JUDGMENT D. P. Sood, J.—This is Regular Second Appeal under para 32 of the Himachal Pradesh Courts Order, 1948, against the judgment and decree dated October 23, 1981, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kangra, Civil Division, Camp at Chamba, whereby the lower Courts judgment dated 4th September, 1979, for possession through redemption of mortgagee of the suit land was up-held, 2. The bone of contention in between the parties Is the land contained in khata-khatoni No. 9/15 to 18 measuring 14 bighas situate at Mohal Jandrog, Pargna Raipur, Tehsil Bhatiyat, District Chamba (hereinafter referred to as the suit land) The instant appeal involves the determination of three questions, firstly, plea of limitation, secondly, bar of resjudicata and thirdly, legality and validity of the Will Ex PW I/A. 3. in order to understand the real controversy arising in between the parties, the narration on the necessary facts are absolutely essential. 4. S/Shri Norang and Gulla were brothers. The former had a son by the name of Bir Singh who inherited the suit land but willed away the same in favour (respondents No. 1 to 5 substituted as L. Rs) of the original plaintiff, namely, Shri Gulla, who died during the pendency of the suit. 5. On 16th of Magh 1917, B, K., Sh. Norang aforesaid had mortgaged the suit land for a consideration of Rs. 600 in favour of the mortgagee Sh. Shayama on the condition that it would be redeemed on the payment of debt. It was asserted that the defendants had appropriated dividends from the suit land many times more than the mortgaged amount and hence the plaintiffs were entitled to recover possession thereof by way of redemption without payment of any mortgage money to the defendants. 6. The defendants resisted the suit by pleading bar of res-judicata stating that Bir Singh aforesaid previously filed a Civil Suit No 123 in the Court of Sub-Judge, Chamba, for possession of the suit land through redemption which was decreed in the year 1997 B. K. and the mortgagor-plaintiff (since deceased) was ordered to deposit an amount of Rs 800 within three months failing which the judgment and decree would become inoperative. They also contested the suit on the ground that plaintiffs had no locus-standi to file the suit inasmuch as the Will in question in favour of Gulla was not validly executed by late Sh. Bir Singh. 7. They also contested the suit on the ground that plaintiffs had no locus-standi to file the suit inasmuch as the Will in question in favour of Gulla was not validly executed by late Sh. Bir Singh. 7. Both the Courts below disagreed with the contentions raised by the defendants and decreed the suit for possession through redemption without payment of mortgage money. It is how the defendants feeling aggrieved with impugned judgment and decree, have come up in this appeal. 8. Before coming to the merits of the case, it may be stated in view of the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in Naranjan Singh v. Durga Dass, ILR 1977 (HP) 640, this Court is empowered to treat the Regular Second Appeal as if it was before the first appellate Court and resultantly, it cannot only go into the question of law but also of facts. In the aforesaid case, it was held that "right of appeal which is vested in a party and which could not be divested unless by an express provision or necessary intendment, is the one which is "to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit" and "not by the law which prevails at the date of the filing of the appeal". Both the parties have not disputed this proposition of law. 9. The first contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants is that the suit in question is patently time barred inasmuch as the suit could have been filed before 1st of January 1969 under section 30 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is pointed out that though the period for filing suits under the Limitation Act, (New) was subsequently amended w. e. f. 26th March, 1970 and words "seven years" were substituted for words "five years" in section 30, the plaintiffs right to file the instant suit remained extinguished in between the period commencing from 1st January, 1969 to 26th March, 1970. As the instant suit was filed on 10-12-1969, the plaintiffs9 right could not be deemed to have been revived by the subsequent amendment. 10. This argument of the Id. Counsel, on the face of it, is fallacious. It is well settled that the limitation merely bars the remedy of the claimant but does not extinguish his right. As the instant suit was filed on 10-12-1969, the plaintiffs9 right could not be deemed to have been revived by the subsequent amendment. 10. This argument of the Id. Counsel, on the face of it, is fallacious. It is well settled that the limitation merely bars the remedy of the claimant but does not extinguish his right. Admittedly under the old Act that is Limitation Act, 1908, the limitation for filing the suit for possession through redemption was sixty years which period was reduced to 30 years by the Limitation Act, 1963. However, under section 30 of the Limitation Act, in cases where the period of 30 years to file such suit had expired but limitation existed under the old law for a period of more than seven years, a right to file such suits was given to the claimant by seven years. Obviously, the period of limitation under the old Act in the instant case was to expire in January 1974 and the instant suit had been filed on 10-12-1969, that is within the extended period of seven years under section 30 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In that view of the matter, the instant suit was filed within limitation. Thus this argument of the learned Counsel being meritless, is rejected. 