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1991 DIGILAW 824 (ALL)

Mahant Baba Ram Nihal Das v. Ram Chander

1991-05-21

S.N.SAHAY

body1991
JUDGMENT : S.N. SAHAY, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order dated December 17, 1988 (Annexure 3) passed by the learned District Judge, Faizabad in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 78 of 1988. 2. Ram Chandra Das has instituted a suit bearing No. 103 of 1978 against Ram Nihal Das and Vimaleshwaranand for permanent injunction in the Court of Civil Judge, Faizabad. He claims to be Mahant of the Gaddi of Samadhi Govind Sahib situate in village Ahirauli, Tahsil fanda, District Faizabad. The suit was contested by the Defendants who claimed to be Mahant of the said Gaddi. The Plaintiff moved application 6/C, for temporary injunction to restrain the Defendants from interfering in the peaceful discharge of his duties as Mahant during the pendency of the suit. The application was allowed by the learned Civil Judge by order dated December 7, 1978. An appeal was preferred against this order which was Misc. Civil Appeal No. 67 of 1978. The appeal was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge, Faizabad on November 23, 1979 and the application filed by the Plaintiff for temporary injunction, was rejected The Plaintiff filed Writ Petition No. 3398 of 1979 against the order dated November 23, 1979. The operation of the order was stayed in the writ petition on November 22, 1979. The stay order was modified on April 9, 1980 and the following directions were issued: Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the petition at this stage, I am of the view that the interim order which has been passed by the court is to be modified in the interest of the Petitioner and in the interest of the institution for preservation of the property of the Gaddi in question including the realisation of Tahbazari dues is concerned, neither the Petitioner nor the opposite parties will exercise any power pending disposal of the writ petition or the disposal of the suit or the disposal of the application for appointment of receiver in the case in case the same is still pending whichever event occurs earlier, the management of the Immovable property may be given in the charge of some other person, who may while managing the property consult the Petitioner as well as the opposite party Ram Nihal Das. So far as moveable property is concerned, a list of the same may be prepared and the same be submitted before the Court of Civil Judge. The Court of the Civil Judge where the suit is pending may appoint some person to manage the property during the period so far as the realisation of money including lahbazari are concerned and account is to be submitted before the Court every fortnightly by Manager so appointed who will also deposit the same before it every for night. So far as the other matters are concerned the parties would maintain status-quo as it stands today. 3. In pursuance of the aforesaid order dated April 9, 1980 the learned Civil Judge appointed Sri Ganesh Prasad Shukla, Advocate by order dated April 17, 1980 to act as receiver. This order was modified on April 24, 1980 and Sri Srawan Kumar Mishra, Advocate was appointed as receiver Sri Misra acted as receiver from August 24. to December 6, 1980. In the meantime writ petition No. 3398 of 1979 was decided. The writ petition was allowed on September 12, 1990 and the order dated November 23 1979 passed by the learned I Additional District Judge was set aside and it was directed that the appeal shall be decided de novo. In view of the decision of the writ petition, the interim order dated April 9, 1980 passed therein was discharged and the order appointing receiver was vacated by the learned Civil Judge on December 6, 1980. 4. In pursuance of the order dated December 12, 1980 passed in the above mentioned writ petition, the learned III Additional District Judge Faizabad heard Misc. Civil Appeal No. 67 of 1978 afresh and decided it on May 19, 1983. He allowed the appeal, set aside the order passed by the learned Civil Judge and again rejected the application 6/C for temporary injunction filed by the Plaintiff. Aggrieved from the order the Plaintiff approached this Court and filed Writ Petition No. 3043 of 1983, which was however, dismissed on February 11, 1987. 5. During the pendency of the case an application 364/C was moved by Vimaleshwaranand for appointment of receiver. This application was opposed by the Plaintiff who filed objection 368/G. The application for appointment of receiver was rejected by the learned Civil Judge by order dated December 6, 1985. Against this order, Vimaleshwaranand filed Misc. 5. During the pendency of the case an application 364/C was moved by Vimaleshwaranand for appointment of receiver. This application was opposed by the Plaintiff who filed objection 368/G. The application for appointment of receiver was rejected by the learned Civil Judge by order dated December 6, 1985. Against this order, Vimaleshwaranand filed Misc. Civil Appeal No. 151 of 1983. The appeal was allowed by the learned I Additional District Judge Faizabad by order dated February 27, 1986 The learned Civil Judge was directed to appoint receiver on the same terms and conditions as was done by him previously by his order dated April 17, 1980 and April 24 1980. Then the Plaintiff filed Writ Petition No. 1335 of 1986. The operation of the order dated February 27, 1986 was stayed. However, the writ petition itself was dismissed as withdrawn on November 16, 1987. 