Judgment :- This appeal has been preferred by the claimant against the award of the Accidents Claims Tribunal (District Court) Tiruchirapalli, in M.C.O.P.No.64 of 1984. According to the ’ case of the appellant, on 20.7.1983, at about 9.45 p.m., the appellant, along with husband was walking along Tiruvanaikkaval South Street on the left side of the road. At time, a moped bearing registration No.TNG.9782, and belonging to the first respondent, came driven by one Singaram from the opposite direction and dashed against the appellant, as a result of which she sustained a fracture in her left arm and other injuries. The accident, according to the appellant, took place only on account of the rash and negligent driving the moped of the first respondent by its driver. In respect of that, the appellant prayed compensation in a sum of Rs.50,000 should be awarded to her against the owner and insurer of the vehicle involved in the accident, who are the respondents herein. The respondent did not contest the claim of the appellant, but remained ex parte. In the counter filed by the second respondent, apart from disputing the rash and negligent driving moped it put forward the plea that the amount of compensation claimed was exorbitant disproportionate and no liability could be fastened on it, as the driver of the vehicle did have a valid driving licence at the time of the accident. The tribunal, on a consideration the oral as well as the documentary evidence, found that the rash and negligent driving the moped TNG.9782 by its driver had caused the accident and that the appellant deserved to be awarded compensation in a sum of Rs.12,000 in respect of the injuries sustained her. Considering the plea of the second respondent-insurance company regarding its for the payment of compensation, the tribunal found that the second respondent company had established that driver of the moped, at the time of the accident, held learner ’ s licence and under the terms of the policy, the liability for payment of compensation could not be fastened on the second respondent-insurance company. Ultimately, the tribunal passed an award in favour of the appellant and against the first respondent for recovery sum of Rs.12,000 together with interest at 15% perannum there on from the date award till the date of payment, if the first respondent defaulted in the payment compensation amount within two months from the date of the award. It is the correctness the award so passed that is challenged in this appeal in which the appellant has prayed the award of the disallowed portion of the compensation in a sum of Rs.38,000. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant first contended that the tribunal, after determining amount of compensation awardable to the appellant in a sum of Rs.16,000 in respect injuries sustained by her in the accident, erroneously proceeded to deduct Rs.4,000 on ground of lump sum payment. It was also further contended that the quantum compensation awardable to the appellant as fixed by the tribunal in a sum of Rs.16,000 too low, meagre and inadequate and that a higher compensation should have been awarded together with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the claim petition till the date payment. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that regard to the injuries sustained by the appellant in the accident and their after-effects, the tribunal was justified in awarding to the appellant compensation in a sum of Rs.12,000 with interest as provided in the award. 3. It is seen from the claim petition that the appellant had claimed compensation in a sum Rs.50,000 comprised of Rs.7,500 under no fault liability, Rs.10,000 for pain and suffering, Rs.7,500 towards medical expenses and Rs.25,000 in regard to permanent disability. 13 is the wound certificate and that shows that the appellant had sustained a fracture left upper arm and two abrasions, one on the lower half of left fore-arm and another lower lip. The appellant examined as P.W.I, referring to the fracture sustained by her left upper arm, stated that though her left arm was put in plaster of paris cast for nearly year and further treatment was also given by Dr.John Karuppiah for another year, fracture had not united and that she was advised that internal fixation had to be done. The appellant examined as P.W.I, referring to the fracture sustained by her left upper arm, stated that though her left arm was put in plaster of paris cast for nearly year and further treatment was also given by Dr.John Karuppiah for another year, fracture had not united and that she was advised that internal fixation had to be done. further added that owing to the non-union of the fracture, she has been experiencing pain and was unable to sleep on her left side and that she was also obliged to seek the and assistance of another person to look after her normal day to day needs. In the course her cross-examination, P.W.I reiterated that she had engaged another person, a relative, help and that that person was staying with her and was also fed by her and that person helped her when she was in the hospital and continued to do so and further that without assistance of that person, she cannot do anything. P. W.2 is the husband of the appellant and in his evidence, he stated that his wife sustained a fracture in her left upper arm she was admitted first into the Government Hospital at Srirangam and subsequently she admitted into a private Nursing Home where she underwent treatment for more than months. P.W.2 had also referred to the advice given to the appellant that internal fixation insertion of plates required to be done, the facilities for which were available either Madurai or at Madras. A sum of Rs.10,000 had been spent by P.W.2 on the treatment appellant and