JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - This is the defendant's First Appeal From Order against the judgment and order dated 23.7.90 passed by the Addl. District Judge, Ballia, allowing the appeal against the judgment and order dated 18.4.88 passed by the Munsif West, Ballia dismissing the suit mainly on the ground that the cost of which was directed to be deposited in the earlier suit was not deposited. In appeal it has been held that the' application 149-C2 was moved by the plaintiff at a belated stage, nevertheless the same was allowed and the time was extended in view of the provisions of Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the Code). 2. It appears that the plaintiff has earlier filed a suit for mandatory injunction for removing constructions from the land in dispute and a relief for permanent injunction was also claimed. That suit was ultimately withdrawn by order dated 24.7.1981, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure-3 to the affidavit accompanying the stay application. The terms under that order were that the plaintiff respondents were permitted to withdraw the suit, but they were to pay cost to the defendant appellant and consequently the suit was withdrawn. A subsequent suit was filed and in that suit issues were framed. A point was raised by the defendant appellant that the cost in the earlier suit was not deposited, hence the subsequent suit was barred under order 23, rule 3 (6) of the Code,. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that as the cost was not deposited, hence the suit was dismissed. Against that order appeal was preferred and the same has been allowed and the suit has been remanded to the trial court for giving an opportunity to the appellant to deposit the cost as imposed vide order dated 24.7.81. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants urged that by order dated 24.7.1981 no time was granted, hence the respondents must have deposited the amount as directed under order 23, Rule 3 (b) of the Code within a reasonable period: and that no application for depositing the amount or for fixation of the same was filed, hence the cost could not be deposited by the plaintiff and the appellate court erred in directing the plaintiff respondents to deposit the cost and also erred in extending time under Section 148 of the Code. Reliance was paced on M/s. Kokan Trading Co. v. Suresh and others, AIR 1986 SC 1009 . 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants I am of the view that the appeal has correctly been allowed. The order dated 24.7.1981 permitting to withdraw the suit with an opportunity to file a fresh suit after depositing the cost of the suit, did not specify and date by which the cost has to be deposited. For that purpose the plaintiffs moved an application 149-C-2 for ascertainment of the cost and for extension of time to deposit, but the same was rejected by the trial court. The object of Order 23, Rule 3 (b) is to give power to court to allow the plaintiff at any time to withdraw the suit independently or to withdraw the suit on fulfilling certain conditions in respect of payment of cost. The defects should not be permitted to prevail particularly when the amount of cost was not specified in the order nor the time for depositing the same was indicated. The procedure provided is just to attain justice and not to frustrate it. In the present case if no time was indicated in the order permitting to withdraw the suit or the amount of cost was indicated, the application filed by the plaintiff, may be at a later stage, must have been allowed in the ends of justice. 5. In M/s. Kokan Trading Co. v. Suresh and others (supra), the following observations may be noticed: "There is no warrant for taking a hyper-technical rigid view which results in denying to a person access to justice and deprives him of his legal rights more so when it is possible to take a liberal view which promotes the ends of justice." 6. With the above observations it is obvious that the Supreme Court was of the view that hypertechnicalities should not be permitted to prevail, rather a liberal and reasonable view may be taken so as to achieve the ends of justice. As the procedure contemplated by Order 23, Rule 3 (b) of the Code is with a view to do justice between the parties and to permit the plaintiff to withdraw the suit with an opportunity to file a fresh suit, the same may be considered in such a reasonable way so as to serve ends of justice. As the procedure contemplated by Order 23, Rule 3 (b) of the Code is with a view to do justice between the parties and to permit the plaintiff to withdraw the suit with an opportunity to file a fresh suit, the same may be considered in such a reasonable way so as to serve ends of justice. The technicalities in the matters of procedure need not be permitted to prevail. 7. The provisions of Section 148 of the Code is very precise and that provides that where any period is fixed or granted by the court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, and the same has expired, the court may enlarge such period. That enlargement of period can be made even after the expiry of the period. In the instant case the order directing withdrawal of suit did not specify any time by which the amount of cost was to be deposited nor the amount of cost was indicated in the order itself. Hence a fortiori the provisions of Section 148 have to be applied in a very liberal way so as to serve ends of justice. If the time has been enlarged by the appellate court there appears to be no error. 8. Jagdhya v. Babu Ram, AIR 1983 SC 57 was a case where the High Court had rejected the application for extension of time under Section 148 of the Code. Their lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the High Court has committed error in not exercising power under Section 148 of the Code. Consequently it appears that a reasonable and liberal view has to be taken in deciding the application under Section 148 for enlargement of the period with a view to do justice which is paramount consideration. The impugned order expending time for deposit of the cost and remanding the suit to the trial court for disposal has done complete justice between the parties. The impugned order does not suffer from any error of law. Consequently there is no justification for interference by this Court. 9. In the result, the present appeal fails and it is dismissed.