Judgment :- The civil revision petitioner herein, namely, Jayakanthi Rathinasabapathy, was the first defendant. 2. Respondents 1 and 2, namely, G.S.D.Prasad and Dayalan were respectively the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant. 3. The plaintiff filed the suit in O.S.No.643 of 1986 on the file of the First Additional Sub Judge, Pondicherry, seeking specific performance and other reliefs. 4. The averments in the plaint disclosed that the first defendant entered into an agreement with the plaintiff on 5.12.1977 for the sale of the suit property for consideration of Rs.94,400. On the date of the agreement, she received an advance of Rs.21,000 agreeing to receive the balance in instalments, as and when the sales in part took place or if it takes place in bulk, otherwise also. As par the agreement, she agreed to execute the sale deed of the property in favour of the plaintiff or in other third party at his instance. The 2nd defendant is the Power of Attorney of the 1st defendant. When there was a breach of the agreement on the part of the first defendant, the plaintiff issued a lawyer ’ s notice on 6.1.1984. The defendant also caused a reply notice dated 12.1.1984, not complying with the demand made by the plaintiff in his notice. Consequently, the plaintiff filed the suit for the aforesaid reliefs. 5. Though the suit is for the relief of specific performance and other reliefs, yet the plaintiff did not choose to make any specific pleading in his plaint that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. He would however state in the cause of action paragraph as follows: “ The cause of action for the suit arose on 5.12.1977, the date of agreement, on 6.1.1984, the date of notice and on 12.1.1984, the date of reply notice.” 6. However stiff resistance came from the first defendant to the suit claim of the plaintiff. The written statement so filed by her, though trans-versed by way of pleadings on many other aspects of the case, did not spell out in categorical fashion that the non-incorporation of specific pleadings in the plaint that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract is fatal to the case of the plaintiff, in the sense of there being no cause of action for decreeing the suit. However, he would allege in paragraph 6 of the written statement that there is no cause of action for the suit being filed as against her decreed. 7. The second defendant did not file any written statement at all. 8. On the necessary and requisite issues framed, the trial appeared to have commenced and the plaintiff had been examined as P.W.I. It appears that he had deposed to the effect that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. At that stage, it was realised that there was no pleading in the plaint to that effect. Realising the lacuna of the absence of such pleading, the plaintiff filed I.A.No.1582 of 1989 on 17.7.1989 under O.1, Rule 17, C.P.C. for amendment of the Plaint to add in paragraph 4 prior to the last line, “ This plaintiff is ready and willing to purchase the property and as such remaining a willing purchaser and is also offering the balance of sale consideration to the tune of Rs.9,35. 9. Stout opposition however emerged from the first defendant for the amendment sought by stating that the amendment, if allowed, will introduce a new case. 10. Learned Subordinate Judge, after hearing the argument of the respective learned Counsel, allowed the amendment application on 26.7.1990 as prayed for with costs of Rs.100 payable on or before 2.8.1990. Aggrieved by the order in the amendment application, the first defendant case forward with the present action. 11.Notice of motion was ordered by me on 25.9.1990 and the first respondent entered appearance through a counsel of her choice. 12. Aggrieved by the order in the amendment application, the first defendant case forward with the present action. 11.Notice of motion was ordered by me on 25.9.1990 and the first respondent entered appearance through a counsel of her choice. 12. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner would strenuously contend that as a result non-incorporation of a specific pleading in the plaint as to the plaintiff having been always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, there was no cause of action for the suit and the amendment now sought for by the incorporation of such a pleading in the plaint, allowed, as had been done by the court below, it would introduce a new cause of action, with the result the first defendant would be prejudiced very much in his case, in the sense of her having been deprived of a legal right accrued in her favour, that is to say, it would tantamount to filing a fresh suit on the new cause of action and the suit, as instituted, would definitely be barred by limitationas had been provided under Art.54 of the Limitation Act, the effect that the period of limitation for specific performance of a contract is three years, from the date fixed for performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that the performance is refused, inasmuch as the period of limitation of three years had expired long before the filing of the said application and in this view of the matter, it is but proper for this Court to set aside the order of the court below in allowing the amendment. 13. Learned counsel for the first respondent would however repel such a submission. 14. will not endeavor to assess the tenability of otherwise of the rival submissions of either Counsel. 15. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner however addressed elaborate arguments drawing my attention to decisions of various High Courts and a few decisions of the apex the judicial administration of the country. I do not think it necessary to traverse through the decisions cited by learned Counsel for the revision petitioner on the face of the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Gajanan J.Joshi v. Prabhakar M.Kalwar, (1990)1 S.C.C. 166 , as cited by learned counsel for the first respondent, which is clearly applicable the facts of the case on hand. I do not think it necessary to traverse through the decisions cited by learned Counsel for the revision petitioner on the face of the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Gajanan J.Joshi v. Prabhakar M.Kalwar, (1990)1 S.C.C. 166 , as cited by learned counsel for the first respondent, which is clearly applicable the facts of the case on hand. Few facts of that case required to be stated for appreciating very well the controversy raised therein. 