ORDER M.L. Bhat, J. - The petitioner is aggrieved against the impugned orders dated 22-3-1982 and 28-5-1982 passed by respondent No. 1. By virtue of order dated 22-8-1982 it was held that allotment of plot No. 43 in favour of the petitioner was illegal and consequently, the sale-deed executed in her favour also was bad. By subsequent order dated 28-5.1982 the sale-deed executed in favour of the petitioner for plot No. 43 for a consideration of Rs. 5000/- was directed to be cancelled and amount of consideration was ordered to be refunded. 2. The petitioner's case is that she was a member of co-operative society which was registered under the W. P. Co-operative Societies Act. The said Society was taken over by the Administrator after its supersession and among S plots which were allotted at a meeting, one of the plots was allowed to the petitioner by resolution of the society dated 13-9-1978. Thereafter, a sale-deed was also executed in favour of the petitioner for the said plot and the same was registered. 3 After some time, the co-operative society seems to have been brought under the Management of the elected committee and on :-13-1979, the Secretary of the Housing Committee of the Society appears to have written a letter to the authority on the basis of the resolution dated 8-5-1978 for cancelling the allotment of 8 plots which were allotted by resolution dated 13-8-1978 to different persons. Plot No. 43 is one of the plots cut of the 8 plots which was allotted to the petitioner. Various reasons are given for said allotment of the plot being illegal and liable to be quashed. This letter was treated as claim petition and the matter was referred to Arbitration under the provisions of Co-operative Societies Act. It is contended that this letter was not a resolution, therefore, no reference could be made on the basis of the said letter. However, the Arbitrator after giving his opinion on the question of allotment of plot No. 43 in favour of the petitioner, opined that the reference was incompetent because it was not based on the resolution passed by the managing committee. Aggrieved against the order of the Arbitrator the respondents seem to have filed an appeal before respondent No 1. The appeal was accepted and decided vide order dated 22.3-1982 which order was modified on 28-5-1982. Aggrieved against the order of the Arbitrator the respondents seem to have filed an appeal before respondent No 1. The appeal was accepted and decided vide order dated 22.3-1982 which order was modified on 28-5-1982. The allotment of the plot in favour of the petitioner was cancelled. The sale-deed was ordered to be cancelled and amount of consideration was ordered to be refunded. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has made the following submissions in support of his contentions : 1. The letter dated 5-12-1979 written by the Secretary, without there being any resolution, could not be a basis of arbitration and on the basis of the said letter the arbitration proceedings were incompetent. 2. The sale-deed could not be cancelled by the appellate authority because cancellation of a sale-deed is the domain of Civil Courts. 3. The allotment of plot in favour of the petitioner was valid because it was based on the order of the Administrator who was appointed after superseding the managing committee. Therefore, the order of the Administrator will be deemed to be a resolution of the managing committee of the Society. 4. In appeal the appellate authority could not allow additional evidence and the additional evidence recorded by the appellate authority at the back of the petitioner could not form basis for the judgment of the appellate authority. 5. That the same person decided the appeal who had earlier made the reference of the dispute to the Arbitrator." 5. At the out set it may be stated that for the last proposition of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the same person had heard and decided the appeal who had made the reference to arbitration, is not borne out from the record. Neither it is in pleading of the petitioner, nor is supported by any document. Therefore, it is not correct that the appellate authority was the same which had earlier made a reference to the arbitrator in regard to the claim of respondent No. 3. 6. One Om Prakash who claims to be allottee of plot No. 43 with effect from 1968 was permitted to file a counter and defend his rights, if any, which were like to be affected by this writ petition. It is the case of the Co-operative Society and Mr. 6. One Om Prakash who claims to be allottee of plot No. 43 with effect from 1968 was permitted to file a counter and defend his rights, if any, which were like to be affected by this writ petition. It is the case of the Co-operative Society and Mr. Om Prakash that allotment of plot in favour of the petitioner was illegal and was made by the Committee which was presided over by her husband, in violation of the provisions of law. It is contended that no allotment could be made in her favour by the resolution passed by a Committee which was presided over by the husband of the petitioner It was next contended that she was not at all a member of the Society. Plot No. 43 which was allotted in favour of the petitioner bad already been allotted in favour of Om Prakash in 1968. 7. Under Section 71 of the Co-operative Societies Act (for short the Act), the disputes concerning constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action, can be referred to the arbitration. On receipt of the reference, the Registrar has a power to decide the dispute himself or refer it for decision to an arbitrator appointed by him or refer it, if the parties so request in writing, for decision to a board of arbitrators consisting of the three persons to be appointed in the prescribed manner. 