JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J. 1. In this writ application, the petitioner has inter alia prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ directing the respondents to withdraw and/or cancel and/or rescind a notice dated 29th November, 1988 as contained in Annexure-6 to the writ application whereby and whereunder the petitioner was intimated that renewal of Khas Mahal lease would be granted for a period of 15 years only in respect of holding no. 108 measuring 1 acre 12 decimals of land on the conditions mentioned therein and for a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to review the deeds of lease in respect of holding nos. 108, 137, 77 and 79 in village Sarley, Sarkarihata, Dist. Hazarihagh for a period of 30 years. 2. The short facts leading to this proceeding are as follows : By reason of several registered indentures of lease granted by the Secretary of State executed on 1st April, 1981, 9th March, 1920 and 24th May, 1926 lease in respect of holding nos. 137 (plot no. 257); holding nos. 250/264 (plot no. 79); plot nos. 257/585 (holding no. 108 of village Sarley was granted to various persons. By reason of the orders dated 4th April 1936, 23rd April, 1936 and 21st May, 1936, the Khas Mahal authorities accorded permission to original lessees to transfer the said lands in favour of late Radha Nath Roy, predecessor in-interest of the writ petitioners and pursuant thereto the original lessees transferred their right, title and interest in favour of Radha Nath Roy by reason or registered deeds of sale dated 21st May, 1936, 5th December, 1936 and 19th September, 1942. 3. The said Radha Nath Roy applied for renewal of the aforementioned leases and by three separate memos dated 5th February, 1948, the State renewed the said leases in respect of the plots aforementioned on execution of three deeds of lease in favour or late Radha Nath Roy, renewing the respective leases for a further period of 30 years with effect from 1st April, 1948. 4. On 23rd May, 1948, a registered deed of lease was executed by the Stale of Bihar in favour of one Manmatho Nath Ghosh for a period or 30 years with effect from 1st April, 1948 in respect of plot nos. 265, 266 and 268 to 283 being holding no. 77 of village Sarley. 4. On 23rd May, 1948, a registered deed of lease was executed by the Stale of Bihar in favour of one Manmatho Nath Ghosh for a period or 30 years with effect from 1st April, 1948 in respect of plot nos. 265, 266 and 268 to 283 being holding no. 77 of village Sarley. By an order dated 19th May, 1949, the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh, accorded approval to the said lessee Manmatho Nath Ghosh and Pramatho Nath Ghosh to transfer their right in the said lands to late Radha Nath Roy and pursuant thereto, an Indenture of assignment dated 19th January, 1950 was executed by the aforementioned lessees in favour or late Radha Nath Roy. 5. On 22nd February, 1958, late Radha Nath Roy executed a will and on 21st September, 1964 executed codicil in the said will appointing his wife Smt. Annapurna Roy his Secretary Miss Marjoria Roberts and his son Rajat Nath Roy (petitioner no.1) as Executor and Executrixes to the Estate of said Radha Nath Roy. Radha Nath Roy died on 12th February, 1966. 6. A probate in respect of the aforementioned will was obtained and, thereafter, the Executor and Executirxes aforementioned got their names mutated in the records of the State of Bihar as lessees. Smt. Annapurna Roy died in February, 1972 and on 1st November, 1974 petitioner no. 1 Miss Marjorie Roberts obtained permission under section 31 (1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 to hold and deal with immovable properties in India. On 1st November, 1977 petitioner no. 1 and Miss Marjorie Roberts filed an application for renewal of the said leases which were due to expire for a period of 30 years with effect from 1st April, 1978. In January 1987 Miss Marjorie Roberts died, as a result whereof petitioner no. 1 became sole and absolute owner of the Estate of late Radha Nath Roy. 7. According to the petitioners on 29th November, 1988 the impugned notice was issued whereby and whereunder the lease in respect of holding no. 108 was purported to have been renewed for a period of 15 years or till the life time of Miss Marjorie Roberts whichever is earlier, inter alia on the following conditions: "i. the lease would be renewed for a period of 15 years or till the life time of Miss M. Roberts which ever was earlier; ii. that the petitioner no. that the petitioner no. 1 and Miss M. Roberts should hand over the remaining leasehold lands held by them to the Government willingly; iii. that after death of Miss M. Roberts Kona Kuthi and the lands appertaining thereto shall be deemed to have been surrendered to the Government; iv. that the annual rent and all arrears of rent would be paid; v. that Miss M. Roberts would have no right to sell the leasehold land; vi. that all other conditions of the earlier lease deed would remain in force." 8. Petitioners have further contended that on 5th December, 1988, representatives of the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh made attempts to take forcible possession of the holdings in question. It has further been asserted that the aforementioned notice dated 29th November, 1988 was forcibly served on petitioner no. 2 on 17th December, 1988. 9. It has also been asserted that petitioner no. 1 by a letter dated 12th January, 1989 written to the respondent-Deputy Commissioner through his advocates M/s. M.M. Mitra & Co. caused reply to be sent to the said notice challenging and/or objecting to the legality, validity, purport and effect thereof. In paragraph 44 of the writ application, the petitioners have stated: "a. the gardens, orchards and the specious building with basement floor and out-houses in the said leasehold known as Kona Kuthi have been laid out and built with all modern facilities on a sloping land on Canary Hill Road with best materials by qualified architects, Engineers and workmen from Calcutta at a considerable cost by the late Radha Nath Roy and ever since his death they have been well maintained by your petitioner no. 1 at substantial cost and expenses. There is a tank within the compound and cremation of bodies of both late Mr. Radha Nath Roy and Mrs. Annapurna Roy after their death took place by the side of the said tank and their ashes have been preserved in tombs built there. It has become a family relic and visited by members of the family of Raja Janaki Nath Roy of Dacea whenever they go to Hazaribagh. b. Although your petitioner no. 1 has been working as a lecturer in a University in Scotland, your petitioner no. I along with his family come to India whenever opportunity arises and not less than twice every year since 1966 and stay at Kona Kuthi. b. Although your petitioner no. 1 has been working as a lecturer in a University in Scotland, your petitioner no. I along with his family come to India whenever opportunity arises and not less than twice every year since 1966 and stay at Kona Kuthi. At present he has no other place or home in India. During the last to Years, your petition no. 1 was selected by the British Govt. Personnel for transfer of Food Technology in pursuance of its trade policy in Canada and Africa and in recognition of his work he was given scholarship under Churchill Award. Your petitioner no. 1 will be retiring from service within a year or two and he intends to work as a consultant in India. As such the necessity of Kona Kuthi to your petitioner is Immense. c. Your petitioner no. 1 has seven sisters of whom two are widows and your petitioners no. 2 a divorcee and all of them are in India and all such sisters come and stay in Hazaribagh. Apart from the facts and circumstances stated above your petitioner no. 1 attaches great sentimental value to the only place he owns in India at present and which has been his home since childhood. Some of the old employees including the body attendants of his deceased mother of your petitioners at Hazaribagh have been still enjoying pension. It will indeed be a terrible shock to your petitioners who are law abiding persons if they are forcibly deprived of enjoyment of the property of your petitioner no. 1 in a country where Rule of Law has been established through the process of democracy." 