Judgment :- SOMASUNDARAM, J. This is an application to suspend the sentence and to release the petitioner on bail pending disposal of C.A. No. 921 of 1989. The petitioner has been convicted under Sections 8(c) and 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, hereinafter called the Act, in S.C. No. 209 of 1989 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Madurai on 13-11-1989 and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a term of ten years' rigorous imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs. 1, 00, 000/- in default whereof to undergo imprisonment for two more years. As against the said conviction and sentence the petitioner has filed C.A. No. 921 of 1989 and the same is pending before this Court. The petitions filed earlier in Cr. M.Ps. 15294/89 and 255/90 for the suspension of the sentence and for bail have been dismissed by this Court and the petitioner has come forward with the above criminal miscellaneous petition again for the suspension of the sentence and for bail pending disposal of C.A. No. 921 of 1989. 2.Mr. P. Rajamanickam, learned Central Government Public Prosecutor, opposed the application contending that after the introduction of amendment to the Act by the Act II of 1989 the power of the High Court is restricted in granting bail by Section 37 of the Act. He further contended that the restrictions imposed by Section 37 will also apply to the release of convicted persons on bail under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter called the Code, pending their appeal against conviction. On the other hand, Mr. G. Gopalswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner con tended that the powers of the High Court under Sections 439 and 389 of the Code are absolute and they are not curtailed by Section 37 of the Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that Section 32A of the Act is not a bar to the High Court exercising its powers in the matter of granting suspension of sentence and bail pending disposal of appeal as the powers of suspension and bail under Section 389 of the Code are preserved by Section 36B of the Act. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied on the order inP.T. Oliver Fernandov. Assistant Collector of Madras[1990 (2) MWN (Crl.) 217 = 1990 L.W. (Crl.) P. 357]. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied on the order inP.T. Oliver Fernandov. Assistant Collector of Madras[1990 (2) MWN (Crl.) 217 = 1990 L.W. (Crl.) P. 357]. 3.Section 37 of the Act reads thus :- "Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)- (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable. (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless - (i)the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and (ii)where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force on granting bail'. Section 32A of the Act reads thus :-" * No suspension, remission or commutation in any sentence awarded under this Act. -Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force but subject to the provisions of Section 33, no sentence awarded under this Act (other than Section 27) shall be suspended or remitted or commuted. "InP.T. Oliver Fernandov. Assistant Collector of Madras[1990 (2) MWN (Crl.) 217] on a reference, a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the following two questions :-" * (1)Whether the powers of the High Court in the matter of granting bail preserved under Section 36A(3) of the Act is in any way restricted by the provisions contained in Section 37(l)(b) and sub-section (2) of the Act?(2)Whether the provisions contained in Section 32A of the Act is a bar for the High Court exercising its power in the matter of granting suspension of sentence and bail pending disposal of the Appeal? The Division Bench of this Court answered the two questions in the following terms :- "(I)The powers of the High Court in the matter of granting bail preserved under Section 36A(3) of the Act are not in any way restricted by the provisions contained in Section 37(1) (b) and sub-section (2) of the Act, though while exercising the unfettered power, the High Court will bear in mind the policy behind the enactment of Section 37 of the Act; and (2)Section 32A of the Act is not a bar for the High Court exercising the power in the matter of granting suspension of sentence and bail pending disposal of an appeal. The powers of suspension under Section 389 of the Code are preserved by Section 36B of the Act. Section 32A will refer only to the Government and not to Courts.' 