6. After dismissal of the said writ petition, Vimaleshwaranand moved application 540/C before the learned Civil Judge for appointment of receiver. The Plaintiff filed objection 546/C against this application. The learned Civil Judge allowed the application by order dated November 4, 1988 and appointed Sri Ranjir Lal Varma. Advocate as receiver. The Plaintiff again moved two applications; No. 570/C for staying the operation of the order dated November 4, 1988 for appointment of receiver and No. 572/C for removing Sri Rartjir Lal Verma for receivership. Both these applications were disposed of by the learned Civil Judge by his order dated November 22, 1988. The Plaintiff Ram Nihal Das felt aggrieved and filed Misc. Civil Appeal No. 78 of 1988 against the order dated November 4, 1988 regarding appointment of receiver. He also filed Misc. Civil Appeal No. 85 of 1988 against the order dated November 29, 1988. Both these appeals were decided by the learned District Judge. Faizabad by a common judgment dated December 17, 1988 Misc. Civil Appeal No. 78 of 1988 was dismissed and the order relating to the appointment of receiver was confirmed. The other appeal was allowed and the order by which Sri Ranjir Lal Verma was appointed as receiver was set aside. It was ordered that the learned Civil Judge shall appoint another respectable person as receiver in place of Sri Verma and Sri Varma shall hand-over charge to him immediately. This writ petition has been filed by the Plaintiff against the aforesaid order of the learned District Judge. 7. It was ordered that the learned Civil Judge shall appoint another respectable person as receiver in place of Sri Verma and Sri Varma shall hand-over charge to him immediately. This writ petition has been filed by the Plaintiff against the aforesaid order of the learned District Judge. 7. The question which arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether the orders relating to the appointment of receiver are liable to be quashed. It has been noticed that the order for appointment of receiver was passed by the learned Civil Judge on November 4, 1988 and was confirmed by the learned District Judge in appeal on December 17, 1988. The learned Civil Judge has observed that after the dismissal of the writ petition No. 1335 of 1986, the order dated February 27, 1988 passed by the learned I Additional District Judge had become and effective and all that remains to be done is to implement that order. It was contended on behalf of Defendant No. 1 that when the order dated February 27, 1986 was passed. Writ Petition No. 3043 of 1993 was pending, and. as such the order dated February 27, 1986 has become ineffective after the dismissal of the said writ petition on November 16, 1987. The contention was repelled by the learned Civil Judge. Fie observed that no application was moved by the parties in. Writ Petition No. 1335 of 1986 to the effect that the above mentioned order has ceased to be effective on account of the dismissal of the earlier writ petition and so it was not open to Defendant No. 1 to raise any such contention-The application for appointment of receiver was accordingly, allowed by the learned Civil Judge and as indicated earlier Sri Ranjir Lal Verma was appointed receiver with the consent of Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2. 8. When the appeals preferred against the orders dated November 4, 1988 and November 24, 1988 were heard by the learned District Judge, a preliminary objection was raised before him that the appeals were not maintainable. The preliminary objection was overruled in respect of Misc. Civil Appeal No. 85 of 1988 on the ground that the power to appoint receiver includes the power to remove him under Order 40, Rule 1 CPC read with Section 16, General Clauses Act. The learned District Judge was however inclined to agree with the contention that Misc. The preliminary objection was overruled in respect of Misc. Civil Appeal No. 85 of 1988 on the ground that the power to appoint receiver includes the power to remove him under Order 40, Rule 1 CPC read with Section 16, General Clauses Act. The learned District Judge was however inclined to agree with the contention that Misc. Civil Appeal No. 78 of 1988 was not maintainable. He took the view that the actual appointment of receiver was made by the learned I Addl. District Judge by his order dated February 27, 1986 and the learned Civil Judge had simply obeyed that order. It was observed that since the Court of I Additional District 'Judge was a court of competent jurisdiction, it was not open to go into merits or demerits of the order of appointing receiver passed by him on February 27, 1986. The learned District Judge did not however stop at that and proceeded to consider the merits of the case also. 9. Coming to the merits of the case, it was observed by the learned District Judge that the contention of the Plaintiff was that he was in possession and no receiver could be appointed for dispossessing him. It was stated that there could not be any dispute about the proposition of law that a receiver should not be appointed to dispossess a person who was already in possession, but it was held that prima facie it could not be said that the Plaintiff