JUDGMENT M. P. Kenia, J. 1. We have, on the 21st of May, 1991, passed the following orders :- "For reasons separately recorded, the petition is dismissed." 2. The reasons aforesaid are indicated herein below. The petitioner was elected as the President of the City Board, Ghaziabad, in November, 1989, and has. therefore, at all relevant times, functioned as such. The petitioner was served with a show cause notice dated 20th of March, 1991, by the State Government inter alia, calling upon him to show cause within a period of 15 days, why he should not be removed from the post of the President. The said show cause notice contained a list along with appropriate particulars of the charges against the petitioner. This show cause notice, a copy whereof is annexed as annexure 3' to the petition, was received by the petitioner on the 1st of April, 1991, and by a reply which is dated the 5th of April, 1991, (Annexure 4' the petition), the petitioner, inter alia, sought copies of various documents such as resolutions passed by the City Board, Ghaziabad, at various times, the minute books of the City Board, the particular issue of a local daily and the like and stated that after the said was made available to the petitioner, it will be necessary to collate the same with the record and, therefore, sought permission to do so by making the record available so as to enable the petitioner to throw light on the correct facts. The petitioner by his aforesaid reply also requested that after the various materials sought by the petitioner were made available to him, he should be granted one month's time to send a further reply to the show cause notice. The petitioner was, thereafter, served with an order dated 4th or May, 1991, whereby the State Government suspended the petitioner as the President of the City Board, Ghaziabad, with immediate effect pending the enquiry pursuant to the show cause notice dated 20th of March, 1991, served upon the petitioner. 3. The show cause notice has been served upon the petitioner under section 48 of the U. P. Municipalities Act and the order of suspension was passed by the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 48 of the Act. 3. The show cause notice has been served upon the petitioner under section 48 of the U. P. Municipalities Act and the order of suspension was passed by the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 48 of the Act. The petitioner thereafter, filed the present petition, inter alia, seeking an issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the show cause notice dated 20th of March, 1991, and all proceeding in pursuance thereof pending before the State Government and for a further writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order suspending the petitioner as the President of the City Board, Ghaziabad, passed by the State Government on the 4th of May, 1991, and for costs and other reliefs. 4. Section 48 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, reads as follows :- "48. 4. Section 48 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, reads as follows :- "48. Removal of President :- (* *) (2) Where the State Government has, at any time, reason to believe that- (a) there has been a failure on the part of the President in performing his duties, or (b) the President has- (i) incurred any of the disqualification mentioned in section 12-D and 43-AA ; or (ii) within the meaning of section 82 knowingly acquired or continued to have, directly or indirectly, or by a partner, any share or interest, whether pecuniary or of any other nature, in any contract or employment with, by or on behalf of the Board ; or (iii) knowingly acted as President or as a member in a matter other than a matter referred to in clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (2) of section 82, in which he has, directly or indirectly, or by a partner, any share or interest, whether pecuniary or of any other nature or in which he was professionally interested on behalf of a client, principal or other person ; or (iv) being a legal practitioner acted or appeared in any suit or other preceeding on behalf of any person against the Board or against the State Government in respect of nazul land entrusted to the management of the Board, or acted or appeared for or on behalf of any person against when a criminal proceeding has been instituted by or on behalf of the Board ; or (v) abandoned his ordinary place of residence in the municipal area concerned ; or 4 (vi) been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties ; or (vii) during the current or the last preceding term of the Board, acting as President or Vice President or as Chairman of a Committee, or as a member, or in any other capacity whatsoever, whether before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Local Self Government Laws(Amendment) Act, 1976, so flagrantly abused his position, or so wilfully contravened any of the provisions. of this Act or any rule, regulation or bye-law or caused such loss or damage to the fund or property of the Board as to render him unfit to continue to be President. of this Act or any rule, regulation or bye-law or caused such loss or damage to the fund or property of the Board as to render him unfit to continue to be President. (viii) been guilty of any other misconduct whether committed before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Local Self Government Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, whether as President or as Vice President, exercising the powers of President, or