4.Subsequently, the Apex Court inNarcotics Control Bureauv. Kishan Lal & Others[1991 L.W. (Crl.) 53 =1991 AIR(SC) 558, 1991 (1) CRIMES 467, 1991 CAR 114, 1991 (97) CRLJ 654, 1991 CrLR(SC) 178, 1991 (52) ELT 328 , 1991 (1) JT 258 , 1991 (1) Scale 97 , 1991 (1) SCC 705 , 1991 SCC(Cr) 265, 1991 (1) SCR 139 , 1991 (2) UJ 121 , 1991 CRLR 178, 1991 (1) KLT 547 , 1991 AIR(SCW) 339(SC)] held that the powers of the High Court to grant bail under Section 439 of the Code are subject to the limitations contained in Section 37 of the Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held as follows :-" * Section 37 as amended starts with anon obstanteclause stating that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 no person accused of an offence prescribed therein shall be released on bail under the conditions contained therein were satisfied. The NDPS Act is a special enactment and as already noted it was enacted with a view to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. That being the underlying object and particularly when the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act are in negative terms limiting the scope of the applicability of the provisions of Cr.P.C. regarding bail, in our view, it cannot be held that the High Court's powers to grant bail under Section 439, Cr.P.C. are not subject to the limitation mentioned under Section 37 of NDPS Act. Thenon obstanteclause with which the Section starts should be given its due meaning and clearly it is intended to restrict the powers to grant bail. In case of inconsistency between Section 439 Cr.P.C. and Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Section 37 prevails. In this context Section 4, Cr.P.C. may be noted which read thus:- "(4)Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. (2)All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.' It can thus be seen that when there is a special enactment in force relating to the manner of investigation, enquiry or otherwise dealing with such offences, the other powers under Cr.P.C. should be subject to such special enactment. In interpreting the scope of such a statute the dominant purpose underlying the statute has to be borne in mind. InLt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi etc.v. Union of India and Others[1 9831 SCR 393] regarding the mode of interpretation the Supreme Court observed as follows :-" * The dominant purpose in constructing a statute is to ascertain the intention of Parliament. One of the well-recognised cannons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the language of the provision, the Court should adopt literal construction if it does not lead to an absurdity", As already noted Section 37 of the NDPS Act starts with anon obstanteclause stating that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 no person accused of an offence prescribed therein shall be released on bail unless the conditions contained therein are satisfied. Consequently the power to grant bail under any of the provisions of Cr.P.C. should necessarily be subject to the conditions mentioned in Section 37 of the NDPS Act'.In view of the ruling of the Apex Court inNarcotics Control Bureauv. Consequently the power to grant bail under any of the provisions of Cr.P.C. should necessarily be subject to the conditions mentioned in Section 37 of the NDPS Act'.In view of the ruling of the Apex Court inNarcotics Control Bureauv. Kishanlal & Others[1991 L.W. (Crl.) 531991 AIR(SC) 558, 1991 (1) CRIMES 467, 1991 CAR 114, 1991 (97) CRLJ 654, 1991 CrLR(SC) 178, 1991 (52) ELT 328 , 1991 (1) JT 258 , 1991 (1) Scale 97 , 1991 (1) SCC 705 , 1991 SCC(Cr) 265, 1991 (1) SCR 139 , 1991 (2) UJ 121 , 1991 CRLR 178, 1991 (1) KLT 547 , 1991 AIR(SCW) 339(SC)] it has to be held that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court inP. T. Oliver Fernandav. Assistant Collector of Madrasof [ 1990 (2) MWN 217], is no longer good law so far as the law as stated by the Division Bench of this Court in the answer rendered with regard to the 1st question referred to them, which is extracted supra. However, the law as laid down by the Division Bench in the answer to the second question extracted supra is not affected by the decision of the Supreme Court inNarcotics Control Bureauv. Kishanlal & Others[1991 L.W. (Crl.) 53 =1991 AIR(SC) 558, 1991 (1) CRIMES 467, 1991 CAR 114, 1991 (97) CRLJ 654, 1991 CrLR(SC) 178, 1991 (52) ELT 328 , 1991 (1) JT 258 , 1991 (1) Scale 97 , 1991 (1) SCC 705 , 1991 SCC(Cr) 265, 1991 (1) SCR 139 , 1991 (2) UJ 121 , 1991 CRLR 178, 1991 (1) KLT 547 , 1991 AIR(SCW) 339 (SC)]. We are also in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench with regard to the question No. 2 that Section 32A of the Act is not a bar for the High Court exercising its powers in the matter of granting suspension of sentence and bail pending disposal of an appeal and that the powers of suspension under Section 389 of the