10. It has further been contended that the petitioners being heirs and legal representatives or late Radha Nath Roy are entitled in law to renewal or the aforementioned leases for a further period or 30 years with effect from 1st April, 1978. 11. Mr. 1 in a country where Rule of Law has been established through the process of democracy." 10. It has further been contended that the petitioners being heirs and legal representatives or late Radha Nath Roy are entitled in law to renewal or the aforementioned leases for a further period or 30 years with effect from 1st April, 1978. 11. Mr. S. Pavel learned counsel for the petitioners firstly submitted that the impugned notice as contained in Annexure-6 In the writ application is illegal on the following grounds: (a) the Deputy Commissioner has passed the impugned order in violation or his jurisdiction inasmuch as he could not have directed renewal of a part or the lease in terms of the provisions of Bihar Government Estate Khas Mahal Manual; (b) A lease once validly granted has to be renewed subject to the fulfilment or the conditions or lease and as in this case, no violation or the conditions or the lease having been pointed out, the impugned notice must be held to be illegal; (c) The Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to impose a condition extraneous to clause 14 or the instrument or lease; (d) assuming that such a condition could be imposed, the same cannot be an unreasonable one. Reference in this connection has been made to Associated Provincial Picture House V. Wednesbury Corporation 1947 Vol. 2 All. ER 680 at page 685. 12. It was further submitted that the right or a renewal is a valuable right and the same cannot be taken away except by way or resumption of lease in terms or the provisions or the Bihar State Khas Mahal Manual. Learned counsel in this connection has referred to Manmohan Lal Bhagat Vs State of Bihar and others reported in 1988 PLJR 12 : 1987 BLT 276 and Deba Jyoti Dutta and others Vs. State of Bihar reported in 1980 PLJR 440 : 1987 BLT 265. 13. It was further Contended by the learned counsel the even in a matter of contract, this Court can exercise its jurisdiction if it is found that the State has acted malafide or arbitrarily. In this connection, learned counsel has relied upon a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Kumari Srilekha Vidyarthi vs. State or U.P. and others reported in 1990 Vol. 4 Judgment Today 211: 1991 (1) SCC 212 . 14. In this connection, learned counsel has relied upon a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Kumari Srilekha Vidyarthi vs. State or U.P. and others reported in 1990 Vol. 4 Judgment Today 211: 1991 (1) SCC 212 . 14. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioners have categorically stated in paragraphs 53 and 54 of the writ application that they have not violated any conditions of lease and as the respondents have not filed any counter affidavit stating that the petitioners are guilty of violation of the conditions of lease, This court should direct renewal thereof. According to the learned counsel, although the execution of the deeds of lease was originated from a contract, but by reason of the instrument of lease, the petitioners predecessor in-interest acquired an interest in the property which could not have been taken away in view of Article 300A of the Constitution of India and, thus, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the petitioners are also entitled to a writ of or in the nature of mandamus from this Court directing the respondents renew the aforementioned four leases granted in favour of the petitioners. Learned counsel in this connection has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in The Comptroller and Auditor General of India Vs. K.S. Jagannathan reported in AIR 1987 SC 537 -1986 Vol. 3 SCC 697. 15. Mrs. M.M. Pal learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand submitted that this Court should not interfere with the impugned order inasmuch as in passing the impugned order, the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh, has exercised his discretion in relation to grant of renewal of a lease. 16 'Khas Mahal" is what is known in English as Government Estate. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this court in Bhola Ram Chaudhary and others Vs. State of Bihar and others, 1989 PLJR 920 , in the following words : "let us therefore examine whether Khas Mahal was/is intermediary. What is, therefore, Khas Mahal'? The word 'Khas Mahal' is nothing but what is known in English as 'Government Estate'. That is defined in the Khas Mahal as follows : Meaning of Government estates’ : The term Government estates is used to mean estates under the direct management of Government whether these are the property or Government or are the estates of private individuals brought under direct management of Government. That is defined in the Khas Mahal as follows : Meaning of Government estates’ : The term Government estates is used to mean estates under the direct management of Government whether these are the property or Government or are the estates of private individuals brought under direct management of Government. It may also mean any land which is the property" of Government and as such would include estates owned by Government which have been let in farm and leased for periods and also the waste lands hut would not include lands belonging to other departments of Government, e.g. roadside lands, so long as they are not relinquished by the department concerned to the Collector for management. This manual unless it so appears from the context, deals with the principles, policy and procedure for Khas management of estates under the direct management of Government." From the above there can be no difficulty in appreciating that Khas Mahal is nothing but Government Estate. It is the Estate of the Government. Since it is Estate of the Government, it cannot be a Zamindari. Not being a Zamindari a Khas Mahal cannot vest in the State of Bihar. It has always been in the State of Bihar itself." 17. The Stale for the purpose of Khas Management of the Estate under the direct management of the State Government issued executive instructions commonly known as Bihar Government Estate Khas Mahal Manual which deals with the principles, policy and procedure of such Management. The said Khas Mahal Manual also provides for the manner in which leases are to be granted, the terms and conditions of such leases, renewal and resumption thereof etc. Rule 14 of the said Rules reads as follows: "What constitutes Town Khasmahals : Town khasmahals consist of urban lands not used or likely to be used for agricultural purposes. They are governed by the Transfer of Property Act and not by the Tenancy Acts except where lands though not used for non-agricultural purposes now were originally leased to raiyats who have subsequently acquired occupancy rights. They are governed by the Transfer of Property Act and not by the Tenancy Acts except where lands though not used for non-agricultural purposes now were originally leased to raiyats who have subsequently acquired occupancy rights. Particular care is necessary in the case of these lands nor merely to safeguard the pecuniary interest of Government hut also to prevent the erection of undesirable and insanitary structures which would be discreditable to Government as landlord." Rule 