8. An appeal can be filed against the awards, orders and decisions. Under clause 98 (a) as appeal was competent before the Registrar and if the order is passed by the Registrar then it would lie to the State Government. The appellate authority has been given powers to review its own orders which it has passed under Sections 97 and 98 of the Act. The appellate authority has to hear the appeal on the fixed date and go through the record and hear the parties to the dispute or their authorised agents and pass such order on the appeal as it may deem just. The appellate order has to be reasoned order. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the appellate authority in terms of Rule 263 of the Co-operative Societies Rules, has to go through the record of the case and not to any other extraneous evidence and thereafter, make a decision in the appeal. The appellate order has to be reasoned order. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the appellate authority in terms of Rule 263 of the Co-operative Societies Rules, has to go through the record of the case and not to any other extraneous evidence and thereafter, make a decision in the appeal. In the present case it is stated that the record of appeal No. 37W was made basis for decision and additional evidence was recorded without affording opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses. 9. Under Rule 98 of the Co-operative Societies Rules it is provided that the Chairman or in his absence the Vice-Chairman or in the absence of the both, a member elected by the members present at the meeting shall preside over the meeting. There is proviso added to this Rule which says that no person including the Chairman or Vice-Chairman shall preside over a meeting when matters in which he has a personal interest are to be discussed. 10. On the basis of the aforesaid provisions of law it is to be seen whether the order passed by respondent No. 1 is in accordance with law or does it suffer from any patent illegality. 11. It is strange that arbitrator has stated that the reference before him was incompetent. If he was of the opinion that the reference before him was incompetent, then be could not decide the matter covered by reference on merits. If the reference was incompetent, according to the arbitrator the best course for him was to refuse to go into the merits of the case and not to pronounce on any point which was subject matter of the reference. On the other hand the arbitrator has chosen a novel method to deal with the matter. He has decided the entire dispute which was referred to him by a reference, then after having given an opinion on the merits of the case stated that reference was illegal. However, the arbitrator having once entered upon the reference and having given his opinion on the reference it was not proper for him to say at the subsequent stage of the proceeding that reference was not competent. However, the arbitrator having once entered upon the reference and having given his opinion on the reference it was not proper for him to say at the subsequent stage of the proceeding that reference was not competent. Once the arbitrator had chosen to pronounce on the merit of the case then it was not fair for him to hold the reference as incompetent In the present case the letter dated 5-12-1979 make a reference to the resolution dated 6-5-1979 by which committee of management seems to have taken a decision to prefer a claim with regard to the allotment of the eight plots by a resolution dated 13-9-1979. The Arbitrator could at the best demand a copy of the resolution from respondent Nos. 1 and 2 first and thereafter, proceed to deal with the arbitration proceeding. Without doing that he gave a finding in favour of the petitioner on merits and thereafter, he held that the reference was incompetent. The approach adopted by the arbitrator is throughly misconceived and opposed to the norms underlying the concept of arbitration. The arbitrator has decided the reference on merits and whether there was valid reference or not was a matter to be decided by the appellate authority. The appellate authority has not touched upon this point. Therefore, contention of Mr. Srivastava that no arbitration proceeding could proceed on the basis of the letter without there being any resolution, cannot be accepted. After having derived the benefits of the arbitrator's order it does not lie in his mouth that arbitrator's order could not be pronounced in the manner in which he had decided the reference. Had the appellate Court also decided in favour of the petitioner, then the petitioner probably was not aggrieved by the arbitration proceeding. His grievance started from the appellate order. It is probably conceived by the petitioner that by assailing the arbitration proceeding as being incompetent, the appellate order would also disappear. I am affraid that this cannot be ruled for the simple reason that arbitrator has taken cognizance of the dispute and pronounce his opinion on the merits of the case and after that has unnecessarily held the reference as incompetent. The observation of the arbitrator in this regard is redundant and does not accord with the context of the matter before him. 12. The observation of the arbitrator in this regard is redundant and does not accord with the context of the matter before him. 12. It was secondly argued that the sale-deed could not be cancelled by the appellate authority, it can be cancelled only by the Civil Court. In my opinion this contention also is misplaced. If the sale-deed as a matter of fact was held to be illegal, bad or in violation of the provisions of law, the appellate authority could declare it as bad and inoperative or non est. If such a finding was returned, cancellation of the sale-deed would be implicit in such a finding. What the appellate authority actually means to say is that the sale-deed is illegal, inoperative or non est as against the interest of the society and would confer no benefit on the petitioner and if he declares the sale-deed as cancelled no fault can be found in that finding. His order, if not set aside in the writ petition has to be recorded in the Sub-Registrar's register. Therefore, it is not correct to suggest that after having declared the sale-deed illegal, the respondent society should resort to a civil litigation for getting the sale-deed cancelled. This would only multiply the litigation and would .be futile type of litigation. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard is, therefore, overruled. 13. It was next contended that the order of the arbitrator in respect of the allotment of plot in favour of the petitioner was valid and final. The argument is based on the plea that there was no managing committee at the relevant time, in existence, therefore, the Administrator had the power of the managing committee and his order i.e. allotment of the plot in favour of the petitioner will be deemed to be a resolution under the Act. So far the proposition that the order of the Administrator, given in a situation when the managing committee was not in existence, would amount to a resolution, is not disputed. But, the matter is not as simple as it is projected. The procedure adopted, in passing the resolution must be fair and in accordance with law. If the procedure is unfair, based on nepotism, favouritism or opposed to law, a seal of legally cannot be given to it by the order of the arbitrator. But, the matter is not as simple as it is projected. The procedure adopted, in passing the resolution must be fair and in accordance with law. If the procedure is unfair, based on nepotism, favouritism or opposed to law, a seal of legally cannot be given to it by the order of the arbitrator. In the present case it is contended by the respondents that there has been violation of Rule 98 of the Co-operative Societies Rules which would not permit Mr. Kanchan Singh, husband of the petitioner to preside over the meeting dated 13-9-1978 in which a resolution for allotment of plot in favour of the petitioner was passed Rule 98 of the Co-operative Societies Rules has a laudable purpose behind it. It seeks to eliminate possibility of favouritism and nepotism in the matter of granting any benefit to any person in whom the Chairman or Vice-Chairman or any member elected for presiding over the meeting, has personal interest. There is no gainsaying that the petitioner's husband Mr. Kanchan Singh who had presided over the meeting dated 13-9-1978, could have no interest in the petitioner. The Rule enjoins upon the person who presides over the meeting of the committee in which resolution is passed, not to give benefit of any kind to any person in whom he has personal interest. This is rule of fair play and the Rule of fair play is ingrained in every statute which concerns the public. It is the duty of every authority to act fairly de Smith in his Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Fourth Edition page 238, says "That the donee of a power must "act fairly" is a long settled principle governing the exercise of discretion, though its meaning is inevitably imprecise. Since 1967 the concept of a duty to act fairly has often been used by judges to denote an implied procedural obligation. In general it means a duty to observe the rudiments of natural justice for a limited purpose in the exercise of functions that are not analytically judicial but administrative. Given the flexibility of natural justice, it may not have been strictly necessary to use the term "duty to act fairly" at all, but its usage is now firmly established in the judicial vocabulary. Given the flexibility of natural justice, it may not have been strictly necessary to use the term "duty to act fairly" at all, but its usage is now firmly established in the judicial vocabulary. Its value has lain in assisting the extension of implied procedural obligations to the discharge of functions that are not analytically judicial, and in emphasising that acting in accordance with natural justice does not mean forcing administrative procedures into a strait-jacket. The comparatively recent emergence of this use of the "duty to act fairly" may also enable the courts to tackle constructively procedural tissues that have not traditionally been regarded as part of the requirements of natural justice. It may therefore be less confusing to say that an immigration officer or a company inspector or a magistrate condemning food as unfit for human consumption or an educational institution considering an application by a student for admission is obliged to act fairly rather than obliged to act judicially (or to observe natural justice which means the same thing). However, close analysis of the relevant judgments is apt to generate its own confusion, for sometimes one judge will differentiate a duty to act fairly from a duty to act judicially and another will assimilate them, both judges being in full agreement as to the scope of the procedural duty cast on the competent authority." 14. Therefore, if Rule 98 of the Rules is violated and the person who has presided over the meeting is allowed to take up the matter for decision in which be is personally interested the guarantee of fair play underlying the Rules will be completely obliterated. Therefore, it is necessary that Rule 98 of the Co-operative Societies Rules be punctually observed and discussion on any matter in a meeting be not permitted where the presiding officer of the meeting has a personal interest in the said discussion. It is unlikely that Mr. Kanchan Singh would not have any interest in his wife who is the petitioner. The resolution of allotment in favour of the petitioner having been passed in the meeting of which her husband Kanchan Singh was the president is dehors of concept of fair play. However, I would leave this aspect to the appellate authority for reconsideration after I deal with the next point urged by learned counsel for the petitioner. 