JUDGMENT - S.M. DAUD, J.:---This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution takes exception to the decision of the second respondent in an appeal preferred by the first respondent. 2. The first respondent is a Co-operative Housing Society registered as such under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. Dr. C.S. Kothari, was a member of the said society and he was allotted premises described as shop No. 17. Some transaction in relation to the shop took place between Dr. Kothari and the petitioner. Petitioner was not a member of the society - whether full or nominal. However after having claimed to purchase the shop from Dr. Kothari, she gave an intimation thereof to the Society. The Society raised a dispute which led to the registration of Case No. 351 of 1983. To this dispute were impleaied the petitioner as also Dr. Kothari. The parties compromised the matter and submitted consent terms on the basis of which an award was passed. The said award is at Exhibit 'B'. After the passing of the award the petitioner started the business of vending liquor in the shop. This was objected to by the Society which eventually filed Case No. 2396 of 1986 in the Co-operative Court. Petitioner filed a written statement setting out various defences to the claim for an injunction sought by the society. An interim injunction had been granted restraining the petitioner from carrying on liquor business in the shop and against that order the petitioner had gone in appeal to the second respondent. The appeal was allowed and this, after negotiating the petitioner's contention that section 91 of the Act did not apply for which reason the forum provided by the Act had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute raised by the first respondent. The appeal was allowed and this, after negotiating the petitioner's contention that section 91 of the Act did not apply for which reason the forum provided by the Act had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute raised by the first respondent. The learned Judge of the Appellate Court in negativing this contention raised by the petitioner, observed thus :--- "However, at the present, at this stage I do not desire to accept the said distinction because prima facie it appears to me that by filing the dispute by the society in the Co-operative Court under section 91 and making the averments relying on the condition of the appellant before it, that the appellant was considering herself as nominal member, it can be treated by necessary application, that the Society had come before the Court on accepting the position of a nominal membership of the appellant and therefore, at this stage it can be accepted that the Court had jurisdiction on these averments to treat the dispute falling under the provisions of section 91 of the M.C.S. Act." It was on merits that the petitioner succeeded in getting the interim injunction vacated. After the matter went back to the Co-operative Court, the parties led evidence and the said Court by its judgment delivered on 6-1-1986 came to the conclusion that the dispute did not fall within the purview of section 91 of the Act and therefore had to be thrown out on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The other issues arising in the dispute were untouched. The dismissal was assailed in appeal which was heard and decided on 13-2-1986 by the second respondent. Before him it was contended that the Co-operative Court had no competence to differ from the earlier findings given in the appeal against the interim injunction granted by it vis-a-vis the issue of jurisdiction. This contention was upheld by the second respondent and the reasoning is to be found in the following passage appearing in his judgment :--- "This Court had held on an issue brought up in this Court in appeal as a preliminary issue of jurisdiction that the Court had a jurisdiction. I think that the trial Court had fallen in error to reopen that issue and further hold that the Court had no jurisdiction, as the matter did not fall under section 91 of the M.C.S. Act, 1960. I think that the trial Court had fallen in error to reopen that issue and further hold that the Court had no jurisdiction, as the matter did not fall under section 91 of the M.C.S. Act, 1960. Therefore, the whole exercise by the learned trial Judge, on the aspect of jurisdiction can be considered as erroneous and not proper and is contrary to the finality given by this Court in the appeal." The appellate judgment is challenged in the petition, and, rightly so. The appeal taken by the petitioner to the Appellate Court against the grant of an interim injunction by the trial Court did give rise to the issue of jurisdiction, but only fleetingly so. As the passage quoted from the appellate judgment itself indicates, the appeal Court did not think it necessary to go deep into the matter and decide the question one way or the other. What it made clear was that the issue of jurisdiction did not really arise at the stage at which the matter was when it had come in appeal before it. The subject-matter of the appeal at the earlier stage was the interim injunction granted against the petitioner restraining her from conducting liquor business in the shop premises. To assail the verdict of the trial Court the petitioner raised two contentions in the Appellate Court. The first was that the Co-operative Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute under section 91 of the Act and therefore, should not have granted the interim injunction. Next, and this without prejudice to the exception taken to the jurisdiction of the trial Court, petitioner contended that on merits the Society was not entitled to the interim injunction sought by it. In appeal on the first ground the Appellate Court did not think it necessary to go deep into the matter for in its view the consideration of the issue of jurisdiction could be deferred to a more appropriate state. Without going into the jurisdiction issue raised by the petitioner, the Appellate Court went into the merits and found that on the said merits, the appellant was entitled to succeed and get the interim injunction vacated. In the face of this reason the second respondent could not say that the issue of jurisdiction had been concluded in the appeal against the interlocutory order. In the face of this reason the second respondent could not say that the issue of jurisdiction had been concluded in the appeal against the interlocutory order. In terms, it was not considered and if considered it was for the limited purpose of assessing the legality or otherwise of an interlocutory order. A determination of an issue in an interlocutory matter cannot preclude a permitted reconsideration when it comes to the final stage. The second respondent has referred to a decision of Kotwal J., in (Kranti Mohan Guruprasad Mehar v. Fatehchand Vasuram Mehal)1, 83 Bom.L.R. 445. With respect to respondent No. 2, the authority cited by him does not apply because in the earlier appeal where the interim injunction was assailed, the issue of jurisdiction had not been truly tried so as to operate as res judicata. The observations made by him in that appeal indicated that he was not going to go into the matter as an issue requiring resolution for the determination of the appeal. In his own words, the said issue was not mandatorily resolvable at that stage in order to facilitate the disposal of the appeal. Even otherwise had he considered the issue of jurisdiction on merits, the determination if adverse to the petitioner, could not have precluded a reconsideration at the final stage of the dispute by the trial Court. However considered the decision of the second respondent cannot be sustained. The same is hereby quashed and the appeal remitted to the second respondent for a fresh hearing and determination in accordance with the above directions as also the law applicable. Rule in the above terms made absolute, with parties being left to bear their own costs. Rule made absolute. -----