Judgment :- 1. The above writ petition has been filed for a writ of certiorari to call for and quash the records of the respondent relating to the notice of demand in Assessment No. 60511 dated 30-9-1983 in Ref. No. 71240/82/A-7 relating to Sri Ramakrishna Hospital, Coimbatore claimed to be run by the petitioner trust. 2. The petitioner, in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, states that a trust was formed on 9-2-1970 under a registered document, that in accordance with the terms of the trust deed, the petitioner trust has been running Sri Ramakrishna Hospital at 2/212-A, Avarampalayam Road, Coimbatore-44 and Sri Ramakrishna Childrens School, Nava India, Avarampalayam Road, Coimbatore-6 and that the hospital in question was started during the year 1974 and the school was started from the academic year 1983. It is also stated in the affidavit that prior to 1981, when the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, came into existence, the Coimbatore Municipality was in existence and though the petitioner sought for exemption from the erstwhile Municipality, it was only in the year 1977 by the proceedings dated 20-9-1977, the petitioner trust was exempted from payment of tax under S. 83(i)(e)of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920 with effect from 1-4-1977. It is also stated that in respect of the portions occupied by the office, canteen, Doctors residential quarters and Nurses quarters, the Municipality appears to have been assessing the trust separately to pay a tax of Rs. 1,246-55 per half year. The petitioner trust appears to have been remitting the tax demand notwithstanding the fact that the canteen and the Doctors and Nurses Quarters formed an integral part of the hospital and would be entitled for exemption under S. 83(1) (e) of the Act with effect from 1-4-1977. 3. The aforesaid method of assessment appears to have been continued upto 30-9-1980 and that for the half year commencing with effect from 1-10-1980 a special notice dated 31-3-1989 was said to have been served on the petitioner proposing to revise the earlier assessment by revising the annual value. On representations filed by the petitioner, it appears that final orders were passed by the respondent on 8-8-1981 granting the petitioner an exemption of property tax under S. 123(e) of the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981 for the period from 1-10-1980 to 31-3-1982. On representations filed by the petitioner, it appears that final orders were passed by the respondent on 8-8-1981 granting the petitioner an exemption of property tax under S. 123(e) of the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981 for the period from 1-10-1980 to 31-3-1982. It is also claimed that the Commissioner of Income-tax, Coimbatore has, granted exemption under S. 80-G of the Income Tax Act, 1961 in respect of donations made to the petitioner trust for medical relief and education and that such exemption was granted upto 31-3-1984. The Collector of Coimbatore also was said to have certified on 1-8-81 that the petitioner hospital is doing charitable and relief work and that 40 per cent of the out-patient cases are treated completely free of charge and that the in-patients whose income was less than Rs. 300 were paid free medical and nursing care including investigations, medicines and operations and free diet. The Government of Tamil Nadu appears to have also granted exemption from the payment of urban land-tax with effect from fasli 1385 on the ground that the petitioner institution was a philanthropic institution. The authorities of the Health Department of the State Government appear to have recommended also to the Director General of Health Services, Government of India, New Delhi for the issue of Customs Duty exemption certificate enabling the petitioner to import medical equipments for use in the petitioner hospital. On the basis of the above materials, the petitioner states that the Central and State Government authorities were satisfied that the petitioner trust was a charitable one of a philanthropic nature and the exemption from payment of tax granted on that account. 4. While so, on 25-2-1982, the petitioner appears to have applied for renewal of the exemption to which no reply was said to have been received. Instead, according to the petitioners, the respondent served a notice of demand for property tax on 24-7-1982 fixing the property tax for the half year commencing from 1-4-1982 at Rs. 1,43,037-93. The petitioner states that a representation has been made to the respondent on 13-8-1982 and again on 30-8-1982 to renew the exemption hitherto granted by the earlier orders, which were in vogue upto 31-3-1982. After calling for further details and clarifications, it is stated that the respondent by his communication dated 30-9-1983 refused to grant exemption and demanded the arrears of tax amounting to Rs. After calling for further details and clarifications, it is stated that the respondent by his communication dated 30-9-1983 refused to grant exemption and demanded the arrears of tax amounting to Rs. 4,29,113-76 for the three half years commencing from 1-4-1982 and calling upon the petitioner to pay the same within seven days from the date of receipt of the said amount. Aggrieved, the above writ petition has been filed. 5. The respondent has filed a counter affidavit stating that during the first half-year of 1975-1976, the hospital building was assessed for tax under three assessment numbers, of which the first two assessments covered the hospital buildings and the third one, the Doctors Quarters, Nurses Quarters, canteen and office room. It is stated that the petitioners have paid tax upto 1977. The respondent refers to the claim for exemption made by a letter dated 26-7-1977, but the exemption appears to have been objected to by the Audit Department on the ground that the petitioner hospital is not entitled to the same, since they are charging the patients for the use and occupation of the rooms and as such, they are not entitled to the exemption in terms of the provisions contained in the District Municipalities Act. It is only at that stage it is stated that on the orders of the Commissioner dated 10-10-1980, the hospital was assessed to property tax on the basis of annual rental value and