as Vice President, or as member ; it may call upon him to show cause within the time to be specified in the notice why he should not be removed from office.) (2-A) After considering any explanation that may be offered by the President and making such enquiry as it may consider necessary, the State Government may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, remove the President from his office ; Provided that in a case where the State Government has issued notice in respect of any ground mentioned in clause (a) or sub-clause (ii), (iii), (iv), (vi), (vii) or (viii) of clause (b) of sub-section (2) it may instead of removing him give him a warning. (2-B) An order passed by the State Government under sub-section (2-A) shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court. (3) The State Government may place under .suspension a President who is called upon to show cause in respect of any ground mentioned in clause (a) or sub-clause (vi), (vii) or (viii) of clause (b) of sub-section (2) or against whom a prosecution for an offence which in the opinion of the State Government involves moral turpitude, is commenced until the conclusion of the enquiry or prosecution, as the case may be, and where a President has been suspended he shall not, for so long as the order of suspension continues ; be entitled- (a) to exercise the powers or perform the duties of a President conferred or imposed upon him by or under this Act or any other enactment for the time being in force ; or (b) to take part in any proceeding of the Board. (4) A President removed under sub-section (2-A) shall also cease to be a member of the Board and in case of removal on any of the grounds mentioned in clause (a) or sub-clause (vi), (vii) or (viii) of clause) (b) of subsection (2), shall not be eligible for re-election as President or member for a period of five years from the date of his removal. The petitioner's case was presented before us by Mr. R. K. Jain and the respondents' case was argued by the Chief Standing Counsel Mr. A. P. Singh, who appeared on notice 5. Sri Jain, learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner who argued the petitioner's case at great length, took us through the individual charges enlisted in the show cause notice (Annexure 3' to the petition), and submitted that :- (1) the proceedings commenced by the show cause notice are quashi criminal proceedings and the standard of proof required to bring the same home against the petitioner was proof beyond reasonable doubt ; (2) as 'misconduct' had not been defined any where in the U. P. Municipalities Act, the misconduct alleged and proved against the petitioner must be misconduct per so and the respondents must demonstrate to the court that each individual charge related to a particular duty that the petitioner was liable to discharge and the misconduct alleged against the petitioner must be shown in the discharge of his duties as President ; (3) even if the charges levelled against the petitioner are taken as they are, no case for taking action against the petitioner under section 48 (2-A) of' the Act is made out so far as the charges relate to the duty of the Board and not to that of the President ; (4) That none of the charges fell within the four corners of Section 48 and, as such there could never be any question for any action of removal being against the petitioner. 6. The scheme of Section 48 is that where the State Government has reason to believe that there has been a failure on the part of the President in performing his duty or that any of the eight grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) (b) exists, it may call upon the President to show cause within the time specified in the notice why he should not be removed from office. Under sub- Section (2-A) after considering any explanation that may be offered by the President and making such enquiry as it may consider necessary, the State Government may either remove him from office, or, in case the notice issued against him is in respect of any ground mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of sub-clauses (ii), (iii), (iv), (vi), (vii) and (viii) of clause (b) of subsection (2), it may instead of removing him, give him a warning. Sub-section (?-B) provides that an order passed by the State Government under sub-section (2-A) shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court. Sub-section (3) provides, inter alia, that where a show cause notice is issued against the President in respect of any ground mentioned in clause (a) or sub-clauses (vi), (vii) and (viii) of clause (b) of sub-section 2 place sub- President under suspension and where the President has been so suspended, for so long as the order of suspension continues, he shall not be entitled to exercise powers or perform the duties of the president or to take part in any proceedings of the Board. 7. Finally, sub-section (4) provides that a President removed under subsection 2-A shall cease to be a member of the Board and in case of his being removed on any of the grounds mentioned in clause (a) or sub-clauses (vi), ivii) and (viii) of clause (b) or sub-section (2) shall not be eligible for reelection as President or member for a period of five years from the date of his removal. 