16. On July 16, 1976, the defendant entered into an agreement in favour of the plaintiff sale of the suit property comprising a shop and a bhatti room situated at Kirloskar Road, Belgaum City for a sum of Rs.20,000. The plaintiff paid to the defendant as part consideration a sum of Rs.5,000 and pursuant to the agreement for sale the plaintiff was put in possession of the suit property. The sale agreement provided that the registered sale deed was to be executed by the defendant after securing a ‘ no objection certificate ’ or permission from the competent Officer as required under the Karnataka Urban Land Ceiling Act and within one month of the grant of such permission. The defendant received the ‘ no objection ’ or permission as aforesaid on March 31, 1981, but failed to execute the registered deed of sale as provided under the said agreement. Hence, on June 30, 1981, the appellant filed the suit. 17. In the plaint, there was no specific averment that the plaintiff was and had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the said agreement. The defendant filed a written statement raising several contentions and inter alia raised the contention that the suit was not maintainable for non-compliance with the provisions of Sec.16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The issue as to whether the suit was not maintainable on the aforesaid ground was directed to be tried as a preliminary issue. At that stage, the plaintiff applied for leave amend the plaint by incorporating an averment in the plaint that the plaintiff was and had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the said agreement. 18. Learned Additional Civil Judge, before whom the said application was made, rejected the same. At that stage, the plaintiff applied for leave amend the plaint by incorporating an averment in the plaint that the plaintiff was and had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the said agreement. 18. Learned Additional Civil Judge, before whom the said application was made, rejected the same. A revision petition was preferred by the plaintiff against the judgment of learned Additional Civil Judge to the High Court of Karnataka but the said revision petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the said High Court. Learned Judge took the view that the application for amendment was filed beyond the period of limitation and the application could not be granted as a vested right of the defendant would be disturbed by allowing the said amendment. It is the correctness of this decision, which was challenged before the Supreme Court. 19. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court before expressing their opinion on the question raised, referred to two decisions, namely, Pirgonda Hon-gonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 363: 1957 S.C.J. 371: 1957 S.C.R. 595: 1957 S.C.C. 264, L.J.Leach & Company v. Jardine Skinner and Company, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 357: 1957 S.C.J. 313: 1957 S.C.R. 438: 1957 S.C.C. 237. What their Lordships said about those two cases reflected in paragraphs 4 and 5, which are as follows: “ 4. In the leading case of Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 363: 1957 S.C.J. 371: 1957 S.C.R. 595: 1957 S.C.C. 264, a bench comprising ” Three learned Judges of this Court laid down the principles which should govern the question of granting or disallowing a mendments. It was held by this court that amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions; (a) not working injustice to the other side and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. It is merely a particular case of this general rule that where a plaintiff seeks to amend by setting up a fresh claim respect of a cause of action which since the institution of the suit had become barred limitation, the amendment must be refused; to allow it could be to cause the defendant injury which could not be compensated in costs by depriving him of a good defence to the claim. 5. In L.J.Leach & Company v. Jardine Skinner and Company, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 357:1957 S.C.J. 313:1957 S.C.R. 438: 1957 S.C.C. 237, to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application. But that is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered, and does not affect the power of the court to order it if that is required in the interests of justice. “ 20. Thereafter, their Lordships expressed their opinion on the question raised in paragraph 6, which runs as under: ” 6. If these principles are to be followed, there is little doubt that the learned Judge was in error in rejecting the application for amendment made by the appellant. In the present case, no fresh cause of action was sought to be introduced by the amendment, applied for. All that the appellant sought to do was to complete the cause of action for specific performance for which relief he had already prayed. It was only that one averment required in law to be made in a plaint in a suit ’ for specific performance in view of the provisions of sub Sec.16 of the Specific Relief Act was not made, probably on account of some oversight or mistake of the lawyer who drafted plaint and that error was sought to be rectified by the amendment applied for. There was fresh cause of action sought to be introduced by the amendments and hence, no question causing any injustice to the respondent on that account arose." 21. There was fresh cause of action sought to be introduced by the amendments and hence, no question causing any injustice to the respondent on that account arose." 21. I may reiterate that what their Lordships expressed, as above, is applicable, on all fours, to the facts of the present case. It cannot be stated, in the case on hand, that amendment sought for and allowed by the court below, introduced any fresh cause of action and all that the plaintiff sought to do was to complete the cause of action for specific performance, for which relief he had already prayed for and hence, no question of causing any injustice to the first defendant on that account would arise. 22. In the view that I have taken, the revision petition deserved to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances, I make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.