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1991 DIGILAW 833 (ALL)

Ram Nath Singh v. Achhaibar Singh

1991-05-25

A.U.KHAN

body1991
JUDGMENT A.U. Khan, Member Judicial. - A suit under Section 229-B of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act is filed by Achhaibar Singh. This was decreed on 23-12-1972. An appeal is lodged by defendant Ram Nath Singh, Additional Commissioner, Varanasi by his judgment and decree dated 25-11-1974 has dismissed the appeal. So this second appeal is carried by defendant Ram Nath Singh. 2. While the appeal lay here, defendant appellant Ram Nath Singh and one plaintiff respondent Achhaibar Singh died. A dispute to decide the substitution of heirs is in hand. 3. Rajendra Bahadur Singh, son of sole deceased appellant Ram Nath Singh moves a substitution application on 19-12-1986. He states that his father died on October, 1985 and he came to know about the pending appeal on 18-12-1986 on receipt of a letter from his advocate. The request is for substitution of his name in place of his deceased father, R.N. Singh, appellant here. This is disputed by Radhey Shyam Singh non-substituted son and heir of respondent Ram Achhaibar he says that appellant Ram Nath Singh has died in the month of October 1977, not at all in October 1985. When actually Ram Nath Singh has died? Khatoni extract of 1384 to 1392 falsi shows that Ram Nath Singh has died and in his place of name of his son Rajendra Bahadur Singh was mutated and is truly incorporated on 28-6-1978. There is no rebuttal of this date of death. Surely, even Ram Nath Singh in his affidavit admits his ignorance about actual date of death of his father. The cleaver man : he is guilty of suppressi veri and suggestive falsi. Not the actual date but the actual year 1977 : 8 years he has repressed. On solemn affirmation he is telling so big a lie. It is difficult to belief that he will not remember the year when his father has died. The delay is of 9 years or thereabouts. 4. Now I take up respondent Ram Achhaibar's. The application dated 19-12-1986 states he had died two and a half months before the application. The death, then, occurred near about 19-10-1986. Radhey Shyam the non-substituted son of respondent Ram Achhaibar, counters this date. Ram Achhaibar, says he, had died on 12-11-1981. A death certificate to support this conclusion is filed. In the absence of a counter case with cogent evidence, I take that Ram Achhaibar had died on 12-11-1981. The death, then, occurred near about 19-10-1986. Radhey Shyam the non-substituted son of respondent Ram Achhaibar, counters this date. Ram Achhaibar, says he, had died on 12-11-1981. A death certificate to support this conclusion is filed. In the absence of a counter case with cogent evidence, I take that Ram Achhaibar had died on 12-11-1981. His substitution application moved on 19-12-1986. A delay of 5 years or thereabouts. 5. Do we have adequate explanation for each days delay? In setting aside the abatement under Section 5 Limitation Act each days delay since the end of 150 day's from death shall have to be satisfactorily explained. Want of diligence on the part of appellant to substitute, soon after the factum of death came to his notice, is fatal : AIR 1978 Cal 516 . 6. The appellant has set forth that from the advocates letter he came to know on 19-12-1985 that an appeal is sub-judice in this court. The letter has not been filed and proven. Why? Rajendra Bahadur Singh is not a truthful man. He moves Achhaibars substitution application with a delay of 5 years and the explanation contrieved of delay and default is only of three months. No explanation is seen of over 8 years for Ram Nath Singh. 7. The counsel argues that Rajendra Bahadur Singh is a villager, so much the more illiterate and ignorant, not aware of legal requirement, to apply for substitution of the heirs of deceased within limitation. I am rot impressed by his contention. The network of legal obligation is therefor everyone to bear. There can be no increase in laxity and arbitrariness because of this. Law has placed just distribution of the burdens regardless of any distinction between man and man. Therefore, nobody should escape this system of strengthened legal obligation. 8. The failure to discharge the legal burden by poor and lowly are consequential for the society. It is the "Ingenuous enthusiasm of an anarchist who hankers for a society in which order and fraternity will reign without the "tedius, stale, forbidding ways of custom, law and statute" (R.H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. Penguin N.Y. 1947 P 81) I, this the kind of society that we madiate, nurture and hope to bring about? 9. This can be evaluated from one more angle. Not only change in social condition but also continuity requires an explanation. Penguin N.Y. 1947 P 81) I, this the kind of society that we madiate, nurture and hope to bring about? 9. This can be evaluated from one more angle. Not only change in social condition but also continuity requires an explanation. Both have to be created a new in each generation, often with great pain and suffering. American writer, Barrington Moore, Jr. remarks. "To maintain and transmit a value system, human being are punched, bullied, sent to jail, thrown into concentration camp, cajoled, bribed made into heroes, encouraged to read news-papers. Stood up against a wall and shot, and sometimes even taught sociology." (Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Becon Press P 486). It is clear that even to preserve the statue que a network of legal obligation is to be enforced The contention of the counsel requires extraordinarily little from the son R.B. Singh. The legal obligation that exists and has been enacted in Order XXII Rule 4(1) C.P.C., and articulated in case after case it to be adequately enforced. In South Asia as in Europe, these obligations usually fall most heavily on the poorer section of the population. More, no reason is to believe that complete abstension from establishing and enforcing such legal requirement increases the likelihood of voluntary participation. Rather, the villagers become cynical and disinterested. The avoidance of burden by court to move the application for substitution within time is an indulgence on their part in low levels of performance, efficiency and punctuality. Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal in relation to social discipline in Europe and the absence of it in South-East Asia notes the remark of a sociologist that in Europe the shift from status to contract, from mechanical to organised solidarity, has occurred, not in South-East Asia or has done so very imperfectly (Asian Drama, Vol II P. 896). No wonder in social life indiscipline is condoned, in court of law negligence is condoned. Ours is a soft state. There is no placing of burdens on villagers. Surely, counsel urges, there be release from legal obligation that law has placed on them to apply for substitution within time. Gunnar Myrdal is perceptive : "The dictum of the highly respected American Jurist, Learned Hand that "Law is violence" will not appeal to or be understood by the greater part of the South-Asian intellectual iliets (Asian Drama, Vol. III P. 1909). 10. Gunnar Myrdal is perceptive : "The dictum of the highly respected American Jurist, Learned Hand that "Law is violence" will not appeal to or be understood by the greater part of the South-Asian intellectual iliets (Asian Drama, Vol. III P. 1909). 10. Legal obligation gives rise to tension. It is by the intimate union of the two elements : the obligation to law courts and rights of ones own, is one's a personal experience, that the creative power of an appellant is derived. It will not do to undermine this creative impulse. The absence of tension in life are terrific. "When a state of equilibrium in any organism is accompanied by relaxation of tension (as here, when the burden to apply for substitution within time is relaxed) the usual consequence is that the organism tends insensibly to lower its standards (M.A.R. Gibb : Modern Trends in Islam, P 25). The senses are dulled, skill and fervour are ebbed. The long rope to villagers is to confine their behaviour and evince little apprehension of the living reality and personal engagement of Order XXII Rule 4(2) C.P.C. The human part from day today has even been, amid the din of plea and advocacy, to discern its meaning and to interpret it, and in a difficult and distracting world of litigation, to act in time. 11. It is apt to seek support from accepted axioms. But a qualification here is in order. When we burrow thought from thought it is necessary to understand material objective conditions that have given rise to these thoughts. This I am not competent to enlarge. Here are axioms that bear on the point I am on. 12. Leges vigilantibus non-dormientibus subveniunt (the laws aid the vigilant not those who sleep on their rights) ignorantia facti excusat, ignorontia juris non-excusat (ignorance of the fact excuses, ignorance of the law excuses not) currit tempus contra desides et sui juris contemptores (time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their right) culpa late dolo aequiparaiur (gross negligence is held equivalent to intentional wrong) lex dihatienes exhorret (the law abhors delays) Article 120 Limitation Act requires that substitution application should be filed within 90 days from the date of knowledge of death, lex nil facit frustra, nil jubet trustra (the law does nothing in vain, commands nothing in vain). 13. 13. I see no provision which helps the court transform ignorance into bliss. Section 5 of Limitation Act appropriately takes accounts of All reasonable delay that occurs in each case. Order XXII Rule 9(2) C.P.C. requires sufficient reasons, telling in each situation, as grounds to condone the delay and default. The reasoning it to be specific and particular, not general and remote, generale nibil certum implicat (a general expression implies nothing certain). If delay of six years is excused it will mean that limitation is of six years, Legis interpretatio legis obtinet, (an interpretation of law obtains the force of law). But, then, expedit reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the public good that there be an end of litigation). 14. Civil Procedure Code is the classic case to prove white heads proposition that "the act of free society consists first in the maintenance of the symbolic Code "for" when we examine how a society bends it's individual members to function in conformity with its needs, we discover that one important operative agency is over vast system of inherited symbolism." 15. A concrete example is worth a wilderness of a abstraction. An appeal is heard within two years from the date of institution in appellate court. A respondent is dead and no substitution application is moved even after arguments are heard. Will the appeal be decided as having abated for non-substitution on of heirs of deceased? The appellant can say that appeal he held up, not decided at all as yet, as he move application any time before expiry of 6 years. Logical extremism but inevitable conclusion of what the counsel says. A few related ideas are in exposition and treatment in 1991 R.D. 68. I do no more. 16. On a consideration of all that so before the substitution application of two deceased are rejected. The appeal has abated for non-substitution of heirs of deceased within reasonable time. The judgment of Additional Commissioner becomes final and definitive.