the same was sought to be given effect to from 1-10-1980 by issue of a special notice raising a demand in the name of the petitioner trust under R. 10 of Schedule IV of the Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920. An half-yearly tax of Rs. 1,43,037-93 was said to have been levied on the property and on receipt of the same, the petitioner was said to have presented a petition to the Commissioner on 7-4-1981. It is also claimed that with effect from 1-5-1981, the Coimbatore Municipality became a Corporation and that the property was inspected by the Commissioner on 6-8-1981 and after perusing the records produced by the petitioner, the exemption appears to have been granted from payment of property tax for the period from 1-10-1980 to 31 3-1982, and that no exemption was granted for the period subsequent thereto. The respondent contends that having regard to the Proviso to S. 123 of the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act, 1981, the petitioner is not entitled to the exemption. It is also contended that the petitioner hospital is one of the biggest hospital in the Corporation limit, with all facilities and equipments for modern treatment, that the hospital is having 210 rooms constructed in a total area of 8961.06 Sq. metres, that for occupation of those rooms, the petitioner collects rents from those persons who used the same and that the normal rent charged varies from the nature of the accommodation (General Ward, Rooms with A.C., Rooms without A.C.), that the petitioner was also collecting charges from the outpatients and, therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to get exemption from the payment of property tax taking advantage of S. 123(e) of the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act. It is also contended that as against the impugned order, an effective alternative remedy by way of appeal to Taxation Appeals Committee headed by a Judicial Officer is available with further appeal to the District Court and a further revision thereafter to this Court and the Writ Petition ought not to be entertained. 6. Mr. Dulip Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, while reiterating the submissions made in the affidavit, contended as follows: (a) The petitioner is entitled to exemption from property tax under S. 123(e) of the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act and the Proviso does not stand in the way of its right to have the exemption as above. (b) The amounts collected from a patient cannot be equated to ‘rent’ for the purpose of attracting the proviso to S. 123 of the Act and consequently, the levy and demand of property tax is illegal, (c) ‘Charitable institution’ does not mean that it cannot earn income or cannot make a gain for itself and that a mere collection of amounts for services rendered cannot be construed to be a factor disabling the petitioner to get exemption under S. 123(e) of the Act. 7. The learned counsel, in support of his submission relied upon the decision in State of Punjab v. British India Corporation Ltd. (1964) 2 S.C.R. 114 . That was a case concerning the property tax exemption claimed, under the provisions of Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1940. 7. The learned counsel, in support of his submission relied upon the decision in State of Punjab v. British India Corporation Ltd. (1964) 2 S.C.R. 114 . That was a case concerning the property tax exemption claimed, under the provisions of Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1940. Apart from other issues, one of the issues that fell for consideration of the Apex Court was of the meaning to be given to the word ‘rent’ in Cl. (ii) of R. 18(4) and the Court was of the view that the word ‘rent’ was used in its narrower sense of payment by tenant to landlord to demised property and does not include payments made by licencees. The next decision relied on was that of a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court in New Delhi Holy Family Hospital Society v. Delhi Municipality AIR 1984 Delhi 84. That was a case arising under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. The learned Judge while adverting to the question of exemption claimed by a charitable society in respect of hospital run by it on a non-profiteering basis, held having regard to the scheme of the provisions of the said enactment, as hereunder: “17. The test is the purpose for which lands and buildings are used. If the lands or buildings are exclusively occupied and used for a ehanitable purpose, the Society qualifies for relief from municipal taxation under sub-section (4). But if any trade or business is carried on by the organisation in such lands or buildings or portions thereof or any rent is derived therefrom “then such lands and buildings shall be subject to general tax under sub-section (5).” On that view, the collection of fees from rich patients visiting Private O.P.D. to defray cost of maintaining hospital, was considered to be not a disentitling factor standing in the way of claiming exemption. The learned counsel also placed reliance upon paragraph 212 of Halsburys Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 27, to contend that a rent can only be reserved on a demise of corporeal hereditaments and the other types of payments do not answer the description of ‘rent’. The relevant portion of the paragraph reads as follows:— “212. Payments which are not rent. The relevant portion of the paragraph reads as follows:— “212. Payments which are not rent. —As a rent can only be reserved on a demise of corporeal hereditaments, the following payments, even though recoverable by virtue of the contract, are not rent; payments reserved on the grant of a licence for the use of premises; payments reserved on a lease of an incorporated hereditament; payments reserved on a lease of chattels: payments, not included in the reservation, which are agreed to be made in addition to the rent, such as the payment of a premium by instalments for the granting of a lease; payments made under a covenant of “guarantee’ contained in a licence or assign; payments on account of a service charge which is not reserved as a rent; and, if the demise was by lease under seal, payments by way of increased rent which the tenant agrees (otherwise than by deed) to make subsequently to the demise.” 