15. The resolution of allotment in favour of the petitioner having been passed in the meeting of which her husband Kanchan Singh was the president is dehors of concept of fair play. However, I would leave this aspect to the appellate authority for reconsideration after I deal with the next point urged by learned counsel for the petitioner. 15. The petitioner's next grievance is that the additional evidence was called for without any authority and without any provision being there for the purpose and the said evidence was considered at her back without having given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses or adduce evidence in rebuttal. 16. This argument can be separated in two parts. First part relates to the jurisdiction of the appellate authority to allow the additional evidence produced at the appellate stage, and the second part relates to the question of denying opportunity to cross-examine the additional witnesses and to rebut the same by the person against whom additional evidence is recorded. 17. So far the first part of the proposition is concerned, I do not think any illegality in allowing the additional evidence at the appellate stage. It is true that there is no specific provision whereby the appellate authority in the present case could direct production of additional evidence, but if it is held that it has the power to record the evidence for coming to a just conclusion then power to allow additional evidence must be concerned to the appellate tribunal. Therefore, it is not against the provision of law. The appellate authority could allow additional evidence or further evidence could be recorded for coming to a just conclusion. The second limb of this proposition as urged by the petitioner cannot be said to be without substance. 18. The appellate authority seems to have taken into consideration the record of appeal No. 37-W and made that record basis of his judgment. There is no dispute if appellate authority is of the opinion the record of that file could be made basis of his judgment. There is no dispute if the appellate authority records any statement of any witness on which he could base his judgment. But before that is done the person against whom the record of the other case is used of statement of the witness is recorded must be given a right to cross-examine the witness and to rebut the record. There is no dispute if the appellate authority records any statement of any witness on which he could base his judgment. But before that is done the person against whom the record of the other case is used of statement of the witness is recorded must be given a right to cross-examine the witness and to rebut the record. It is not the concern of the tribunal as to whether the party against whom the record was used or evidence was recorded would be able to rebut it or not, but right to cross-examine the witness is necessarily.to be given to the person who is likely to be affected by calling the additional evidence and by production of the record. If that is not done, principle of natural justice would stand violated. 19. The petitioner, in this case was, therefore, entitled to be granted an opportunity to rebut the evidence which was brought against her and to cross-examine any witness whose statement was recorded against her. This is so, because the petitioner is entitled to get full and fair opportunity from the tribunal to rebut any evidence which is recorded against her and which is likely to affect her interest adversely. The petitioner has been denied the opportunity to rebut the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses which were produced at the appellate stage against her, therefore, the appellate judgment as it stands cannot be used against her unless she gets fair opportunity to rebut the additional evidence, if any, produced against her and to cross-examine the witnesses if recorded at her back. 20. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed only on the ground of violation of principle of natural justice by the appellate authority. All other points urged by the petitioner are over-ruled. The appellate judgments dated 22-3-1982 and 28-5-1982 are set aside with the directions that the appellate authority shall decide the appeal de novo and if it has allowed the appellant to produce additional evidence or used any documents which was likely to effect the interest of the petitioner, he shall dive fair opportunity to the petitioner of rebutting the evidence so produced by the appellant against her and allow the petitioner to adduce evidence in rebuttal. Thereafter, the appellate authority shall pass a fresh reasoned order based on the material before him without being influenced by any other consideration. Thereafter, the appellate authority shall pass a fresh reasoned order based on the material before him without being influenced by any other consideration. For this purpose one opportunity on consecutive two days shall be given to the petitioner Smt. Kiran Devi for adducing evidence in rebuttal and for cross-examining the witnesses whose statements had been recorded at her back. This should be done within two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before the appellate authority. In the meantime, the appellant and Om Prakash who had been heard in this writ petition, are directed not to change the present position on the spot and maintain status quo in respect of the plot in question.