17 inter alia provides that in case of building leases, a reasonable right of renewal should be allowed, subject to such terms as may be approved on behalf of Government. The term should not ordinarily be less than 30 years. Rule 21 provides for resumption of leasehold which reads as follows; “Resumption should be for public purposes only : When a tenant holds land from Government under a lease containing a clause which authorises the lessor to resume possession of the whole or part of the lands of the tenancy, this power of resumption shall only be exercised if the land is required for a public purpose, and the power of resumption shall not be exercised without the sanction of Government obtained through the Board of Revenue. If such land be required for the use of persons other than Government, e.g. for a local body, it should ordinarily be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, and not under the power of resumption given by the lease." Rule 22 provides for the procedure for obtaining Khas possession in the following manner: "When in a lease it is provided that in the event of certain contingencies occuring, the Collector will enter upon and take Khas or direct possession of the property, it must be understood that, where the settlement holder objects, possession cannot be taken save under the orders of a competent Civil Court." 18. The leases are granted in a prescribed form. The leases are granted in a prescribed form. Clause 14 of the Indenture of lease reads as follows : "Six months prior to the expiration of the said term the Deputy Commissioner will issue a notice calling on the lessee to state whether he is desirous to renew his lease and if within three months from the date of issue of this notice the lessee shall notify the Deputy Commissioner that he is desirous of taking a new lease of the said premises and shall have duly observed and performed all the terms and conditions aforesaid, he shall be entitled to a renewal of the lease for another term of 30 years and further to similar renewals at intervals of 30 years with a revision of rent at the end of each such period, the enhancement at each renewal being limited to 100 per cent of the rent paid for the previous term and the total term being limited to a period of 90 years. If the lessee does not notify the Deputy Commissioner of his desire to take a new lease nor reply is received from him within three month from the date of issue of the aforesaid notice, the Deputy Commissioner will take steps for taking khas possession and resettlement of the said premises. In the event of the lessee not taking a new lease as aforesaid, he shall not be entitled to any compensation for any buildings or improvements on the said premises or otherwise, provided that the Deputy Commissioner may in his discretion where the circumstances' of a lease will require it grant compensation for buildings or allow the lessee to dispose of them." (underlining is mine for emphasis) 19. From a perusal of the aforementioned clause 14 of the Indenture of lease as also Rule 21, it is evident that a total term of a lease would be limited to a period of 90 years and the leases are to be renewed subject to the lessee fulfilling the terms and conditions thereof and subject to the exercise of the power of the State in the matter of enhancement of rent. 20. 20. From what has been stated hereinbefore, it is clear that a property leased out to a lessee can be refused to be renewed only on the ground of his violating the terms and conditions of the lease and/or of his refusal to pay the enhanced rent. Subject to the said limitation, a lessee will be entitled to the renewal of a lease almost as a matter of course except in such cases where the State for public purposes and with prior approval of the State Government considers it desirable to resume the leasehold land or a part thereof. This constitutes a 'promise' on the part of the respondent State. 21. In Deba Jyoti Dutta and others Vs. State of Bihar and others reported in 1988 PLJR 440 , this Court held as follows: "It may be mentioned here that from the Khas Mahal Manual as also the terms of the lease it appears that the right of renewal conferred upon renewal of lease is to be granted almost automatically unless and until the lessee is guilty of violation of the conditions of lease or any of the provisions of the Khas Mahal Manual." With regard to the power of the State to take steps for resumption of the building and/or cancellation of lease, this Court observed: "The procedure for resumption of the building and/or of cancellation of lease are engrafted in various provisions of the Khas Mahal Manual. The respondents who are public authorities and were invested with wide powers even to deprive a person from his right to property, were expected to exercise such powers with extreme care and caution. It was their duty to see that the power conferred upon them be not exceeded or abused. The respondents were required to keep themselves within the limits of the authority committed to it; to act in good faith and reasonably." 22. In relation to the right of the State to take possession of the leasehold, this Court stated the law thus : "Learned counsel appearing for the respondents when questioned, admitted that there is no condition in the lease to resume possession of the leasehold only because the house is not occupied by the lessee throughout the year. In relation to the right of the State to take possession of the leasehold, this Court stated the law thus : "Learned counsel appearing for the respondents when questioned, admitted that there is no condition in the lease to resume possession of the leasehold only because the house is not occupied by the lessee throughout the year. It is also admitted that under the provisions of the Khas Mahal Manual it is obligatory on the part of the authority to take recourse to the remedy of a civil suit instituted in a civil court for taking possession of the building after the same is directed to be resumed. Admittedly, no such civil suit has been filed and further admittedly the building in question was occupied by the respondents, in the manner as stated hereinbefore. The respondents, therefore, evidently did not follow the rule of law nor the proceeding was conducted fairly and reasonably. It is now well settled by the various decisions of the Supreme Court that arbitrariness is antithesis of equality and any action which cannot stand the test of reasonableness would be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Reference in this connection may be made to E.P. Royappa V. State of Tamil Nadu and another, AIR 1974 SC 555 ; in Smt. Maneka Gandhi V. Union of India and another, AIR 1978 SC 596 as also the decision in Ajay Hasia V. Khalid Mujib Suhravardi and others, AIR 1981 SC 487 ." 23. Dealing with the matter of discretion of the Deputy Commissioner in relation to renewal of the said lease, this Court observed: "Even assuming that the respondent no.2 or the Deputy Commissioner had the discretion to renew or not to renew the said lease but even the right to exercise discretion has to be exercised reasonably and not whimsically m capriciously. 'Discretion' as Lord Mansfield staled it in classic terms in the case of John Wikes (1770) 4 Burr 2528 at 2539, means sound discretion governed by rule not by humour, it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful. & 24. The said decision was followed in Manmohanlal Bhagat Vs. 