8. It may be noticed that whereas under sub-clause (vi) of clause (b) of sub-section (2), the President is liable for removal in case of his having been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties, sub-clause (viii) thereof refers to "any other misconduct whether committed before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Local Self Government Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, whether as President or as Vice President exercising the powers of the President or Vice President or as member". Referring to the four fold submissions made by Sri Jain, on behalf of the petitioner, referred to hereinabove, we find ourselves unable to accept the proposition that the proceedings commenced against the petitioner pursuant to the show cause notice dated 20th of March, 1991, can correctly be termed as quasi criminal proceeding or that the standard of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. The proceedings only involve civil consequences. The suspension in question is something temporary and does not involve any punishment preperly so called. All that happens is that during the period of suspension, it is not open to the President in question to exercise the powers or perform the duties as President or take part in any of the proceedings of the Board. More often than not, suspension facilitates the enquiry in so far as it minimises (if not eliminates) the scope for interference by the party concerned by use of his official position. The above position is well settled. However, we need not refer to the case law on the point as in the light of our findings in the last two parts of Mr. R. K. Jain's submission, the first our referred to above does not survive for consideration. 9. This brings us to the second submission made on behalf of the petitioner, viz, that the misconduct alleged and proved against the petitioner must be "misconduct per se" and that each individual charge against the petitioner should relate to a particular duty that the petitioner was liable to discharge and the misconduct alleged against the petitioner must be shown to be misconduct in the discharge of his duties as President. With regard to the argument that the misconduct must relate to the discharge of the duties of the petitioner as President, this argument proceeds on a very narrow view of the provisions either in ignorance or in disregard of the marked contrast in the wordings of sub-clauses (vi) and (viii) or clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 48. Thus, whereas sub-clause (vi) talks of misconduct (on the part of President) in the discharge of his duties, sub-clause (viii) includes "any other misconduct whether as President or as member". 10. Sri R. K. Jain relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this court in the case of Bhagwan Das Baranwal v. The State of Uttar pradesh, 1956 ALJ 409. 10. Sri R. K. Jain relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this court in the case of Bhagwan Das Baranwal v. The State of Uttar pradesh, 1956 ALJ 409. This case need not detain us at all for twin 'reasons, firstly that the Advocate General had conceded that the notice which was subject matter of the said decision was "an unsatisfactory one", and the other even more important reason that the said decision rendered on May, 7, 1956, was well before the amendment brought in U. P. Act 4i of 1976, under which, inter alia, sub-clauses (vii) and (viii) of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 48 were brought on the statute book. Naturally the case was decided considering the clause (vi) which refers to the President having been "guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duty" and makes no reference to clause (viii) which also encompasses "any other misconduct whether before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Local Self Government Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, whether as President or as Member". We are not dealing with this submission in greater detail because in view of our findings on the last two of the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner (listed hereinabove), this does not survive for consideration. We shall now take up arguments nos. 4 and 3 advanced on behalf of the petitioner in that order. 11. Submission no. 4 above is to the effect that none of the charges levelled against the petitioner fall within the four corners of section 48 and, as such, there can be no question of any action for removal being taken against the petitioner under the provisions of section 48 and, consequently, also no question of the petitioner being suspended in exercise of the power under subsection (3) of section 48. The other argument is that even if the charges levelled against the petitioner are taken as they are, no case for taking action against the petitioner under section 48 (2) of the Act is made out as the charges relate to the duty of the Board and not to that of the President. 12. The other argument is that even if the charges levelled against the petitioner are taken as they are, no case for taking action against the petitioner under section 48 (2) of the Act is made out as the charges relate to the duty of the Board and not to that of the President. 