Judgment :- The plaintiff is the appellant. This appeal is against the Judgment and the Subordinate Judge of Tiruvannamalai in A.S.No.8 of 1979, which was in turn O.S.No.143 of 1978on the file of the District Munsif, Tiruvannamalai. The suit was tried with six other suits filed by the same plaintiff against the other tenants occupying properties. The suits are disposed of by a common judgment by the District Munsif 29.4.1978. The appeals against the judgments and decrees in all the suits were also of by a common judgment by the Subordinate Judge dated 30.10.1979. Both the courts held that the respondent herein and the other tenants are entitled to the benefits Tamil Nadu City Tenants’ Protection Act and the plaintiff is not entitled to the possession. Consequently, the suits were dismissed. 2. The plaintiff filed this second appeal as well as Second Appeal Nos.1461 to 1466 Those second appeals were heard by a Division Bench and disposed of by judgment 20.10.1989. This second appeal was not posted along with those second appeals and counsel states that he could not trace out this appeal and have it posted with the appeals. Thus, this appeal was left out from the batch. 3. The judgment of the Division Bench is reported in Bhargarakula Nainargal Thiruvannamalai v. Arunachala Udayar, (1990)1 L. W. 46. The matter was referred Bench by Ratnavel Pandian, J. on the question whether a tenant in respect of a vacant who denies title of the landlord, is entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Protection Act. The Division Bench answered the question in the negative and held tenant, who has denied the title of the landlord is not entitled to the benefits of the The Division Bench ruled that a tenant, who wants to claim the benefits of the Act must two requirements; firstly, he must be a person liable to pay rent in respect of the and secondly, such a liability should be under a tenancy agreement express or implied. Division Bench pointed out that will not by any stretch of imagination apply to a case where tenant denies the very agreement itself and claims title in himself. 4. Division Bench pointed out that will not by any stretch of imagination apply to a case where tenant denies the very agreement itself and claims title in himself. 4. The facts of the present case, which are similar to the facts of the cases decided Division Bench, are shortly as follows: The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was and filed an eviction petition under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease Rent Control) Act. That petition was dismissed on the ground that the demised premises a vacant site and proceedings should be taken in a civil court. Subsequently, determining the tenancy was issued by the plaintiff and the defendant was called deliver possession. The defendant sent a reply denying the allegations made in the Hence the suit was instituted. 5. In the written statement filed by the defendant, it was contended that the plaintiff title to the suit property as it stood registered in an individual name and not in the Sangam. It was contended that the Sangam, by no stretch of imagination could claim the owner of the property. There was no tenancy whatever in favour of the defendant tenancy set up in the plaint was specifically denied and the plaintiff was put to strict the averments made in the plaint. It was also contended that the notice issued prior was not valid. Subsequently, an additional written statement was filed in which pleaded that if, in any event, the Court found that the plaintiff Sangham was the landlord the suit site, the defendant was entitled to the protection of the Madras City Protection Act. 6. At the time of trial, the plaintiff examined its President as P.W.I. There was no examination challenging his evidence. The defendant did not adduce any evidence side. Thus, he gave up the plea with respect to all the issues raised in the suit. Hence issues were found in favour of the plaintiff. 7. The only question which survived for consideration was, whether the defendant entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act (hereinafter called Act’) on the facts pleaded by the plaintiff. The Courts below have upheld the claim the defendant. 8. Hence issues were found in favour of the plaintiff. 7. The only question which survived for consideration was, whether the defendant entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act (hereinafter called Act’) on the facts pleaded by the plaintiff. The Courts below have upheld the claim the defendant. 8. Inspite of the fact that the Division Bench has disposed of the connected cases and a ruling holding that the tenant, who denies the title of the landlord is not entitled benefits of the Act, learned counsel for the defendant/respondent contends that the Bench has failed to take note of an earlier ruling of another Division Bench and the requires fresh consideration. He invites my attention to a Judgment in Sanjeevi Chittibabu Mudaliar, (1953)1 M.L.J. 260 . In that case, suits were filed for recovery possession and mesne profits. Decrees were passed and when they were sought executed, an objection was raised that notwithstanding the decree, the defendant liable to be evicted because of the provisions of Sec.7(1) of the Madras Buildings (Lease Rent Control) Act of 1949. That contention was upheld by the Master, who dismissed execution petition and on appeal it was confirmed by a single Judge. On further appeal, Division Bench confirmed the order of the learned single Judge holding that the decree not be executed because of the provisions of Sec.7(1)of the Madras Buildings (Lease Rent Control) Act. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows: "So it may be taken as established that under the general law the tenancy in Chittibabu had been duly terminated. But the definition of "tenant" in the Rent Control expressly includes a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy his favour. Chittibabu would certainly be such a person. In accordance with the findings the trial court which has since been affirmed by us, Chittibabu did not have title property at any time. He must therefore be deemed to have continued all along in as a tenant. He would be a tenant-holding over. Under the general law a tenant holding is deemed to be governed by the same terms as the terms of the tenancy under came into occupation. He must therefore be deemed to have continued all along in as a tenant. He would be a tenant-holding over. Under the general law a tenant holding is deemed to be governed by the same terms as the terms of the tenancy under came into occupation. One of such terms would be the payment of monthly rent of therefore hold that Chittibabu was a tenant within the meaning of Sec.2(4) of Control Act, as a person by whom rent was payable and as a person continuing in after the termination of the tenancy in his favour. Sec.7(l) expressly provides that a tenant in possession of a building shall not be therefrom, whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, whether in execution decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of that section. This provision is a complete answer to the execution petition filed by Sanjeevi for eviction. In this view it is not necessary to consider the effect the proviso because the procedure indicated in the proviso has not been followed in case. That proviso contemplates first a petition before the Rent Controller himself for eviction and a denial of title in such proceedings. If the controller decides that the denial of bona fide and records a finding to that effect, then the landlord will be entitled to sue eviction of the tenant in a civil court. But even here the decree for eviction can only passed on any of the grounds mentioned in Sec.7. Though the proviso in terms will not any application to the facts of this case, the principle of the proviso supports the view we have already taken as regards the status of Chittibabu as a tenant under the Act. effect of the proviso is that even if a civil court finds that the claim of the tenant is not founded the tenant can be evicted only on any of the grounds mentioned in sec.7. In words, even when the tenant has denied the title of the landlord and his denial has found to be without foundation, he will be entitled to the benefits of Sec.7(1)." 9. The ruling cannot have any bearing in the present case as the provisions of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act will stand on a different footing. In words, even when the tenant has denied the title of the landlord and his denial has found to be without foundation, he will be entitled to the benefits of Sec.7(1)." 9. The ruling cannot have any bearing in the present case as the provisions of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act will stand on a different footing. As pointed out Division Bench itself there is a specific provision for eviction under the Act on the ground denial of title. The Rent Control Act has always been held to be a self contained Act complete Code with regard to eviction of tenants occupying buildings on lease thereof. (1) of the Act, which was then in force, provided that a tenant shall not be evicted whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of that section. Hence the Division Bench held though the tenancy was terminated in accordance with the provisions set out in Sec. the Transfer of Property Act, that would not enable the landlord to recover possession; the result he could not execute the decree which he had obtained in the suit. 10. It is to be pointed out that this Court has consistently been taking the view that the court has not lost its jurisdiction to pass a decree for possession even after the advent Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, but such decrees cannot be executed, in accordance with the provisions of the said Act -vide: Mohamed Unni v. Melapurukkal (1949)1 M.L.J. 452 , Sec.7(2)(vi) of the Act of 1949, which corresponds to Secl0(2)(vii) Act of 1960, provided that where a tenant has denied the title to the landlord or claimed right of permanent tenancy and that such denial or claim was not bona fide, Controller could pass an order evicting the tenant and direct the tenant to put the landlord possession of the building. On the other hand, if the denial or claim was bona fide, proviso, corresponding to Sec.10(1) of the 1960 Act was to the effect that the Controller shall record a finding to