JUDGMENT V.N. Malhotra, J. - This petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr. P.C. for quashing the order dated 24.10.1990 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, Jaunpur and order dated 6.4.1991 passed by the Additional S.D.M. Jaunpur in Case No. 169 under Section 145 Cr. P.C. 2. The applicant has alleged that his father executed a gift deed in his favour on 10.2.1977 in respect of his property. The applicant's brother, named Aditya Narain Singh was residing permanently in district Sultanpur while the applicant was residing in village Goshada district Jaunpur. On the death of the father of the applicant, the name of Aditya Narain Singh and the applicant were jointly mutated in respect of the land belonging to their father. The applicant moved application for correction of the record and expunging the name of Aditya Narain Singh. Sri Aditya Narain Singh filed a suit under Section 176 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act for division of holding. Both these proceedings were still pending before the competent Courts. 3. Aditya Narain Singh executed a sale-deed in favour of opposite pantie Nos. 2 and 3 on 7.2.1990 in respect of his alleged share in the land. The opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 moved the applications for mutation of their names. The dispute regarding the same was still pending. The applicant was in actual and physical possession of the entire land and the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 were never in possession of the same. The opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 moved an application before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate under Section 145 Cr. P. C. Police report was called by the Magistrate after which the learned Magistrate passed preliminary order under Section 145(l) Cr. P.C. on 24.10.1990. The parties filed their written statements before the Magistrate concerned. The case was transferred to the Court of Addl. S.D.M. Sadar Jaunpur. The opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 filed a number of applications before the Magistrate for passing an order under Section 146 (1) Cr. P.C. The opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 never asserted that they had sowed crops over the same and were in actual possession. Actually the applicant had sowed the crops which were standing on the land. Ultimately the learned Magistrate passed the impugned order on 5.4.1991 attaching the land as well as the crop standing over it. P.C. The opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 never asserted that they had sowed crops over the same and were in actual possession. Actually the applicant had sowed the crops which were standing on the land. Ultimately the learned Magistrate passed the impugned order on 5.4.1991 attaching the land as well as the crop standing over it. The applicant has asserted that the order by the learned Magistrate was illegal and invalid. It is asserted that the question of joint possession could not be decided in the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. and that the learned Magistrate passed the order under Section 146 (2) Cr. P.C. without applying his mind. Inasmuch as he had wrongly directed the Police Inspector to attach the property and place it in the custody of some independent person. It is contended that this order was invalid. 4. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of opposite party No. 3 denying the allegations made by the applicant. It has been asserted that no gift deed was executed in favour of the applicant by his father. It has also been asserted that Aditya Narain Singh inherited the property from his father and transferred the land in favour of the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 and also gave them physical possession over it. It is also contended that as there was apprehension of breach of peace relating to possession over the land in dispute the learned Magistrate rightly initiated proceedings under Section 145 (1) Cr. P.C. and also passed order under Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. on the ground of emergency. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also perused the affidavits and other material on record. As regards the order under Section 145(1) Cr. P.C. the learned Magistrate passed the same on 24.10.1990 after considering the report by the S.O. P.S. Sikrara dated 20.10.1990. On satisfied that there was grave apprehension of breach of peace relating to the possession over the land in dispute, the learned Magistrate passed that order. It is contended on behalf of the applicant that the question of joint ownership or joint possession could not be considered in proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. However, in this case it appears that the applicant has claimed his exclusive possession over the land in dispute while the opposite parties have claimed their possession. It is contended on behalf of the applicant that the question of joint ownership or joint possession could not be considered in proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. However, in this case it appears that the applicant has claimed his exclusive possession over the land in dispute while the opposite parties have claimed their possession. In any case the applicant can raise this plea before the Magistrate concerned who will no doubt, decide it in accordance with law. 6. The next contention of the applicant is that as in civil Court the proceedings were pending in respect of the land in dispute, hence the proceedings under Section 145(1) Cr. P.C. cannot be maintainable. The applicant can raise this plea also before the Magistrate concerned, who will decide the same at the earliest. In these proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. it will not be proper to decide this matter. 7. The third contention by the applicant is that the order under Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. was invalid as there was no material before the learned Magistrate to pass such an order and further that under Section 146(2) Cr.P.C. the learned Magistrate should have himself appointed a person or passed order for the proper looking after of the attached property but instead he has left it to the S.O. concerned to appoint some independent person as Supurdar of the land. 8. As regards the order under Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. is concerned the learned Magistrate has passed a detailed order giving reasons for passing such an order. According to him it was a matter of emergency and for this reason such an order was necessary. It is true that he had used the word 'Adhipatya' instead of 'Kabza', in his order but when this order is considered in the context of the order under Section 145 Cr. P.C. it will be clear that what the learned Magistrate wanted to express was that the dispute was in respect of possession over the land in dispute. It cannot be said that the order by the learned Magistrate under Section 146(1) was improper or invalid. However, as regards the order under Section 146 (2) Cr. P.C. the learned Magistrate should have himself made arrangement for looking after the land in question instead of directing the S.O. concern to appoint an independent person as Supurdar. 9. It cannot be said that the order by the learned Magistrate under Section 146(1) was improper or invalid. However, as regards the order under Section 146 (2) Cr. P.C. the learned Magistrate should have himself made arrangement for looking after the land in question instead of directing the S.O. concern to appoint an independent person as Supurdar. 9. In the case of Makhan Lal Raina v. Additional City Magistrate 1, Lucknow and Others, 1989 S.C. D.P. 209, it was held by the Lucknow Bench of this Court that such an order was invalid. In the present case Sri Nem Singh and Triloki Singh had already been appointed Supurdar of the land as alleged by the opposite party No. 3 and they have already harvested the crop standing over the land under the supervision of the police. This fact has been mentioned in Para 19 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite party No. 3. In view of this fact it will not be in the interest of justice to set aside the order of the appointment of these supurdars by this Court. It is, however, directed that in case the parties or any of them object the appointment of these persons as supurdars, the learned Magistrate shall consider the objection on merits and pass suitable orders for either removing these supurdars, if a case is made out for the same, or confirming their appointment, if it is in the interest of proper management of the land in dispute, pending these proceedings. 10. The petition is, in the circumstances, dismissed.