was in possession. The contention of the Plaintiff was, therefore, found to be untenable. It was also contended that the learned Civil Judge had not given any finding as to whether it was just and convenient to appoint a receiver. It was held in regard to this contention that the learned Civil Judge could not go behind the order dated February 27, 1986 and he had to travel with in the directions given by the learned Addl. District Judge. It was further observed that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the learned Civil Judge to come to a finding as to whether it was just and convenient or not because the appointment of receiver was concluded by the order of the learned I Additional District Judge, which had become final and which was not challenged by the Plaintiff-Appellant in any manner before the High Court and in this way he had submitted to it. Then it was also contended that the order of the learned I Addl. District Judge has exhausted itself because the application for appointment of receiver was moved in November, 1985. This contention was also rejected. The learned District Judge pointed out that no doubt, the application was moved in November, 1985, but it cannot be said that it was for the year 1985 only. The order of the learned I Additional District Judge was passed on February 27, 1986 and no specific order for any particular year was passed. Moreover, the stay order clothed the learned Civil Judge with simple power inasmuch as it directed him to appoint receiver on the same terms and conditions as was done by him previously by his order dated April, 17, 1980 and] April 24, 1980 or in such variation as it deemed fit. The view was accordingly taken that the learned Civil Judge had jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. Dealing with the merits of the other appeal, it was held by the learned District Judge that the appointment of Sri Ranjit Lal Verma as receiver was bad because he happened to be a counsel of the Plaintiff and his appointment as counsel had not been determined in accordance with the provisions of Order 3, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure. In the result the appeal preferred against the order for appointment of receiver was dismissed and the appeal preferred against the appointment of Sri Ranjit Lal Varma as receiver was allowed It was ordered that the learned Civil Judge shall appoint another respectable person as receiver at once in place of Sri Ranjit Lal Varma. 10. It will be seen that the order for appointment of receiver was virtually passed by the learned I Additional District Judge on February 27, 1986 and what has been done by the courts below is in substance to give effect to that order. Both the courts below were under a constraint inasmuch as the learned Civil Judge could not go behind that order which was passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction and was as such binding on him and the learned District Judge could not have examine the correctness of that order because he was a court of concurrent jurisdiction. Both the courts below were under a constraint inasmuch as the learned Civil Judge could not go behind that order which was passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction and was as such binding on him and the learned District Judge could not have examine the correctness of that order because he was a court of concurrent jurisdiction. It may be mentioned that the writ petition which was in fact filed against the order dated February 27, 1986, was dismissed as withdrawn and there was no occasion to examine the merits of the case. It will also be relevant to observe that the order dated February 27, 1986 is not an order of collateral nature but happens to be the main order which has been continued through the impugned orders that have been subsequently passed. Therefore 'the nature and effect of the order dated February 27, 1986 may now be examined. 11. It has been observed by the learned I Additional District Judge in his order dated February 27, 1986 but the necessity for moving the application for appointment of receiver arose because the temporary injunction granted by the Civil Judge was vacated in appeal but by reason of the stay order passed by this Court, the order vacating the in junction had not become effective. He referred to the order dated April 9, 1980 which was passed in the writ petition and further observed that after decision of the appeal against the grant of temporary injunction on merits on May 19, 1983, the necessity for appointment of receiver has again arisen in view of the orders of this Court dated April 9, 1989, because the parties have reverted to the same position. After making these observations it was pointed out that it cannot be said that it is not just and convenient to appoint receiver in the case, because a receiver had already been appointed in the case previously by order of the High Court and the same situation has now arisen for appointment of receiver. The application of the Plaintiff has been rejected on merits, but still the Plaintiff is insisting to manage the property himself. In this connection a reference was also made to the fact that recovery warrant was issued against Math properties it was held that this in itself shows that there has been mis-management on behalf of Plaintiff. The application of the Plaintiff has been rejected on merits, but still the Plaintiff is insisting to manage the property himself. In this connection a reference was also made to the fact that recovery warrant was issued against Math properties it was held that this in itself shows that there has been mis-management on behalf of Plaintiff. In view of these circumstances, the order dated February 27, 1986 was passed by the learned I Additional District Judge for appointment of receiver. 