the effect and the landlord shall be entitled to eviction of the tenant in a civil court and the civil court may pass a decree for eviction ground mentioned in the section, notwithstanding the fact that the court found that denial did not involve forfeiture of the lease. That provision is very significant and reference is made to that provision by the Division Bench. This provision contained in of the old Act, corresponding to Sec.10of the present Act, clearly prescribed the procedure which a landlord could evict his tenant in the case of denial of title. If the denial of title bona fide, eviction can be obtained before the Rent Controller and if the denial is eviction has to be obtained in a civil court and that too only on the grounds set out Act. It is only because of that the Division Bench held that a tenant who had denied title incurred forfeiture, which led to termination of tenancy under Sec.111 of the Transfer Property Act, was still a tenant within the meaning of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Control) Act, being entitled to invoke the provisions thereof. The definition of "tenant" Act includes a person who continues in occupation after the termination of the tenancy. 11. That ruling will have no relevance to a case arising under the City Tenants’ Act. In so far as this Act is concerned, there is no provision similar to the one found Buildings Act. This Act does not prescribe the ground for eviction. This Act will come into only in cases where the tenancies are determined by the lessors of the property under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. When a ejectment is filed it is open to the tenant who is a tenant within the meaning of the claim the benefits of the Act under Sec.3 or Sec.9. The only change which is brought by this Act is found under Sec.11 of the Act, which provides that notice should be accordance with the provisions contained therein, in the event of the tenant being the benefits of the Act. The only change which is brought by this Act is found under Sec.11 of the Act, which provides that notice should be accordance with the provisions contained therein, in the event of the tenant being the benefits of the Act. If a suit for ejectment is filed without complying with provisions Sec.11 of the City Tenants ’ Protection Act, it will have to be dismissed because provisions contained therein. Apart from that, there is no other provision in the impinge upon the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. 12. The Division Bench has in the connected batch discussed the matter in detail and come to the conclusion that a person who denies title of his landlord is not claim the benefits of the City Tenants Protection Act. Hence, it is not necessary for repeat the reasoning or add thereto. 13. It is because the learned counsel wanted to rely on the judgment of the Division in Sanjeevi Naidu v. Chittibabu Mudaliar, (1953)1 M.L.J. 260 , and contended that therequires reconsideration, I had to refer to the above provisions. I hold that the Sanjeevi Naidu v. Chittibabu Mudaliar, (1953)1 M.L.J. 260 , has no relevance to which the tenant makes a claim under the City Tenants ’ Protection Act. Hence, there necessity for reconsideration of the matter once again. 14. Learned counsel invites my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1745: (1979)4 S.C.C. 214 : (1980)1 (S.C.) 1. In that case the Supreme Court held that no notice is necessary under Sec.106 the Transfer of Property Act before instituting a proceeding under the provisions of Control Act. The Court held it was unnecessary and mere surplusage because the cannot get eviction of the tenant even after such notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer Property Act. While discussing the different arguments put forward by the learned both sides, the Supreme Court considered the position of a tenant, who had forfeiture of tenancy of denial of title under Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property though such a question did not arise on the facts of the case. The relevant passage judgment on which reliance is placed by learned counsel is as follows: “On a careful consideration and approach of the matter in the instant case we think cannot approve of the view expressed in the passage extracted above. The relevant passage judgment on which reliance is placed by learned counsel is as follows: “On a careful consideration and approach of the matter in the instant case we think cannot approve of the view expressed in the passage extracted above. In Ratan Vardesh Chander, (1976)2 S.C.R. 906 , Krishna Iyer, J. delivered the judgment on behalf Bench of this Court consisting of himself, Chandrachud, J. as he then was and Gupta, case related to a building in Delhi. The Court was concerned with clause (g) of Sec.111 Transfer of Property Act. Tracing the history of the legislation it was pointed out by at page 918 that the requirement as to written notice provided in Sec.111(g) cannot to be based on any general rule of equity and therefore forfeiture of lease brought terms of Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act not by notice but on the application justice, equity and good conscience was held to be good determination