12. For the purpose of dealing with these two arguments, we shall take up the first two of the charges contained in the show cause notice issues against the petitioner and examine the petitioner's argument in the light of the provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act and the fact comprises the charge levelled against the petitioner. The fact comprised in charge no. 1 may be summarised as follows :- On the agenda of the meeting of the Board dated 17th of April, 1989, was an item relating to purchase of electrical goods of the value of 2 lacs 16 thousand rupees. With regard to this, it appears that an estimate had been submitted earlier and the items duty brought on the agenda. After discussion, the resolution relating to this item, being resolution no. 221, was duly passed. After this, it is alleged, a resolution purporting to be a resolution for the purchase of one thousand P.C.C. Poles was inserted. The value of the electrical goods represented above is of the order of about 28 lacs of rupees and it appears that neither any estimate was obtained nor was the item property brought on the agenda so as to ensure due and proper notice thereof and deliberation thereon. But the thing does not stop there. Assuming that resolution was indeed passed on the 17th of April, 1989, for the purchase of electrical goods of the value of about 28 lacs, the further allegation is that no reasonable efforts were made to obtain the aforesaid goods in a manner most beneficial to the City Board, Ghaziabad. Instead a tender notice was inserted in a little known local daily called, "Gau Ganga', of the 25th of May, 1989, inviting tenders by 3.00 P.M. on the 26th of May, 1989. Instead a tender notice was inserted in a little known local daily called, "Gau Ganga', of the 25th of May, 1989, inviting tenders by 3.00 P.M. on the 26th of May, 1989. The obvious purport of the allegation is that the tender notice was inserted in an insignificant daily newspaper only in order to make a show of tenders having been invited and insufficient time was given for receipt of the tender so that no genuine parties may get an adequate opportunity of filling in their tender and thus favourable conditions were created so that a party which was intended to be favoured could actually be granted the favour for supplying the electrical goods in question to the City Board. 13. The charge further recites that the terms and conditions of the tender were not observed and unauthorised and imporper party was given the tender in a manner devoid of sincerity and integrity. We may mention here that while dealing with the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner on the first two charges, Sri A. P. Singh, learned Chief Standing Counsel, appearing on behalf of tae respondents briefly took us through the relevant provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act having a bearing on this aspect of the matter. Referring to the relevant provisions, he prefaced his submission in this behalf by the statement that the President's is a statutory post under section 9 of the Act and the President is an Officer of the Board as defined in the section containing the definition. Sri A. P. Singh drew the pointed attention of the Court to the definition of the term, "Board", under section 2 (1) of the Act which defines the Board as a Municipal Board and includes within the definition, in any case where a power is expressed as being conferred or a duty as being imposed on a Board, a committee appointed by a Board and any member, officer or servant of a Board authorized or required by or, under this Act to exercise the power or perform the duty, Mr. Singh then referred to the provisions of Section 80 which outlines the functions of the Board that must be discharged by the President, underlining the provisions of Section 50 (bb) relating to general supervision of all officers and works of the Board and 50 (e) which includes "all other duties, powers and functions of a Board" with the exception of three items mentioned therein. Section 51 of the Act provides for the additional duties of the President and includes within its purview the duty and the power to watch over the financial affairs of the Board and to superintend to executive administration of the Board and to bring to the notice of the Board any defect therein; as also the duty and the power to convene and preside at all meetings of the Board and to otherwise control in accordance with any regulations made in this behalf the transaction of business at all meetings of the Board. In substance and effect, Mr. Singh argued, the President oversees everything. Mr. Singh pointed out that whereas in the case of the purchase of electrical goods worth only 2 lacs 16 thousand rupees, an estimate had been obtained, the item had been placed on the agenda to ensure proper notice thereof to the members and to ensure due deliberation thereof by the meeting and was duly passed after proper notice and mature consideration, in the case of electrical goods worth about Rs. 26 lacks to rupees 28 lacs neither had any estimate been obtained nor had the item been duly placed on the agenda nor, for that matter, had, in fact, a resolution been passed. An insertion seems to have been made in the minute book to the effect that a resolution was passed for the purchase of electrical goods, one thousand PCC poles, the value thereof comes to nearly 28 lacs rupees. Mr. Singh argued that even if in fact a resolution had been duly passed on the 17th of April, 1989. it is difficult to justify no attemt being made to secure the best interest of the City Board by inviting tenders with sufficient notice giving adequate time so as to ensure that the most beneficial results for the City Board were obtained in the purchase of the electrical goods in question. it is difficult to justify no attemt being made to secure the best interest of the City Board by inviting tenders with sufficient notice giving adequate time so as to ensure that the most beneficial results for the City Board were obtained in the purchase of the electrical