JUDGMENT Brijesh Kumar, Member. - This revision arises out of an order dated 16-6-1988 passed by Sri Misri Lal, Additional Commissioner (Administration), Jhansi Division, Jhansi in revision petition No. 67/137 of 1985-86 dismissing the revision and confirming the order dated 18-11-1985 passed by the Additional Collector, Lalitpur, cancelling the lease granted in favour of the revisionist. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the Additional Collector Lalitpur initiated proceedings suo-moto under Section 198 (4) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act against the revisionist Deo Singh on the grounds that the revisionists father held 60-90 acres land and that the revisionist was not the resident of the circle. In response to the notice, the allottee denied the allegations contending that the allotment was made according to rules and that in earlier proceedings No. 2006/227 under Section 198 (2) of the Act the S.D.O. Lalitpur had vacated the notice by means of his order dated 13-6-1972. He claimed to be the resident of the circle and lived separately from his father. Not satisfied with the explanation of the allottee, the learned Additional Collector cancelled the allotment. Aggrieved by this order, the allottee preferred a revision before the Divisional Commissioner. The learned Additional Commissioner dismissed the revision upholding the findings of the learned trial court. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the revisionist and the learned D.G.C. (R). Sri D.N. Gupta learned counsel for the revisionist has contended that the revisionist has no land at all, that he was a landless agricultural labourer, that he was major and was living separately from his father prior to the grant of the lease. His second contention is that a notice was vacated in an earlier proceedings on 13-6-1972 and this order would operate as res-judicata. His third submission is that the revisionist has mentioned in paras 11, 12 and 13 of his objection that he was resident of the village Piparaunia where the land was situated at the time of allotment and that he is still a resident thereof. Referring to the statement of the lekhpal, the learned counsel has contended that the village Bala Behat and Piparaunia are adjoining villages. Another submission is that the allotment was made in the year 1964 and according to the order of preference at the time of allotment any other person categorised in clause (d) could be allotted land. Referring to the statement of the lekhpal, the learned counsel has contended that the village Bala Behat and Piparaunia are adjoining villages. Another submission is that the allotment was made in the year 1964 and according to the order of preference at the time of allotment any other person categorised in clause (d) could be allotted land. Assailing the findings of the Courts below on the joint that the allottees father had held sufficient land, the learned counsel has contended that the land held by bis father cannot be taken into consideration while making allotment in favour of the revisionist. In support of his arguments, he has placed reliance on 1984 RD 274, Prabhu Dayal v. Board of Revenue, 1990 RD 70, Sarman Lal v. State. The last argument advanced by the learned counsel is that the learned trial court has passed its findings on the report of the S.D.O. and thus the enquiry made by the Collector is not enquiry in the eye of law. Reliance has been placed on 1990 RD 232 Lalman v. State. 4. The learned D.G.C. (R.) has contended that a person living outside the circle is not entitled to the allotment of any land and the person coming under the category of 'any other person could be allotted land only when the allotment has been made in favour of all the landless agricultural labourers. Referring to the order of 13-6-1972, he has contended that the S.D.O. had not power to pass any order as the power to cancel the lease vested in the Collector from 1969. 5. I have carefully considered the arguments advanced before me and have also perused the record. The first question for consideration is whether the enquiry, as alleged by the learned counsel for the revisionist, has vitiated. On a careful scrutiny of the record, I find that the contention of the learned counsel is not sustainable. It appears from the record that the Additional Collector got the preliminary enquiry made by the S.D.O. - Lalitpur who submitted a report to him pointing out the irregularities in the allotment. The Collector initiated the proceedings suo-moto and issued notice under his own seal and signature. The evidence was recorded in his Court and he has given a certificate to this effect that the statement was recorded in his presence and under his signature. The Collector initiated the proceedings suo-moto and issued notice under his own seal and signature. The evidence was recorded in his Court and he has given a certificate to this effect that the statement was recorded in his presence and under his signature. I am, therefore, satisfied that the enquiry was made according to law. 6. The second question for consideration is whether the proceedings are barred by res-judicata. It appears from the record that the A.S.D.O. Lalitpur had initiated proceedings against the revisionist under Section 198 (2) of the Act and subsequently vacated the notice on 13-6-1972. The A.S.D.O. had no jurisdiction to pass this order as the power to cancel the allotment vested in the Collector since 1969. This order has, therefore, no legal sanctity and would not operate as res-judicata. 7. Coming to the merits of the case, I find that the Courts below have committed manifest error in law in cancelling the lease. The first ground for cancellation is that the revisionists father had sufficient land. No lease can be cancelled on this ground because the father is not included in the definition of a landless. This has been held in Prabhu Dayal v. Board of Revenue, reported in 1984 RD 274 by the Honble K.P. Singh, J. Allowing the Writ Petition, the Hon'ble Judge has observed that a bare perusal of explanation (1) would indicate that even if the father had sufficient land, the petitioner could be termed as landless and this aspect of the matter has escaped the notice of the revisional Court. The only limitation prescribed for a person being landless is that he or she or their spouse and their minor children should not hold land as bhumidhar, sirdar or asami. 8. Another ground on which the allotment was cancelled is that the allottee lived outside the circle. The allotment could not be cancelled on this ground also. The only limitation prescribed for a person being landless is that he or she or their spouse and their minor children should not hold land as bhumidhar, sirdar or asami. 8. Another ground on which the allotment was cancelled is that the allottee lived outside the circle. The allotment could not be cancelled on this ground also. The revisionist has claimed that he is covered by the clause (d) of order of preference under Section 198 (1) of the Act as it stood at the time of allotment, which is as under : "198(1) In admitting any person as sirdar or asami under Section 195 or 197, the Land Management Committee shall, subject to the rules framed or order made by the Court under Section 178 observe the following order of preference : (a) a landless agricultural labourer or an asami residing in the circle who does not hold any land whether as bhumidhar, sirdar or adhivasi, (b) a bhumidhar, sirdar or adhivasi who is holding landless than 6 acres in area in the circle, (c) a co-operative farm established under this Act holding land within the jurisdiction of the Land Management Committee to enable it to possess a suitable area of land, and (d) any other person." It is held in Gonde v. State, reported in 1987 RD 124 that the lease could be granted under category (d) to any other person. The term any other person is very wide. The statute has not attached any qualification of the person coming under this category. But the common sense and justice demands that the person coming under this category should be considered for allotment in those cases only when the list of all the landless agricultural labourers has been exhausted. In the instant case, there is nothing on the record to show that a list of persons desirous of taking lease was prepared at the time of grant of lease and the plots to be let out were announced in the proclamation. It, therefore, cannot be said in the absence of any positive proof that the lease was granted in favour of the revisionist at the cost of other agricultural labourer. 9. In the result, this revision succeeds and the impugned orders of both the Courts below are quashed.