary decision and after the decision and after having satisfied that the lands should be taken immediate possession of for the aforesaid purpose, issued notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act invoking emergency provisions under Sec.17(1) and (4) of the Act, which are impugned in these petitions. 38. With reference to the contention that there was a long delay of about more than a between the date of G.O.Ms.No.648 Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 16.9.1989, according administrative sanction for acquiring lands and the impugned notification Sec.4(1) of the Act, it is well settled that by reason of the pre-notification of the delay impugned proceedings cannot be said to be vitiated. That apart, it is also explained by Government that by reason of the representations made requesting the Government to the acquisition proceedings, the Government had to take a decision on consideration facts and circumstances of the case and ultimately issued the impugned Notification. there is no sub-stance in the said contention. 39. With reference to the contention that the Government Order according administrative sanction for acquiring the lands in question does not disclose any reason for invocation urgency provision and there is no need to" dispense with the enquiry under Sec.5 Act, learned Advocate General relied on the statements made in the counter affidavit filed W.P.Nos.1444, 1955 and 5495 of 1991 and that the relevant statements referred to by are as follows: "It is submitted that the lands under acquisition are intended for setting up a major industrial Aromatic Complex and other downstream projects at a cost of Rs.1,380 crores in the interest of industrial development of the State and of the public at large. It aims at creation of employment potential both for skilled and unskilled in addition to the economic development of the State. In order to establish such an Industrial Complex early, it is essential to provide all infrastructural facilities such as road, power supply, water etc., which can be done only entering upon the land intended for the establishment of the industries. The Madras Refineries Limited which is one of the major participants in the Industrial Complex obtained Letter of Intent for the Project and requested the land required for the establishment project urgently with reference to the Letter of Intent obtained by it. Further, the implementation of the project early would create opportunities for large number downstream industries with considerable employment potential. Hence, the Government issued orders in G.O.Ms.No.648 Industries Department, dated 16.9.1989 invoking urgency provision." [Para 4 in W.P.No.1444 of 1991] ".......In this case, the acquisition is for establishment of Aromatic Complex with downstream industries at an investment of Rs.1380 crores. This will provide employment opportunities a large number of unemployed persons, both skilled and unskilled. All infrastructure facilities such as road, power supply, water etc., have to be provided for early setting up industries. These can be provided by only entering upon the land. Hence, urgency provision has to be necessarily invoked. The lands involved under acquisition are arable or lands. Hence, there is no restriction to invoke the urgency provisions of the Act for lands." [Para 6 in W.P.No.1444 of 1991] "The proposed scheme is a major industrial to be set up at a cost of 1380 crores in the interest of industrial growth of the State. action of the Government in having decided to have the urgency clause for acquisition justifiable. The aim of the Government is to promote employment potentiality and consequent economic development in the field of petro chemicals for which the feed stock readily available in the adjacent refinery......." [Para 6 in W.P.No.l955 of 1991] "........... that the Aromatic Complex to be established is a major project. It requires infrastructural facilities such as laying of road, power connection, water supply kept ready for construction of Industrial Complex and start industry without delay. the 30 days time provided in Sec.5-A of the Act is only for the purpose of filing objection the land owners and not for taking possession of the land. It requires infrastructural facilities such as laying of road, power connection, water supply kept ready for construction of Industrial Complex and start industry without delay. the 30 days time provided in Sec.5-A of the Act is only for the purpose of filing objection the land owners and not for taking possession of the land. The experience in the past that in a number of cases the landowners have indulged in dilatory tactics thereby delaying the enquiry for a long period. The provisions of infrastructural facilities cannot brook delay it will lead to escalation of cost and also affect the economic development of the State. the contention of the petitioner in this paragraph is untenable." [Para 9 in W.P.No.5495 1991] 40. From the above, it is clear that the instant acquisition is for industrial development public interest, for creation of great employment potential, for providing infrastructural facilities such as road, power supply, water etc., by entering upon the lands, Madras Refineries Ltd., a major participant of the Industrial complex requested that the land required urgently for the establishment of the project with reference to the Letter of obtained by it; for providing opportunities for large number of