Code are preserved by Section 36B of the Act. While answering the second question referred to the Division Bench, Sivasubramaniam, J., has further observed as follows :-" * Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the power available under Section 389 of the Code to suspend sentence is not taken away by Section 32A of the Act. While answering the second question referred to the Division Bench, Sivasubramaniam, J., has further observed as follows :-" * Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the power available under Section 389 of the Code to suspend sentence is not taken away by Section 32A of the Act. However, we must add that the limitations contained in Section 37 of the Act will have to be borne in mind by the High Court while suspending the sentence and enlarging the accused on bail. Even at this stage, the High Court will have to bear in mind the object of the Act and it should exercise its powers with great care and caution, so that the very object of the Act is not defeated ".However, the Apex Court inNarcotics Control Bureauv. Kishanlal & Others[1991 L.W. (Crl.) 53 = 1991 AIR(SC) 558, 1991 (1) CRIMES 467, 1991 CAR 114, 1991 (97) CRLJ 654, 1991 CrLR(SC) 178, 1991 (52) ELT 328 , 1991 (1) JT 258 , 1991 (1) Scale 97 , 1991 (1) SCC 705 , 1991 SCC(Cr) 265, 1991 (1) SCR 139 , 1991 (2) UJ 121 , 1991 CRLR 178, 1991 (1) KLT 547 , 1991 AIR(SCW) 339 (SC)] has held that:" * Consequently the power to grant bail under any of the provisions of Cr. P.C. should necessarily be subject to the conditions mentioned in Section 37 of the NDPS Act." From the above observations of the Supreme Court it follows that the powers of the High Court to grant bail under any of the provisions of the Code should necessarily be subject to the conditions mentioned in Section 37 of the Act. Consequently we have to hold that the powers of the High Court to grant suspension and bail under Section 389 of the Code are also subject to the limitations and restrictions mentioned in Section 37 of the Act. The Division Bench of this Court inP.T. Oliver Fernandov. Assistant Collector of Madras[ 1990 (2) MWN 217] also nowhere says that the powers of the High Court to grant suspension and bail under Section 389 of the Code pending disposal of the appeal against conviction for offences under the Act, are not subject to the restrictions mentioned in Section 37 of the Act. Assistant Collector of Madras[ 1990 (2) MWN 217] also nowhere says that the powers of the High Court to grant suspension and bail under Section 389 of the Code pending disposal of the appeal against conviction for offences under the Act, are not subject to the restrictions mentioned in Section 37 of the Act. On the other hand, the Division Bench clearly says that the High Court will have to bear in mind the object of the Act and it should exercise its powers with great care and caution so that the very object of the Act is not defeated and that the limitations contained in Section 37 of the Act will have to be borne in mind while suspending the sentence and enlarging the accused on bail. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the limitations prescribed by Section 37 of the Act will apply only to a person who is accused of an offence under the Act and not to a person who is convicted for offences under the Act and who has filed an appeal against the conviction and sentence and moves for suspension of the sentence and bail under Section 389 of the Code, cannot be countenanced because, as rightly contended by the Central Government Public Prosecutor that a person does not cease to be a person accused of an offence under the Act merely because he has been convicted by the trial court for offences under the Act and the appeal filed by him against the conviction and sentence is pending before the High Court. Further Section 389 of the Code deals with the power of the High Court to order suspension of sentence pending appeal and release of the convicted person on bail. As already pointed out, the Apex Court in clear terms has laid down that the power to grant bail under any of the provisions of the Code should necessarily be subject to the conditions mentioned in Section 37 of the Act. As already pointed out, the Apex Court in clear terms has laid down that the power to grant bail under any of the provisions of the Code should necessarily be subject to the conditions mentioned in Section 37 of the Act. From the above discussion it emerges that Section 32A is not a bar for the High Court exercising its powers in the matter of granting suspension of sentence and bail pending disposal of the appeal, inasmuch as the powers of suspension under Section 389 of the Code are preserved by Section 36B of the Act and