goods in question. Instead, a notice of tender was inserted in a little known daily, whereas usually Ghaziabad notices are expected to be printed in Delhi news papers. Again, very little time was given before closing of tenders which, according to Mr. Singh, appears to have been done in order to favour a particular party, with obvious motives. Mr. Singh pointed cut that even after all this the tender was awarded to an unauthorized person under breach of the terms and conditions of the tender in so far as at the time of the tender no security deposit was obtained from the party concerned who did not really qualify at that point of time as it did not meet (he requirement of being registered as a Class A contractor at the time when the tender was awarded to him. Similarly, referring to the second charge which relates to the allotment of several shops by the President on substantial premium, Mr. Singh, inter alia, complained that the President, whose duty and power it was to make the allotment did so without having a proper criteria fixed for its allotment and without issuing any advertisement in the daily newspapers in respect thereof and further after bank drafts worth lacs of rupees were received by the President in connection with the payment of premium for the allotment of the aforesaid shops, the President kept the same with him for a period of about four months without banking the same with the obvious result of causing serious loss to the City Board, Ghaziabad. (We may mention that Mr. R. K. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner, in the course of his submission on the aforesaid charge, had admitted that the allotment was done by the petitioner, but had argued that it was so to speak a continuation of what was done by the Ghaziabad Development Authority and could not be termed as an independent misdemeanour. Mr Jain had argued that the allotment done by the President on a 'first come first serve' basis to 86 out of the 108 applicants had been made bonafide). 14. Mr. Mr Jain had argued that the allotment done by the President on a 'first come first serve' basis to 86 out of the 108 applicants had been made bonafide). 14. Mr. Singh submitted that it was not permissible on the part of the petitioner to seek to get out of his responsibility by making subtle distinction as to what were the President's duties and what are the duties and functions of the Board itself and arguing, as MR. Jain did, that it may be a case of superseding the Board but certainly not taking action for removal against the petitioner. MR. Singn argued that in view of the functions, duties and powers of the President as indicated above, various acts complained of fell very much within the purview of section 48 (2) (b) (vi) but, in any case section 48 (2)(b) (viii) is wide enough to encompass the acts complained of against the President. MR. Singh urged that, in fact, the petitioner, who is the President of the Board, and has at his beck and call a majority of the members of the Board was actively involved in making sure that a contract for the purchase of goods worth a very huge amount was improperly and unfairly given to an unauthorised party to the serious detriment of the Board and with the obvious motive of making unfair and illegal gain to himself. In any case, MR. Singh urged that the President had been sadly remiss in his duty of general supervision over all officials and works of the Board and particularly in his duty to watch over the financial affairs of the Board and to superintendent the executive administration of the Board and particularly to bring to the notice of the Board any defect in the same. MR. Singh further argued that it is for the President to convenue and preside at all meetings of the Board and otherwise control the transaction of business at such meeting in a competent and bonafide manner. Any matter involving the purchase of goods worth 28 lacs of rupees, MR. Singh argued, one would expect a proper estimate to be obtained, the matter to be placed on the agenda of a meeting and a resolution passed after due deliberation by members having notice of the same. Any matter involving the purchase of goods worth 28 lacs of rupees, MR. Singh argued, one would expect a proper estimate to be obtained, the matter to be placed on the agenda of a meeting and a resolution passed after due deliberation by members having notice of the same. This does not appear to have been the case here, instead a resolution appears to have been interpolated in the minute book recording the sanction of the Board of the item relating to the purchase of electrical goods of the order of about rupees 28 lacks. The President cannot disown the responsibility for this whether he is found to be personally involved in this or whether it has been done otherwise when it was his bounden duty to exercise proper control over the transaction of the business and the recording of the minute of the meeting of the Board. Furthermore, the matter of purchase of goods worth about rupees 28 lacks cannot be termed as a routine administrative matter and assuming that sanction was indeed accorded by a resolution on the 17th of April, 1989, one cannot but wonder ever the inaction of the powers that he for nearly a month and a half before issuing a notice notifying tender in an insignificant newspaper giving what is per so inadequate time for submitting tenders to the City Board of Ghaziabad. As indicated earlier, it is the duty of the President to watch over the financial affairs of the Board and to