Judgment :- The plaintiff is the appellant. The suit is one for a permanent injunction restraining the first respondent Municipality from in any way interfering with the plaintiffs possession and enjoyment of the suit property. In the plaint itself, it is categorically stated in paragraph 3 that the site in this suit property was classified as sandhu poramboke “and the plaintiff had originally put up a thatched house thereon at his own cost in 1987. In the plaint, there is no reference whatever to any permission h aving been granted by the Municipality or any lease granted by it. The plaint proceeds on the only footing that the plaintiff is in possession from 1957, having constructed a superstructure, and was entitled to continue on the property. It is alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff has perfected his right over the suit property. 2. In the written statement, the first defendant contested the claim of the plaintiff and also raised an objection on the ground of non-joinder of the Government as a party as the land is a poramboke. Thereafter, the Government was impleaded as the second defendant in the suit. 3. The trial court granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff, while the appellate court reversed the same and dismissed the suit. The aggrieved plaintiff has referred this second appeal. 4. It is contended by learned counsel for the plaintiff that there was lease in favour of the plaintiff by the Municipality from 1959, as evidenced by Ex. A3. According to him, the lease was for a period of three years and it was being renewed periodically on the expiry of each lease. He places reliance on Exts. A3, A6, A7, A8, A9, A13 and A17. Even according to the plaintiffs case the leases and the renewals thereof came to an end in 1973. There was no further renewal thereafter. 5. In 1983, the Municipality issued a notice to the plaintiff calling upon him to remove the superstructure. It is only thereafter, the plaintiff has filed the suit. 6. As pointed out already, there is no reference whatever to the lease in the plaint. Ex. A3 is a notice issued by the Municipality to the plaintiff on 4.7.1959 informing him that the Municipal Council had decided to lease out the property in question for a period of three years. But there is no document of lease. 6. As pointed out already, there is no reference whatever to the lease in the plaint. Ex. A3 is a notice issued by the Municipality to the plaintiff on 4.7.1959 informing him that the Municipal Council had decided to lease out the property in question for a period of three years. But there is no document of lease. As the period mentioned is three years, in the absence of a registered document, there cannot be a valid lease in favour of the plaintiff. Even assuming that there was a resolution by the Municipal Council that would not constitute a valid lease in favour of the plaintiff. Ex. A6 is a memo dated 30.9.1961 issued to the plaintiff informing him that the Municipal Council has refused to sanction the renewal of the lease for the encroached space for a period of three years as prayed for by him. He was, therefore, required to remove the encroachment and intimate the fact to the Municipal Office within three days from the receipt of the memo. Ex. A7 is another memo dated 20.10.1961 giving final notice to the plaintiff to remove the encroachment within three days after the receipt of the memo, on the footing that his request for renewal was rejected. Ex. A8 is a letter by the plaintiff to the Commissioner of Salem Municipality and the Inspector of Local Boards praying for renewal of the lease from 14-8-1961 to 14.8.1967. Ex. A9 is a memo dated 7.2.1962 informing the plaintiff that the Municipal Council sanctioned the renewal of lease. The plaintiff was required to deposit necessary stamp papers for writing the lease deed. There is no evidence that any such lease deed was written or executed. Ex. A13 is a memo dated 19.10.1967 informing the plaintiff that the period of lease had expired on 12.7.1967 and that he should remove the encroachment within three days after the receipt of the notice. Ex. A17 is a notice dated 22.12.1972 that the lease granted to the plaintiff had expired on 12.7.1967 and there was no renewal thereafter. He was directed to deposit the amounts due upto 12.7.1973 within three days after the receipt of the notice, failing which the encroachment would be removed. The subsequent documents were only calling upon the plaintiff to remove the encroachment. Thus it is seen that there was no renewal of the lease after 1967. He was directed to deposit the amounts due upto 12.7.1973 within three days after the receipt of the notice, failing which the encroachment would be removed. The subsequent documents were only calling upon the plaintiff to remove the encroachment. Thus it is seen that there was no renewal of the lease after 1967. There is no document of lease. In the absence of any document of lease proving the valid lease in favour of the plaintiff, the courts below are in error in holding that the plaintiff was a lessee. 7. Even assuming that there was a lease in favour of the plaintiff, it was not valid in law. The Municipality is certainly not entitled to lease out a street poramboke land to any party when the land is intended only to be used for the purpose of street. The Municipality has no power to convert the user and allow any party to use it for any other purpose. The position of law has been clearly set out in Zahara Bi v. Sheik Dawood AIR 1966 1 Mad 550. The law has been very clearly elucidated by the learned Judge and it is pointed out that a street has to be used only as a street and the Municipality cannot put it to a different user. It is also pointed out that any member of the public can compel the Municipality to use it as a street. In this case admittedly it is a street and it is not open to the Municipality to lease out the same to the plaintiff for having his superstructure. 