that to undergo internal fixation surgery, it would cost Rs.20,000, according him. P.W.2 had also referred to the employment of a person to help the appellant. cross-examination, P.W.2 stated that though P.W.I was initially admitted into Government Hospital at Srirangam, she was later admitted into a private Nursing because of the seriousness of her condition and the inattention in the Government Hospital. P.W.2 was obliged to admit that to establish the incurring of expenditure of Rs.10,000 documents were filed. P.W.3 is the doctor who attended on the appellant on her admission into the private Nursing Home and he has spoken to the taking of the X-rays marked Exs.A-2 to A-10 with reference to the fracture sustained by the appellant in her left arm. P.W.3 is the doctor who attended on the appellant on her admission into the private Nursing Home and he has spoken to the taking of the X-rays marked Exs.A-2 to A-10 with reference to the fracture sustained by the appellant in her left arm. P.W.3 has also spoken to the issue of Ex.A-12 to the effect that the appellant had admitted in the G.V.N.Hospital for treatment for compound fracture on 20.7.1983 and discharged on 10.1.1984 and that during that period, the appellant would have Rs.10,000 towards medical expenses. P.W.3 was unable to state how much it would the appellant to undergo surgery for internal fixation. From the aforesaid evidence, clearly established that the appellant had sustained a compound fracture on her left arm which had not united inspite of prolonged treatment haying been given to her. evidence also discloses that immediately after the accident, the appellant was admitted the Government Hospital at Srirangam and later, in a private Nursing Home 20.7.1983 and 10.1.1984. Owing to the non-union of the fracture, the appellant has been able to use her left arm and has been obliged to seek the help of another person to look after her daily needs. The medical evidence further discloses that surgery for fixation for insertion of plates required to be done and that would also cost the appellant quite a bit. The tribunal, in paragraph 7 of its award, observing the appellant at the when she gave evidence, stated that owing to the fracture, she had not been able to left hand at all. It is in the background of the aforesaid evidence that the amount compensation awardable to the appellant has to be determined. Under the head of pain suffering, the tribunal had not awarded to the appellant any compensation separately. nature of the injuries sustained by the appellant in the accident as well as the period hospitalisation has already been referred to. The appellant had sustained a compound fracture in her left upper arm and immediately after the accident as well as during the of her undergoing treatment, the appellant would have undoubtedly undergone considerable pain on account of the fracture and the other injuries. The appellant had sustained a compound fracture in her left upper arm and immediately after the accident as well as during the of her undergoing treatment, the appellant would have undoubtedly undergone considerable pain on account of the fracture and the other injuries. Taking account the nature of the injuries sustained by the appellant and the period hospitalisation and also her evidence as P.W.I that she was still experiencing pain, it be just, fair and reasonable to award to the appellant compensation in a sum of Rs.4,000. Under the head of medical expenses, the tribunal had awarded to the appellant Rs.6,000 against her claim for Rs.7,500. The amount of expenditure incurred on the treatment appellant while she was in the Government Hospital and also in the private Nursing has not been clearly made out by evidence. Merely relying upon Ex.A-12 issued by and others, it cannot be assumed, in the absence of other supporting documentary evidence, that the appellant had spent Rs.10,000 on her treatment. Indeed, it is seen that towards medical expenses, the appellant had claimed Rs.7,500. Considering the injuries sustained the appellant and also the treatment undergone by her, initially in the Government at Srirangam and later in the private Nursing Home between 20.7.1983 and 10.1.1984, the absence of clinching and reliable evidence, the award of Rs.6,000 under this head tribunal cannot be stated to be either meager or low. Regarding the permanent disability pain and suffering, the tribunal had awarded to the appellant compensation in a Rs.10,000. Earlier, the injuries sustained by the appellant in the accident and her inability use her left upper arm inspite of treatment which had also been observed by the had been noticed. On account of the inability of the appellant to use her left hand, obliged to depend upon another person for help and assistance and that would undoubtedly create a feeling of dependence and depression in the appellant. It has also to be borne mind that the appellant has crossed 50 and that the fracture had not united completely that internal fixation by insertion of steel plates required to be done and that would more expenditure for the appellant on that account either at Madras or at Madurai. That had been advised to undergo corrective internal fixation surgery is clearly established Ex.A-11. That had been advised to undergo corrective internal fixation surgery is clearly established Ex.A-11. It is thus clearly made out by the evidence that as it is, the appellant is not have the use of her left arm for any purpose and is obliged to depend on others and deserves to be adequately and sufficiently compensated for. On the available evidence, my view, it would be just, fair and reasonable to award to the appellant compensation sum of Rs.15,000 under the head of permanent disability. In other words, the appellant would