superintend the executive administration of the Board and to bring to the notice of the Board any defect therein and one could legitimately expect an alert and sincere President would notice that the m inner in which the transaction of awarding the contract for the purchase of electrical goads worth 28 lacs of rupees had been brough about was grossly imparper irregular and against the interest of the Board and was in fact, to the detriment of the Board, [t would, in such an event, also be his duty to report the matter to the Board and ensure remedial action being taken forthwith. These are certainly matters within the purview of section 48 and relate both to the discharge of the duties of the President as also to his conduct as President. Mr. These are certainly matters within the purview of section 48 and relate both to the discharge of the duties of the President as also to his conduct as President. Mr. Singh referred to the relevant words of section 48 and submitted that all that the section required was that the State Government should have "reason to believe" that any of the things or factors enumerated in section 48 existed. According to Mr. Singh, there was adequate material for the State Government to have reason to believe thai the ground set out in sub-section (2) of section 48 existed. 15. Mr. Singh further submitted that the Government had then also directed the A.D.M. to make a sort of preliminary enquiry and report to the Government with findings as a result thereof. A copy of this report is annexed as annexure no. 2 to the writ petition. MR. Singh pointed out different portions from the said preliminary report to show that as a result of the preliminary enquiry, the A.D.M. had expresssd the view that resolution 221 related to an item of the agenda of the meeting of the City Board, Ghaziabad, dated 17th of April, 1989, with regard to the purchase of goods of the estimated value of rupees 2 lacks 16 thousand, which was approved by the said meeting. To this appears to have been added an item with regard to the purchase of one thousand poles for which neither any estimate was called nor was the same placed on the agenda, but a resolution for inviting the tender was made a part of the minute book. The preliminary report also enumerates various other irregularities with regard to the manner in which the notice of tender was given in an insignificant newspaper in which it was given and the M grossly inadequate time within which the tender was closed; the terms and Civ conditions of the tender which were not observed and, on top of everything, De an unauthorised person was illegally given the tender of contract in breach Me and violation of the terms and conditions of the tender and subsequently vers by a resolution no. 740, the tender to M/s. Allied Engineers for Rs 27,12, 700/- utt was granted ex post facto approval. MR. 740, the tender to M/s. Allied Engineers for Rs 27,12, 700/- utt was granted ex post facto approval. MR. Singh urged that the Government had, on the one hand, received several complaints against the petitioner as mentioned in the show cause notice and had also made appropriate enquiries to ascertain atleast prima facie the relevant facts and when it had bonafide reason to believe that the President was guilty of the charges levelled against him which fell squarely within the purview of section 48, issued him show cause notice giving him an appropriate opportunity of showing cause and, later on, by a letter dated 4th of May, 1991, in exercise of the powers under section 48 (3) of the Act placed the petitioner under suspension. As against this, MR. Singh pointed out, the petitioner, who had been served with a show cause notice dated 20th of March, 1991, had by its reply dated 5th of April, 1991, sought various copies of the minutes, sought permission to collate the copies of the minutes and the resolution of the Board and had sought to rely on the same by looking into the records of the Board and had sought permission for so doing and had further sought an additional time of one month after all the material requested for by the President had baa made available to him for sending his further reply to the show cause notice; but throughout it was not the case of the President either that the charges levelled against him were beyond the purview of the provisions of section 48 of the Act or that even if the charges levelled against him were taken as proved, no case was made out for his removal as President. This was an after thought on the part of the petitioner after an order was passed by the State Government placing the petitioner under suspension on the 4th of May, 1991. 16. This was an after thought on the part of the petitioner after an order was passed by the State Government placing the petitioner under suspension on the 4th of May, 1991. 