'Discretion' as Lord Mansfield staled it in classic terms in the case of John Wikes (1770) 4 Burr 2528 at 2539, means sound discretion governed by rule not by humour, it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful. & 24. The said decision was followed in Manmohanlal Bhagat Vs. State of Bihar and others 1988 PLJR 12 wherein the following observations were made : "From the statements made in the writ application, which were not controverted by filing returns by the respondents, it appears that the respondents concerned have thrown to the winds all procedures as laid down under the provisions of Khas Mahal Manual" This court also quoted the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Yadav and others Vs. State of Haryana and others ( AIR 1987 SC 454 ) thus: "The basic principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done and this rule has received wick recognition in several decisions of this court. It is also important to note that this rule is not confined to cases where judicial powers stricto sensu is exercised. It is appropriately extended to all cases where an independent mind has to he applied to arrive at a fair and just decisions between the rival claim of the parties. Justice is not the function of the courts alone; it is also the duty of all those who are expected to decide fairly between contending parties. The strict standards applied to authorities exercising Judicial powers are being increasingly applied to administrative bodies for it is vital to the maintenance of the rule of law in a Welfare State where the jurisdiction of administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid pace that the instrumentalities of the State should discharge their functions in a fair and just manner. 25. In Remendra Nath Khan Vs. State or Bihar and others, 1988 BLT (Rep) 540, this Court followed the Deba Jyoti Dutta's case (supra) and held: "A lessee, in whose favour an indenture of lease has validly been executed is entitled to possess the said leasehold which becomes his property within the meaning of Article 300A of the Constitution of India till he makes himself liable to be evicted therefrom in accordance with law or in terms of the terms and conditions of the instrument of lease itself. It is now well settled that the State cannot deprive a person from his property on an extraneous consideration nor can it do so without taking into consideration the relevant and garmane factors. Apart from the fact that there does not appear to be any ground for coming to the conclusion that the petitioner has not been utilising the land in question or the same is lying parti or for that matter the same is in excess of his requirement, the respondents have also not come forward to, controvert the allegation made in the writ petition. If any land is required to he resumed for public purpose there exists a provision in this regard under the Khas Mahal Manual itself" This Court then quoted clause 21 of the Khas Mahal Manual and observed : "From a perusal of the aforesaid provision it is evident that the authorities can resume the land in question or a part thereof only on existence of two conditions precedents therefor viz : (a) there exists a public purpose. (b) Prior sanction of the State Government has been obtained therefor through the Board of Revenue" 26. In Jaleswar Mistry Vs State of Bihar and others reported in 1989 PLJR 402 this Court again considered clauses 21 and 22. 22. In Kailash Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and others reported in 1988 PLJR 1014 this Court observed : "It is now well known that the Khas Mahal authorities if there is any violation of the condition of lease or it intends to resume the land in public interest may do so in accordance with the provisions of the Khas Mahal Manual as also in accordance with terms, conditions and covenants contained in the document." It is also well settled that the State as a lessor cannot take forcible possession by ejectment of a lessee and the same must be done by taking recourse to and in terms of the conditions of lease. Reference in this conncct on may be made to Express News Papers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India and others (1986 Vol. 1 SCC 133) and Lallu Yeshwant Singh Vs. Rai Jagdish Singh and others ( AIR 1968 SC 620 at page 622)." 27. In Express News Papers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India and others reported in 1986 Vol. Reference in this conncct on may be made to Express News Papers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India and others (1986 Vol. 1 SCC 133) and Lallu Yeshwant Singh Vs. Rai Jagdish Singh and others ( AIR 1968 SC 620 at page 622)." 27. In Express News Papers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India and others reported in 1986 Vol. 1 SCC 133, the Supreme Court inter alia repelled the contention that a right to occupy the land leased for the construction of building for installation of printing press is not within Article 19(1)(c) nor within Article 19(1)(g) but such a right would derive from grant of a contract and thus a writ under Article 32 was not maintainable observing : "These contentions plausible though it may seem at first blush, are, on closer scrutiny, not well-founded. They ignore the true object and purpose for which the grant was made, namely, for the construction of a building or installation of a printing press for publication of a newspaper and the direct and immediate effect of the impugned notices for re-entry upon forfeiture of lease and the threatened demolition of the Express Building built on the leasehold premises under Clause 5 of the lease deed for alleged breach of clauses 2(5) and 2(14) thereof and under sections 343 and 344 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 when the said buildings had been constructed with the permission of the lessor i.e. the Union of India, Ministry of Works and Housing and in conformity with the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan for D-II area as well as with the sanction of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and therefore must amount to a violation of the freedom of speech and expression enshrined in Article 19(1)(a). I am not impressed at all with the submissions of learned counsel for respondent 1 that the forfeiture of lease or the threatened demolition of the Express Buildings does not touch upon the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) as the petitioners can still shift the printing press to an alternative accommodation." The Supreme Court further repelled the criticism of the dictum of Bhagwati J. in International Airport Authority case that arbitrariness was antithesis of Article 14 and commented that this would mean that all governmental actions which are not supportable by law were per se violative of Article 14. A.P. Sen, J. further observed: "I am afraid, it is rather late in the day to question the correctness of the landmark decision in Maneka Gandhi case and the innovative construction placed by Bhagwati J. on Article 14 in the three cases of Royappa, Maneka Gandhi and International Airport Authority which have evolved new dimensions in Judicial process." 28. With regard to the right of re-entry upon forfeiture of lease, the Supreme Court in the aforementioned case followed its earlier decision in Bishan Das Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 1570 and held that its decision in State of Orissa Vs. Ramchandra Das appeared to have been rendered per incuriam. It observed : "Even in cases involving purely contractual issues, the settled law is that where statutory provisions of public law are involved, writs will issue: Mohd. Hanif V. State of Assam." It further held: "Due process of law in a case like the present necessarily implies the filing of suit by the lessor i.e. the Union of India Ministry of Works & Housing for the enforcement of the alleged right of re-entry, if any upon forfeiture of lease due to breach of the terms of the lease." 29. It is true that in Express Newspaper's case (Supra), the Supreme Court was concerned with a lease granted under Government Grants Act. But in view or the policy decision laid down in the Bihar Government Estate Khas Mahal Manual, in my opinion, the said decision of the Supreme Court shall apply in all fours to the fact of the present case also. 30. It is, therefore, evident that the respondent-Deputy Commissioner has committed a serious illegality in passing an order of renewal in respect of holding no.108 which is extraneous to clause 14 of the instrument of lease. 