8. Even assuming that, there was such lease, it had come to an end admittedly in 1973. After 1973, there was no lease or permission in favour of the plaintiff to use the land for the purpose of superstructure. It is argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that he has got a superstructure for which the Municipality has made an assessment and is collecting tax therefor. That will not in any manner alter the character of the property and prevent the Municipality from exercising its powers under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 9. Learned counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Annapurnaiah v. Narasimha Rao AIR 1982 A.P. 253 . That will not in any manner alter the character of the property and prevent the Municipality from exercising its powers under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 9. Learned counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Annapurnaiah v. Narasimha Rao AIR 1982 A.P. 253 . It is held by a Division Bench of that court that after the lease is terminated, if the tenant continues in possession without the consent or acquiescence of the lessor, such a tenant is a “tenant by sufferance” and he cannot be deemed lobe “holding over” when there is no proof of extension of lease in his favour. But his possession is not unauthorised and it is juridical possession. It is also held that he is entitled to a decree for injunction restraining the owner of the land from interfering with his possession. It is pointed out by the Bench that he should be removed from possession only by due process of law. On the facts of the case it had nothing to do with a Municipality or the Government. But in the course of the judgment, a reference is made to the judgment of Bombay High Court in K.K. Verma v. Union of India AIR 1954 Bom. 358 . In the case before the Bombay High Court, it was held by that court that the law made a clear distinction between a trespasser and an erstwhile tenant and the possession of a tenant by sufferance was Juridical Possession, which was protected by law. Learned counsel submits that in the view taken by the Bombay High Court that even with reference to the Government lands the tenant by sufferance would have juridical possession and it cannot be disturbed except by due process of law. 10. Neither of the rulings will apply to the present case. As I have pointed out already, there could not have been a valid lease in favour of the plaintiff herein. If at all, there was only a permission or licence by the Municipality to use the land for the plaintiffs own purpose, that permission has also came to end in 1973. Hence the plaintiff cannot claim to be tenant by sufferance or that his possession is a juridical one. 11. The relevant provisions in the Act are contained in Ss. 162, 180-A, 182, and 183. Hence the plaintiff cannot claim to be tenant by sufferance or that his possession is a juridical one. 11. The relevant provisions in the Act are contained in Ss. 162, 180-A, 182, and 183. Under S. 162 of the Act, the Municipal Council, shall, at the cost of the municipal fund, cause the public streets and bridges to be maintained and repaired and also meet the cost of improvements of the same. Under S. 180-A, all streets vested in a Municipal Council shall be open to person of whatever caste or creed. S. 182 reads thus:— “(1) The executive authority may by notice require the owner or occupier of any premises to remove or alter any projection, encroachment or obstruction (other than door, gate, bar or ground-floor window) situated against or in front of such, premises and in or over any street. S. 182 reads thus:— “(1) The executive authority may by notice require the owner or occupier of any premises to remove or alter any projection, encroachment or obstruction (other than door, gate, bar or ground-floor window) situated against or in front of such, premises and in or over any street. (2) If the owner or occupier of the premises proves that any such projection, encroachment or obstruction has existed for a period sufficient under the law of limitation to give any person a prescriptive title there to or that it was erected or made with the permission or licence of any municipal authority duly empowered in that behalf, and that the period, if any, for which the permission or licence is valid has not expired, the Municipal Council shall make reasonable compensation to every person who s uffers damage by the removal or alteration of the same.” S. 183(1)(4) and (6) are as follows:— “(1) The Council may grant a licence, subject to such conditions and restrictions as it may think fit, to the owner or occupier of any premises to put up verandas, balconies, sunshades weather-frames and the like, to project over a street, or in streets, in which the construction of arcades has been sanctioned by the council, to put up an arcade or to construct any step or drain-covering necessary for access to the premises.” “(4) But neither a licence under sub-S. (1) nor a lease under sub-S. (3) shall be granted if the projection, construction or occupation is likely to be injurious to health or cause public inconvenience or otherwise materially interfere with the use of the road as such.” “(6) On the expiry of any period for which a licence has been granted under this section, the executive authority may without notice, cause any projection, or construction put up under sub-S. (1) or (2) to be removed, and the cost of so doing shall be recoverable in the manner provided in S. 344 from the person to whom the licence was granted.” 