be entitled to recover compensation in a sum of Rs.25,000 in all. In paragraph the award of the tribunal, it had determined the amount of compensation award-able appellant in a sum of Rs.16,000 and had deducted Rs.4,000 on the ground of lumpsum payment. The deduction in respect of lumpsum payment and other uncertainties would be more relevant in assessing the compensation awardable in the case of death than in a case of injury. A careful consideration of the evidence does not in any justify a further reduction from the amount of compensation recoverable by the appellant and as stated earlier, the appellant, on the facts and circumstances of this case, would entitled to recover compensation in a sum of Rs.25,000 without any further deduction. regard to the interest on the amount of compensation awarded to the appellant, the fell into an error in depriving the appellant of the interest from the date of the claim till the date of the award and also for two months thereafter. It is well settled by decisions the Supreme Court that claimants in motor accident cases are entitled to be paid interest the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the claim petition till the date of payment. view of this, the appellant would be entitled to recover compensation in a sum of Rs.25,000 with interest at 12% per annum thereon from 19.1.1984 till the date of payment, being given to payments, if any, made meanwhile. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant next contended that the view taken by the tribunal that the second respondent-insurance company cannot be made liable for the payment of compensation to the appellant, is erroneous. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant next contended that the view taken by the tribunal that the second respondent-insurance company cannot be made liable for the payment of compensation to the appellant, is erroneous. According to learned counsel, though the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident, at the time of the accident, had only a learner licence, that would be a valid driving licence, sufficient to fasten liability on the second respondent-insurance company, for the payment of compensation. Reliance in this connection was placed, amongst others, on the decision reported in National Insurance Co., Ltd., v. A.Babu, 1990A.C.J. 1003: A.I.R. 1990 Mad. 305. Per contra, learned counsel for the second respondent-insurance company, drawing attention to the terms of the policy submitted that one of the conditions in the policy is to exclude its liability in the event vehicle involved in the accident being driven by the holder of a learner ’ s licence. Attention this connection was also drawn to the decision reported in Ambujam v. Hindustan Insurance Company, 1981 A.C.J. 175. It was also submitted on the basis of Sec.96(2)(b)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘ the Act ’ ) that a condition excluding liability in respect of vehicles driven by those holding a learner ’ s licence, as found policy, would be quite in order and the distinction pointed out in National Insurance Co., v. A.Babu, 1990A.C.J. 1003: A.I.R. 1990Mad. 305, in regard to the decision in Ambujam Hindustan Ideal Insurance Company, 1981 A.C.J. 175, would not stand attracted. 5. The liability of the second respondent-insurance company is purely contractual necessarily, therefore, that would depend upon the terms and conditions incorporated policy as well as the availability of one or more of the defences permitted to be raised insurance company under the provisions of the Act and on a consideration of the Tamil Motor Vehicles Rules (hereinafter referred to as ‘ the Rules ’ ) framed under the Act. It from the evidence of R.W.I that the driver of the moped which was involved in the accident had been granted a learner ’ s licence for the period 2.6.1983 to 1.12.1983. The accident taken place on 20.7.1983 as a result of the rash and negligent driving of the moped Singaram, while he was the holder of a learner ’ s licence. The accident taken place on 20.7.1983 as a result of the rash and negligent driving of the moped Singaram, while he was the holder of a learner ’ s licence. R.W.3 has spoken to the terms the policy issued by the second respondent-insurance company under Ex.B-4. In order ascertain whether the second respondent-insurance company would be liable for payment compensation to the appellant, a reference has to be made to the conditions incorporated the policy Ex.B-4. In regard to the limitations found in the Schedule for the driver vehicle insured, it had been stated that the driver, driving the vehicle at the time accident, should hold a valid driving licence or had held a permanent driving licence than a learner’s licence) and is not disqualified from holding or obtaining such a licence. further condition in the policy is to the effect that the insured is not indemnified, vehicle is driven otherwise than in accordance with the terms of the Schedule. Under of the Act, no person shall drive a motor vehicle in any public place unless he holds effective driving licence issued to himself authorising him to drive the vehicle; and no shall so drive a motor vehicle as a paid employee or shall so drive a transport vehicle; his driving licence specifically entitles him so to do. Under Sec.3(2) of the Act, the Government is enabled to prescribe the conditions subject to which sub-sec.