16. We find much substance in the arguments advanced by Mr A, P. Singh and in the light of the above discussion, we find ourselves unable to accept the argument on behalf of the petitioner that none of the charges contained in the show cause notice fall within the four corners of section 48 of the U. P. Municipalities Act or that even if the charges levelled against the petitioner are taken, as they are, as true, no case is made out for taking action against the petitioner under section 48 (2-A) of the said Act. In fact, it is obvious that the petitioner will have some explaining to do while dealing with the charges against him as indicated by the bit of sampling exercise undertaken hereinabove for examining two of the charges contained in the show cause notice issued to the petitioner. As a detailed argument in this behalf had been submitted on behalf of the petitioner, the Court finds no alternative but to deal with them appropriately and satisfactorily and in the process has expressed its views on some of the matters argued before the Court Suffice it to say as we expect the State Government in the course and conduct of proceedings under section 48 of the Act to proceed uninfluenced by our observations herein made by us while dealing with the argument advanced by 'he petitioner so far as the merits of the charges are concerned as at present the proceedings are only at the show cause notice stage. A feeble attempt was made on behalf of she petitioner to allege malafides in the action against the petitioner by submitting that one Mr. Tyagi who was a party to a motion expressing no confidence against the petitioner as President of the City Board, Ghaziabad, failed to go through on the 9th of July, 1990, the show cause notice dated 20th of March, 1991, was got issued by the aforesaid Mr. Tyagi who was a party to a motion expressing no confidence against the petitioner as President of the City Board, Ghaziabad, failed to go through on the 9th of July, 1990, the show cause notice dated 20th of March, 1991, was got issued by the aforesaid Mr. Tyagi who persuaded the Chief Minister to direct the Commissioner, Meerwt Division to get an enquiry held against petitioner and the Commissioner, Meerut Division, appointed Sri Tejpal Singh, A.D.M. Ghaziabad, to hold the enquiry, which the aforesaid A.D.M. (City; Ghaziabad, held and completed and submitted his report to the State Government finding five of the six charges against the petitioner to have been prima facie established. 17. Mr. Jain submitted that the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are sufficiently wide to strike down the action which is being pursued against the petitioner. No material has been placed before us adequate to justify a conclusion that the action of the State Government is malafide whereas the motion expressing want of confidence against the retitioner stated to have fallen on the 9th of July, 1990, the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on the 20th of March, 1991, this surely does not justify the allegation of the petitioner in the petition that the Government has acted "in hot haste." If anything, the facts seem to indicate a certain amount of circumspection with which the State Government has proceeded. Even after the receipt of various complaints against the petitioner, the Government has made appropriate enquiries and it was only after consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances that the Government has issued the show cause notice and more than a month and half thereafter issued the order placing the petitioner under suspension. A show cause notice has been duly issued and served upon the petitioner. A show cause notice has been duly issued and served upon the petitioner. The petitioner has purported to reply to the same and has sought further material in order to enable him to send a further reply to the same for which purpose he has sought further time and after consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, the Government has issued an order of suspension under section 48 (3) of the Act which entitles the Government to place under suspension a President who is called upon to show cause in respect of any grounds mentioned in clause (a) or sub-clauses (vi), (vii) and (viii) of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of the said Section. The action of the State Government can neither said to be malafide not beyond the purview of section 48 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. Having said this, we wish to make it clear that it is not for this Court at this stage to go into the merits or demerits of the charges levelled against the petitioner for that is a function which will have to be performed by the State Government in accordance with the provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 18. As regards the "wide powers' of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, referred to in the argument, one must always bear in mind the distinction between the existence of wide powers and the propriety and desirability of using them and these powers have to be used "taking into consideration the nature of the right infringed or threatened to be infringed, the scope and object of the legislation or of the order or decision complained of, the need to balance the right and interest of the individual as against those of the society and the circumstances under which and the person by whom the jurisdiction is invoked, as also the nature of the relief sought." In order that certiorari may lie, the respondents must be shown to have acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction conferred upon them by law. Whereas this Court does not hesitate to interfere to prevent manifest injustice, it will not interfere on the merits with the determination of issues which function is entrusted to the State Government which has been invested with statutory power under the provisions of the law concerned, The respondents cannot be said to have acted either without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or in contravention of the principles of natural justice or any constitutional provision. In the circumstances, the petition fails and the same is dismissed. Petition dismissed.