that Section 32A will refer only to the Government and not to the Courts. However, the powers of the High Court in the matter of granting suspension of sentence and bail pending disposal of the appeal under Section 389 of the Code are also subject to the restrictions contained in Section 37 of the Act. 5.In the light of the position of law as stated above, now let us examine whether the petitioner is entitled to an order of suspension of sentence and bail pending disposal of the appeal. Mr. Gopalswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the sample of the substance seized from the petitioner in this case had not been sent to the Chemical Examiner as defined under Rule 2(a) of the Rules framed under the Act, but, was sent to the Chemical Examiner, Customs House, Madras-1, and therefore, the test report Ex. P.12 received from the Chemical Examiner, Customs House, Madras-1 can not be construed as the test report in the eye of law showing the nature and quality of the substances seized from the petitioner and therefore, the conviction of the petitioner is liable to be set aside. On the other hand, the Public Prosecutor brought to our notice that the identical contention has been repelled by this Court in the order in Crl. M.P. No. 10868 of 1990, dated 12-9-1990. However, that is a matter to be considered at the time of final hearing of the appeal. On the other hand, the Public Prosecutor brought to our notice that the identical contention has been repelled by this Court in the order in Crl. M.P. No. 10868 of 1990, dated 12-9-1990. However, that is a matter to be considered at the time of final hearing of the appeal. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the father of the petitioner is aged more than seventy years and he has developed serious setback in his health owing to the ischaemic heart disease (IHD), that the petitioner is a young man aged 22 years and that he is in jail for nearly two years from 13-11-1989 and under the changed circumstances the petitioner is entitled to be enlarged on bail pending disposal of the appeal. We are not inclined to accept the above grounds as valid grounds for granting an order suspending the execution of sentence imposed by the trial court and for granting bail pending disposal of the appeal in view of the restrictions imposed on the powers of this Court under Section 389 of the Code in the matter of suspension of sentence and bail pending disposal of the appeal by Section 37 of the Act. On the basis of the evidence, the trial court found that the petitioner is guilty of offences under Sections 8(c) and 21 of the Act and convicted him to undergo imprisonment as stated supra. Having regard to the nature of the petitioner's involvement and the evidence let out by the prosecution in this case before the trial court, the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot contend that there are not sufficient materials against him and that he is not guilty of the offences for which he was convicted and that he is entitled to be released on bail pending disposal of the appeal. On a consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and on a perusal of the judgment of the trial court, we are not inclined to suspend the sentence and release the petitioner on bail pending disposal of the appeal. This Court on earlier two occasions in Cr. M.P. Nos. 15294/89 and 255/91 refused to suspend the sentence and release the petitioner on bail pending disposal of the above appeal. The petitioner has not made out case of any changed circumstances for reviewing or reconsidering the earlier orders passed by this Court in Cr. This Court on earlier two occasions in Cr. M.P. Nos. 15294/89 and 255/91 refused to suspend the sentence and release the petitioner on bail pending disposal of the above appeal. The petitioner has not made out case of any changed circumstances for reviewing or reconsidering the earlier orders passed by this Court in Cr. M.P. Nos. 15294/89 and 255/91. There is no merit in this petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly the petition is dismissed.W.M.P. No. 19007 of 1991:- 6.This is a petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 36B of the Act requesting this Court to pass anad interimorder suspending the execution of the sentence and fine imposed in the judgment dated 13-11-1989 in S.C. No. 209 of 1989 on the file of the I Additional Sessions Judge, Madurai pending disposal of the writ petition and enlarge the petitioner on interim bail. Today we have passed a detailed order in Cr. M.P. No. 5611 of 1991 seeking identical relief and we have dismissed the same. Hence, this petition is also dismissed as devoid of merits. 7.In the result, both the petitions are dismissed.