31. The building in-question known as Kona Kuthi is standing on plot no.137. The respondent-Deputy Commissioner however, evidently acted irrationally in directing renewal of lease only in respect of holding no.108 and that too, on unreasonable conditions. 32. 31. The building in-question known as Kona Kuthi is standing on plot no.137. The respondent-Deputy Commissioner however, evidently acted irrationally in directing renewal of lease only in respect of holding no.108 and that too, on unreasonable conditions. 32. In the famous decision of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. V. Wednesbury Corporation reported in 1947(2) All ER 680, Lord Green, M.R. held: “I do not wish to repeat what I have said, but it might be useful to summarise once again the principle, which seems to me to be that the court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view to seeing whether it has taken into account matters which it ought not to take into account, or, conversely, has refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which it ought to take into account. Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may still be possible to say that the local authority, nevertheless, have come to it. In such a case, again, I think the court can interfere. The power of the court to interfere in each case is not that of an appellate authority to override a decision of the local authority, but is that of a judicial authority which is concerned and concerned only to see whether the local authority have contravened the law by acting in excess of the powers which Parliament has confided in it." 33. In R v Nurfolk County Council, ex parte M reported in 1989 Vol.2 All ER 359, Write, J. while considering a case as to whether information to the employer about the concerned employee relating to registration of his name in the Child Abuse Register should have been in consonance with the principles of natural justice, answered the question in affirmative. In R v Nurfolk County Council, ex parte M reported in 1989 Vol.2 All ER 359, Write, J. while considering a case as to whether information to the employer about the concerned employee relating to registration of his name in the Child Abuse Register should have been in consonance with the principles of natural justice, answered the question in affirmative. It further held that the behaviour of the Council offended not only the most basic notion of fair playas also so unreasonable so as to come within the purview of Wednesbury's principle in the following words : "Counsel's second submission was found on the premises, which is undoubtedly correct that the council's decision cannot (in the absence of bad faith or excess of jurisdiction neither of which is relied on by counsel for M) be reviewed in the courts except on the basis of breach of natural justice or unreasonableness within the limited sense of that term approved in Associated Provincial Picture House Ltd. V. Wednesbury Corp." Under the head of natural justice, counsel contends that in deciding to register M as an abuser the council was not acting judicially, or even quasi judicially, but administratively, and was accordingly exempt from any requirement to apply the natural justice rules to its case conference proceedings. I accept that a case conference deliberating whether or not to place a name on the register as an abuser is not acting judicially so as to make the rules of natural. justice automatically applicable to its procedures as though it had been functioning as a Tribunal. Nevertheless, the consequences of registration for M were in my judgment sufficiently serious (for the reasons I have already stated) to impose on the council a legal duty to act fairly towards him. The council's case conference acted unfairly and in manifest breach of that duty when it operated a procedure which denied him all opportunity of advance warning of its intention, or of prior consultation, or of being heard to object, or of knowing the full circumstances surrounding its decision. As to unreasonableness, counsel contends that the onus is on M to show that the council's conduct in relation to the registration was irrational to an extent verging on the absurd, and that all the criticism that may fairly be made of his client does not add up to unreasonableness in that restricted sense. As to unreasonableness, counsel contends that the onus is on M to show that the council's conduct in relation to the registration was irrational to an extent verging on the absurd, and that all the criticism that may fairly be made of his client does not add up to unreasonableness in that restricted sense. I do not agree with the submission in its result. The council's behaviour towards M offended not only the most basic notions of fair play but was also so unreasonable as in my judgment to come well within the Wednesbury principle." 34. In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (1984 Vol. 3 All England Law Report 935) Diplock L.J. held that the power of judicial review is limited to the grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. The aforementioned observation was followed by the Supreme Court in Ranjit Thakur versus Union of India and another reported in 1987 PLJR 79 (SC) and in Sri Lekha Vidyarthy vs. State of U.P. in 1990 Vol. 2 Scale 561: 1991 Vol. I SCC 212. 35. Wednesbury's 'unreasonableness' comes within the purview of the term 'irrationality' as indicated by Lord Diplock. 35A. Halsbury's Laws of England Fourth Edition Vol. 1 (1) paragraph 60 states the law as follows: "The grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review have been conveniently classified as threefold. The first ground is 'illegality'; the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. The second is "irrationality' namely Wednesbury unreasonableness. The third is 'procedural impropriety'. What procedure will satisfy the public law requirement of procedural propriety depends upon the subject matter of the decision, the "executive functions of the decision-maker (if the decision is not that of an administrative tribunal) and the particular circumstances in which the decision came to be made". 36. It is, therefore, clear that respondent/Deputy Commissioner did not at all take into consideration the act that a lessee would normally he entitled to renewal of a lease where he has put on valuable structure rather than vacant land. It is, further, clear that a lease of Khas Mahal land is not a personal grant. As noticed, the deeds of lease contain the terms and conditions as laid down in the prescribed form. It is, further, clear that a lease of Khas Mahal land is not a personal grant. As noticed, the deeds of lease contain the terms and conditions as laid down in the prescribed form. In this view of the matter except in exceptional cases no condition can be imposed upon the lessee in granting the lease which conditions have not been imposed upon other lessees or are not imposable under the Manual. The respondent did not file their return. No reason was assigned in the impugned order as contained is Annexure-6 to the writ application. It is not, therefore, known to this Court as to what impelled the respondent-Deputy Commissioner in laying down conditions as mentioned In the impugned notice. 37. In R Vs. Panel on Take overs and mergers, exparte Gunness pic reported in 1989 Vol. 1 All ER 509 and 512:- It was observed. "In the context of a body whose constitution, functions and powers are sui-generis, the court should review the panel's acts and omissions more in the round than otherwise be the case and, whilst basing its decision on familiar concepts, should eschew any formal categorisation." It was further observed : The court should consider "Whether something has gone wrong in nature and degree which requires the intervention of the courts". 