8. The learned Advocate General, while reiterating the stand taken in the counter affidavit, contended that the charges collected by the petitioner from the occupants of the various rooms falls within the description of ‘rent’ within the meaning of the Proviso to S. 123 of the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act and consequently the petitioner is not entitled to the exemption provided under S. 123(e) of the Act. The learned Advocate General further submitted that the word ‘rent’ is to be taken to have been used in the ordinary and comprehensive sense and not in a restricted sense and consequently, the amounts collected by the petitioner from the occupants of the rooms for their stay in the rooms constitute ‘rent’ within the meaning of the Proviso. The learned Advocate General further submitted that the word ‘rent’ is to be taken to have been used in the ordinary and comprehensive sense and not in a restricted sense and consequently, the amounts collected by the petitioner from the occupants of the rooms for their stay in the rooms constitute ‘rent’ within the meaning of the Proviso. The decision in Karnani Properties Ltd. v. Miss Augustine A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 330 was relied upon to contend that it is the intention of the Legislature that should be taken into account in construing a word when there is no definition as such in the Act and that in the absence of a definition as such and that in the absence of a definition of a particular word in the Act itself, it must be taken to have been used in its ordinary dictionary meaning and so viewed, the term ‘rent’ was comprehensive enough to include all payments agreed to be paid by the tenant to the land lord for the use and occupation not only of the building and its appurtenances but also of furnishings, electric installations and other amenities agreed to be provided by and at the cost of the landlord. The learned Advocate General relied upon the very passage referred to on behalf of the petitioner from the Halsburys Laws of England referred to above to support his stand-point as well. 9. I have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel appearing on either side. The provisions of S. 123 of the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act. In so far as it is relevant for the purposes of the issue to be decided by me, reads as hereunder:— “123. General exemptions from property tax — The following buildings and lands shall be exempt from the property tax— (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) xxx xxx xxx (d) xxx xxx xxx (e) Charitable hospitals and dispensaries but not including residential quarters attached thereto; (f) xxx xxx xxx (g) xxx xxx xxx (h) xxx xxx xxx (i) xxx xxx xxx (j) xxx xxx xxx Provided that nothing contained in Cls. (a), (c) and (e) shall be deemed to exempt from property tax any building or land for which rent is payable by the person or persons using the same for the purposes referred to in the said clauses.” It could be seen that the provisions of the Act themselves make it clear that buildings and lands comprising of charitable hospitals and dispensaries alone are exempt from property tax and they also make it clear that the residential quarters attached thereto are excluded from such exemption. Even in respect of the properties exempted as above under S. 123 (e) of the Act, the Proviso mandates that the exemption shall not enure in respect of any building or land for which rent is payable by the person or persons using the same for the purposes referred to under Cls. (a), (c) and (e) of S. 123 of the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act. In my view, the scheme underlying the Proviso itself as well as the phraseology employed in respect of Cls. (a), (c) and (e) of that Section would go to show that the word ‘rent’ requires to be construed liberally and comprehensively and not in any limited or restricted sense of ‘rent’ in respect of a demised property. Cl. (a) deals with places set apart for public worship, Cl. (c) deals with places used for charitable purpose of sheltering the destitute or animals or orphanages, homes and schools etc., and Cl. (e) refers to charitable hospitals and dispensaries. When the Legislature has thought it fit to deprive the entitlement of exemption in respect of such properties on the ground of any collection of rent from person or persons using the same, it could be taken for granted that the Legislature was alive in drafting the Proviso to the position that the properties or places to which the Proviso was sought to be applied on a given contingency are not primarily capable of being let in the ordinary sense of lease of demised property by those running such institutions from the users of the same. There is no question of hospitals and dispensaries being let in the restricted sense by those who run them. If in spite of the nature of the properties concerned under Cls. There is no question of hospitals and dispensaries being let in the restricted sense by those who run them. If in spite of the nature of the properties concerned under Cls. (a), (c) and (e) of S. 123 of the Act, the word ‘rent’ has been used, it should be considered to have been used in a comprehensive or in a general and wide sense as to include the collection of any charges from the person or persons using the property by those who run the hospital and dispensaries or the other kind of prope rty covered under Cls. (a) and (c) also. The decision in A.I.R. 1963 SC 1459 may be seen in this connection with advantage. Consequently, in my view, the proviso is squarely attracted to the case on hand. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the accounts maintained by them would indicate that they are not making any profit out of those collections, has no relevance whatsoever in considering the applicability or otherwise of the Proviso. The collection of any sum, be it negligible, in my view would attract the applicability of the Proviso so long as such charges are collected from the users of the property. In view of the above conclusion of mine, all the issues raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission has to fail. 10. The writ petition, therefore, fails and it shall stand dismissed. No costs.