12. Under S. 182 of the Act, the executive authority may require the owner or occupier of any premises vested in the Municipality to remove or alter any projection, encroachment or obstruction in or over any street. Under S. 182 of the Act, the executive authority may require the owner or occupier of any premises vested in the Municipality to remove or alter any projection, encroachment or obstruction in or over any street. Under sub-S. (2) of S. 182, if the owner or occupier of the premises proves that any such projection, encroachment or obstruction has existed for a period sufficient under the law of limitation to give any person a prescriptive title thereto, then the Municipal Council shall make reasonable compensation to such person, who suffers damage by the removal or alteration of the same. In the present case, the plaintiff cannot claim that he has been in possession for a period which would in law be sufficient to give a prescriptive title. No doubt, he has been in possession from 1957. But his possession has been admittedly with the permission of the Municipality from 1959. He himself places reliance on Exts. A3, A6 and other documents referred to 7 already. When his possession is with the permission of the Municipality, it cannot be treated as adverse and the plaintiff can never claim prescriptive title of the property. In fact, the only case put forward in the plaint is that of possession, which had ripened into prescriptive title. The evidence let in by the plaintiff himself disproves his case. 13. With regard to the other part of the said section, if the owner or occupier has been in possession with the permission or licence of any municipal authority and if the period for which the permission or licence is valid has not expired, then also the Municipal Council shall make reasonable compensation to such person, in the present case, the permission or licence granted by the Municipality had already come to an end as early as 1973. Hence, the plaintiff cannot claim the benefit of latter part of sub-S. (2) of S. 182 of the Act. Consequently, the plaintiff is not entitled to any compensation whatever under S. 182 of the Act. 14. Under sub-S. (4) and (6) of S. 183, it is open to the Municipality to have the projection or construction removed even without notice. Under sub-S. (4) even licence cannot be granted if the projection, construction or occupation is likely to be injurious to health or cause public inconvenience or otherwise materially interfere with the use of the road as such. Under sub-S. (4) even licence cannot be granted if the projection, construction or occupation is likely to be injurious to health or cause public inconvenience or otherwise materially interfere with the use of the road as such. Learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that there is no evidence whatever in this case that this construction has caused any public inconvenience or is likely to be injurious to health. Once it is admitted that the land is intended to be used only as a street and has been classified as street poramboke, then no part of it can be leased out or be permitted by the Municipality to be used by any person for any other purpose. Such user will undoubtedly interfere materially with the use of the property as a road. Hence any licence granted in favour of the plaintiff by the Municipality from 1959 onwards was ab initio void and the plaintiff cannot claim any right thereunder. 15. In Ratnaswami Nadar v. Virudlntnagar Municipal Council 1943 I M.L.J. 406 it was held that even if a projection was found above or over the area constituting the street, the Municipality was entitled under S. 182 of the strict Municipalities Act to have it removed and that even if the owner of the premises had obtained a prescriptive right to have the projections it would be open to the Municipality to direct their removal but in such a case the Municipal Council should make a reasonable compensation. The ruling in that case was that the right of removal with the municipality could not be disputed and the only right that could be claimed by a person who had acquired prescriptive title was to claim compensation. 16. In Appavoo v. Corporation of Madras 1966 I M.L.J. 187 it is held that S. 220 of the Madras City Municipal Act authorises the Corporation to issue notice and remove any unauthorised occupation of a public place, the control of which is vested in them. It is also pointed out that though the land might belong to the Government, if it has rested in the Corporation and entered in their land Register as a public place, then the Corporation would be entitled to take proceedings under the said Section. It is also pointed out that though the land might belong to the Government, if it has rested in the Corporation and entered in their land Register as a public place, then the Corporation would be entitled to take proceedings under the said Section. Learned counsel for the plaintiff wants to distinguish the judgment on the ground that it refers to the original occupation without the permission of either the Corporation or the Government. According to him, in the present case the original occupation was with the permission of the Corporation. In that ruling, it is held that the mere fact that the Corporation collected licence fee for the trade carried on by the occupier or tax for the superstructure put up by him or provided the amenities for the place cannot make the occupation lawful, if it is proved that the original occupation was without the permission of either the Corporation or the Government. 17. In the present case, there is no evidence that the original occupation of the plaintiff was with the permission of the Municipality. According to him, he got into the property in 1957. He has not produced any document to show that his first occupation was only with the permission of the Municipality. The first permission on which he could place any reliance is evidenced by Ex. A3 dated 4.7.1959. But it was only subsequent to the original occupation and it was not before the original occupation. In the circumstances the ruling will apply and the fact that the Municipality had subsequently collected from him licence fee or rent for the encroachment would not prevent the Municipality from exercising its statutory function under the Act. 18. It is the duty of the Municipality to comply with the provisions of the Statute, as found in Ss. 182 and 183 of the Act and no court can grant an injunction restraining the Municipality from exercising its functions which are enjoined by a Statute. In the circumstances, the present suit is not sustainable and the plaintiff is not entitled to get any relief. Consequently, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court dismissing the suit are unassailable and that the second appeal fails and is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.