38. In S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 , it has been held that in view of the extended horizon of the principles of natural justice, the requirement of recording reasons must be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which covers the exercise of power by administrative authorities. 39. It is now well known that legitimate expectation or reasonable expectation forms part of the principles of natural justice. See 1984 Vol. 3 All ER 935. 40. Without multiplying the decisions on the subject, the law as stated in Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 1/1 Paragraph 81 may be noticed: "81. Legitimate expectation : A person may have a legitimate expectation or being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation or from consistent past practice. Legitimate expectation : A person may have a legitimate expectation or being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation or from consistent past practice. The existence of a legitimate expectation may have a number of different consequences; it may give locus standi to seek leave to apply for judicial review; it may mean that the authority ought not to act so as to defeat the expectation without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so; or it may mean that, if the authority proposes to defeat a person's legitimate expectation it must afford him an opportunity to make representations on the matter.” 41. The doctrine of legitimate expectation which is applicable in a case of renewal of a licence, in my opinion, would apply with more force in a case of lease of immovable property. Prof S.A. DE Smith in his Judicial Review of Administrative Action at page 223 observed : "Non-renewal of an existing licence is usually a more serious matter than refusal to grant a licence in the first place. Unless the licensee has already been given to understand when he was granted the licence that renewed is not to be expected, non-renewal may seriously upset his plans, cause him economic loss and perhaps cast a slur on his reputation. It may therefore be right to imply a duty to hear before a decision not to renew when there is a legitimate expectation of renewal even though no such duty is implied in the making or the original decision to grant or refuse the licence." 42. In R v. Secretary of State for Social Services ex parte Wellcome Foundation Ltd (1987 Vol.2 All ER 1025) Sir John Donaldson observed thus: "Before I express my views on the merits of the contentions of the parties, I should like to advert to a more general point concerning the judicial review jurisdiction. In R v. Secretary of State for Social Services ex parte Wellcome Foundation Ltd (1987 Vol.2 All ER 1025) Sir John Donaldson observed thus: "Before I express my views on the merits of the contentions of the parties, I should like to advert to a more general point concerning the judicial review jurisdiction. It will be seen that the Secretary of State changed his stance in the course of the dispute Initially he was saying simply that it was for applicants for PL(PI)s to ensure that they were entitled to use the trade name which would be specified in the licence for which they were making application. Later he was saying that he was not sure that he had power to take account of possible infringements of trade mark rights which might he involved in the medicines were imported and marketed under that name, but that in any event it was not really practicable to do so. In the end through counsel who appeared for the Secretary of State both here and below, he was saying that, as a matter of law, he had no power to do so. Against this background, it seemed at one stage in the appeal that counsel for Wellcome was advancing, or at least was about to advance, an argument on the following lines. It is trite law the 'a person entrusted with a discretion must direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is hound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to the matter that he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly he said and often is said to be acting unreasonably. (See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury Corp (1947) 2 All ER 680 at 682-683 (1948) 1 KB 223 al 229 per Lord Greene MR. From this it is said to follow that the first stage in every decision-making process involves the decision-maker considering and determining precisely' what are the limits of his discretion and what are the precise parameters delimiting matters which are and are not relevant to his consideration." 43. From this it is said to follow that the first stage in every decision-making process involves the decision-maker considering and determining precisely' what are the limits of his discretion and what are the precise parameters delimiting matters which are and are not relevant to his consideration." 43. It is clear that the Deputy Commissioner-respondent in passing the impugned order dated 29.11.1988 fell into error as to the extent of his jurisdiction inasmuch as in view of the provisions as contained in the instrument of lease as also Khas Mahal Manual, he could not have refused to renew the leases except on the grounds mentioned therein. The power to refuse the renewal of lease is contained in Rule 21 of the Khas Mahal Manual which power should have been exercised only when a public purpose exists. 44. In R v. Registrar of Companies ex parte Esal (Commodities) Ltd. (1985 Vol. 2 All ER 22) it was held as follows: "It follows that the registrar fell into error as to the extent of his jurisdiction. The words of Webster J in Steeples v Derbyshire CC (1984) 3 All ER 468 at 488 (1985) 1 WLR 256 at 281 albeit in the context of planning seem to me to be very apic. "but if Parliament lays down conditions which are to be fulfilled before a power may be exercised, it is incumbent on those exercising the power to ensure that those conditions have been fulfilled not merely so as to avoid the risk of a successful challenge in the exercise of that power and all the time-consuming and constly consequences that may follow, but simply because the law requires those conditions to be fulfilled and because it is essential that any body exercising a power which affects the interests of the public should scrupulously comply with the conditions which Parliament imposes on the exercise of such a power." 45. In Kumari Sri Lekha Vidyarthy Vs. State of U.P., 1991 Vol. 1 SCC 212, the Supreme Court held: "It is now too well settled that every State action, in order to survive, must not be susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness which is the crux of Article 14 of the Constitution and basic to the rule of law, the system which governs us. Arbitrariness is the very negation of the rule of law. Arbitrariness is the very negation of the rule of law. Satisfaction of this basic test in every State action a sine qua non to its validity and in this respect, the State cannot claim comparison with a private individual even in the field of contract. This distinction between the State and a private individual in the field of contract has to be borne in the mind." It further held that even the authority is entitled to exercise its discretion, the same means sound discretion guided by law. It further held: "Conferment of the power together with the discretion which goes with it to enable proper exercise of the power is coupled with the duty to shun arbitrariness in its exercise and to promote the object for which the power is conferred, which undoubtedly is public interest and not individual or private gain, whim or caprice of any individual. All persons entrusted with any such power have to bear in mind its necessary concomitant which alone justifies conferment of power under the rule of law." 46. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the arbitrariness or unreasonableness on the part of the State in any field of action including a matter of contract is justiciable. However, I may hasten to add that the• question as to whether an action is arbitrary or unreasonable would depend upon the facts of each case. 47. It may however, be noticed that the court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether a party to the contract has violated the terms and conditions thereof or not. Such a question normally is outside the purview of judicial review of such action (See AIR 1977 SC 1481 and AIR 1989 SC 997 ). In the latter case, the Supreme Court has pointed out that the court while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction is not concerned with the merit of the decision, but is concerned with the decision-making process. However, in this case as noticed hereinbefore, it has not been contended on behalf of the State that the petitioners are guilty of violation of any condition of lease and as such the said question does not arise in this case. 48. Further recently in M/s. Pancham Singh Vs. However, in this case as noticed hereinbefore, it has not been contended on behalf of the State that the petitioners are guilty of violation of any condition of lease and as such the said question does not arise in this case. 48. Further recently in M/s. Pancham Singh Vs. State of Bihar and others being C.W.J.C. No. 7116/90 disposed of by this Court on 25th January, 1991, [ 1991(1) PLJR 352 (F.B.)] a Full Bench of this Court upon considering the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others (AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1620); M/s. Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy etc. v. the State of Jammu & Kashmir and another (AIR 1980 Supreme Court, 1992); Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India (AIR 1979 SC 597); Mahabir Auto Stores and others vs. Indian Oil Corporation and others (AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1031); M/s. State Enterprises etc. v. the City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. and others (1990 Vol. 2 Judgment Today SC 401) and in Kumari Srilekha Vidyarthi etc. vs. State of U.P. and others (1990 3 Supreme Court Journal 336) held as follows : "The judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above have repeatedly impressed that every action of the executive Government must be informed with reason which is part of the rule of law and its bare mininial requirement. In the present case the work order and the agreement in favour of the petitioner has been cancelled without assigning any reason, on a ground which did not exist on the date the impugned order was issued. The step for the cancellation of the contract is said to have been taken with an object to save the public exchequer. But rule of law as interpreted by courts required the State Govt. to inform the petitioner that the drawing, design and the estimated cost were likely to be changed on the basis of fresh data to be received. As such, it has to be held that action of the State does not satisfy the test of reasonableness and fair play. But rule of law as interpreted by courts required the State Govt. to inform the petitioner that the drawing, design and the estimated cost were likely to be changed on the basis of fresh data to be received. As such, it has to be held that action of the State does not satisfy the test of reasonableness and fair play. In my view, apart from three categories mentioned by the Supreme Court in the Judgment of Radhakrishna Agarwal (supra), under the changed circumstances, there should be a fourth category of cases: "Where the contract entered into between the State and the person aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual but such contract has been cancelled on a ground, de hors any of the terms of the contract, and which is per se violative of Article 14 of the Constitution." Even in such cases applications under Article 226 of the Constitution are maintainable. I am quite conscious that this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution which is discretionary in nature cannot issue a writ of mandamus in the nature of 'a decree for specific performance of contract' when a doubt has been raised about the original drawing, design and the estimated cost of the project. According in the State, the Commission is of the opinion that the scheme can be completed on the basis of a revised drawing and design at estimated cost of about Rs. 15 crores instead of about Rs. 31 crores. In this background it shall not be proper exercise of discretion on part of this Court to direct the State to allow the petitioner to proceed with the construction of the project on the basis of the agreement entered into by the petitioner even if the impugned order dated 17.5.1990 is quashed." 49. Yet recently in Satrudhan Sahani & Ors. In this background it shall not be proper exercise of discretion on part of this Court to direct the State to allow the petitioner to proceed with the construction of the project on the basis of the agreement entered into by the petitioner even if the impugned order dated 17.5.1990 is quashed." 49. Yet recently in Satrudhan Sahani & Ors. vs. State or Bihar and others reported in 1991 B.B.C.J. 20: 1990(2) PLJR 832 (SB) a Special Bench of this Court held: "In view of series of judgments of the Supreme .Court, now it is not possible to dismiss a writ application filed on behalf of a person who feels that he has been discriminated by the State Government or an Authority which can be held to be a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution in matter of settlement of fishery rights in tanks and jalkars belonging to the State, only on the ground that no registered document has been executed in favour of such petitioner by the competent authority." In that case it was further held that the policy decision of the State and the executive' instructions issued by it from lime to time are meant for observation and not to be flouted with impunity. The Special Bench, however, observed: "From the aforesaid judgments it shall appear that Courts have from time to time impressed that not only the statutory provisions are meant to be obeyed or enforced, but even executive instructions issued by the State Government are expected to be followed and obeyed. Same will be the position in respect of the executive instructions issued relating to grant of licence or lease of the properties of the State. It need not be pointed out that the very object of issuance of such executive instructions is to avoid arbitrariness in matters by grant of contracts, licence, quotas, mineral rights and rights in Jalkars so that there is no element of personal bias or extraneous consideration. Since last few decades the State Government is the biggest landlord of the State. But within the framework of the Constitution by which it is bound, it cannot act as the old landlords. Since last few decades the State Government is the biggest landlord of the State. But within the framework of the Constitution by which it is bound, it cannot act as the old landlords. As such to achieve uniformity, remove arbitrariness and discrimination, executive decisions are taken from time to lime laying down the procedure for the grant of contracts', licences, rights in minerals and Jalkars, which have vested in the State." 