down-stream industries considerable employment; for promoting economic development in the field of chemicals for which the feed stock is readily available in the adjacent refinery viz., and for providing infrastructural facilities, which cannot brook the delay as it would lead escalation of cost and affect the economic development of the State. It is also stated compliance of provisions of Sec.5-A of the Act would enable the land owners to indulge dilatory tactics thereby delaying the . enquiry for a long period and that the provision infrastructural facilities cannot brook the delay of the minimum period that is required complying with the provisions of Sec.5-A of the Act. 41. Learned Advocate General produced the file relating to the acquisition proceedings. enquiry for a long period and that the provision infrastructural facilities cannot brook the delay of the minimum period that is required complying with the provisions of Sec.5-A of the Act. 41. Learned Advocate General produced the file relating to the acquisition proceedings. M.R.L., a major participant of the Industrial complex, by their letter dated 14.3.1988 addressed to the Government stated that since the land is required at an early date to the construction work, the company requested the Government to appoint Special Officer acquisition and that it also requested the Government to direct the Special Officer to acquire the lands for M.R.L, invoking urgency provisions under the Land Acquisition Act and enclosed therewith the land plan indicating the lands required in each of the villages the required form of Schedule for land acquisition. After having had a number of discussions on various aspects, the M.R.L., by their letter dated 4.11.1988, requested, among things, for early action for sanction and appointment of staff to complete the acquisition work invoking the urgency clause. Again by letter dated 11.11.1988, the informed the Government that the Committee of P.I.B. of the Government of India had given first stage clearance for setting up aromatic complex of M.R.L. and also requested for acquiring the lands for setting up of the industry an early date. Under Secretary to Government by his letter dated 11.11.1988, addressed the Special and Commissioner of Land Administration, requested him to send necessary proposal for sanction of land acquisition staff for Aromatic Complex urgently, taking consideration the revised proposal of M.R.L. as reported earlier. Again the M.R.L. by their letter dated 24.11.1988 addressed the Government that the lands were required by them very urgently and hence requested the Government to invoke the urgency clause and requested that if possible poramboke lands, if any, in these areas could be handed over them even earlier than the acquisition of the rest of the lands requested for. Again M.R.L. by their letter dated 18.12.1988 informed the Government that as the Government India and their joint promoter are pressing them to take urgent steps to start work project they require the co-operation and permission from the Government of Tamil go ahead with the preliminary operation and also requested the Government for expeditious steps for early completion. 42. Again M.R.L. by their letter dated 18.12.1988 informed the Government that as the Government India and their joint promoter are pressing them to take urgent steps to start work project they require the co-operation and permission from the Government of Tamil go ahead with the preliminary operation and also requested the Government for expeditious steps for early completion. 42. On a perusal of the file, it is clear that the matter was considered various levels various aspects, including the details of downstream projects, the total lands that required and for according administrative sanction for acquisition of the lands in question for nominating the SIPCOT as a Nodal agency to co-ordinate the work and for approval the matters. It is also very clear from the proceedings Ka.No.7103l/MIH/84 that a has been taken that the lands in question could be taken by invoking urgency provision, the Governmental authorities and ultimately approved by the Government. From these it is manifest that the Government have considered this aspect of the matter and their mind before initiating the acquisition proceedings by invocation of the urgency clause. 43. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, it is also explicit there is a need for dispensation of enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the contention on the part of the petitioners that the reasons for invocation the urgency clause were not explained and that the respondents viz., the Government not applied the mind before invocation of the urgency provision and that there was no for dispensation of enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act is devoid of merits. It is conformity with the laid down by the Supreme Court that it is not merely urgency matters, but also that there should be a need for dispensation of enquiry under Sec.5 the Act and that it is not just the existence of an urgency, but the need to dispense enquiry under Sec.5-A which has to be considered. It is also relevant to point out that provisions of the Act do not contemplate that a separate notification should be issued dispensing with the provisions contained in Sec.5-A of the Act for invocation of the provisions of Sec.17(4) of the Act In fact, a Division Bench of this court in Muthu Gounder (supra) observed that it is imperative that Sec4(1) Notification should indicate if provision was to be invoked. It is also observed that it is not necessary for the Government to go further and specify in the Notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act the urgency was under Sub-sec.