of the lease. from Manujendra’s case it was said at page 911: “We are inclined to hold that the landlord in the present case cannot secure an eviction without first establishing that he has validly determined the lease under the of Property Act? why this dual requirement? Even if the lease is determined by a under the Transfer of Property Act the tenant continues to be a tenant, that is to say, no forfeiture in the eye of law. The tenant becomes liable to be evicted under the State Act, not otherwise. In many State statutes different provisions have been made grounds on which a tenant can be evicted and In relation to his incurring the liability evicted. Some provisions overlap those of the Transfer of Property Act. Some are new are mostly in favour of the tenants but some are in favour of the landlord also. That the dictum of this Court in Brij Raj case comes into play and one has to look to the of law contained in the four corners of any State Rent Act to find out whether a tenant evicted or not. The theory of double protection or additional protection, it seems to us, has been stretched too far and without a proper and due consideration of all its ramifications.” 15. The theory of double protection or additional protection, it seems to us, has been stretched too far and without a proper and due consideration of all its ramifications.” 15. I have already pointed out that a ruling under the Buildings Act cannot be applicable to case in which the benefits of the City Tenants ’ Protection Act are claimed. The case before the Supreme Court arose under Buildings Act and has nothing to do with the claim under City Tenants ’ Protection Act. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent contends that the definition of “tenant” Acts is almost the same. In both the cases, a person who continues to be in possession after the termination of tenancy is considered to be a tenant. It may be so. But the two entirely different in their scope and objects. It is rightly pointed out by learned counsel the appellant that under the. Buildings Act, the landlord need not necessarily be the of the building. The landlord ” is defined as including a person who is receiving or is to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another. that cannot be the position under the City Tenant’s Protection Act Sec.9 of the Act confers privilege on the tenant to purchase the land on which he has erected a superstructure conditions prescribed in the section are complied with. That can be done only proceeding is against the owner of the land. Hence necessarily the landlord under Tenants’ Protection Act has to be the owner, who is capable of conveying the title in to the tenant. That is a fundamental difference between the two Statutes. Apart from have already referred to the circumstances that the Buildings Act is a self-contained regard to eviction of tenants. On the other hand, the City Tenants ’ Protection Act will into play only when the tenancies are determined under the provisions of Transfer Property Act. Therefore, the ruling of the Supreme Court will not help the respondent present case. 17. Learned counsel for the respondent places reliance on a judgment of Karnataka Court in Govindamma v. Murugesh Mudaliar, A.I.R. 1991 Kant. 290. That is a case under Karnataka Rent Control Act. That will have no application to the present case. otherwise, there is a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court. 17. Learned counsel for the respondent places reliance on a judgment of Karnataka Court in Govindamma v. Murugesh Mudaliar, A.I.R. 1991 Kant. 290. That is a case under Karnataka Rent Control Act. That will have no application to the present case. otherwise, there is a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court. Since it is binding there is no point in relying on the judgment of the Karnataka High Court. 18. In the present case, the denial of title was even prior to the institution of the suit reply notice issued by the tenant. Even if the denial is made in the course of the proceedings for eviction, it is held by the Supreme Court recently that such a denial would be a for eviction, (vide: Subbarao v. Krishna Rao, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 2187) 19. In the result, the judgments of the courts below are erroneous and unsustainable. second appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees are set aside. O.S.No.143 of the file of the District Munsif, Tiruvannamalai, is decreed as prayed for by the plaintiff, costs throughout. Learned counsel for the respondent prays for time. Learned counsel the appellant is agreeable for grant of three months time, If the respondent files an of undertaking. Hence the respondent is granted time till 31.3.1992 to vacate the and hand over possession to the landlord, on condition that he files an affidavit in this on or before 15.11.1991 undertaking to vacate the premises on or before 31.3.1992 driving the appellant to execution proceedings. Learned counsel for the respondent directed to give a copy of the affidavit of undertaking to learned counsel for the appellant this Court. If the affidavit is not filed, the respondent will not be entitled to the benefit grant of time. Appeal allowed.