Judgment : PRATAP SINGH, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition coming on for hearing on Thursday the 10th day of October, 1991 and upon perusing the petition and the affidavit filed in support thereof and upon hearing the arguments of Mr. V. Balakrishnan, Advocate for the petitioner and of Mr. R. M. Kannuppa rajendean, Govt. Advocate (Cr1. side) on behalf of the respondents and having stood over for consideration till this day the Court made the following order: petition under section 482. Criminal Procedure Code. praying for a direction to the first respondent to release the oil tanker bearing Registration No. TMT 8397 seized on 30-7-1991 by the respondent in Crime No. 234/91. ( 2 ) THE petitioners case is briefly as follows: He is the owner of the oil tanker bearing Registration No. TMT 8397. He is running it as a public carrier. The vehicle was at Nasarathpet before the mechanic shop. The respondent seized the vehicle and registered a case that there was 4000 liters of kerosene in it. Due to the leak age of Kerosene of another oil tanker of Andhra Pradesh Dealers, for temporary custody, 4000 litres of kerosene was unloaded and kept in the petitioners tanker to be delivered on the next day. The petitioner had no knowledge about it. The respondent has falsely registered the case against the petitioner on the allegation that kerosene was found in his tanker. The vehicle shall not be liable for confiscation as per section 6a of the Essential Commodities Act. The seizure is illegal. The vehicle is with the first respondent. Hence the petition for return of the vehicle to him. T ( 3 ) IN the court below, the first respondent had resisted the claim on the following grounds: the petitioner is in the habit of collecting kerosene illicitly and selling the same in black market at a higher price. This respondent had sent a repot to the Deputy Commissioner (North) on 5-8-1991 for confiscation of the lorry with kerosene under section 6a of Essential Commodities Act and the same is pending. The Deputy Commissioner has power to confiscate the vehicle also under section 6a of Essential Commodities Act. As per clause 17 of TNK (R and T) Order, 1973, if a person is found in possession of kerosene exceeding 20 litres,-it is an offence. The Deputy Commissioner has power to confiscate the vehicle also under section 6a of Essential Commodities Act. As per clause 17 of TNK (R and T) Order, 1973, if a person is found in possession of kerosene exceeding 20 litres,-it is an offence. The first accused, the driver of the vehicle, was found in possession of 4000 litres in the lorry without valid licence. He accepted that his owner viz. , the petitioner left the lorry and kerosene with him. The vehicle is liable for confiscation to the Government. The vehicle is used for an offence under Essential Commodities Act, the purpose of which is to prevent hoarding of essential commodities. If it is returned, the purpose would be defeated. ( 4 ) MR. V. Balakrishnan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would contend that the vehicle is a moving vehicle and keeping of kerosene in it would not amount to an offence and that the court has got power to return the vehicle to the petitioner and that petitioner is prepared to abide by any conditions. The learned Government advocate opposes contending that under section 6e of the Essential Commodities Act (which I shall hereinafter refer to as E. C. Act) the Court cannot return the vehicle to the petitioner. ( 5 ) TO appreciate the contentions put forth by the learned counsels, section 6e of the E. C. Act, needs extraction. It reads as follows:"6e. Whenever any essential commodity is seized in pursuance of an order made under section 3 in relation thereto, or any package, covering or receptacle in which such essential commodity is found, or any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance used in carrying such essential commodity is seized pending confiscation under section 6a, the Collector, or, as the case may be, the State Government concerned under section 6c shall have, and, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, any court, tribunal or other authority shall not have, jurisdiction to make orders with regard to the possession, delivery, disposal, release or distribution of such essential commodity, package, covering, receptacle, animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance". The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope and ambit of section 6a of the E. C. Act in shambhu Dayal Agarwala v. State of W. B. After referring to the various provisions under the E. C. Act, and after extracting section 6e of the E. C. Act, the apex court has expressed its view as follows: it is obvious on a plain reading of this provision that the same was brought on the statute book with a view to debarring the courts from making any order with regard to the possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of any essential commodity seized under an order made under section 3 of the Act. Then again, in para 6, the apex court has observed as follows:by the substituted section 6e as it presently stands the scope of the provision has been enlarged by extending the bar of jurisdiction of the court, tribunal or other authority to the release, etc. , of packages, coverings or receptacles as well as animals, vehicles, vessels or other conveyance also. It provides that whenever any essential commodity is seized under an order made in exercise of power conferred by section 3 in relation thereto, no court, tribunal or other authority shall have jurisdiction to make any order with regard to the possession, delivery, disposal, release or distribution of such essential commodity save and except the Collector pending confiscation under section 6a or the State Government concerned under section 6c". The apex court has also stated that while debarring courts, tribunals and other authorities from exercising power in relation to the seized commodity, power is conferred on the Collector or the State Government concerned under section 6c to make orders with regard to the possession, delivery, disposal, release or distribution of such commodity etc. Then again it has observed that there could be no question of releasing the commodity in the sense of returning it to the owner or person from whom it was seized even before the proceeding for confiscation stood completed and before the termination of the prosecution in the acquittal of the offender. Finally, the apex court has laid as follows: it seems to us that section 6e is intended to serve a dual purpose, namely: (i) to prevent interference by courts, etc. and (ii) to effectuate the sale of the essential commodity under sub-section (2) and the return of the animal, vehicle, etc. Finally, the apex court has laid as follows: it seems to us that section 6e is intended to serve a dual purpose, namely: (i) to prevent interference by courts, etc. and (ii) to effectuate the sale of the essential commodity under sub-section (2) and the return of the animal, vehicle, etc. under the second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 6a. In that sense section 6e is complementary in nature. Section 6e takes within its fold not only the essential commodity but also the vehicle or other conveyance. There is an embargo by virtue of section 6e on the courts to pass an order in respect of a vehicle which is covered by section 6e. It is relevant to point out that the first respondent has taken the specific stand before the trial Judge that he had sent a report to the Deputy Commissioner (North) on 5-8-1991 for confiscation of lorry with kerosene and the same is pending. In view of the pronouncement of the apex court, I am clear that the vehicle which was seized in the aforesaid circumstances, cannot be returned to the petitioner, in view of section 6e of the E. C. Act ( 6 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the petitioner rely upon State pi M. P. v. Rameshwar Rathod the apex Court has considered the scope of Sections 6a and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, as amended by Act 30 of 1974, and had held that in view of language used in sections 6a and 7 of Essential Commodities Act, and the context in which this language has been used the inference that arises is that criminal court retained the jurisdiction and its jurisdiction is not completely ousted. The question whether section 6e would stand as a bar did not fall for consideration in this ruling. ( 7 ) IN view of the above, the petition for direction for return of the vehicle has to necessarily fail and hence is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.