11. Second point pleaded is the bar of res-judicata. Admittedly, late Sh. Bir Singh filed a civil suit for possession through redemption of mortgage of the suit land in question—much earlier which was decided on 8th Asuj 1997 BK, certified copy of the judgment on record is Ex, DA. it reveals that decree for possession by way of redemption was passed and the plaintiff was ordered to deposit Rs, 800 within three months failing which the decree would be void and inoperative. This argument is also untenable The sole point to be looked into at this stage is whether previous judgment Ex. DA extinguished the right of mortgagor to redeem the mortgage in dispute ? In case the answer is in affirmative, the subsequent suit is definitely a bar otherwise no legal bar can be deemed to have been created by the previous judgment. DA extinguished the right of mortgagor to redeem the mortgage in dispute ? In case the answer is in affirmative, the subsequent suit is definitely a bar otherwise no legal bar can be deemed to have been created by the previous judgment. In such a case a mortgagor is entitled to bring successive suits for redemption The basic principle in this behalf is that unless the equity of redemption is extinguished, a second suit for redemption by the mortgagor, if filed within the period of limitation, cannot be treated as barred. Onus of proving that the old decree had extinguished the right to redeem is heavy upon the mortgagee. The learned Court below has rightly appreciated the ratio of the law laid down in Raghunath Singh v. Mt. Hansraj Kunwar and others, AIR 1934 PC 205, and Somnath Pradhan and others v. Sanno Govindo Misra and others, AIR 1959 Ori 122. In the earlier case it was held :-— “that the provision in a decree in a suit for redemption that in case of default by the plaintiff in payment, his case will stand dismissed, cannot be construed as meaning that the plaintiff was to be debarred of all right to redeem and that the decree was an order of a Court extinguishing the right to redeem within the meaning of the proviso to section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. A second suit for redemption will be maintainable in such cases." The facts of the instant case are fully covered by the observations made in the case of Raghunath Singh (supra). As such this contention too being without any substantial force, is rejected. 12. The Id. Counsel for the appellants has lastly urged that the Courts below have erred in holding the Will Ex. PW ?/A to be a valid Will inasmuch as the proper execution thereof has not been proved nor the same can be taken into consideration as the provision of section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, have not been complied with because it has not been proved that the Will had been attested by two or more attesting witnesses, it is pointed out that Will Ex PW I/A is attested by Sh. Chaterbhuj a sole witness to this document and none else. Neither Sh. Hans Raj PW 1 nor Sh. Chaterbhuj a sole witness to this document and none else. Neither Sh. Hans Raj PW 1 nor Sh. R K. Dharmani PW 3 can be deemed to be attesting witnesses in terms of section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, as none of them put their signatures indicating their animo-attestandi. Reliance has been placed on the observations made in M L. Abdul Jabbar Sahib v. H Venkata Sastri and Sons and others, AIR 1969 SC 1147. On the contrary Sh Bhupender Gupta, Id. Counsel for the respondents has vehementlv argued that the signatures of both Hans Raj scribe PW 1 and that of R K. Dharmani, Sub Registrar, PW 3, signed not only as attesting witnesses in the presence of testator but also put their signature in his presence He argued that both these witnesses can be treated as attesting witnesses to the Will Alternatively, it has been urged that even if Will" is held to be invalid, late Sh. Gulla being uncle of Sh. Bir Singh, deceased, was entitled to inherit the estate left behind by the latter, as at the relevant time there was no other heir except him. 13. I have carefully considered the arguments so advanced by the Id. Counsels for the rival parties, There appears to be substantial force in the arguments of Id, Counsel for the appellant qua the validity of Will Ex. PW I/A only. However, he cannot succeed on the alternative aspect of the case. 14. Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act says that "the Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will or has seen some other person sign the Will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgement of his signature; or mark or the signatures of such other person and each of the witnesses shall sign the Will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary for more than ore witness to be present at the same time and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary. The execution of the Will is, thus to be proved within four corners of the aforesaid section and the law requires strict compliance of this provision of law Thus before execution of a Will is considered to be proved, the Court has to satisfy itself that the Will was attested by two or more witnesses strictly in accordance with the requirement of section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, referred to above. The Will comes to operation after the death of the testator and it can be attested at any time before the testator dies. It is also not the compulsorily registerable document. 15. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Will stands on a different footing than the other documents which are compulsorily registerable under the Transfer of Property Act. As held by the Supreme Court in Moonga Devi v. Radha Ballab, AIR 1972 SC 1471, it is not merely the genuineness of signatures or mark of the testator on which the proof of the execution of the Will under section 63 of the Succession Act depends, it has to be proved that the Will was attested in accordance with clause (c) of that section. 16. In the instant case Will Ex. PW I/A was attested only by one witness namely, Chaturbhuj who has not been produced to prove its execution. Both the trial Courts relied upon the statements of scribe and the registering authority respectively (PWs 1 and 3) and on the basis of earlier decisions of Bombay High Court in Theresa v. Francis J. Misquita, AIR 1921 Bom 156, Allahabad High Court in Lachman Singh and others v. Surendra Bahadur Singha and others, AIR 1932 All 527, Lahore High Court in Pt. Parshotam Ram v L Kesho Dass and another AIR 1945 Lab 3, and Punjab and Haryana High Court in Gain Chand etc. v Surinder Kumar etc. 1951 PLR 251 Makhan Mal L Ram Ditta Mal and others, v. Mst. Pritam Devi and others, AIR 1961 Punj 411 ; Lai Singh and another v. Bant Singh and others AIR 1983 P & H 384 ; and Labh Singh and others v. Plara Singh (deceased by L. Rs) and another, MR 1984 P & H 270, held that Will Ex. PW I/A stood proved. Pritam Devi and others, AIR 1961 Punj 411 ; Lai Singh and another v. Bant Singh and others AIR 1983 P & H 384 ; and Labh Singh and others v. Plara Singh (deceased by L. Rs) and another, MR 1984 P & H 270, held that Will Ex. PW I/A stood proved. It appears that the decision of Supreme Court in M. L. Abdul Jabbar Sahib, AIR 1969 SC U47, and Seth Beni Chand (since dead) now by L Rs v. Smt Kamh Kunwar and others, (1976) 4 SCC 554, were not brought to the notice of the Courts below. In the earlier case the Supreme Court considered the word attested" as defined in section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. In that contest it was held that essential conditions of a valid attestation are: "(1) Two or more witnesses have seen the executant sign the instrument or have received from him a personal acknowledgement of his signature. (2) With a view to attest or to bear witness to this fact each of them has signed the instrument in the presence of the executant. It was observed that "the witness -should have put his ammo attestandi. If a person puts his signature on the document for some other purpose, easy to certify that he is a scribe or an identifier or a registering officer, he is not an attesting witness. Further it was observed that prima facie the registering officer puts his signature on the document in discharge of his statutory duty under section 59 of the Registration Act and not for the purpose of attesting it or certifying that he bas received from the executant a personal acknowledgement of his signature. Thus mere registration prima facie does not make the registering officer as an attesting witness without proving that he had put his animo-attestandi in letter and spirit". 17. Now in a recent case of Dharam Singh v, Aso and another, 1990 (Supp) SCC 684, relying upon the earlier two decisions, the Supreme Court has categorically held that the Registrar could not be a statutory attesting witness. In this Supreme Court case too, the two attesting witnesses having not supported the executing of the Will, the trial Court relied upon the statement of the registering authority in holding the Will to be valid which decision was reversed by the lower appellate Court. In this Supreme Court case too, the two attesting witnesses having not supported the executing of the Will, the trial Court relied upon the statement of the registering authority in holding the Will to be valid which decision was reversed by the lower appellate Court. In the instant case also firstly the Will Ex. PW I/A has not properly been executed and as such neither the scribe nor the registering authority though appeared as witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff can be said to have put their animo attestandi Thus the finding of both the Courts below holding the "Will" to be a validly executed "Will" is reversed In other words late Bir Singh continued to be the owner of the suit land during his life time. 18. Also viewing the alternative argument of the Id. Counsel for the respondents, record does not reflect any other heir except late Sh. Gulla, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents who was entitled to inherit the estate left behind by late Sh. Bir Singh. Said Sh Gulla fell in entry VII of Class II of the Schedule under section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act XXX of 1956) as admittedly Will Ex. PW !/A was executed on 22-4-1963 which shows that Bir Singh died after the enforcement of the said Act. Thus late Sh. Gulla was entitled as an heir to file the instant suit for possession through redemption. 19. In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed with costs throughout. The impugned judgment and decree are upheld though on other reasons. The appeal stands disposed of in terms of the above. Appeal dismissed.