(1) or sub-sec.(2) and it would be open to the Government to specify the particular provision for urgency for the first time in declaration. In view of the above fact, the contention that there should be Notification to dispense with the enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act is not sustainable. 44. With reference to the contention that the Government of India has not given approval, there is no material whatsoever produced by the petitioners to support aforesaid contention. In fact, ongoing through the file, it appears that the Government India had given a clearance for phased programme. In the absence of any material to that the Government of India has not given its approval the said contention has no stand. Even otherwise, it is to be considered that the project in question is, sponsored Government of India and that the M.R.L. is a Government of India, undertaking, having than 85% of the shares is the major participant in the proposed complex. Hence contention in this behalf is devoid of substance. 45. The contention that the public purpose specified in the notification is vague is sustainable in law. On a reference to the decision of the Bench of this Court in The Tamil Nadu and another v. A.Mohammed Yousuf and others, (1990)2 M.L.J. 149 , stated that the public purpose specified therein is for development of the construction of houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and that was considered absence of any other particulars as vague and indefinite and conveys no idea as specific purpose for which the site was utilised. In the instant case, the public specified in the impugned notifications is very clear to the effect that it is for the purpose setting up an aromatic complex and the petro-based downstream project. It is also explained that a Division Bench of our High Court in Doraiswami Pillai’s case, (supra) that in the absence of any oblique motive the question as to whether the purpose is purpose or not and whether the urgency provision is to be invoked or not, are not for review. It is also explained that a Division Bench of our High Court in Doraiswami Pillai’s case, (supra) that in the absence of any oblique motive the question as to whether the purpose is purpose or not and whether the urgency provision is to be invoked or not, are not for review. In the instant case’, there is no vagueness in the public purpose specified impugned Notification and that the public purpose is specific for the purpose of setting aromatic complex and also for petro based downstream projects and while so contention found no acceptance, apart from the fact that in the absence of any motive the question as to whether the public purpose is a public purpose or not is judicial review. 46. With reference to the contention that the compensation is not paid by the Government and the M.R.L. but also by the third parties, it may be said that there is no material by the petitioners to show who are the third parties likely to pay compensation for acquisition of the lands in question. A feeble attempt has been made on the part of the petitioners state that the downstream projects specified in the Notification could be allotted parties and that could be inferred from the language employed in paragraph 3 of No.648 dated 16.9.1989, wherein it is stated that in respect of other organisations as present land policy, lease rent may be collected from the industries to whom the lands likely to be allotted for establishing downstream projects, it is not specified in the paragraphs that the industries to whom the lands are allotted should pay compensation the lands under acquisition. It is specific that only lease rent could be collected and from no inference can be drawn that the compensation would be payable by the industries whom the lands are likely to be allotted. It is clear that major part of the compensation, apart from the Governmental contribution, would be made by M.R.L. for payment compensation payable for the lands under acquisition to the owners as well as to the interested in the lands under acquisition and consequently it cannot be said compensation is payable by third parties. It is clear that major part of the compensation, apart from the Governmental contribution, would be made by M.R.L. for payment compensation payable for the lands under acquisition to the owners as well as to the interested in the lands under acquisition and consequently it cannot be said compensation is payable by third parties. That apart, the contention that Part VII attracted for the purpose of initiating acquisition proceedings is also not sustainable reason that the definition of the company under Sec.3(3) of the Act is that the expression “company” means, a company as defined in Sec.3 of the Companies Act, 1956 other Government company referred to in Clause (cc). Under Sec.3(cc) the expression “ corporation owned or controlled by the State ” means any body corporate established by or Central Provincial or State Act, and includes a company as defined in Sec.617 Companies Act 1956 etc Explanation 2 to Sec.6(1) provides that where the compensation be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid public revenues. The observation of the Supreme Court in Aflatoon ’ s case (supra) the effect that merely because the Government allotted a part of the property operative Societies for development, it would not fall that the acquisition was operative societies and therefore, Part VII of the Act was attracted. Haying regard aforesaid contentions, it cannot be said that Part VII of the Act is attracted for the acquisition proceedings and as such there is no substance in the said contention put by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 47. With reference to the contention that the right available under Sec.5-A of the very valuable right and such right cannot be defeated by reason of the fact that a large extent of the lands were acquired for setting of an aromatic complex and petro based downstream projects, it may be said that it cannot be disputed that the right available for the owner of the land or the person interested the land under acquisition is a valuable statutory right to raise effective objection for proposed acquisition. That does not mean that such right cannot be dispensed with at whenever the acquisition proceedings are initiated to acquire the lands for a public purpose. That does not mean that such right cannot be dispensed with at whenever the acquisition proceedings are initiated to acquire the lands for a public purpose. If such construction has to be accepted, the provisions contained in Sec.17(1) and (4) of Act would become otiose. In a given case, it is for the Government to form the opinion as the urgency in relation to the acquisition of the property in question and in the event forming an opinion as to the existence of an urgency, there cannot be any impediment invoking the provisions of Sec.17(1) and (4) of the Act. In the instant case, it is explained about the existence of urgency and the need for dispensation of the enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act. It is not in all cases that the Government invoke the provision of Sec.17 (1) and (4) of the Act; dispensing with the provisions of Sec.5-A of the Act. In the instant case, having due regard to the facts and circumstances explained hereinabove, Government invoked the provision of Sec.17(1) and (4) of the Act dispensing with enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act. It is not necessary to reiterate the reasons set forth in behalf already. It may also be considered apart from the reasons set forth hereinabove, decision "of the Allahabad High Court in Brij Bhushan Goswami’s case (supra) wherein Court had an occasion to consider the fact of unemployment increasing etc. observations extracted in paragraph 26 of this order). 48. Having due regard to all the facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that the instant acquisition proceedings are vitiated by reason of the invocation of the provision contained Sec.17(1) and (4) of the Act. It is only the subjective satisfaction of the Government as the existence of the urgency on the available materials that matters and if the Court satisfied that there exists the urgency, it is not for the court to consider the adequacy sufficiency of material and that formation of opinion is not subject to judicial review, as down by the Division Bench of this Court. The contention that the invocation of the urgency provision cannot have any nexus to the vast extent of land that is sought to be required no relevance having due regard to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The contention that the invocation of the urgency provision cannot have any nexus to the vast extent of land that is sought to be required no relevance having due regard to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The proposition may be considered in so far as Sec.17(2) of the Act is concerned, but so far Sec.17(1) of the Act is concerned, one could comprehend the existence of the facts circumstances which formed the basis for formation of opinion as to the existence of urgency for invocation of Sec.17(1) of the Act. 49. However, with regard to the contention put forward by the learned counsel appearing behalf of the petitioners in W.P.Nos.3484, 6725 and 6726 of 1991 are concerned, Government may consider the facts and circumstances of those cases where the petitioners have obtained necessary sanction for establishment of an Industry and also spent considerable amount for establishment of such an industry which is also stated to be public purpose. In view of the fact that the petitioners have not only applied for sanction from the authorities but also have spent huge amount by raising loan for establishment the industry, the Government has to consider the facts and circumstances set forth in affidavit filed in support of the above writ petitions and also representations, if any, made this behalf and decide whether the petitioners’ lands in question should either be deleted allotted in their favour after acquisition or if the said lands form part of the lands where major complex has to be set in, the Government should think of providing alternative land order to enable them to set up their factories. 50. Having due regard to the above facts and circumstances of the case, there are no merits in the contentions put forward on behalf of the petitioners and that there is no warrant interference with the impugned acquisition proceedings. Hence, all the writ petitions fail are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.