(1) of Sec.3 the Act shall not apply to a person receiving instructions in driving a motor vehicle. Rule 39 of the Rules, as it stood at the relevant time, framed under Sec.3(2) of the Act, applicability of Sec.3(1) of the Act to learner ’ s licences, has been excluded. In other while under Sec.3(1) of the A ct a person can drive a motor vehicle only if he holds effective driving licence authorising him to drive the vehicle, by Rule 39 of the Rules, had not been made applicable to a learner. A combined reading of Sec.3(1) and (2) of Act and Rule 39 of the Rules thus clearly establish that an effective driving licence contemplated under Sec.3(1) of the Act and a learner ’ s licence as provided under Rule the Rules are not the same. A combined reading of Sec.3(1) and (2) of Act and Rule 39 of the Rules thus clearly establish that an effective driving licence contemplated under Sec.3(1) of the Act and a learner ’ s licence as provided under Rule the Rules are not the same. Indeed, Rule 39 of the Rules creates a separate class of licences known as learner ’ s licences distinct from the licences contemplated by Sec.3(1) of the Under Sec.96(2)(b) of the Act, it is open to the insurer, who is made a party to a proceeding, to defend such an action on receipt of notice on the ground that there has a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the conditions enumerated thereunder. Sec.96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act states that if there is a breach of a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons, then, it would be open to the insurer defend the claim for compensation on that ground. In this case, the condition in the excludes driving by holders of learner ’ s licence. The provision under Sec.96(2)(b)(ii) of Act excluding driving by a named person or persons, cannot be construed only as referring individuals A, B or C, but would also be applicable to a class of persons named learners. other words, the provision under Sec.96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act could be read as excluding driving by persons, all of whom would go under one name “ Learners ” . The word cannot be literally interpreted to refer to the name of a particular person, but as comprehending specified person or persons cited as instance. So construed, even though driver of the vehicle involved in the accident in this case held only a learner ’ s licence date of the accident, such licence had been excluded from the purview of the liability the policy and that exclusion has been incorporated in the policy as a condition that by holders of a learner ’ s licence cannot be regarded as either holding a valid driving or as having held a permanent driving licence. The exclusion of a class of licence known as learners ’ licence holders as persons driving the vehicle for purposes of one conditions of the policy cannot, as assumed in National Insurance Co., Ltd., v. A.Babu, A.C.J. 1003:A.I.R. 1990 Mad. 305 at 311, run counter to the provisions of Sec.96(2) Act and would, therefore, be unenforceable. The exclusion of a class of licence known as learners ’ licence holders as persons driving the vehicle for purposes of one conditions of the policy cannot, as assumed in National Insurance Co., Ltd., v. A.Babu, A.C.J. 1003:A.I.R. 1990 Mad. 305 at 311, run counter to the provisions of Sec.96(2) Act and would, therefore, be unenforceable. In the above view of the terms of the Secs.3(1) and (2) and 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act and Rule 39 of the Rules, it would follow the exclusion of the holders of learner ’ s licences under the terms of the policy, constitute a condition in the policy, excluding the driving of vehicles by a class of named learners and that would enable the insurance company to avoid its liability ground that there has been a breach of one of the conditions of the policy under Sec.96(2) (b)(ii) of the Act. In National Insurance Co., Ltd., v. A.Babu, 1990 A.C.J. 1003: A.I.R. Mad. 305, only the latter part of Sec.96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act had been taken into account relation to Rule 39 of the Rules framed under the Act and there had been no consideration whether a provision in the policy, such as there is in this case, could not be considered condition of the policy excluding driving by the class of persons named learners therefore, the decision in National Insurance Co., Ltd., v. A.Babu, 1990 A.C.J. 1003: 1990 Mad. 305, cannot have any application here. Likewise, the decision in Ambujam Hindustan Ideal Insurance Company, 1981 A.C.J. 175, has also not taken into account first part of Sec.96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act and has confined itself to the question whether learner ’ s licence, would be a valid driving licence or not within the meaning of the latter of Sec.96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act and that decision also cannot be pressed into service. Thus, a due consideration of the terms of the policy and the relevant provisions in the Act Rules, no liability could be fastened on the insurance company for the payment compensation to the] appellant. It would, therefore, follow that only the first respondent be made liable for payment of compensation to the appellant. Thus, a due consideration of the terms of the policy and the relevant provisions in the Act Rules, no liability could be fastened on the insurance company for the payment compensation to the] appellant. It would, therefore, follow that only the first respondent be made liable for payment of compensation to the appellant. In the result, the Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed in part against the first respondent and the appellant will entitled to recover from the first respondent herein compensation in a sum of Rs.25,000 together with interest at 13% per annum thereon from 19.1.1984 till the date of payment, credit being given to payments, if any, made meanwhile and the award of the tribunal stand modified accordingly. The appeal against the second respondent will stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. B.S. ----- Appeal allowed in part.