12. Since too much emphasis has been laid on the order dated April 9, 1980 passed by this Court, it is necessary to examine in a little detail the effect of that order. It may be appreciated that the order dated April 9, 1980 was passed in Writ Petition No. 3398 of 1978 which was filed against the appellate order by means of which the temporary injunction granted by the trial court in favour of the Plaintiff was vacated. The matter for consideration in the writ petition was grant of temporary injunction in favour of Plaintiff and not appointment of receiver. The order dated April 9, 1980 has been extracted in an earlier part of this judgment. It was in the nature of an interim order and purported to modify the earlier interim order by which the operation of the appellate order in question was stayed. It was stated in order dated April, 9, 1980 that it was being passed for preservation of the property of the Gaddi in question including realisation of Tahbazari dues with the end and view it was directed that the Civil Judge may appoint some person to manage the property so far as the realisation of money including Tahbazari is concerned. The appointment of a third person was to be made for a limited purpose, that is to say for the realisation of money including Tahbazari. So far as other matters are concerned, the parties were directed to maintain status quo as it existed on the date of order, that is April 9, 1980. It cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the court was seized with the matter regarding appointment of receiver at the time when it proceeded to pass the order dated April 9, 1980. The said order cannot be constructed as being one for appointment of receiver of property. 13. It cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the court was seized with the matter regarding appointment of receiver at the time when it proceeded to pass the order dated April 9, 1980. The said order cannot be constructed as being one for appointment of receiver of property. 13. It may be observed that Order 40 Rule 1 CPC authorises a Court to appoint a receiver whenever it appears to it to be just and conversant. But it is settled by a long chain of judicial decisions that a party applying for the appointment of a receiver must show prima-facie that he has a strong case and good title to the property, that there is a special equity in its favour and that the property in the hands of the other party is in danger of being wasted. The Courts below have not considered the relevant matters and have not recorded conclusion which would justify the appointment of receiver. It has been seen that they were influenced by the consideration that the Plaintiff's application for temporary injunction has been rejected on merits and that this Court had directed on April 9, 1980 that a person may be appointed to manage the property as indicated above. These considerations are of no significance as discussed above. The Courts below have not recorded any finding on the questions as to (1) who is in possession of the property, (2) whether he is guilty of gross-mismanagement an account of which the property is in danger of being wasted; (3) whether he is liable to be removed from possession at the instance of the parties to the suit; particularly, Vimaleshwaranand who has applied for appointment of receiver, and such other questions. The learned District Judge has no doubt adverted to the question of possession and has held that the Plaintiff is not in possession. Even if this finding is accepted as correct, there is no finding as to who is in possession of the property in suit or whether it is not possible to decide prima facie about the person being in possession. If Bimaleshwananand is in possession there may be no question of appointing a receiver at his instance. If a third person of is in possession, then the various questions will have to be determined for finding out whether it is just and convenient to remove him and appoint a receiver. If Bimaleshwananand is in possession there may be no question of appointing a receiver at his instance. If a third person of is in possession, then the various questions will have to be determined for finding out whether it is just and convenient to remove him and appoint a receiver. Under the circumstances, the impugned orders cannot be justified as one which could be legally passed under Order 40, Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure. They are liable to be quashed and it is expedient that the matter is decided afresh by the trial court. 14. The writ petition is allowed and the order dated November 4, 1988 (Annexure 2) passed by the learned Civil Judge and the order dated December 17, 1988 (Annexure 3) passed by the learned District Judge are hereby quashed. It is directed that the trial court shall decide the application for appointment of receiver and objections thereto afresh in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. Cost easy.