50. From the conspectus of the decision aforementioned, it is evident that the impugned order dated 29.11.88 as contained 'in Annexure-6 to the writ application cannot be sustained inasmuch as it is not only unreasonable, but in passing the said order the provisions of Khas Mahal Manual as also the conditions of lease contained in the instruments of lease have been violated. The respondent no.2 in passing the said order- failed to pose unto himself the right question and acquaint himself with relevant materials and thus, misdirected himself in law and the said order is also against the principles of fair play in action. For the reasons aforementioned, it must be held that the order dated 29.11.1988 as contained in Annexure-6 to the writ application cannot be sustained and must be quashed. 51. The question which now arises for consideration is as to whether this court should issue a writ of or in the nature of mandamus or a direction upon the respondent-Deputy Commissioner to renew the leases of the petitioner. 52. In Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and others vs. V.R. Rudani and others reported in AIR 1989 S.C. 1607, it was held that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can issue writs to 'any person or authority for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose'. It was further held that the authority used in Article 226 must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. The Supreme Court observed: "Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to he enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, professor De Smith states: 'To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. The Supreme Court observed: "Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to he enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, professor De Smith states: 'To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract. (Judicial Review of Administrative Action 4th Ed. P. 540). We share this view." 53. Reference in this connection may also be made to another decision of the Calcutta High Court in State of West Bengal and others etc. Vs. Nani Gopal Dutta and others reported in AIR 1991 Calcutta 67 wherein the Calcutta High Court observed : "Mr. Gupta cited next The Comptroller and Auditor General v. K.S. Jagannathan AIR 1987 SC 537 , where the Supreme Court has discussed the circumstances under which the Court can pass a mandatory order or even pass an order or give directions which the Government or a public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretions. The decision makes it quite clear that the Court can pass such orders where the Government/Public Authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a Statute, or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretions malafide or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion. Can it be said that the Government has exercised its discretions in this ease wrongly and malafide" 54. Can it be said that the Government has exercised its discretions in this ease wrongly and malafide" 54. In the Comptroller and Auditor General of India vs. K.S. Jagaunathan reported in A.I.R. 1987 Supreme Court 537, the law has been laid down thus : "There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature or mandamus or to pass orders and given necessary directions where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion malafide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case, a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority and in a proper case, in order in prevent injustice resulting to the concern of parties the court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion." “Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, professor De Smith states: "To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty docs not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract." (Judicial Review of Administrative Action 4th Ed.p. 540). We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water-tight compartment. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract." (Judicial Review of Administrative Action 4th Ed.p. 540). We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water-tight compartment. It would remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available to reach in justice wherever it is found. Technicalities should not stand in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition." 55. In Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. III 4th Edition it is staled that the purpose of issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus is to remedy defects of justice; and accordingly it will issue to the end that justice may be done, in all cases where there is a specific legal right and no specific legal remedy for enforcing that right. It is a discretionary remedy and may issue in cases where, although there is an alternative legal remedy, yet that mode of redress is less convenient, beneficial and effective. 56. It is however well known that normally a court does not exercise its jurisdiction in directing the respondent-Deputy Commissioner to renew the lease except in extraordinary circumstances. In the instant case, as noticed hereinbefore, renewal is to be granted almost, as a matter of course subject to the conditions mentioned in the deed of lease and/or the Khas Mahal Manual. The total period of lease is limited to 90 years. A lessee when obtains a grant from the State may reasonably expect that his lease would be renewed and that the period of lease would go a long term and invest in the construction of house as well as any other matters. It is only in exceptional cases where the lessee is guilty of violation of the conditions of lease leading to guilty of violation of the conditions of lease leading to forfeiture thereof or there exists a public purpose, the leasehold may be resumed in terms of Rule 21 of the Bihar State Khas Mahal Manual subject to the approval of the State. 57. In this case, the leases were to be renewed with effect from 1.4.1978. 57. In this case, the leases were to be renewed with effect from 1.4.1978. The petitioners and/or their predecessor in interest filed the application for renewal of lease in the year 1977. Only on 29.11.1988 the impugned order as contained in Annexure-6 was passed. The petitioner and/or their predecessors in-interest have, therefore, remained in possession of the leasehold for a period of more than 12 years from the date of expiry of the leases. The petitioners have categorically stated that they have not violated any condition of lease. The statements made in paragraphs 53 and 54 of the writ petition to this effect remain uncontroverted. 58. The State either during the period when the application for renewal was pending or even in this proceeding did not make any allegation that the petitioners are guilty of the violation of the conditions of lease or the provisions of Khas Mahal Manual. No reason has been assigned as to why leases granted in favour of the petitioners or their predecessor in interest would not be renewed. No case for resumption of the leasehold properties have also been made out. In this situation in the facts and circumstances of this case, it must be held that the petitioners are entitled to a direction in the nature of mandamus commanding upon the respondent-Deputy Commissioner to renew the instrument of lease, details whereof have been given hereinbefore, subject, of course, to payment of enhanced rent in terms of instruments of lease. 59. It is, however, made clear that it would be open to the respondent Deputy Commissioner, if such an occasion arises to proceed to resume the leasehold. 60. In the result, this application is allowed and the respondents are directed to forebear from, giving effect to or acting pursuant to or in furtherance of the notice dated 29th November, 1988 as contained in Annexure-6 to the writ application and are also directed to renew the instruments of lease in respect of holding nos. 108, 137, 77 and 79 in village Sarley, Sarkarihata, Dist. Hazaribagh for a period of 30 years with effect from 1.4.1978. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there will, however, be no order as to costs.